

Narratives on the Recruitment Practices of Armed Groups in the Rebel Appeals and Incentives Dataset (RAID)

This document contains the detailed, qualitative narratives that were used to code the recruitment practices of all 232 armed groups in the Rebel Appeals and Incentives Dataset (RAID). Details on how these narratives were translated to quantitative data can be found in the article “Recruiting Rebels: Introducing the Rebel Appeals and Incentives Dataset (RAID).”

There are a few important notes to keep in mind, pertaining to these narratives. First, due to substantial overlap in the information for a handful of groups, such as the Palipehutu and Palipehutu-FNL, there are a small number of narratives that contain information on two groups (though this is rare). Second, some alternative monikers are listed for groups to try to aid researchers. However, this is not intended to be, nor is it, an exhaustive list of all the names these groups have been associated with. Third, information on groups that lacked sufficient information are still included in this document to help highlight which groups are missing from RAID, despite otherwise meeting the inclusion criteria. Fourth, every narrative starts on a new page. Fifth, additional information, that has not been translated into specific variables, is included in these narratives to serve as a further tool for researchers. Sixth, these narratives were written with the help of research assistants. For anonymity before the dataset is published, the names of the authors of the dataset have been temporally redacted. If a specific author is noted listed, then the narrative was constructed by the author of the dataset. When a research assistant wrote the narrative, their name will appear. The author of the dataset also edited all the narratives written by research assistants.

Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FIS

Also Known As: Front Islamique du Salut; Islamic Salvation Front; Islamic Salvation Army; AIS

Narrative:

The FIS mobilized international networks in the United Kingdom, including through the intense spread of jihadi propaganda (Filiu 2009, p. 2). The early leaders of the group, Ali Ben Hadj and Abbassi Madani, were able to expand the group through their preaching in mosques (Fearon and Laitin 2006). The group also mobilized around opposition to Algeria's support for Kuwait (and by proxy, the United States), during Iraq's invasion, with a specific focus on alleged anti-Islam goals of these countries (Fearon and Laitin 2006). The group also demanded expanded political representation and rights (Fearon and Laitin 2006). The FIS was much more moderate than its splinter faction, the GIA (Fearon and Laitin 2006). Overall, the group's mobilization efforts focused more on state abuse, especially against religious organizations, rather than religion itself (Fearon and Laitin 2006).

There was no direct evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Many who participated in the conflict viewed it as a path towards social advancement (Fearon and Laitin 2006). Unemployed young men were targeted for recruitment in this conflict more broadly (Fearon and Laitin 2006). However, Fearon and Laitin (2006) argue that clerics exploited economic crisis to mobilize support in the name of fundamentalist ideals. However, while the worsening economic conditions of Algeria made recruitment easier, the group's main recruitment message focused on bolstering public morality via Islam and that this message particularly attracted members when the multi-party system was introduced (Mortimer 1996). I did not find any evidence of the group actually offering material incentives for recruitment. Given that mobilization was largely focused on government repression and exclusion of Islamist political movements, I code the group as relying *exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The FIS had a network of 9,000 mosques (Fearon and Laitin 2006), and as mentioned above, they served an important role in recruitment. Indeed, the group's base of recruitment was in these mosques (Mortimer 1996). The FIS has had conflict with the country's Berber population (Minorities at Risk Project 2003). Given this, and the fact that most of the population of Algeria is either Arab or Berber, the group is likely predominantly Arab. The group also had veterans from the Buyali band and from the conflict in Afghanistan (Mortimer 1996). Thus, social networks appear to have mattered for recruitment. The group appears to have recruited children as young as 15 (Child Soldiers International 2001). Armed groups in the conflict tried to convince conscripted young men to join their group, threatening death if they joined the Algerian military (Fearon and Laitin 2006).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Exile and Redemption

Also Known As: Al-hijra wa At-takfir

Narrative:

Some members of the group participated in the Afghan civil war (Mellah 2004). This is important to the group's core ideology, as it views all Muslim countries as impious, and thus, individuals must go abroad (to exile themselves), to reinvigorate their faith so that can come home to fight on the behalf of God (Mellah 2004). The group's Takfir ideology became the broader ideology of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s (Mili 2006). This provides indirect evidence of the group mobilizing around religious ideology. I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as relying *exclusively on ideological appeals*. This evidence is indirect, and thus, I weight the coding for uncertainty.

Larger Takfir networks (in part because of the Algerian civil war), helped move combatants between conflicts (Mili 2006), suggesting that social networks mattered for recruitment into Exile and Redemption. There is also indirect evidence of the group drawing in recruits from multiple countries, including Afghanistan (Mellah 2004), suggesting that the group is multi-ethnic (given the diversity of countries). Armed groups in the conflict tried to convince conscripted young men to join their group, threatening death if they joined the Algerian military (Fearon and Laitin 2006).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: GIA

Also Known As: Armed Islamic Group

Narrative:

The group was formed in 1992 with the goal of overthrowing the Algerian government and establishing an Islamic state (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Vriens (2009) notes that many experts attribute GIA's rapid growth to grievances related to the political environment at the time. Thus, ideological appeals appear to have played an important role in GIA's recruitment efforts.

There was no direct evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Watts (2015) details how the Algerian government initially abandoned many areas of the country that supported the GIA, but that when the GIA was left to govern, the economy of these areas eroded, significantly decreasing the popularity of the GIA. Watts argues that when the government came back in with job creation programs, the GIA lost potential recruits. However, it is difficult to determine from this evidence alone whether civilians were joining the GIA because of lack of employment or if these programs increased the popularity of the government, thereby turning civilians away from the GIA. There was no direct evidence of the group employing any sort of material incentives, such as offering employment. As noted above, experts discuss how the political environment at the time was important for group recruitment. Thus, I code the group as relying *exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the potential for economic incentives to have mattered, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

GIA members included returnees from the fight against the Soviet military in Afghanistan in the 1980s as well as those who were dissatisfied with the FIS, the more moderate dissident group (Vriens 2009). Indeed, GIA was a radical splinter group from the FIS (Vriens 2009). The GIA specifically rejected the involvement of foreigners in Jihad in Algeria (Filiu 2009, p. 4). The group had a lack of recruitment screening, which made it vulnerable to infiltration (Ashour 2008). While I did not find direct evidence of the ethnic composition of GIA, it likely has predominantly Arab membership. The two major ethnic groups in Algeria are the Arabs and the Berbers. During the war, the major Berber political parties opposed the creation of the Islamic state (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1995) and were sometimes targeted by the GIA's parent organization, the FIS (Minorities at Risk Project 2003). Thus, the group is likely predominantly Arab.

The GIA had cells in Europe (e.g., France), and while they used coercion to gain the support of some in the diasporic Algerian communities, it relied primarily on ideological appeals for recruitment (Lia and Kjøk 2009). In Europe, prison was also an important recruiting ground for the GIA, and it recruited many petty criminals who had not been previously radicalized (Lia and Kjøk 2009). Additionally, the GIA used the internet, literature, and audio recordings for recruitment (Lia and Kjøk 2009). Social networks, especially in Europe, appear to have played a

role in GIA's recruitment (Bokhari et al. 2006). Child soldiers feature prominently in the group (Child Soldiers International 2001).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: AQIM

Also Known As: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)

Narrative:

AQIM employs ideological recruitment appeals. The perceived legitimacy of AQIM as a religiously motivated group has aided it with recruitment from religious communities in northern Mali (Government of Canada 2018). Indeed, recruiters seek out communities that are religiously motivated (Government of Canada 2018). Armstrong (2011) details how AQIM's recruitment propaganda reaches across ethnic, tribal, and national lines to highlight a shared Islamic identity. She finds that with this, there is an emphasis on the existential threats faced by Islam more broadly as well as the threat of French military intervention more specifically. Armstrong also argues that AQIM effectively addresses local political grievances—especially related to failures of the Malian government—in its recruitment propaganda. Halverson and Greenberg (2017) argue that while AQIM recruits have a variety of motives, including material gain, the group particularly emphasizes Islam being under threat in its propaganda, because it believes that it is a message that can resonate widely.

AQIM has been able to fill a gap of social services provision that local governments have not (Ghanem 2017). In addition to gaining popularity through the provision of basic needs to civilians, the group has served as an attractive source of employment and income in impoverished communities (Ghanem 2017). Working in intelligence gathering for AQIM provides locals in Mali significantly higher wages than minimum wage jobs in the legitimate economy (Boeke 2016).

Social networks play an important role in the group's recruitment efforts. Specifically, the group uses kinship networks and marriage to strengthen its ties with local communities (Ghanem 2017). Furthermore, Ghanem (2017) gives the example that Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar, a prominent member of AQIM, spent a decade building relationships, intermarrying, and proselytizing in the Azawad desert communities. He instructed combatants under him to marry into local communities as well (Government of Canada 2018). Members will also sometimes "refer" their friends and siblings (some of whom are children) to work for the organization (Ghanem 2017).

Connections forged through participation in transnational smuggling networks also help with recruitment (Australian National Security). The group also spreads online propaganda and has a media wing called al-Andalus Media Productions (Australian National Security) and its media operations are used for recruitment (Fanusie and Entz 2017). The media division was officially launched in 2009 (Halverson and Greenberg 2017).

The brand recognition that came with aligning with Al-Qaeda central also helped with recruitment of locals who had been inspired by Al-Qaeda's fight against the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan (Chivvis and Liepman 2013). Polisario-run refugee camps in Western Sahara

are also a recruiting ground for AQIM (Chivvis and Liepman 2013). Much of the group's (at least early) leadership was thought to have gained experience in the fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989 (Laub and Masters 2015).

AQIM is a prominent recruiter of child soldiers. Children are offered money and the promise of instruction in Islam, and their parents are often offered even more money for letting their children be recruited (Obaji 2017; Fanusie and Entz 2017). However, children are often misled by recruiters about what their experiences will be like (Obaji 2017). When the group controlled territory in 2012, it was able to more easily recruit and press-gang hundreds of children into the group (Boeke 2016). When the group was the GSPC, it threatened to kill any members who accepted the government amnesty deal (Boudali 2007).

The evidence clearly indicates that AQIM employs both ideological appeals and material incentives for recruitment. As noted above, Halverson and Greenberg (2017) argue that even though AQIM recruits have a variety of motives (including the acquisition of material incentives), protecting Islam is the primary issues the group mobilizes around. Thus, I code AQIM as relying *mostly on ideological appeals*.

The group recruits throughout the Sahel but is strongest in Mali (European Council on Foreign Relations), though Algeria used to be its primary recruitment location (Guitta 2016). It also recruits in Niger, Libya, Morocco, and Mauritania (Ghanem 2017). This geographic variation in recruitment has led to an ethnically and socially diverse group (Boeke 2016). However, most of the core leadership was Algerian, and sub-Saharan Africans in the organization were looked down on (Boeke 2016).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment: UNITA

Also Known As: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola; National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

Narrative:

UNITA was formed in 1966 by members of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Popular Union of Angola (Encyclopedia Britannica). The group was founded to fight for independence from Portugal and was initially Maoist-leaning. However, when Portugal ended its colonial involvement in 1975, and the MPLA took charge, UNITA took an anti-communist stance and began fighting the MPLA. The conflict officially ended in 2002 (Encyclopedia Britannica). Many recruits in the 1970s had served in the Portuguese military during the 1960s (Stuvøy 2002). As discussed below, UNITA's recruitment tactics changed over time, and ideological and material appeals have both played an important role. Indeed, there have long been competing narratives of whether UNITA fighters are materially-driven bandits, or ideologically-driven freedom fighters (BBC 1980).

There is evidence of UNITA making ideological recruitment appeals, particularly earlier in the conflict. While the group's heavy involvement in the diamond trade have often led observers to assume the group is primarily economically motivated, the group frequently constructed ideologically-based narratives in order to establish its legitimacy and gain supporters (Pearce 2012). Indeed, the anti-government and pro-UNITA propaganda that the group used for recruitment also helped it to maintain loyalty from its troops (Prendergast 1999). Minter (1994) found in interviews with UNITA-recruits during the mid-1970s that the cadres joined because "they saw UNITA as the natural movement for their region" (Minter 1994, p. 177). Stuvøy (2002) argues that political education was still the primary mechanism of mobilization for support, and physical force was a subordinate mechanism.

There is also extensive evidence of UNITA employing material-based recruitment appeals, particularly later in the conflict. Particularly in earlier years, there are conflicting reports on whether UNITA recruits received regular salaries (Stuvøy 2002). However, recruits did have the opportunity for advancement, medical care, overseas training, and the potential to take power if the group was successful. However, leaders of the group received much better benefits than the rank-and-file (Stuvøy 2002).

Although UNITA received substantial international assistance in the 1980s, and traded in multiple resources before that, diamonds became its most important source of funding by the 1980s. While UNITA soldiers engaged in pillaging, the rank-and-file had little involvement in the diamond trade, as Savimbi largely left his family members in charge of the group's diamond operation (Stuvøy 2002).

There have also been reports of the group using mercenaries for much of its history. The group worked with South African mercenaries in the 1970s and 1980s (Xinhua 1999). Specifically, the group worked with the South African mercenary company, Executive

Outcomes, during the Cold War (Reno 1997). Reports as early as 1975 note that the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was allegedly recruiting Black American military veterans as mercenaries to help UNITA, though CORE denies these accusations (Facts on File World News Digest 1975). The CIA was accused by some of helping recruit mercenaries for UNITA in the early 1980s (BBC 1981).

However, as the group began to lose the backing of some international allies, including the United States and South Africa, UNITA became much more heavily involved in the diamond trade, enabling to reup the conflict (e.g., Orogun 2004). The group exported billions of dollars of diamonds that it used to pay for arms and mercenary reinforcements (Xinhua 1999). Evidence indicates that the group was attempting to recruit mercenaries in South Africa in 1999 by offering them thousands of dollars a month and that it had worked with such mercenaries since the 1970s and 1980s (Xinhua 1999). A report from 1997 notes that UNITA was accused of recruiting foreign mercenaries, including individuals associated with the South African mercenary company, Executive Outcomes, including many former members of the South African Defense Force, who fought along UNITA previously and remained sympathetic to their cause (Gilmore 1997). More generally, the Angolan government accused the group of using mercenaries from Uganda, Rwanda, and South Africa (Xinhua 1999). UNITA also allegedly recruited Serbian mercenaries (Gilmore 1997). UNITA was accused of recruiting these large number of white mercenaries to help restart the war after the 1994 peace accords fell through (Africa News 1997; BBC 1999). The government has also been accused of recruiting mercenaries in the 1990s (e.g., BBC 1999).

Reports of the group recruiting mercenaries occurred throughout the 1990s, including 1990 (ITAR-TASS News Agency 1990); 1993 (Kennedy 1993); 1994 (BBC 1999); 1995 (BBC 1995); 1997 (Agence France Presse 1997; All Africa Press Service 1997; Gilmore 1997); 1998 (Africa News 1998); and 1999 (Xinhua 1999). A Xinhua News Agency story from 1999 quotes an estimate from the Angolan defense minister that UNITA had upwards of 60,000 troops, excluding the significant number of mercenaries it fought with (Xinhua 1999). Gilmore (1997) argues that even during this time period, some ideological-hardliners remained in the group.

Before the 1990s, reports of mercenaries and other paid forcers were rarer than after the diamond trade took off in the 1990s. Indeed, as noted above, Stuvøy (2002) argues that political indoctrination was essential to UNITA's mobilization of support. Thus, from *1989 and before*, I code the group as relying *mostly on ideological appeals*. However, as noted in the evidence above, while the group still had some ideologically committed recruits, the role of diamonds in funding the fighting, and the recruitment of mercenaries soared, in the 1990s. Reports on the recruitment tactics of UNITA in the decade focused largely on material recruitment incentives. Thus, *from 1990 onwards*, I code UNITA as relying *mostly on material incentives*.

UNITA extensively employed child soldiers. Following the end of the conflict in 2002, the Angolan government estimates that at least 6,000 children who had been in UNITA needed to be demobilized. This included children who were used as combatants, logistic support, and girls who were taken as sex slaves and "wives" (Child Soldiers International 2004). However,

estimates of the number of child soldiers used by UNITA varies widely, with estimates as high as 10,000-16,000 (10,000 would be approximately 10% of UNITA's forces) (McMullin 2011).

The group also appears to have forcibly recruited adults, with a 1997 report indicating that "200 young men" had recently been forcibly recruited by the group (Sibanda 1997). Specifically, UNITA forces would go through villages, abduct children and adults, and press them into service (Human Rights Watch 2003). While recruitment was primarily voluntary during the 1970s, by the 1980s, most recruits had been forced to join (Stuvøy 2002). In UNITA controlled areas, these recruits were primarily conscripted, and in government controlled areas, they were primarily abducted (Stuvøy 2002). Deserting the group was punishable by death (Stuvøy 2002). When UNITA had a resurgence in 1992, it engaged in extensive abuse against civilians, including forced recruitment and the group was experiencing significant recruitment problems (Stuvøy 2002). Stuvøy (2002) sums this up by noting that, even with the ideological and material benefits that were being offered, abduction was the main recruitment mechanisms in the 1980s and the 1990s.

UNITA was primarily supported by the Ovimbundu and Chokwe ethnic groups (Encyclopedia Britannica). The group also established social networks that were critical to garnering support and pro-UNITA narratives were taught at schools in areas that UNITA operated in (Pearce 2012). While the MPLA was dominated by mesitos and urban based, UNITA portrayed itself as the representative of black peasants in Angola (Aftergood 2003). UNITA had intricate structures in the territory it controlled, and cooperation with locals was vital (Stuvøy 2002).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Palipehutu and Palipehutu-FNL

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The Palipehutu engaged in teaching about emancipatory ideology related to ethnicity in Bujumbura Rural since the mid-80s, and this ideology was vital for attracting new recruits (Uvin 2007; Van Acker 2016). The group was successful at forging close social bonds with the community, which further helped the group with mobilization (Van Acker 2016). The group was predominantly Hutu, and ethnicity played an important role in the group's recruitment (Van Acker 2016). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as relying *exclusively on ideological appeals*.

There is evidence of the group forcibly recruiting child soldiers, which they appeared to have done through kidnapping (UNSC 2006). The youth wing—Jeunesse patriotique hutu—was also used for the recruitment of children into the group (Amnesty International 2004; Child Soldiers International 2004). As with the CNDD/CNDD-FDD (discussed later), most sources do not clearly distinguish them. As a result, I was not able to identify differences in the recruitment practices of these two groups across a variety of dimensions. The FNL faction, however, split because it did not believe that the rest of the group was fighting hard enough for the cause (UCDP_, indicating that this splinter faction remained ideologically committed. Thus, both the Palipehutu and the Palipehutu-FNL are coded as relying *exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: CNDD and CNDD-FDD

Also Known As: National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy

Narrative:

The CNDD-FDD employed a mix of recruitment tactics. Promises to end social and ethnic discrimination and to fight the repression of the “Tutsi army” were key ideological recruitment appeals made by the group (Dilworth 2006). Material recruitment appeals were also made in some cases, as families were given payment, or the promise of payment, in exchanging for their children joining (Dilworth 2006). However, these promises for payment were often empty as the group lacked resources and engaged in extortion and banditry to survive (Dilworth 2006). Based on Dilworth’s language that *many* recruits joined because they had been directly affected by the conflict, while *some* joined for financial rewards, I code the group as relying *mostly on ideological appeals*.

Social networks also appear to have mattered for recruitment. Specifically, the group tapped into local networks for recruitment and peers and families sometimes encouraged their children to join (Dilworth 2006). The leaders of the group claimed it was multiethnic, but there were reportedly ethnic cleavages in the movement (Nindorera 2012). However, it was still primarily a Hutu movement (Dilworth 2006). The group used its base in Tanzania to help with recruitment and recruited from refugee camps in Tanzania and the DRC as well (Dilworth 2006).

Various iterations of the group have used child soldiers but estimates on the number used vary widely (Dilworth 2006). Estimates have been as high as 50% of the ranks being comprised of children (Dilworth 2006). Abduction, particularly from schools, seems to be the most common method of the forced recruitment of children used by the group (Dilworth 2006). Children were also recruited from refugee camps in surrounding countries (Dilworth 2006). Some of the former child soldiers have also stated that desertion was punishable by death (Dilworth 2006). The group denied using any child under 15 for combat, and claimed all children came to the group voluntarily, despite significant evidence against both claims (Dilworth 2006).

While the CNDD-FDD split from the political wing of the CNDD over a leadership struggle (UCDP), I could find little evidence distinguishing the recruitment practices of the groups, and the groups themselves more generally. Thus, I code both the CNDD and the CNDD-FDD as relying *mostly on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Frolina

Also Known As: Front pour la Libération Nationale; Forces armées populaires (FAP); Popular Armed Forces

Narrative:

The group was one of multiple Hutu armed movements in Burundi's civil war (Curtis 2015). Frolina formed when it broke away from Palipehutu in the 1970s (United States Justice Department 2003). Palipehutu had recruited largely through mobilizing around ethnic-based grievances (Van Acker 2016). Like other rebel groups in Burundi, Frolina recruited from Burundi refugee camps in Tanzania, until government officials stopped the practice (Mogire 2011). However, the group resumed recruitment in these camps in the 1990s (Mogire 2011). Many of these refugees joined voluntarily, as they were bored or disgruntled (Mogire 2011). The group also recruited heavily in southern Burundi (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000).

While the evidence is indirect, Frolina not only had members that had been ideologically recruited by Palipehutu, but it sought after “disgruntled” and “bored” refugees, implying that at least some members likely were disgruntled due to ethnic discrimination. Based on this, it would appear that the group uses ideological recruitment appeals. However, because this evidence is indirect, I evaluate this coding as having a moderate certainty. I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as relying *exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Frolina admitted to using child soldiers (Amnesty International 2004). I did not find direct evidence of the group using forced recruitment. However, there is more general evidence of Hutu groups using forced recruitment during the conflict (Cohen 2013). Abduction was a common mode of forced recruitment in this conflict (Child Soldiers International 2004). However, because this evidence is indirect, I include a weight for uncertainty.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Revolutionary Forces of 1 April

Also Known As:

Narrative:

There is very little information on this group. The group proclaimed to form because of tribalism, injustices, and lack of freedom in Chad (UCDP). The group merged with Mosanats to form the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) (UCDP). I could not find information on the recruitment tactics of this group, and thus, I am unable to code variables for the recruitment practices of this group.

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MOSANAT

Also Known As: The Mouvement pour le Salut National du Tchad; Movement for the National Salvation of Chad

Narrative:

MOSANAT launched its rebellion when Idriss Miskine, a Hadjarai leader, was assassinated under suspicion of being disloyal to the ruling regime of Chad (Debos 2011). There is (indirect) evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Members of the group secretly disseminate pamphlets about the group (Debos 2011). The group also opposed what it perceived as the “nomadic minority” taking all of the power from the sedentary majority (Buijtenhuijs 2011). The group also positioned itself as fighting against high taxes and remained anti-government throughout several administrations (Collelo and Nelson 1990).

There is also (indirect) evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. The biggest draw to the group for most joiners was protection from the government crackdown against Hadjarai that resulted from the initial rebellion by MOSANAT (Debos 2016). The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). While this information is not specific to MOSANAT, evidence still indicates that the most important factor in drawing recruits in was self-defense, which is classified as a material appeal in RAID. Thus, based on this, and the fact that there is some (indirect) evidence of MOSANAT using ideological appeals, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. There is anecdotal evidence of a group of friends joining MOSANAT together (Debos 2011). MOSANAT is primarily comprised of members of the Hadjarai ethnic group (Debos 2011). Material recruitment incentives also have played an important role for rebel groups in Chad more generally.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Islamic Legion

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The majority of members of the Islamic Legion were forcibly recruited (McGregor 2011). Two major droughts in Mali in the 1970s and 1980s created a huge number of Tuareg refugees, some of whom went to Libya and joined the Islamic Legion (Kisangani 2012). As a result, many members of the group were Tuareg immigrants who went to Libya looking for work but were forced to join the group (McGregor 2011). Some individuals who refused to join were executed (Mahjar-Barducci 2011). Other members of the group joined in exchange for pay and not going to prison (Azevedo and Decalo 2018).

However, there is evidence of the group making persuasive recruitment appeals as well. The Islamic Legion employed a variety of material recruitment appeals. The Islamic Legion is frequently described as a band of mercenaries (De Waal 2007). As noted above, individuals were offered money to join. Gadhafi also promised Tuareg joiners national identity documents if they joined (Taha 2017).

There is also some (indirect) evidence of the group using ideological recruitment appeals. In his call for individuals to join the group, Gaddafi framed the organization as a tool for building an Islamic state in North Africa (Gwin 2011). The group also promised emancipation Black Arabs living in Darfur (De Waal 2004). Additionally, Gaddafi told these refugees that he would take them from the deprivation they faced in Mali and Chad because they were “pure Arabs” (Kisangani 2012).

The more direct evidence, as discussed above, describes the Islamic Legion as a mercenary force who paid individuals to join. There was only some, indirect evidence of ideological rhetoric being used for mobilization. Thus, I code the group as relying *mostly on material incentives*.

The Islamic Legion recruited from a variety of groups including Darfurians, Chadian Arabs, Tuaregs, and various other groups (De Waal 2004), including the Tubu (Tubiana and Grmizzi 2018). Recruits also came from Pakistan (Joffe 1981). In 1987, the group recruited in Darfur and launched an offensive into Chad (Collins 2006). The group also promoted the idea of shared kinship in recruitment (Guichard, Grätz, and Diallo 2014).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: CSNPD

Also Known As: Comité de sursaut national pour la paix et la démocratie (CSNPD); National Revitalisation Committee for Peace and Democracy

Narrative:

CSNPD was formed in 1991 by southern soldiers who mobilized around the goal of implementing federalism in Chad to help keep oil revenues local and to prevent the government from exploiting oil in the Doba Basin (Buijtenhuijs 1998; Gould and Winters 2011). It also wanted reparations to be paid for damages committed by the government against the southern portion of the country and to expel the military from the region (Behrends, Reyna, and Schlee 2011).

The group's base was in the Central African Republic (Miles 1995). The founder of the group, Moïse Ketté, had been in the government security forces and recruited various members of the ruling regime and Codos (Behrends, Reyna, and Schlee 2011). Ketté threatened the country's oil supply for leverage (Behrends, Reyna, and Schlee 2011). Members of the group that viewed the 1994 peace agreement as inadequate formed FARF, which had the publicly stated goal of fighting for oil (Behrends, Reyna, and Schlee 2011). Basedau, Erdmann, and Mehler (2007) argue that the CSNPD is a prime example of a rebel group fighting to take control of (oil) rents in a country. However, the group was active in the Doba region before oil production began there (Frank and Guesnet 2009). As noted for other groups in Chad, there is more general evidence of material recruitment incentives playing an important role. The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). However, this evidence is not specific to the CSNPD.

Thus, the evidence of ideological appeals is more direct and specific to the CSNPD. Based on this, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, due to the indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The group recruited members from the Sara ethnic group (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: CNR

Also Known As: National Council of Chadian Recovery

Narrative:

The CNR was formed in 1992 by opponents of the ruling regime in Chad whose main goal was to overthrow the government (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005). The CNR recruited individuals from multiple ethnic groups, but most members were Zagawas (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005). The group also has cells across the world including in Algeria, England, France, and Sudan (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005). However, there is a general lack of information of the recruitment tactics of the CNR, making it impossible to gather many of the relevant variables for this group. The movement could also be considered a coup (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2009), which would also exclude it from RAID.

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MPS

Also Known As: Mouvement Populaire Du Salut (MPS)

Narrative:

As with many of the armed groups in Chad, there is relatively little information on the recruitment practices of the MPS. In 1989, Idriss Déby, the chief military advisor to then President Hissène Habré, fled to Sudan after plotting an unsuccessful coup (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Once there, Déby formed the MPS with other opponents of the Habré regime (Tubiana and Debos 2017). The fighting began in 1989, and the MPS was victorious by 1990, with Déby becoming the leader of Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). When Déby took power, he declared that “I bring you neither gold, nor money, but freedom” (Tubiana and Debos 2017). The rebellion has both been attributed to Habré not placing a sufficient number of Zaghawas in government positions (Kasara, Fearon, and Laitin 2006) as well as his atrocious human rights abuses (Decalo 1997). Thus, there appears to be evidence of the group making ideological appeals as it mobilized around ethnic discrimination and human rights abuses.

There is indirect evidence of the group making material recruitment appeals. The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017) (though the MPS put in the third—Déby). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). However, this information is indirect and not specific to the MPS, unlike the evidence for ideological recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as relying *mostly on ideological appeals*. Given the indirect nature of much of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

The group had primarily Zaghawa membership, but also had members from the Hadjeray ethnic group to a lesser extent (Decalo 1997). The MPS also had a few members of the Tama ethnic group (Tubiana 2008) as well as the Hadjerai (De Bruijn and van Dijk 2007).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FNT

Also Known As: Chad National Front

Narrative:

There is very little information on the recruitment practices of this group. The group's goal was thought to have been to establish an Islamic state in the Ouaddi region of Chad (UCDP). However, there is no evidence of the group publicly declaring this goal (or any other), and thus, the UCDP does not code the group as having a stated incompatibility (UCDP).

There is indirect evidence of groups making material recruitment appeals in Chad more generally. The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017).

However, this information is indirect and not specific to the FNT. Additionally, there is even less information about this group than most others in Chad. This, coupled with the fact that the group is not coded as having a stated incompatibility, leads me to code the recruitment practices of the group as missing.

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MDD [-FANT]

Also Known As: Movement for Development and Democracy; Mouvement pour le Développement et la Démocratie—MDD; Mouvement pour le Développement et la Démocratie—Forces Armées Occidentales (MDD-FANT)

Narrative:

The MDD formed was formed in 1991 by supporters ex-president Hussein Habré with the goal of overthrowing the Idriss Déby regime (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1998). Habré had taken power in 1982, until he was ousted by the MPS, and replaced by Déby, in December of 1990 (UCDP). In 1992, the group split into two factions, and the pro-Habré faction became the MDD-FANT (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1998). This faction was predominantly composed of former members of Habré's Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes (FANT) (UCDP). It is unclear whether Habré had a direct connection to the group, and its primary focus was overthrowing Déby, not bringing Habré back to power. Ottmann (2012) argues that the MDD claims to fight for multi-party democracy.

As with other groups in Chad, there is indirect evidence of the MDD using material recruitment incentives. The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Both government and rebel soldiers use the instability in eastern Chad for banditry (International Crisis Group 2009). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Furthermore, Déby has been successful at buying off opponents to ward off rebellions (International Crisis Group 2009). Because Déby coopts warlords, their existence and domination of local politics is heavily incentivized (International Crisis Group 2009). As a result, taking up arms has become almost a way of life for many in northeastern Chad (International Crisis Group 2009).

There is indirect evidence of the group using both ideological and material incentives for recruitment. As noted above, the group at least nominally claims to be fighting for democracy. However, even by standards of other groups in Chad, this evidence is fairly indirect. All evidence of material recruitment incentives is not specific to the MDD. As a result, I do not find evidence of the group clearly relying on one type of appeal. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*. However, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding due to indirectness of the evidence and the general dearth of information.

The ethnic composition of the group is primarily Goran and Kanembu (Decalo 1997; International Crisis Group 2006). Given that many members of this faction were veterans of FANT (UCDP), prior social connections likely mattered for recruitment. I did not find evidence of the group having a formal youth wing.

Certainty Score: 1

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FARF

Also Known As: Armed Forces of the Federal Republic

Narrative:

FARF was one of the many rebel groups that fought against President Déby of Chad in the 1990s (UCDP). The group's primary goal was to establish federalism in Chad in order to weaken the Muslim north's stranglehold on power and so that the south could have more control over oil fields in the region (UCDP). There was also a large ethnic component to the rebellion (UCDP), implying that ideological appeals played an important role.

Again, as with other groups in Chad, there is indirect evidence of the use of material recruitment incentives. The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Thus, while there is some evidence to suggest that the group could have used both ideological and material appeals, the evidence more clearly indicates that ethnicity played a central role in the group mobilizing. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. FARF recruited primarily from the Kanembu ethnic group (UCDP).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MDJT

Also Known As: Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad

Narrative:

The MDJT fought the government of Chad from 1997 to 2011 (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017). There is direct evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The Tibesti region of northern Chad was extremely marginalized, putting it at significant risk for armed rebellion (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017). The group's founding members included military officers and cabinet members (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017). Grievances surrounding the exclusion of the Teda ethnic group by both the Habré and Déby allowed the group to quickly mobilize many recruits (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017).

There is some (indirect) evidence of the group using material recruitment appeals. The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Indeed, many members of MDJT stood to benefit from the power and social status that came with being integrated into the government—as some members of the group eventually were (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017). Chad's government capitalized on internal, ideological divisions within the group by offering payments to members (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017).

Based on the evidence presented above, the group likely used both material and ideological recruitment appeals. However, based on Tubiana and Gramizzi's (2017) assessment that the MDJT was able to draw in a large number of recruits by mobilizing around grievances related to government discrimination against the Teda ethnic group, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

The group also recruited individuals who crossed-over into Chad from Libya (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017). Teda living in Libya provided many recruits and many material resources for the MDJT (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017). Many troops from the national military defected and joined the MDJT as well (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017). The group began to fragment as it recruited along clan and geographic lines (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017). Educated members of the group ran regular schools while volunteers for the group ran Koranic schools (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017). The group briefly had some non-Teda members, however, many of the non-Teda members left the group (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017, p. 37).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MPA-Comoros

Also Known As:

Narrative:

In the Anjouan region of Comoros, the secessionists historically highlighted the increasing poverty and political unrest that was harming the island (Cornwell 1998). By the time of this conflict, the increasing authoritarian nature of the central government and decreased living standards in Anjouan and increased grievances against the government (Cornwell 1998). Government crackdowns against strikes and protestors boosted the opposition movement and it turned its aim from negotiation to secession (Cornwell 1998). Up until 1997, there were three distinct separatist organizations on Anjouan (UCDP). However, it is unclear whether the MPA simply served as an umbrella organization for these three groups, or if it was a completely new group formed by existing secessionists. Based on this, however, the MPA likely mobilized around the same issues that the secessionist movements had (e.g., poverty and authoritarianism). Thus, the group appears to have made ideological appeals. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

The government claimed that the secessionist forces were too professional to be civilian-based (Associated Press 1997). The government was thus likely implying that the secessionists were relying on mercenaries. Indeed, mercenaries had been a key feature in coup attempts in the country. However, I could not find independent evidence of the MPA using mercenaries, and the government did not call out the MPA specifically. I also did not find any other evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as relying *exclusively on ideological appeals*. According to data in the ACD2EPR dataset, group recruits primarily Nzwani Comorans (Vogt et al. 2015). Many of the founding members of the group were Comoran veterans of the French military (Cornwell 1998). I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narratives: Ninjas

Also Known As: Ninja militia forces

Narrative:

There is evidence of the Ninjas employing material incentives for recruitment. The group engaged in extortion and looting (Englebert and Ron 2004). Many lower-ranking segments of the group prioritized looting over long-term strategies (Englebert and Ron 2004, p. 72). Englebert and Ron (2004) argue that in this conflict, the elites used militias to try to achieve political goals, while the average members used it to acquire loot. Carroll (2003) also discusses how the Ninjas were the best source of employment for many young men in the area. Bazenguissa-Ganga (1999) notes that by 1994, most members of the group were demoralized because they had not received any material rewards for their service. The Ninjas also recruited many local who sought self-defense, capitalizing on their fear and anger during the 1998-1999 rebellions (Demetriou, Muggah, and Biddle 2002). However, the group also appealed to protecting the broader Lari ethnic group (UCDP).

There is also evidence of the group employing ideological appeals for recruitment. The Ninjas employed shared ethnic identities (primarily for the Lari ethnic group) and messianic religious beliefs to mobilize recruits (UCDP). Elements of Christian theology were used to help socialize members into the group, as members were required to wear dreadlocks because of versus in the Bible that discuss the chosen ones not uses razors for their hair; members (allegedly) believed in a coming apocalypse; and the leader of the group, Pastor Ntoumi, claimed to have been sent by God (Carroll 2003). Indeed, Animist beliefs play an important role for many members of the group, as about half of the cadres follow such beliefs (GlobalSecurity.org).

Thus, there is evidence of the group frequently employing both ideological and material recruitment appeals. As noted above, the promises of loot and employment played an important role in mobilization, as did shared ethnic and religious identities. Given that the evidence suggests both material and ideological appeals were important for mobilization, and that one type of appeal does not appear to have been used more than the other, I code the group as taking a *mixed approach*.

The Ninjas recruit predominantly from the Bateke, Bakongo, and Lari ethnic groups (GlobalSecurity.org). The group was comprised of police and military officers that also served as former Prime Minister Bernard Kolelas' bodyguards as well as Lari youth that lived in Brazzaville (Englebert and Ron 2004, p. 65). Larger units within the group were often led by former military officers while smaller groups were often led by youth (Englebert and Ron 2004). I did not find evidence of the group employing forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Cocoyes

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The Cocoyes were the former core of former President Pascal Lissouba's presidential guard who mobilized against the new government following the ousting of Lissouba (UCDP). However, it is unclear the extent to which Lissouba exercised control over the group, if at all (UCDP). There is indirect evidence of the group relying on material recruitment appeals. Englebert and Ron (2004) argue that in this conflict, the elites used militias to try to achieve political goals while the average members used it to acquire loot. Indeed, Lissouba recruited unemployed and underemployed young males who had poor prospects in the legitimate economy (Englebert and Ron 2004). The Cocoyes also employed child soldiers. An interview with one former child soldier reveals that that he joined because he had lost his family and viewed it as the only means of survival (Dumas 2003).

The group also claimed to be a "popular movement" in the region, "similar to the Vietcong" (Englebert and Ron 2004). However, I did not find evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Thus, the evidence focuses entirely on material appeals (e.g., Dumas 2003; Englebert and Ron 2004), so I code the Cocoyes as *relying exclusively on material appeals*. However, given the somewhat indirect and limited nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

The majority of Lissouba's supporters were from the Nibolek ethnic group (globalsecurity.org). The Cocoyes also had members from the Bateke ethnic group (Nomikos 2021). However, multiple ethnic groups comprised the Niboleks (EPR Atlas), suggesting that the movement was likely multiethnic. The group recruited primarily rural youth (Englebert and Ron 2004). The Cocoyes had former militia members, former military officers, and youth leaders who had risen to prominence during the street battles (Englebert and Ron 2004).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Ntsiloulous

Also Known As:

Narrative:

Ex-members of the Ninjas formed a break-away fraction, Ntsiloulous (Themnér 2013). Many ex-Ninjas that were pursued by government forces fled to Ntsiloulous because the ex-Ninja leader, Ntoumi, was now the leader of this movement, and they trusted him (Themnér 2013).

Drawing on messianic traditions from the region, Ntoumi claimed to be sent by God to save the people of the Pool region, and that he was leading a peaceful movement (Themnér 2011). He was also able to attract many former Ninjas with his charismatic leadership and messaging (Themnér 2011). Many members were also dissatisfied with Mampouya's decision to cooperate with the government (Themnér 2011). Followers of the group claimed that they were fighting for God (Themnér 2011). Even though the Ninjas employed material recruitment appeals (see corresponding narrative), I did not find evidence of the Ntsiloulous using these appeals. Thus, I code the group as relying *exclusively on ideological appeals*. The Ntsiloulous represented the Lari and Bakongo ethnic groups (Nomikos 2019). I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative #: AFDL

Also Known As: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL)

Narrative:

The AFDL formed as a loose coalition of rebels in Zaire in 1996 with the goal of disposing Mobutu Sese Seko (World Peace Foundation 2015). The group was successful, installing its leader, Laurent-Désiré Kabila as the head of the newly named Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1997 (World Peace Foundation 2015). The territory that the group seized on its way helped it gain more recruits (Bjarnadótti 2017).

There is evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. According to a report from the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, recruiters would enter village schools and promise children food or money for joining. The report also notes that an unknown number of children were forcibly recruited into the group (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2017).

I did not find evidence of the AFDL using ideological recruitment appeals. The group did use religion as a means of socializing combatants. According to a former child soldier of the group, the leaders would conduct magical ceremonies in order to try to convince child combatants that they were invincible (Nichols 2015). However, there was no evidence of the AFDL using religious rhetoric for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*.

The AFDL appears to have had primarily Tutsi membership but did have some cadres from a variety of other ethnic groups, including the Luba and Shaba ethnic groups (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008). The recruitment of child soldiers has been rampant in recent conflicts in the DRC, and the AFDL is one the first examples of this (Matambura 2017). Upwards of 10,000 children were combatants in the AFDL, with many hundreds dying from the horrid conditions of the group's camps alone (Child Soldiers International 2001). Some of the children most vulnerable to recruitment by the AFDL were those that had been separated from their families (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2017). Child soldiers in the group typically received little training and were often raped, beaten, and given very little food in the group's camps. Kidnapping appears to be the main way in which the group forcibly recruited children (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2017).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narratives: RCD

Also Known As: Rally for Congolese Democracy; Rassemblement Congolais pour al Démocratie

Narrative:

The RCD formed in 1998 due to dissatisfaction with the Kabila government (Shackel and Fiske 2016). The RCD struggled, however, and splintered because members had very diverse goals (Shackel and Fiske 2016). There is evidence of the group employing material incentives for recruitment. Marriage (2007) finds, with interview data, that recruits were attracted to the RCD through the promise of pay (which was often meager sums of \$10-15). She further finds that the failed promises of material payments made allegiance switching during the conflict common. Montague (2002) argues that the RCD and its splinters are primarily motivated by material gain. Relatedly, the group worked with dozens of multinational companies during the war (Mampilly 2007). There was no evidence of the RCD employing ideological recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*.

The RCD recruited from multiple ethnic groups (Richards 2016), however, it was saddled with an image of being a mono-ethnic movement (Mampilly 2007). The group attempted to garner support from local, traditional authority figures (Mampilly 2007). The RCD did not interest itself into the provision of education, leaving it to the government (Mampilly 2007).

The RCD had difficulty attracting recruits, and as a result, turned to the forced recruitment of children (Human Rights Watch 2001). The UN estimates that among 3,000 new recruits in the group, 60% were children (Human Rights Watch 2001). The RCD would commonly kidnap children at school or on their way home from church (Human Rights Watch 2001). The group abducted both boys and girls (Human Rights Watch 2001). Those who were caught trying to desert the group would be executed or their family members would be killed (Richards 2016). Some members might have joined “voluntarily” out of fear of being forcibly recruited by another group (Richards 2016).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MLC

Also Known As: Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC); Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC)

Narrative:

The MLC was formed in 1998, largely with the help of the Ugandan government, during the Second Congo War (Koko 2017). During the war, the MLC was able to rapidly draw in recruits, primarily from northern Équateur (Carayannis 2008). The ease of recruitment was facilitated by “pervasive poverty, resentment against the FAC and Chadians, and often family encouragement” (Carayannis 2008, p. 7). When the MLC would take over an area, it would set up an elaborate administrative system that included women’s groups and territorial assemblies, but they were likely put in place for recruitment rather than governance (Carayannis 2008). The group recruited predominantly from Mobutu’s former guards and drew in members from several ethnic groups in the region (Kisangani 2003). Koko (2017) argues that recruits were mainly motivated by the possibility of securing places in state institutions, as many had been in the Mobutu regime. The group was frequently accused of looting (Wohlers et al. 2015).

Survey data of former MLC combatants reveals that while 70% of members joined “voluntarily or in the name of revenge against their enemies,” while the other 30% were driven by family and social pressures (Pangburn, Vlaconou, and Ndala 2019). The structure and training of the group has been identified as an important reason why so many former MLC members participated in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program (Pangburn, Vlaconou, and Ndala 2019). Religion likely played an important role in the group, as it (1) established religious institutions in the places that it governed (Carayannis 2008) and (2) had the slogan “Avec dieu nous vaincrons – With God, we will overcome” (Pangburn, Vlaconou, and Ndala 2019).

Thus, there appears to be indirect evidence of both ideological and material appeals. Dissatisfaction with Chad’s involvement in the country and religious rhetoric were both potentially important factors. As noted above, revenge was an important driving factor for the majority of recruits. Other evidence indicates that promises of jobs in state institutions was another main driving factor for recruits (Koko 2017). Members of the MLC thus appear to have been drawn in by both material and ideological reasons. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*. However, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding due to the indirect nature of the evidence. The MLC used many child soldiers (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2002). The group conscripted some of the child soldiers (Child Soldiers International 2001).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FRUD and FRUD - AD

Also Known As: Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy

Narrative:

FRUD's fight against Djibouti's government began in 1991 over the lack of representation for the Afar ethnic group in the central government (McGregor 2009). The group primarily sought to overthrow the government (UCDP).¹ FRUD was formed from the merger of three Afar militant groups: AROD, FRDE, and FRPD (UCDP). Fighting ended between the government and moderates in 1994, but a radical faction (FRUD-C) continued the fight (Kessels et al. 2016). FRUD-C is likely to exploit government oppression and lack of democratic reforms in Djibouti (Kessels et al. 2016).

There is indirect evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. More specifically, Leta et al. (2015) argue that exclusion from government and violence by government security forces were the main motives of FRUD's rebellion. They also cite the inequality faced by the Afar as another motivating factor. Leta et al. also argue that these problems are exacerbated by institutional design in the government. I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I coded the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. I found little evidence distinguishing the recruitment practices of FRUD and FRUD – AD, as well as the groups themselves more generally. Thus, I also code FRUD – AD as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. Members of FRUD are predominantly from the Afar ethnic group (Schraeder 1993). Though they deny it, the group likely recruits Afars from Eritrea and Ethiopia as well (Bricker and Leatherbee 1994).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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¹ Schraeder (1993) discusses several reasons why FRUD did not seek to establish an independent country for the Afar people.

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: EPRDF

Also Known As: Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)

Narrative:

The EPRDF formed as a merger between Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), with the initial goal of obtaining self-determination for the Tigray people of Ethiopia (Berhe 2004). The group's leadership strategically and flexibly promoted this nationalist ideology (Bach 2014). The group was eventually successful, taking over the government in 1991 (Berhe 2004). More radical elements of the group pushed for secessionism in the early years, but this goal was soon dropped due to a variety of internal and external pressures (Berhe 2004). The group downplayed its leftist elements, and emphasized historical nationalism at times, to broaden its appeal (CIA 1983).

Ideological appeals played a central role in the EPRDF's recruitment efforts. Political education was used as a recruitment tool by the group (Veale 2003). The group tapped heavily into ethnonationalist and class-based ideologies to mobilize members (Berhe 2004). The group focused on recruiting civilians that were active and motivated, and that it believed would stay committed through the difficulties of military training (Berhe 2004). Behre (2004) details how the EPRDF was able to use its roots to developed a "sophisticated political ideology" (p. 591). The group also recruited women, who in addition to being drawn to the group's fight for political justice, also felt like they were fighting for gender equality" (Berhe 2004). I did not find evidence of the group using material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as relying *exclusively on ideological appeals*.

During the conflict, the EPRDF had a primarily Tigrayan membership (Berhe 2004). While the group gave POWs the option to return to their homes or to go to refugee camps in Sudan, the group also gave them the option to join its ranks, especially towards the end of the war (Young 1996). The EPRDF set up special boarding schools for political and military training for women (Veale 2003). The group also ran schools that spread propaganda (Stremlau 2018). Social networks also appeared to have played an important role in recruitment. A survey of former girl soldiers in the group revealed that the most commonly cited reason for joining was because family or friends had joined as well (Veale 2003).

There is no evidence of the group using forced recruitment (Young 1996). However, the Ethiopian government accused the group of using forced recruitment, including the forcible recruitment of children (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1993). The EPRDF did extensively use child soldiers. A study of former female members of the group found that all had joined when they were younger than 18 (Veale 2003).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ARDUF

Also Known As: Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF)

Narrative:

The ultimate goal of ARDUF has often been unclear, as certain factions of the group simply want autonomy for the Afar in Ethiopia, while others want an independent, greater Afar state, which would be a homeland for the Afar in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti (Dias 2008). There is indirect evidence of ARDUF making ideological recruitment appeals. Dias (2008) argues that the marginalization of the Afar ethnic group and Eritrea's secession was the catalyst for Afar mobilization against the state, including by ARDUF. Furthermore, members of the group continue to claim that they fight for Afar independence (Kfir 2008). Post-2005, members have been dissatisfied that they did not receive any benefit from the disputed 2005 elections (AFP 2012). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. Members of ARDUF are predominantly from the Afar ethnic group (Dias 2008). Membership among the factions was largely based on clans, as the group was a merger of three organizations that had different bases of clan support (Woldemariam 2011).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: EPLF

Also Known As: Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)

Narrative:

The EPLF fought the Ethiopian government from 1972 to 1991 and was successful in achieving independence for Eritrea (Weinstein 2005). It was a splinter faction from the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) who the EPLF believed, among other things, was too undisciplined and did too much to heighten tensions between Muslims and Christians in the region (Weinstein 2005). Weinstein (2005) highlights the EPLF as a prime example of a group that benefited from relying more on social endowments than on material resources. EPLF members got rid of all personal property upon joining the group and the EPLF focused on self-reliance (Weinstein 2005). The group engaged in literacy training and was able to attract many well-educated and highly-skilled recruits (Pool 1998). The EPLF required recruits to go through six months of political training and this training was a vital part of the recruitment process (Connell 1993).

Good performance in the political education process was also vital for advancement in the organization, making the process of costly induction more continuous (Weinstein 2005). The Ethiopian government's crackdown on Eritrean civilians also led many to join the EPLF (Woldemikael 1991). The promotion of gender equality was also important for the group's recruitment of women (who also joined for a variety of other reasons) into combat roles (Wasmus 2017). I did not find evidence of the EPLF employing material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The group effectively mixed informal friendship networks and the Leninist model of democratic centralism to build a strong sense of comradeship in the group (Woldemikael 1991, p. 35). Networks of students were used to help recruit their classmates (Weinstein 2005). The group was ethnically and linguistically diverse, had recruits from many familial groupings, and had both Christian and Muslim members (Weinstein 2005). Various international human rights organizations have accused the EPLF of employing forced recruitment, but the group denies doing so (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006). In 1989, the EPLF allegedly killed upwards of 200 members of the Afar ethnicity who resisted joining the group (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006). However, the exact period during which the EPLF used forced recruitment is unknown (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ONLF

Also Known As: Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)

Narrative:

The ONLF is a Somali nationalist group in Ethiopia that seeks self-governance for Somalis who live in the Ogaden region (Bloom and Kaplan 2007). Unlike other movements in the Horn of Africa, the ONLF just wants self-determination for Somalis in the Ogaden region, rather than to form a “Greater Somalia” (Bloom and Kaplan 2007). The group recruits primarily pastoralist youth from the Ogaden clan, but the Ethiopian government has attempted to exploit clan rivalries to combat the ONLF (Blair 2007). The group also claims to be fighting human rights abuses by the Ethiopian government (Bloom and Kaplan 2007). The ONLF also objects to the presence of oil and gas companies in the region and does not want oil and gas exploration to occur until the region becomes independent (Bloom and Kaplan 2007).

There is some evidence of the ONLF employing ideological recruitment appeals. For example, the group states in its 1984 Political Program that women’s representation is essential for the nationalist aspirations of the group and that they thus will seek out gender equality and to recruit women (Thomas and Bond 2015). However, this is unlikely to be the primary recruiting tool of the group, because while the group has some female combatants, they make up less than 5% of the troops (Wood and Thomas 2017). Instead, ONLF recruits appear to be primarily motivated by discontent and government abuses (LandInfo 2017). I did not find evidence of the group using material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Former Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) members formed the ONLF and recruited other former WSLF members into the group as well (Bloom and Kaplan 2007). More specifically, the group was founded members of the youth-wing of the WSLF (Van Hauwermeiren 2011). Evidence from a 2011 Amnesty International report indicates that the ONLF engages in forced recruitment of children in Kenya to serve as porters and cooks and traffics them back to Ethiopia (IRIN 2012).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: OLF

Also Known As: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)

Narrative:

The OLF formed in 1973 to promote self-determination for the Oromo people in Ethiopia (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). It began as a student organization but soon evolved into an armed movement (Minority Rights Group International 2018). The group's main base was confirmed by OLF leadership by at least the mid-2000s. Additionally, when OLF members were allowed by into Ethiopia into 2018, they indicated that it had been 26 years of exile (Meseret 2018), suggesting that their last year in Ethiopia was 1992.

There is some (indirect) evidence of the OLF employing ideological recruitment appeals. Meseret (2018) notes that the group advocates for the right to self-determination for the Oromo people and that OLF supporters are dissatisfied with the lack of Oromo representation in Ethiopia. I did not find any evidence that the group offered material incentives to potential recruits. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, I assign a moderate certainty to this coding due to the indirect nature of the evidence.

Despite its resurgence in the mid-1980s, its struggled to fight the Ethiopian military in the late 80s undermined its message that it provided a viable political alternative for the Oromo people. After the fall of Mengistu in 1992, membership expanded rapidly, as the organization is estimated to have grown three times as big, in part by incorporating Oromo soldiers that had served in the military under Mengistu (National Democratic Institute and African-American Institute 1992, p. 15). In 2006, OLF gained some defectors from the Ethiopian military (the UN estimates 150 while the OLF estimates 500) (Plaut 2006, p. 588). The group also recruits Oromo deserters from the Ethiopian National Liberation Front (ENLF) (Human Rights Watch - Africa Watch Report 1991). In the mid-2000s, the Ethiopian military was also concerned that OLF was recruiting from their ranks and other parts of the security sector in the country (Global Security.org). The group seems to be occupied by dissatisfied combatants from state and non-state groups. The OLF recruits some students (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: RFDG

Also Known As: Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea; Rassemblement des forces Démocratiques de Guinée (RFDG)

Narrative:

The RFDG had the goal of overthrowing President Lasane Conte of Guinea (Butcher 2011). Rumors linked the RFDG to Malinke dissidents, however, there is no evidence of the group discusses Malinke grievances (Lindemann 2014, p. 188). Instead, the group is often viewed as an invasion by Liberian president Charles Taylor (Lindemann 2014). Indeed, the group is likely backed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Liberian government (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). However, there is also evidence to suggest that the group is its own, independent movement (UCDP). Instead, the group claimed to be exclusively comprised of Guinean combatants that wanted to overthrow President Conte (UCDP). The group launches most of its attacks in mineral-rich regions and was trying to take over diamond mines to raise money for its fight (UCDP).

Given the substantial lack of information on this group, I code the groups' recruitment tactics as missing. While the group has at least some political goals (e.g., overthrowing the president) and exploits natural resources, it is unclear the role they play in recruitment.

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MPC

Also Known As: Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire; Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire

Narrative:

The MPC was formed by northern soldiers who had been part of a failed coup, and defected from the military, and who sought to overthrow President Laurent Gbagbo (Tsai 2020). The group received many military members who had been purged because of real or perceived associations with the coup; and many really were sympathetic with the goals of the group (International Crisis Group 2003). These soldiers were loyal to former president General Robert Gueï (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004). Specifically, the group's demands were (1) for Gbagbo to resign, (2) for inclusive national elections to be held, (3) a review of the constitution, and (4) ending the dominance of southerners in the country (Dadson 2008). The group's ranks soon grew to several thousand, as youth, traditional hunters, and foreign fighters joined the movement (Tsai 2020). Many northerners supported the group because of perceived injustices caused by the government (Tsai 2020). A core issue of the conflict was reestablishing political order and redefining Ivorian citizenship, as there are many immigrants in the country (International Crisis Group 2003).

The group controlled much of the northern territory and administered it, though social service provision declined (Cook 2011). A 2007 report from the Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that "the MPC was the most organized, disciplined and ideological rebel group in Côte d'Ivoire" (Higonnet 2007). While the MPC frequently abused civilians, it was generally better-behaved and more concerned about its reputation than other armed groups in the country (Higonnet 2007). More specifically, the group viewed itself as a liberation movement and tried to educate civilians in its territory on the group's aims (Higonnet 2007).

However, when the group began struggling to provide salaries and provisions to members, the recruits turned increasingly towards sexual violence and looting (Higonnet 2007). There is also some evidence of the group using mercenaries. The MPC recruited hundreds of traditional hunters, known as dozos, from Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Burkina Faso (International Crisis Group 2003). Dozos in these countries have often been used as bodyguards for political personalities (International Crisis Group 2003). The group also recruited some Liberians who had previously fought for Charles Taylor (International Crisis Group 2003).

The MPC thus appears to make both ideological and material recruitment appeals. However, I code the group as relying more on ideological recruitment appeals based on Higonnet's assessment that (1) it was the most ideological group in the conflict, (2) it made an effort educate the public on its goals, (3) that many northern citizens were sympathetic towards their goals, and thus, supported them, and (4), that the group primarily viewed itself as a liberation movement. Thus, I code the group as relying *mostly on ideological appeals*. Given, however, that it is not completely clear which broad appeal the MPC relied on more, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

The MPCCI had a large base of Guei supporters as well as Burkinabe, Malian, and Guinean immigrant communities (Busch 2017). Further evidence confirms that the MPCCI's membership was multi-ethnic (Cook 2011). The group forcibly recruited women as sex slaves and to take part in active hostilities (Higonnet 2007). Child soldiers were recruited with both persuasion and force during this conflict (Djereke 2012).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MPIGO and MJP

Also Known As: Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO); Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP)

Narrative:

The MPIGO and MJP are often discussed in context of each other. The two groups formed at the end of 2002 seeking revenge for the government's killing of former president General Robert Gueï (International Crisis Group 2003). It also had the goal of overthrowing President Laurent Gbagbo (Kohler 2003). Both groups are considered to be much less ideologically motivated than their eventual Ivorian ally, the MPCJ (Higonnet 2007). MPIGO was largely the creation of Liberian leader Charles Taylor, and its members were primarily fighters from Sierra Leone and Liberia (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004). Taylor also supported the MJP (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004).

Both groups heavily recruited mercenaries from Sierra Leone and Liberia who were living in Côte d'Ivoire as refugees (Pailey et al. 2017). Both MPIGO and the MJP have been estimated to be comprised of upwards of 90% paid mercenaries from Sierra Leone and Liberia (Kohler 2003, p. 24). The MJP also recruited traditional hunters (dozos) (Chelapi-den Hamer 2011), who were often used as mercenaries in this conflict (International Crisis Group 2003).

Payment for participation in these groups varied substantially in frequency and amount from individual to individual, and there was variation in pay by position in the group (Chelapi-den Hamer 2011). Some members were never paid, some were rarely paid, and some were regularly paid (Chelapi-den Hamer 2011). The MJP also contained many bands of looters (International Crisis Group 2003). I did not find evidence of the groups employing ideological recruitment appeals. Thus, I code both groups as *relying exclusively on material incentives*.

Members of MPIGO came from the Yacouba and Gio ethnic groups, which are closely related (International Crisis Group 2003). The MJP appears to have fought on behalf of the Yacoubas and Dioulas (International Crisis Group 2003). The MJP is also connected to the Yacouba and Gio ethnic groups (Kohler 2003). This, coupled with the fact that many of MJP's members came from Sierra Leone and Liberia, suggests that the group was likely multi-ethnic. Both groups recruited children, many of whom were between the ages of 10 and 15, and many of whom were from Liberia (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004). Both forcibly recruited refugees and children (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004). This included recruiting from refugee camps in Ghana (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: NPFL

Also Known As: National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)

Narrative:

In interviews with former child soldiers in the NPFL, many reportedly joined to defend the country, with ethnic patriotism playing an important role in their descriptions (Podder 2011). Children also joined to provide food and other material goods to their families (Podder 2011). In terms of direct recruitment appeals, Podder (2011) argues that calls to protect its constituent ethnic groups and economic benefits were the two main incentives offered to child soldiers.

While children were not typically given actual salaries, but the group did pay adult cadres, and high-ranking members received additional material benefits (Podder 2011). Ethnic solidarity and revenge played an important role in the mobilization of recruits (Kieh Jr 2004). Thus, different recruitment appeals appear to have been used at different levels of the organization. However, even though there is some evidence of ideological appeals being employed, Weinstein (2005) argues that recruitment was primarily based on the provision of material appeals. Thus, I code the group as relying *mostly on material incentives*.

The NPFL was ethnically mixed, and recruited heavily from the Kpelle, Gio, and Mano ethnic groups (Kieh Jr 2004; Podder 2011). Social networks also played an important role in the group's recruitment efforts, as many children reported joining because they had friends in the organization (Podder 2011). The NPFL recruited, with both persuasion and force, in refugee camps in Côte d'Ivoire (Podder 2011). Overall, child soldiers and forced recruitment played an important effort in the group's recruitment efforts (Podder 2011). Uses and threats of violence were a common method of forced recruitment used by the NPFL (Podder 2011).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: INPFL

Also Known As: Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)

Narrative:

The INPFL was a splinter faction of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which was formed in 1990 by Prince Johnson, who was in Charles Taylor's inner-circle (Kieh 2004). The group disbanded in 1992 (UCDP). The group had two main goals: (1) remove President Doe from power and (2) prevent Charles Taylor (of the NPFL) from taking power (Kieh 2004). Prince Johnson was considered to be less motivated by political power, and more motivated by material gain, than the other Liberian rebel leaders (Kieh 2004).

Members of the INPFL were drawn in by a variety of motives and recruitment tactics. Podder (2011) interviewed two former child soldiers of the INPFL. Both reported joining voluntarily and reported multiple motives including (1) supporting the group's political goals, (2) the desire to protect family, and (3) knowing someone in the group. Taking a broader view of the group, Podder (2011) argues that the primary methods of recruitment of child soldiers into the group were (1) family and friend networks, (2) coercion, and (3) economic incentives. Thus, while at least two combatants reported joining because of support for political goals, Podder (2011) identifies material, not ideological, appeals as being a primary recruitment tactic of the group. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*.

The INPFL recruited from a wide variety of ethnic groups (Kieh 2004), including from the Kpelle and Vai ethnic groups (Podder 2011). Prince Johnson's Gio ethnic group was probably the best represented among combatants (Gerdes 2013). The group mobilized many former AFL combatants into its ranks (Gerdes 2013). The group was also built heavily around Prince Johnson's personal connections (Gerdes 2013).

The group conscripted members, including some of Prince Johnson's own bodyguards (including women), and would kill any member that tried to escape the group (Gerdes 2013). The INPFL also used abduction to acquire more members (Foster et al. 2009). The group publicly admitted that it would execute any soldier that "betrayed" the group (Human Rights Watch 1991). Prince Johnson went to extremes to instill discipline in the group and would execute members for a variety of offenses ranging from looting to even more minor infractions (Gerdes 2013).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: LURD

Also Known As: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)

Narrative:

Ideological appeals played an important role in the group's recruitment efforts. The LURD formed with the goal of disposing Charles Taylor, a former rebel who had come to power in Liberia (Käihkö 2015). The group had many internal divisions but shared strong ideological opposition to Taylor (Käihkö 2015). Power-sharing problems, and the ambitions of several politicians in the group to eventually become president, caused rifts in the group. Individual relationships with commanders played important roles in the group, and as a result, when a commander died, it could be disastrous for individual units (Käihkö 2015).

In interviews with former child soldiers in LURD, Podder (2011) finds that force was the single most common reason for joining. However, in terms of persuasive appeals, Podder finds that support for political goals was the most common reason children joined LURD. Podder also finds that some joined to protect their family, some joined to avenge their family, and some joined because of separation from their family.

Material appeals also played a role in the group's recruitment. Early in the first conflict, before the group had external support, the group had so few resources that many combatants had only sticks and stones, and food was scarce. This led to looting, which many interpreted as evidence of the group functioning more like a criminal group. Many combatants expected to receive benefits once the war ended and Taylor was driven out of the country, such as being integrated into the security forces of Liberia, but such benefits were not realized (Käihkö 2015). Podder (2011), in interviews with former child soldiers in LURD, found that "looting and profit motives" played a moderate role in the decision to join the group (p. 61).

Podder (2011) also finds that there were differences in the recruitment tactics used on children and adults. Adults made up the majority of the group (Haer and Böhmelt 2017), and thus, recruitment appeals directed at them likely represent the most commonly employed recruitment appeals by groups. While promises of protection played a more prominent role in the recruitment of children, ideological and material recruitment appeals played a much bigger role in the recruitment of adults. Indeed, Podder finds that later in the conflict, material recruitment appeals played a significant role among the rank-and-file, creating significant commitment problems for the group. LURD also made more promises to recruits about the ability to loot than did other groups in the conflict (Podder 2011). However, Podder finds that for child soldiers the primary recruitment appeals employed by the group were based on ethnicity (defending its constituents' ethnic group) and political ideology.

Thus, the LURD appeared to employ both ideological and material recruitment appeals. As discussed above, children tended to be more attracted by ideological appeals, while adults tended to be more attracted by material incentives. However, members of all ages were drawn-in by both material and ideological appeals (Podder 2011). Thus, because LURD appeared to

frequently employ both ideological and material appeals, I code the group as taking a *mixed approach*. However, due to the ambiguity of the evidence about the frequency at which these appeals were employed, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Some members of LURD were former soldiers (Käihkö 2015). Many were former ULIMO-K faction, RUF, and Burkinabe combatants (Podder 2011). Mandinkas were the dominant ethnic group in LURD, although the group was still ethnically mixed (Podder 2011). Social networks also appear to have mattered somewhat for recruitment into LURD, as Podder's (2011) survey indicates that a low to moderate number of children cite joining because they had a friend in the group.

LURD extensively used child soldiers, recruiting many by abducting children from refugee camps (Human Rights Watch 2004). Children were also used to abduct other children (Human Rights Watch 2004). Approximately 23% of LURD's members were forcibly recruited into the group (Pugel 2009). Indeed, through surveying former child participants, Podder (2011), finds that the most given reason for joining the group as a child was being kidnapped. Threats of violence were also used as a tool of forced recruitment (Podder 2011). During the last phase of the conflict, LURD actively recruited refugee and displaced children from IDP camps (Podder 2011). While the modal answer was joining through force, the majority still joined LURD voluntarily for most of the conflict (Podder 2011). However, towards the end of the second conflict, the group did have to rely much more on coercion and force for recruitment (Podder 2011).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MPA

Also Known As: Mouvement populaire de l'Azawad (MPA); Azawad Popular Movement (MPA)

Narrative:

There is indirect evidence of the MPA employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group had a nationalist agenda that sought to abolish caste and tribal distinctions and unify the Tuareg population. Ideological constraints created internal strain in the group. Negotiations with the government led some hardline members to believe that the group had given up its territorial demands (Thurston and Lebovich 2013). The group eventually split because of tribal and ideological differences (Thurston and Lebovich 2013). Thus, nationalist ideology was likely an important motivator for many members. Many members of the group had received military training in Libya and had even fought in Chad and Lebanon. They had originally traveled to Libya looking for work (Lebovich 2017). However, Humphreys and Mohamed (2005) argue that it is unlikely that the conflict was driven by material interests. Additionally, there is a lack of evidence that the MPA used material-based recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The MPA had approximately 1,000 members (International Federation for Human Rights 2012). While the MPA was a primarily Tuareg-based organization (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013), it represented several elite clans in the area (Pezard and Shurkin 2015). Most members were Ifogas, however, many of the non-Ifogas split off (Global Security). Recruitment in this conflict was conducted along ethnic lines not because of the presence of an ethnic conflict, but because it facilitated organization (Humphreys and Mohamed 2003). While the group was tied to certain clans, it avoided intercommunal aspects of the conflict (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005). There is ambiguous evidence about whether the MPA employed forced recruitment. Lecocq (2010) notes that “In March 1994, the FNLA was ousted from its base Halboubouti by the MPA, after which a number of their fighters forcibly joined this movement” (Lecocq 2010, p. 283-284).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FIAA

Also Known As: Front islamique Arabe de l'Azawad (FIAA); Arab Islamic Front of Azawad

Narrative:

There is indirect evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals, supporters and members of the group have discussed grievances against the government and military's poor treatment of Arabs living in Mali (Pezard and Shurkin 2015). Government crackdowns against Arab communities during the Tuareg uprisings directly led to the formation of the FIAA (Beumler 2017). The FIAA was the first movement, as its name suggests, to emphasize religious and ethnic issues in the region (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005).

In terms of material recruitment appeals, the FIAA was framed by rival armed groups as "reengaged rebels" and "bandits" (Lecocq 2010, p. 301). Indeed, the group did engage in looting (Lecocq 2002). Furthermore, when the group was under the umbrella of the MFUA, it fought with another member, the FPLA, because of poorly coordinated acts of banditry (Collier and Sambanis 2005). However, Humphreys and Mohamed (2005) argue that it is unlikely that the conflict was driven by material interests. They note that the group's looting of cattle was primarily used to buy arms. I did not find evidence that such wealth was used for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The group was primarily comprised of northern Hassani Arabs and Moors (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005; Morgan 2012). The group was created by "Berabiche" Arabs (International Crisis Group 2012, p. 3). Indeed, clan ties mattered in group formation (Dillon 2007). The group also frequently attacked Black African villages (Kisangani 2012). Arab traders in particular supported the group (Collier and Sambanis 2005). Some former FULA members joined the group (Lecocq 2010). The group also emerged out of/broke away from the MPLA/MPA (Rabasa et al. 2011). I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment. The group withdrew to Libya in 1995 (Kulte 2013, 423).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: POLISARIO

Also Known As: Polisario Front; Popular Front for the Liberation of the Sanguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO)

Written: RA #1

Edited: Author of RAID

Narrative:

Located in the Western Sahara, POLISARIO originated in Mauritania in May of 1973 as an insurgency against Spanish control of the Western Sahara. (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.) The conflict between POLISARIO and the Moroccan government began at the earliest 1975 but evolved throughout the late 1970's. Conflict in the area began after Spain withdrew as a colonial power in 1975 and allowed Morocco and Mauritania to lay claim to parts of the Western Sahara. Many insurgency groups rose up to contest these claims, but the predominant one was POLISARIO, who declared independence of the region as the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (Congressional Research Service, 2018). Mauritania renounced its claim to the Western Sahara in 1979.

There is evidence of the group employing ideological appeals. Although unsuccessful, POLISARIO did try to use technological advances to spread its message and goals to garner more supporters (Mostafa 2021). It has also been argued that POLISARIO was able to empower people in Western Sahara through its nationalist struggle and collective identity aided the group's fight (Zunes 1987; Farah 2010; Mostafa 2021). While POLISARIO does not have a specific ideology beyond nationalism, it is able to successfully use its flexible ideology to mobilize supporters around a variety of issues (Zunes 1987). It is a very inclusive group, which has also aided its efforts to gain supporters (Zunes 1987). The group also sought to emulate Palestinian nationalism in formulating its own struggle (Becke 2019). The group formulated its nationalist rhetoric in contemporary struggles, rather than historical identities, and it published nationalist rhetoric in its newspapers with the hope of mobilizing support (Healy 2011).

There was not evidence of POLISARIO employing material incentives. Members of POLISARIO allegedly served as mercenaries for the Gadhafi regime during the 2011 Libyan civil war (Agence Marocaine De Presse 2011a). More recent reports indicate that POLISARIO members continue to serve as mercenaries in the Sahel region (Agence Marocaine De Presse 2021a). The regime allegedly recruited 450 POLISARIO mercenaries, paying them each \$10,000 for two months of service (Agence Marocaine De Presse 2011b). The group also allegedly conscripted some individuals that it sent to fight in the Libyan civil war (Agence Marocaine De Presse 2011c). However, I did not find evidence of POLISARIO itself using material-based recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Recent reports indicate that POLISARIO still engages in the recruitment of child soldiers (Agence Marocaine De Presse 2021b) as well as forced recruitment (Agence Marocaine De

Presse 2020). POLISARIO is almost entirely composed of the Saharawi population of the Western (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013) Sahara – a nomadic group that is ethnically different from the population of Morocco. However, there are reports of POLISARIO recruiting from other Saharan tribes, such as from the Touareg tribes of Mali, Niger, and even south-west Libya in addition to cadres in northern Mauritania and possibly in western Algeria, northern Mali, and northern Nige (Damis, 1983). This would indicate that while the primary ethnic group involved in POLISARIO is Saharawi, but low concentrations of other ethnic groups from around the Western Sahara and Northern Africa regions are involved.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Renamo

Also Known As: Resistência Nacional Moçambicana; Mozambican National Resistance

Narrative:

Renamo relied heavily on material incentives for recruitment. External support provided by Rhodesia was essential to the group's provision of material incentives for recruitment (Weinstein 2005). In its earlier years, the group also recruited secondary school students by promising scholarships, though Renamo later tried to deny these claims (Weinstein 2005). Weinstein (2005) further details how, after Rhodesia collapsed in 1979, the group lost its major source of funding. He further notes that even though South Africa provided some support to the group, Renamo lost its ability to provide selective incentives (Vines 1991). From then on, the group began relying on force recruitment, including abducting children and adults. Approximately 90% of members were forced recruits during this period (Minter 1995). Over 40% of the recruits were children (Weinstein 2005). However, to compensate for their loss of support, Renamo turned to allowing recruits to loot during attacks on civilians and engaged in the ivory trade and extortion (Weinstein 2005). Weinstein (2005) notes that Renamo was able to grow and prosper, even though it primarily used coercion for recruitment, because it provided participants with material incentives.

Minter (1989) notes that while the dominant narrative among the former members that he interviewed was that they were forced into the group, a very small number joined for ideological reasons. Hall (1990) notes that while the group lacked a specific ideology, members had specific grievances including against perceived oppression of religious practices and tribal leadership by the government, as well as dissatisfaction with government agrarian and economic policies. In sum, Weinstein (2005) notes that material incentives were the predominant persuasive recruitment appeal employed by Renamo. However, there is also evidence of ideology mattering (Minter 1989; Hall 1990). Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*.

Weinstein (2005) notes that Renamo recruits came from a diversity of ethnic groups. Among the leadership, for instance, the Ndau, Manyika, Sena, Lomwé, Shangaan, Chope, Yao, and Ronga tribes were all represented (Weinstein 2005). Minter (1989), however, argues that the shared Shona identity among many of the group's leaders might have helped with group cohesion, while Hall (1990) argues that it ultimately undermined Renamo's cohesiveness.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: CRA

Also Known As: Coordination of the Armed Resistance (CRA)

Narrative:

The CRA was created in 1993 as an umbrella organization of several Tuareg armed groups that were fighting the government of Niger to promote and defend Tuareg interests (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). Specifically, the members of this group were the FLAA, the FLT (Front de libération de Tamoust, or Tamoust Liberation Front), FPLS (Patriotic Front for the Liberation of the Sahara), and ARLN (Armée révolutionnaire de libération du Nord-Niger, or Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of North Niger) (UCDP).

The CRA's grievances focused on the mistreatment of Tuaregs in the region more broadly and the appropriation of mineral resources (especially uranium) more specifically (Norris 2001). The group also fought for greater autonomy in the region (Suso 2010), but at other times promoted a secessionist agenda (Pedrosa de Sousa 2014). The group demanded that 40% of taxes from the revenues of mining companies be directly reinvested in the northern regions of the country (Norris 2001). The group also demanded Tuareg representation in the central government, demilitarization of Tuareg regions, and for Tamashek (the Tuareg language) to be taught in schools (UCDP). I did not find evidence of any group in the CRA using forced recruitment or child soldiers.

Given that the CRA is an umbrella organization, it is difficult to find information on its recruitment practices. As noted above, the group appeared to have mobilized around ethnic-based grievances, just as other Tuareg insurgent groups in Niger had. One of its members, the FLAA, appears to have relied exclusively on ideological recruitment appeals (see corresponding narrative). However, inadequate information was available on the other groups in the CRA (i.e., FLT, FPLS, and ARLN). Based on this information, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, due to the difficulties associated with finding information on various factions of the CRA, I assign a moderate certainty to this coding.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FDR

Also Known As: The Democratic Front for Renewal; Front Démocratique du Renouveau

Narrative:

The FDR was a Toubou-based rebellion (International Crisis Group 2017). More specifically, the FDR fought for autonomy for Toubou people (UCDP). The immigration of Toubous from Chad exacerbated tensions between the Toubou and Fulani ethnic groups in Niger over grazing rights (UCDP). Thus, the group formed to promote Toubou rights (UCDP). The group was active in the Kawa region of Niger, where the country's largest oil field is (Small Arms Survey 2005). I did not find evidence of the group employing forced recruitment.

I did not find any evidence of the FDR employing material incentives for recruitment. Given that all sources indicate that the group formed to protect Toubou rights, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given that there is little information on this group, and that all evidence of its recruitment tactics is indirect, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding of this variable.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FPR

Also Known As: Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)

Narrative:

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Evidence from an interview with a former members shows that the group depicted the conflict as a “struggle for liberation” (War Resisters’ International 2016). The training of new recruits included extensive lessons on Rwandan history, including the impact of colonialism on tensions in the country (Human Rights Watch 1999). In its early stages, the group had a very selective recruitment process, exclusively recruiting individuals with political training and adherence to the group’s procedures (The Chronicles 2019). The RPF sought a wide support base and had an eight-point platform that “called for national unity, democracy, an end to corruption and nepotism, a self-sustaining economy, improved social services, a national military, a progressive foreign policy, and an end to the system which generates refugees” (p. 49).

In terms of material appeals, recruits were not given any sort of contract up front but were promised a higher standard of living if the FPR was successful (War Resisters’ International 2016). However, recruits were not promised any sort of material goods specifically. I did not find any other evidence of the FPR employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The group was primarily comprised of Tutsi refugees from refugee camps in Uganda (Bonner 1994; Kuperman 2004). The FPR emphasized shared kinship among cadres (Human Rights Watch 1999). However, the group also recruited some Hutus (Human Rights Watch 1999). Young Hutus living in RPF camps were often pressured by the FPR to join the military or political wing of the organization (Human Rights Watch 1999). The FPR also tried to attract many members from the Interahamwe but were only able to get a few (Human Rights Watch 1999). Most of the initial members were veterans of the Ugandan military (Bonner 1994). The group also recruited members from FAR, which changed its reputation of having only Tutsi membership (Orth 2001). The government claimed that the FPR was recruiting individuals from: Tutsi refugees, the Uganda army, Tutsis in Rwanda, Hutu’s who opposed the regime, unemployed individuals both in and out of Rwanda, foreigners married to Tutsi women, Nilo-Hamatic people, and runaway criminals (Des Forges 1999, p. 50-51).

As part of its recruitment efforts, the FPR trained young people as political agents to broaden its networks (Des Forges 1999). Thousands of Tutsi civilians joined spur of the moment during the FPR’s invasion of Rwanda, as they were inspired by the group’s effort to take back power (Kuperman 2004). While the initial influx of recruits following the invasion of Rwanda led to a greater lack of discipline, FPR leadership was able to help establish compliance within the group (Des Forges 1999). Some of the leadership also had prior connections with each other through the political organization, the Rwandan Alliance of National Unity (Lyons 2016).

The FPR recruited children as young as 12 (War Resisters' International 2016). There is evidence of the group not allowing members to leave (War Resisters' International 2016). I did not find evidence of the group using other modes of forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Opposition Alliance

Also Known As: Army for the Liberation of Rwanda; Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (ALIR); Party for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR)

Narrative:

The Opposition Alliance was a merger of the Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) and the Interahamwe, which also recruited new members, in order to overthrow the Tutsi-dominated government that had been installed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and to bring Hutus back to power (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013; Federation of American Scientists 2004). However, most members were newly recruited after 1994, rather than being former members of the FAR or Interahamwe (Human Rights Watch 2001). Many recruits also came from refugee camps and the Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese population (Human Rights Watch 2001). However, I did not find evidence of the Opposition Alliance drawing recruits from outside of the Hutu ethnic group.

The group also ran a training school for military and political education (Human Rights Watch 2001). Many recruits were motivated by the desire to return to Rwanda (Human Rights Watch 2001). Members also spoke of the desire to overthrow the ruling regime in Rwanda and end its human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch 2001). The ethnic dimension of the conflict was also relevant to some recruits (Human Rights Watch 2001). Indeed, in the refugee camps in which the group recruited, the Opposition Alliance spread extremist Hutu propaganda that resembled the propaganda that preceded the Rwandan genocide (Lischer 2005). Christian theology was also used to frame the group's goals and played a role in the socialization process of the group (Human Rights Watch 2001). Based on the information above, the group appears to have mobilized around ideological appeals, especially ones focused on Hutus returning to power in Rwanda.

Members of the group frequently engages in pillaging, and though the group's leadership allegedly forbids the looting of valuable goods, they do explicitly allow members to steal essential resources, such as food (Human Rights Watch 2001). This alone is not enough to suggest that the group employs material recruitment appeals. However, there is evidence of the group offering material resources to children for recruitment.

The Opposition Alliance recruited children for a variety of roles, including soldiers, porters, cooks, and general workers (Human Rights Watch 2001). Children were recruited both through abduction and the provision of food and protection (Human Rights Watch 2001). Orphans often join the group because they had nowhere else to turn (Human Rights Watch 2001). Some children, however, articulated similar political goals to those of the adult members (Human Rights Watch 2001). However, other child members were unable to articulate what the war was about (Human Rights Watch 2001). Recruits are as young as 10 and 11, but none that are younger than 16 are used for combat (Human Rights Watch 2001). Child members were also paired off with adults as part of the socialization process (Human Rights Watch 2001). Young

children were forced to partake in military training and were beaten if they refused to do so (Human Rights Watch 2001). They were also threatened with beatings and death to not leave the group (Human Rights Watch 2001).

Thus, there is some evidence of the group employing material incentives for recruitment, as they offer food to children to recruit them. However, as shown above, most evidence focuses on the central role of ideology in recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MFDC

Also Known As: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques la Casamance (MFDC)

Narrative:

The MFDC is a secessionist group that formed in Senegal in 1982 (Evans 2004). There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Evans (2004) notes that volunteers had a variety of motives including ideological conviction, perceived discrimination, and to fight against persecution against their families and villages. Evans explains that the group would hold “awareness meetings” to discuss the merits and justifications for independence. Humphreys and Mohamed (2005) also make the case that joining the group was ideologically based, as the group did not form to profit from the vast array of lootable resources that were in the area of its operations, and they only did so later on in the conflict. Additionally, these resources were primarily used to fund logistically operations, not to attract recruits. The group also mobilized against violent government repression (Foucher 2007).

Evans (2004) argues that various non-Diola members used the group as cover for crime, especially those that operate out of Guinea-Bissau. Evans notes that despite fragmentation and banditry, most members still appear to have been ideologically motivated. However, there is no evidence that the group used the promise of loot as a recruitment tool, or that the criminal members were officially affiliated with the group. Instead, the group is simply used as a front by certain factions. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological recruitment appeals*.

Members of the group would sometimes persuade their friends to join, while others were driven by familial ties (Evans 2004). The MFDC claims to represent all ethnic groups in the Casamance region (though the group sometimes draw on ethnicity in its rhetoric). While multiple ethnic groups are likely represented within the organization, most members appear to be from the Diola ethnic group (Evans 2004). Older members of the resistance movement would “use the community to socialize the youth in the memory of the struggle” (Zartman 2016, p. 5).

While there are no reports of forced recruitment, the group makes it very difficult to leave because members are required to take a “mystical oath” but can only leave if the priestess that performed the oath “undoes” it (Home Office 2010). The group promotes the belief that if someone leaves without getting the oath undone, they will get sick or die painfully (Home Office 2010). There are contradicting reports about whether the group recruits child soldiers and the group denies ever using them (Jaffré 1999).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Recruitment Narrative: RUF

Also Known As: Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Narrative:

The RUF is notorious for having recruited opportunistic joiners (Abdullah 1998; Weinstein 2005). Two groups of soldiers made up the initial fighting forces of the RUF: (1) youth from Sierra Leone that were recruited and trained in Liberia and (2) combatants sent by Charles Taylor from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Taylor gave these fighters the ability to control trade in the areas they operated and to loot. Overall, members of the group benefited more from material rewards, rather than ideological or social connections (this summary is derived from Weinstein 2005). The looting and widespread destruction caused by the group made the RUF very unpopular in Sierra Leone, leading them to turn to forced recruitment (Richards 1996; Humphreys and Weinstein 2004).

Ideological recruitment appeals played a limited role in recruitment. The RUF sought to exploit grievances of rural youth related to government oppression and misuse of diamond wealth (Richards 1996; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). In their survey of former participants of the civil war in Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein find that among the former RUF members, approximately 10% said they supported the political goals of the group. Thus, while material incentives were still clearly the predominant recruitment tactic of the group, ideology still played a role in recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*.

The RUF had an ethnically diverse membership (Weinstein 2005). The group recruited both individuals from Sierra Leone and Liberia (Weinstein 2005). Scholars generally argue that social ties explicitly did NOT play a role in recruitment into the RUF. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) find that only 0.3% of surveyed veterans of the RUF reported joining because of social pressures. Additionally, they find that social ties facilitated voluntary recruitment into the RUF but inhibited abduction into it. The RUF is also notorious for its widespread use of child soldiers. Indeed, Child Soldiers were the primary types of combatants used by the RUF (de Hoyos 1999). The primary form of forced recruitment appears to have been abduction. Indeed, during its 1998-1999 offensive on Freetown, the RUF abducted 6,000 children (de Hoyos 1999).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: AFRC

Also Known As: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); Sierra Leone Army (SLA)

Narrative:

The AFRC was formed by former soldiers in Sierra Leone's military who allied with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to try to take over the country's diamond mines (Tran 2007). However, the group claimed to be fighting because of (1) the government's inability to keep the peace following its negotiations with the RUF, (2) the lack of democracy, and (3) that resources were being unfairly distributed to the pro-government militia, the kamajors (who were from the Mende ethnic group) at the expense of the national military (Amnesty International 1998). Some members of the RUF also joined the AFRC (McHugh 2016).

Like the RUF, profits from the diamond trade were important in attracting the support of international businesses and mercenaries (Rashid 2004). Multiple scholars have argued that combatants on all sides of the conflict were primarily motivated by the acquisition of jobs and education (See Shepler 2004). Interview evidence with former AFRC members also confirms this (Peters 2006). Former military members also sometimes pressured each other to join the AFRC for protection from possible civilian retaliation (Peters 2006). There is also evidence of combatants on all sides of this conflict being motivated to fight against political corruption (Peters 2006). Based on all of this, it appears that the group made both material (e.g., employment, diamond wealth) and non-material (e.g., fighting political corruption) appeals. However, based on the evidence above, it appears that the need for employment was the primary motivator of most volunteers. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*.

I did not find direct evidence describing the ethnic composition of the AFRC. However, given that (1) many members were formally part of the national military and (2) some were part of the RUF, a multi-ethnic organization (Weinstein 2005), I code the group as being multi-ethnic. As noted above, the group argued that the Mende ethnic group received unfair, preferential treatment by the government. However, it did not claim to fight on the behalf of any specific ethnic group.

The AFRC engaged extensively in forced recruitment, including through abduction (Rashid 2004). The group also used thousands of civilians as human shields during its campaign to retake Freetown in 1999 (Rashid 2004). The group reportedly abducted thousands of children to serve as combatants, laborers, and sex slaves (Amnesty International 1998; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999). Most, if not almost all, children in the group were forcibly recruited (McBride 2014). The group recruited children as young as seven (Fahy 2002).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Kamajors

Also Known As: Kamajoisia; Civil Defense Forces (CDF)

Narrative:

The Civil Defense Forces (CDF) was an umbrella organization of hunter groups from multiple tribes in Sierra Leone that formed to fight with the government against the Revolutionary United Front (Dalby 2017). The Kamajors were the strongest group in the CDF (Dalby 2017). While the CDF operated throughout Sierra Leone, the Kamajors operated primarily in the south (IRBC 2003).

Recruits were attracted to the group by a variety of material and non-material appeals. Especially in the later stages of the conflict, many individuals joined to acquire government handouts, to carry out revenge against the RUF and AFRC, or to settle personal disputes (Dalby 2017). Recruitment into the group was unregulated, so it is unclear how many members were in the group (Dalby 2017).

Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) surveyed former members of the CDF, of which the Kamajors were the dominant faction. 70% of the members of the CDF reported joining because they supported the political goals of the group, suggesting that ideological appeals played a vital role in recruitment. Almost 16% stated that they joined to protect their community while just over 50% noted that they feared what would happen if they did not join. 5% said they joined for retaliation. The group also heavily employed ethnic-based recruitment appeals (Zack-Williams 1997). Recruitment also focused on the protection of civilians (Ferme and Hoffman 2004).

Initiation rites played an important role in group socialization. These rites included placing the ashes of burned herbs and paper with verses from the Quran, on the recruits' skin (Dalby 2017). The fighters were told that they would be immune from bullets if they followed certain rules, ranging from not drinking alcohol to not deserting the group (Dalby 2017). As the conflict drew on, these rituals became more important for recruitment and made initiation more costly (Ferme and Hoffman 2004).

Based on the above information, a variety of ideological appeals appear to have played a central role in recruitment into the Kamajors. There is some evidence of material recruitment appeals mattering as well. As noted above, individuals increasingly joined the group to gain material benefits from the government in later stages of the conflict (Dalby 2017). Material goods played a role in solidifying patronage networks in the group (Hoffman 2007, p. 658). Among those Humphreys and Weinstein surveyed, however, only 0.4% stated that they were offered money to join. Thus, the group appears to have made some material appeals, but in a rather limited capacity. As a result, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

Social networks appear to have played an important role in recruitment. Members were conscripted with the approval of traditional authority figures in order to ensure a high level of commitment (Muana 1997). Members of the Kamajors are predominantly from the Mende tribe

(Dalby 2017). Hoffman (2007) argues that social connections are essential to prestige among the Mende and thus play an important role in both recruitment and advancement in the ranks of the Kamajors. Furthermore, Hoffman (2004) argues that “Initiation into the Kamajors became synonymous with initiation into Mende manhood” (p. 224). In Humphreys and Weinstein’s aforementioned survey, 1.4% of respondents said they joined, in part, due to social pressures to do so.

Captured RUF fighters would also sometimes be integrated into the ranks of the CDF if someone vouched for them (Hoffman 2007). Indeed, Hoffman (2007) argues that existing social networks were not replaced during the war, rather, they were simply militarized. Former ULIMO fighters from Liberia (who were primarily in Liberian refugee camps in Sierra Leone) also fought with the Kamajors (Hoffman 2007). Thus, while the group was mostly Mende, other ethnic and tribal groups were likely represented as well. The group also cooperated with South African mercenaries to establish control over diamond zones (Woollacott 2000). Coercion and force played a limited role in recruitment into the Kamajors. As noted above, members would only be conscripted with the approval of traditional authority figures (Muana 1997). In Humphreys and Weinstein’s survey, they find that only 2% of former CDF members interviewed had been abducted into the group.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UPA

Also Known As: Ugandan People's Army (UPA)

Narrative:

The UPA was one of several armed groups that formed in Uganda in the late 1980s to oppose the country's leader, Yoweri Museveni (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). The UPA formed in 1987 when it split from the Ugandan People's Democratic Army (UPDA) (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). The group continued to fight until 1991 (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013).

State violence against civilians and former combatants is often cited as driving the formation of the UPA and interviews with former participations in the conflict present the narrative that the war was about survival (Lindemann 2010). Thus, while not necessarily strongly ideologically motivated, many of the rank-and-file appear to have joined for self-defense. Many young boys also reported joining the group for protection, as they viewed it as their only source of security during the conflict (de Berry 2001; Cherwon 2014). Government violence left many children orphaned and homeless, essentially forcing them to join the UPA (Cherwon 2014).

Furthermore, the group was able to mobilize support by blaming members of the Karamojong ethnic group and the government's complicity/inability stop devastating cattle raids that were bad for the local economy (Lewis 2017). However, these raids did not occur until after the conflict broke out, and one former UPA leader admitted that the group knew that the cattle raids would help gain support for the group and that some members of the UPA were even involved in some of the raids (Lewis 2017).

Early on, however, the group focused on maintaining secrecy, and as a result, so they relied on a small group of reliable individuals before trying to win broad support (Lewis 2017). The role of these cattle raids in mobilizing support for the UPA is also extensively discussed by de Berry (2001). Indeed, de Berry argues that the loss of cattle became the main rallying cry for the UPA. She emphasizes that cattle were essential in Iteso communities because they provided economic livelihood and were exchanged for brides. Thus, boys and young men were angry at the loss of social and economic opportunity and the lack of government protection that led to these losses. This led to some young men to join the UPA to acquire the necessary wealth to acquire a bride from looting, while others want to bring back general material prosperity to the Teso region (de Berry 2001, p. 102). Thus, rallying around the loss of cattle appears to have both ideological (e.g., blaming the government and another ethnic group) and material (e.g., acquisition of wealth) dimensions.

The group recruited primarily from the Iteso people as well as former UNLA special forces (Golooba-Mutebi 2008). Social networks also played a role in recruitment into the group as boys would often join because of influence from their peers (de Berry 2001; Cherwon 2014). Relatedly, boys who joined the group were inspired by their peers who had guns and the ability to loot and get food (de Berry 2001; Cherwon 2014). The UPA used children as both messengers

and soldiers (de Berry 2001; Cherwon 2014). I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment.

Ideological and material considerations both clearly played a role in the recruitment process. Two of the main motives of recruits appear to have been self-defense and the acquisition of wealth. Additionally, some individuals were inspired to join because their peers in the group had acquired food and loot. Thus, material appeals likely played a more prominent role. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. However, because the extent to which rallying around the issue of cattle raids was about ideology vs. material gain is somewhat ambiguous, I assign a moderate certainty to this coding.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: LRA

Also Known As: Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

Narrative:

A report by Arieff, Blanchard, and Husted (2015) argues that while the group initially espoused some ethno-regional based socioeconomic and political grievances through its political wing, the Lord's Resistance Movement, the group does not have clear political or economic goals, and rather, seem to function primarily to protect the leadership. For instance, an early goal of the group was to establish a Christian theocracy based around the 10 commandments (Fischer and Wanjohi 2014). However, while religious ideology long played an important role in the group's indoctrination practices, the establishment of a theocracy does not appear to have been a clear and consistent goal throughout the group's history that was used for mobilization.

Forced recruitment of both children and adults is rampant in the LRA (Pham, Vinck, and Stover 2008). Indeed, since the early 1990s, since the group started using forced recruitment, the group was comprised of almost all abducted recruits, with the exception of a few officers (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 2012). Reports indicate that most members of the group were forced to join. Abducted recruits fill a variety of roles for the LRA including "porters, scouts, sex slaves, and junior fighters" (Arieff, Blanchard, and Husted 2015, p. 3). A 2002 military campaign by the Ugandan government put significant pressure on the LRA. In 2003, the group doubled the 12,000 abducted children in the group from the year before, and in 2004, that number was upwards of 30,000. The LRA mainly focuses on boys ages 12 to 16, they typically avoid recruiting children younger than this or release them (but not always), and there are not distinguishable patterns for the recruitment of children older than 16 (globalsecurity.org).

In fact, there does not appear to be any evidence of children voluntarily joining the LRA for economic opportunities (Falkenburg 2013). The LRA violently kidnaps many of the children it forces into the group, while other children are born into the group (Falkenburg 2013). The group initially recruited ethnic Acholis, but pro-government civil defense forces recruited Acholis as well. This led the LRA to step up its violence against the Acholis, which made the group very unpopular (Arieff, Blanchard, and Husted 2015).

There were important gendered differences in the roles that were assigned to abducted male and female recruits. Nkabala (2014) details the role of women in the LRA. She notes that while upwards of 30% of LRA members were female, they were never in top leadership positions (though there were some female officers), they were typically assigned to logistical support roles including medical care and prayer. However, she notes that female members do sometimes serve in combat roles.

Thus, because I could not find evidence of the group employing any sort of persuasive appeals, and only evidence that it relied on forced recruitment, the LRA does not enter RAID.

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: WNB

Also Known As: West Nile Bank Front (WNB)

Narrative:

The group began its fight against President Yoweri Museveni in 1995 and was no longer engaging in significant activity by 1998 (International Business Publications 2011). The WNB sought to return Idi Amin to power (Ciment 2015). It also sought an “autonomous Islamic state in norther Uganda” (Ciment 2015). The group also claimed to fight for multiparty democracy in Uganda (UCDP). Despite these claims, the WNB appears to have relied exclusively on material recruitment appeals, as it promised high wages to recruits (however, these promises were false) (International Business Publications 2011). Given this, I code the group as relying *exclusively on material incentives*.

The WNB recruited from the Kakwa and Aringa ethnic groups (Baker 2001). Strong support and family networks in the Arua District allowed the group to operate more easily (Payne 1998). Many of the early recruits in the West Nile conflict were former members or soldiers of the recently disposed regime (Bogner and Rosenthal 2017). The WNB eventually turned to forced recruitment (International Business Publications 2011). Abduction appears to be its primary form of forced recruitment (The New Humanitarian 1996). The WNB used child soldiers (Child Soldiers International 2001).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ADF

Also Known As: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

Narrative:

The ADF was formed by Ugandan Islamic militants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with the goal of overthrowing the Ugandan government and replacing it with an Islamic state. There is evidence of the ADF employing ideological recruitment appeals. More recently, recruitment propaganda by the group has included ethnic and jihadist-based rhetoric (Nantulya 2019). The group has also been successful in playing off of local grievances as well as using multiple ideologies to recruit new members (Nantulya 2019). The group also uses online videos to disseminate recruitment propaganda (Congo Research Group 2018). Such propaganda includes striving for “Allah’s cause” and stopping polytheism (Congo Research Group 2018). However, the exact role of religion in the group has been disputed, as many scholars, observers, and some former members argue that the group has a much more political drive, and that Islam was used for more instrumental purposes (Postings 2018). The group has become more radical, and more aligned with ISIS, in more recent years (Postings 2018). However, the implementation of sharia law within the group began in the early 2000s (Beevor 2019).

Scorgie-Porter (2015), however, argues that while Islamist appeals played an important role in the ADF’s recruitment process, other economic and political grievances matter as well. She further argues that the group’s Islamist ideology was even strategically adopted to draw in more members. Regional and local politics also mattered, as many individuals were mobilized around the political marginalization of the borderland region (Scorgie-Porter 2015). Some individuals even mobilized forming a Rwenzori kingdom (Scorgie-Porter 2015). The group also mobilized individuals by calling on them to protect their communities (Scorgie-Porter 2015).

There is also evidence of the ADF employing material recruitment incentives. Some members were former UPDF soldiers, and other militants, who were looking for a more lucrative job (Scorgie-Porter 2015). The ADF also took advantage of the political and economic marginalization of the borderland regions by offering material incentives to recruits. Scorgie-Porter (2015, p. 10) writes that “of those who willingly joined the group, many reported being swayed by promises of lower tax rates, schooling opportunities, assistance in acquiring houses, or positions in local and national government structures once the ADF took power.” Scorgie-Porter cites other interview evidence in which people claimed that children joined the ADF because they had lost faith in the government and because of the promise of jobs once the Museveni regime was ousted. She notes that people were also offered business loans if the group was successful. Recruit drives for youth included promises of jobs and government posts as well (Scorgie-Porter 2015). The ADF also started offering a salary of \$100 a month, which was very high for the region, and actually decreased the demand that the group had for forced recruitment (Scorgie-Porter). Being an ADF combatant was one of the most lucrative jobs in the region and rebels from many extinct groups joined the ADF to make money as well (Scorgie-Porter 2015).

Overall, Scorgie-Porter (2015) argues that while the group's Islamist ideology was an important mobilizing tool, regional political issues and economic incentives were also vital recruitment tools. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*.

The ADF has recruited members from Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda (Nantulya 2019). Recruits come from the Congo as well (Congo Research Group 2018). The group is multi-ethnic (Scorgie-Porter, p. 7). Former members of the Interahamwe or FAR who were fleeing the Goma region also joined the group (Scorgie-Porter 2015). The group also used social networks for coercion, having members convince their families and communities to join the group for self-defense, often lying about impending attacks (Scorgie-Porter 2015).

Many of the early members of the group and leaders were important figures in Jamaat al-Tabligh in Uganda (Postings 2018) as well as the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) (Beevor 2019). The ADF also ran schools in its camps that provided Islamic education to children (Postings 2018). The group also uses women as recruiters (Congo Research Group 2018). The ADF has attempted to increase its number of troops through kidnapping (The New Humanitarian 2013) and forced recruitment played a vital role in the ADF gaining troops, though it came to depend on this tactic less over time (Scorgie-Porter 2015).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FDU

Also Known As: FDP; Cobras

Narrative:

I could not sufficient enough information on this group to code any of its recruitment practices. Indeed, the group does not even have a UCDP profile. Other sources also suggest that the FDU later turned into the Cobras (Amnesty International 1999; Home Office of the United Kingdom 2002), which the NSA lists as a separate actor. Given the lack of information on this group, it is missing from RAID.

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FLEC-FAC and FLEC

Also Known As: Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC-FAC)

Narrative:

FLEC-FAC formed when it split off from FLEC in 1975 and has been fighting the Angolan government with the hopes of achieving independence of the Cabinda province (UCDP). The Cabinda province contains much of the country's oil and oil exports from this region account for the majority of Angola's GDP, and thus, Angola has been highlighted as a prime example of the resource curse (Hammond 2011). The group wants full control of oil production in the region but also independence for the region (Ojakorotu 2011).

Information on the group's recruitment practices is limited. I find some evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia notes that the group was "described as the most radical of all the Cabindan separatist faction" (UCDP). FLEC-FAC also claims that Cabinda was not fairly consulted when it was integrated with the rest of Angola and that the region has its own distinct identity, history and culture (Minorities at Risk Project 2006). The group has publicly called on civilians to join FLEC in fighting for the "independence of the fatherland" and to free the people of Cabinda (BBC 1985). The group also declared the need for everyone to put aside their differences to fight the Cuban troops (BBC 1985). Pearce (2005) finds most individuals in Cabinda to be supporters of FLEC and its goals.

There is also some (indirect) evidence of the group making material recruitment appeals. In 2008, a former FLEC activist claimed that there was no longer an armed conflict in Cabinda, but rather, the violence was a result of bandits attempting to settle personal scores (Africa Research Bulletin 2008). Given the above evidence, *I code the group as relying exclusively on ideological appeals before 2008, and exclusively on material appeals from 2008 onwards*. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Based on information in the EPR Atlas, I code FLEC-FAC as non-multi-ethnic and FLEC-R as multi-ethnic. FLEC-FAC extensively recruits children. The group allegedly has used children as young as 8 and among their child soldiers, 30-40% are girls (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000). One report notes that upwards of 200 children had been press-ganged (BBC 1999).

I did not find distinguishable differences between the recruitment practices of FLEC and FLEC-FLAC. Indeed, FLEC-FAC is considered the most radical of the various FLEC factions (BBC 1999), suggesting that it might have attracted even more ideologically committed members. Thus, I code both groups as making the same kinds of recruitment appeals. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate uncertainty to the coding.

Certainty Code: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: SNM

Also Known As: Somali National Movement (SNM)

Narrative:

The SNM was formed by members of the Isaaq Clan of northwestern Somalia in 1981 to oppose the Siad Barre regime (United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 1999). The movement was motivated by the fact that Barre predominantly incorporated individuals from his southern-based clan, excluding northern-based clans, including the Isaaq Clan (BBC 2001). Barre fled in January of 1991 and the SNM declared the independence of the territory it controlled in May of that year (United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 1999).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group had elements of Islamist fundamentalism, and combatants even referred to themselves as mujahidin, which helped with group morale, but such an ideology was not at the core of the movement (Adam 1994). Marxism also did not play a significant role in the group (Adam 1994). However, the flexibility the group had with ideology helped it to recruit many followers (Bakonyi 2015). The SNM pushed a narrative that each tribe should “liberate itself,” which limited the degree to which other tribes were integrated into the movement (Adam 1994).

There is also evidence of the group making material recruitment appeals. A 1993 report from the Human Rights Watch notes that all factions in the conflict recruited along clan lines and through the promise material rewards (particularly from looting from other clans). High levels of youth unemployment also provided a cheap labor pool for all groups in the conflict (Menkhaus 2011). However, the evidence for the SNM employing ideological recruitment appeals is more direct and Bakonyi (2015) discusses the importance of the group’s flexible ideology in mobilizing recruits. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, given that there is some uncertainty as to the frequency at which these appeals were employed, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

While the core leadership and many of the members are from the Isaaq clan, it did have non-Isaaq members (United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 1999). The broader Somali ethnic group comprises most of the population of Somalia, however, clan divides play a key role in the politics of the country. Tribal leaders played an important role in helping the group recruit combatants as well as to demobilize child soldiers from the group, following the conflict (Adam 1994). Although the group had upwards of 4,000 of regulars, and many thousands more it could mobilize, it still had poor organization and discipline (Adam 1994). Refugee camps in Ethiopia also served as an important recruitment ground for the group (Bakonyi and Stuvøy 2005). Reports indicate that the SNM did not use forced recruitment and that clan members did not face pressure to join (War Resisters’ International 1998). However, the group used child soldiers, some as young as 6, many of whom had fled government security forces (War Resisters’ International 1998).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Narrative: SPM

Also Known As: Somali Patriotic Movement

Narrative:

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Specifically, the SPM leader, Ahmed Omar Jess, exploited sub-clan grievances to mobilize recruits (Hall 2015). While there had been Ogadeni representation in the Barre regime, there was eventually a split. The Ogadenis were excluded from power and rebelled, and with clan politics playing the central role in the conflict (Compagnon 1992). Bakonyi (2015) likewise argues that the group employed clan-based frames to mobilize support. Bakonyi and Stuvøy (2005) argues that economic and political grievances, and government repression, led to the formation of many of the resistance groups during this conflict, and that these groups used clan-affiliation to mobilize recruits (Bakonyi and Stuvøy 2005).

There is also (indirect) evidence of the group making material recruitment appeals. A 1993 report from the Human Rights Watch notes that all factions in the conflict recruited along clan lines and through the promise material rewards (particularly from looting from other clans). High levels of youth unemployment also provided a cheap labor pool for all groups in the conflict (Menhaus 2011). Peterson (1992) argues that the group's leader, Omar Jess, was allowing his group to engage in widespread looting and might have even been profiting from it. Based on the above evidence, the group likely used both ideological and material recruitment appeals. However, the use of clan-based mobilization frames, and economic and political grievances, are much more commonly cited methods of recruitment for the SPM than are material appeals (i.e., permission to loot). Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. The group recruited primarily from the Ogadeni sub-clan of the Darod clan (Duyvesteyn 2004). Members of the SPM were exclusively recruited from this clan (Bakonyi 2009). I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: USC and USC-Faction

Also Known As: The United Somali Congress

Narrative:

The USC formed in 1989 with the intent of serving as an umbrella organization for several groups that were fighting the Barre regime (i.e., SSDF, SPM, SDM) (Reno 2011). Bakonyi (2015) argues that the group employed clan-based frames to mobilize support. The group also emphasized the injustices of the current government as well as the bravery of their own members in sacrificing their lives (Bakonyi 2015). The group's recruitment strategy focused heavily on anti-Darod rhetoric, painting the clan as controlling all the economic and political power in urban areas (Hall 2015).

There is (indirect) evidence of the group making material recruitment appeals. A 1993 report from the Human Rights Watch notes that all factions in the conflict recruited along clan lines and through the promise material rewards (particularly from looting from other clans). High levels of youth unemployment also provided a cheap labor pool for all groups in the conflict (Menkhaus 2011). Group leadership claimed that gangs arose during the mass uprisings that looted, robbed, and were difficult to control (Bakonyi 2009). Peterson (1992) argues that the group's leader, Mohammed Farah Aidid, was allowing his group to engage in widespread looting and might have even been profiting from it. Bakonyi (2010), however, argues that looting occurred for many different reasons during this conflict that went beyond the simple desire for material gain. One former supporter of the group even claimed that the USC did not want its members to loot, but it was too decentralized to stop them (Bakonyi 2015).

Thus, the group appears to have employed both ideological and material recruitment appeals. However, the evidence is less clear as to which appeal the group relied on more. Based on the discussion by Hall (2015), anti-Darod rhetoric appeared to have played a central role in the group's recruitment. This evidence is also more direct than the 1993 Human Rights Watch report that finds that all parties on the conflict mobilized fighters through material rewards. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

The USC recruited exclusively from the Hawiye clan, and from two of its sub-clans—Abgal and Habar Gidir (Lewis 2008; Bakonyi 2009). Many of its members were formally soldiers in the national military (Bakonyi 2009), as well as mujahidin, and it recruited in Ethiopia (Morgan 2015). None of the evidence clearly distinguished between the USC and the USC-Faction. Thus, I code both groups' recruitment tactics the same.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: SRRC

Also Known As: Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC)

Narrative:

The SRRC opposed the Transitional National Government (TNG) and was primarily composed of southern warlords outside of the rebuilding process (Dutch Immigration Service 2002). The group was co-chaired by representatives from the Somali National Alliance (SNA), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), and the Southern Somalia National Movement (SSNM), among other warlords (Dutch Immigration Service 2002). The rhetoric of the group was rather vague, but it called for a more broad-based reconciliation government (Dutch Immigration Service 2002).

Given that the SRRC is an alliance of existing militant groups, there is not a substantial amount of information on specific recruitment strategies of the SRRC. In the absence of more specific information on this group, I consider the recruitment tactics of its factions. The SPM the SNA each employed ideological and material appeals, but both relied more on ideological appeals. The USC-Faction, which is also known as the SNA, likewise employed both ideological and material recruitment appeals, but relied more heavily on ideological appeals (see the corresponding narratives for each group).

The RRA recruited around clan and genealogical lines as well (Bakonyi 2013). The goal of the group is to create an independent Southwestern Somalia (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2010). The group recruited from the Rahanweyn clan family and the Digil and Mirifle sub-clans (Bakonyi 2013). However, the group also experienced divisions along clan lines (Bakonyi 2013). However, there is an overall lack of direct information on other recruitment practices of the RRA. As noted in other narratives on groups in this conflict, mobilization along clan lines and with material appeals was common (Human Rights Watch 1993), suggesting that the RRA might have used some combination of these tactics.

Overall, the various factions of the SRRC appear to use both material and ideological recruitment appeals. However, I found at least three of its faction to recruit predominantly with ideological appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: PIRA/IRA

Also Known As: Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

Narrative:

The PIRA formed in 1969 when the original IRA split, resulting in the PIRA and the Original IRA (OIRA) (Gill and Horgan 2013). The PIRA viewed itself as the true defender of Catholics and protection against the loyalists (Gill and Horgan 2013). Bloom (2017) finds that the PIRA engaged in a meticulous recruitment process, seeking out only individuals that they considered to be highly qualified.

The PIRA employed a variety of ideological recruitment appeals. The group relied more on internal political indoctrination than its predecessor, including providing a “Green Book” to all new recruits, which covered the group’s structure and code of conduct (Dingley 2012; Scuto 2018). Violence by the British government was also used to draw in recruits. Indeed, Bloody Sunday helped to increase support (Schaub and Darken 2007) and recruitment (Gregory 2010) for the group. Kenney (2010) argues that many new recruits joined the PIRA because of perceived abuses by the British military rather than because of ideological similarities to the traditional Republicans.

Bloom (2017) notes that the PIRA tailored its recruitment appeals based on the specific individuals that were being reached out to. She writes that these include (1) patriotic appeals if the individual came from a privileged family, (2) social advancement if they were from a poor family, and (3) emphasized the revolutionary nature if the family was disapproving. While there is evidence that promises of social advancement were used, I did not find any evidence of material incentives being used for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The PIRA has a youth wing, Na Fianna Eireann, which it relied heavily upon for socialization and recruitment (Gill and Horgan 2013). However, Na Fianna Eireann was disbanded in the 1990s, which substantially reduced the number of youth in the PIRA (Gill and Horgan 2013). This was replaced with another youth organization, the Ogra Sinn Fein, which reflected the group’s divergence from recruiting minors (Gill and Horgan 2013). The PIRA also relied heavily on kinship ties for recruitment, rather than identification with the PIRA (Kenney 2010).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Communist Party of the Philippines

Also Known As: Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA)

Narrative:

The CPP was founded in the Philippines in December of 1968, and its armed wing (the New People's Army) in 1969, with the goal of disposing the Philippine government, replacing it with a state run by the working class, and expelling U.S. influence from the country (Mapping Military Organizations 2018). The group is primarily modeled after Mao's movement in China and the group focuses primarily on mobilizing support in rural areas (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

While primarily a rural movement, many educated individuals from urban areas joined the group in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly after Marcos imposed martial law on the country in 1972 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). The group has made several types of ideological recruitment appeals. In order to gain support from a larger portion of the population, the group has focused more on anti-Marcos sentiment, land reform, government abuse, and nationalism than on communism. Anti-imperialism is also an important source of rhetoric for the group. Marxism-Leninism and Catholic Liberation theology is all justified with the façade of nationalism (Central Intelligence Agency 1985). Exposure to Catholic liberation theology specifically was important for recruitment (International Crisis Group 2011). Ferrer and Cabangbang (2012) argues that the martial law imposed by Marcos attracted many recruits to the group and the Maoist ideology of the group was attractive to many vulnerable individuals in the country.

According to a report in the Global Security newsletter, the group "continued recruiting ideologically aligned members at Philippine universities and in poor parts of the archipelago." Domingo (2013) credits the group's longevity with its ability to maintain a viable recruitment pool. Domingo (2013) argues ideologically similar individuals joined the CPP, but that the group has increasingly relied on social networks for recruitment (whereas it previously drew more heavily on university students and peasants in Luzon). However, unlike the Islamist networks in the Philippines, these networks are not based on blood-ties (Domingo 2013). Domingo (2013) argues that most of the rank-and-file did not join the group because of its specific ideology, but rather, to address perceived injustices that took a variety of forms, including land disputes and abuses by local and national governments, including security forces. Other sources note a similar dynamic as well (Branigin 1984). Domingo further argues that many who join view the group to address these injustices and/or provide a living and social advancement. Domingo argues that, overall, the group is able to generate support primarily because of the government's ineffectiveness on a variety of issues, especially in dealing with socioeconomic problems and corruption. Domingo notes that many of the core members of the groups, and some "intellectuals," joined because of their support for the ideology of the group, while many of the rank-and-file joined because of structural conditions, such as poverty and government corruption and abuse. As further evidence of the ideological nature of the group's recruitment strategy, the

group launched a massive indoctrination program in the countryside in 1998 to gain new recruits to offset previous losses (Xinhua 1998).

Domingo (2013) details the extensive, three-stage recruitment process that the CPP employs. The author refers to this first stage as “spotting.” In this stage, undercover cadres engage in conversations with potential recruits to assess if their political beliefs and activities align with those of the group. Domingo calls the second social investigation. In this part of the process, the group attempts to learn more about the background of potential recruits, including information about their family and ties to government officials and employees. Domingo argues that this stage exists to determine if the recruit is a liability to the organization. The final stage requires recruits to participate in an actual mission. Walch (2014) notes that while the group’s recruitment patterns have changed over time, most of its recruitment efforts are still directed at reaching out and screening individuals to determine if they would buy into the ideology of the group. The group has offered a basic party course since 1979 and a set of “basic rules” since 1969 (International Crisis Group 2011).

Evidence of the use of material recruitment appeals is not as clear. The CPP appears to have implemented land-reform programs, though it is probably exaggerating the scale of the program. The CIA report lists these as rewards, but it’s unclear how direct of a role, if any, they play in recruitment into the armed wing of the group (Central Intelligence Agency 1985). As noted above, some members join the group as a means of making a living (Domingo 2013). Despite undergoing ideological and military training, newer recruits have been found to be less ideologically motivated (International Crisis Group 2011). The group provides healthcare and seedlings in communities that it recruits from to gain a foothold (International Crisis Group 2011).

Overall, however, the evidence suggests that ideological appeals are much more commonly used. Indeed, the above cited evidence from Domingo (2013) indicates that the CPP not only employs a variety of types of ideological appeals, but that it typically seeks out ideologically motivated individuals to recruit. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

Members of the NPA who found life in the group too difficult were allowed to surrender but were given death threats to not cooperate with the government (International Crisis Group 2011). One former member claimed to be recruited through deception (Thai News Service 2019). The Kabataang Makabayan (KM) is the youth wing of the organization and has played an important role in its recruitment efforts (Fabe 2011). The Catholic Church has helped expand the groups network (International Crisis Group 2011). The group also uses the internet for recruitment (Wilson 2019). The CPP has recruited from both the police and military (BBC 2003). The group also recruited former members of Huk army (Associated Press 1986). A 1999 BBC report finds that the group started recruiting former rebels. The government claims that Indigenous Peoples are most vulnerable to the propaganda of the group (Lopez 2019). The group has a committee dedicated to Moros but has had difficulty in recruiting them (International Crisis Group 2011).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narratives: JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The JSS formed in response to perceived injustice and discrimination faced by the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts' (CHT) region of Bangladesh, which included mass Bengali migration and clashes over land, which led to socioeconomic downturn in the region (Ahsan and Chakma 1989). The primary goal of the group was to preserve the rights of the indigenous persons living in the CHT (Panday and Jamil 2015). There is (indirect) evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. In its early years, the group was able to recruit youth who resented the authority of the central government (Bashar 2011). Abuses by government security forces drove many younger people to join the group (Ahsan and Chakma 1989). Bangladesh's Foreign Minister, in 1987, accused the group of employing misleading propaganda and that the group was held "alien political ideology (BBC 1987). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence related to ideological appeals, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

There were also notable divides within the organization. Members of the Mru ethnic group left JSS in the 1980s due to mistreatment by the group and JSS was plagued by division over ideology and tactics (Braithwaite and D'Costa 2012). Given that there was discrimination within the group against Mru members, the organization was likely multi-ethnic. The JSS recruited Bangladeshi refugees from refugee camps (Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs-U.S. House of Representatives 1988; Refugee Review Tribunal 2005). The group also allegedly recruited new members during the ceasefire (Mustafa 1995).

There is some evidence of the group using forced recruitment. For instance, a Financial Times article from 1990 states that the group evicted 164 families from their homes in the CHT for refusing to join the group. The group also allegedly once killed three people when a person in the household refused to join the group (BBC 1987).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FMLN

Also Known As: Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN); Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front

Narrative:

Ideological training played a vital role in the FMLN's socialization of new recruits. Hammond (1996) notes that the group was able to socialize its combatants despite a lack of material resources and constant threats. Hammond notes that some combatants did not find the political education necessary, as they were more concerned with injustices perpetrated by the government rather than specifics of leftist ideology. Hammond further argues that ideological training was still likely important for status in the organization as there were few differences material differences between the various ranks/positions in the group. The FPL (one of the five groups that merged together to form the FMLN) recruited members by establishing leftist groups at universities and then seeking out the most radicalized students in those groups (Álvarez 2010). Social networks also played an important role in FPL recruitment (Álvarez 2010).

Viterna (2013) provides a detailed description of FMLN recruitment processes. She argues that before 1984, the two types of recruits in the organization were the "politicized" and the "reluctant." After 1985, most joiners were "recruited." Specifically, Viterna argues that politicized recruits were predominantly men who had participated in large militant organizations before the war and that "reluctant" combatants were those who had joined because they believed it was their safest option. Viterna argues that women were systematically excluded from recruitment during this time period because women were viewed as not having a strong ideological adherence to the movement because of perceived differences in prewar participation (See Becerra's 2016 synthesis of Viterna 2013). However, when the organization eventually did begin recruiting women, recruiters sought how women who were ideologically committed to the group's cause (Viterna 2013). Thus, even when some individuals started joining for personal protection, the group was still employing ideological appeals.

Courtney (2010) argues that children that joined the FMLN had a variety of motives including: "a real desire to improve societal conditions, for familial reasons, for revenge factors, and for protection" (p. 539). The FMLN, however, discouraged certain personal motives, especially revenge (Courtney 2010). Some children that joined did so because they were already labeled as rebels by the government and believed joining the group would make them safer (Courtney 2010).

There is very limited evidence of individuals joining for material benefit. Hoover Green (2018), for instance, finds that among the former participants she surveyed, most members of the Salvadorian armed forces were motivated by economic considerations while most FMLN recruits were driven by ideological beliefs. Recruits had a wide variety of other motives that cannot be neatly categorized as what we consider to traditionally be "ideological" motives. Such motives include joining for a sense of adventure (Viterna 2015), joining for revenge (Viterna

2015), and joining for the emotional benefits of participation (Wood 2003). However, as discussed above, some recruits did join the group for personal protection, particularly starting in 1985. However, even during this time, the group continued to employ a variety of ideological appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals before 1985 and on mostly ideological appeals from 1985 onwards*.

Social networks also played an important role in recruitment into the FMLN. Joiners, especially children, would follow family members into the group (Cohn and Goodwin 1994; Miller 2016). Particularly in the initial stages of the conflict, most members were recruited by friends or family members (Bracamonte, Spencer, and Perdomo 1995). The group also used a radio channel and a magazine to disseminate propaganda to gain more support (Courtney 2010). The group was primarily comprised of campesinos who were primarily indigenous peoples (Wood 2003).

It is estimated that approximately 20% of the FMLN combatants were under the age of 18 (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2004). Many of the child soldiers were girls (Courtney 2010). While the FMLN did use some forced recruitment, El Salvador's armed forces (FAES) relied much more on force to recruit children, while the FMLN focused more on ideological training children (Courtney 2010). Unlike the government, the FMLN only used forced recruitment in the beginning of the conflict (Courtney 2010). The group rarely used abduction and press-ganging, and instead, relied primarily on a system of geographic quotas (i.e., villages were required to provide a certain number of recruits) (Courtney 2010). A survey conducted by UNICEF of youth members of the group reveals that 91.2% joined voluntarily (Courtney 2010). The FMLN used "kid units" and propaganda units to use persuasion to recruit youth as well (Courtney 2010). The group also likely punished deserters (Courtney 2010).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: URNG

Also Known As: Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)

Narrative:

The URNG formed in 1982 to coordinate the activities of four insurgent groups: EGP, FAR, ORPA, and PGT (Allison 2006). This umbrella organization faced a series of challenges including military defeats, the failure to develop a base of opposition, and the failure of their Marxist-Leninist agenda to challenge the political order of the time (Allison 2006). The group transitioned to a political party in 1997 (Allison 2006).

Revolutionary nationalism was at the center of much of the group's recruitment propaganda, and liberation theology played an important role as (Bibler 2007). In rural areas in particular, abuses by the military were the ORPA's most effective recruitment tool (Bibler 2007). The URNG also proclaimed that they sought equality for indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, and two of the members groups—the EGP and ORPA—made a particular effort to mobilize Mayas (Elgueta 2018). Recruitment pamphlets focused heavily on revolutionary nationalism and not Marxism (Bibler 2007). The ORPA's political propaganda appeared to be successful in mobilizing a significant number of recruits (Bibler 2007).

The government considered the Maya population to be supporters of the URNG and to protect themselves from the resulting government counterinsurgency campaign, many joined the URNG (Van Cott 1996). Indeed, self-protection was part of the group's recruitment efforts (Bibler 2007). The URNG collected war taxes, and "criminal elements" of the organization took back taxes (U.S. Department of State 1997). During mobilization and negotiations, some URNG combatants remobilized as criminal gangs (Burgerman 2006).

Thus, the group appears to frequently employ both ideological and material recruitment appeals. Evidence from Bibler (2007) indicates that that both revolutionary nationalist appeals, and appeals for self-defense, were vital recruitment tactics. Thus, based on the central role of these two types of appeals, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*.

The group was comprised of a large number of Maya indigenous groups (Hauge 2011). 70.8% of the group's members were indigenous (Hauge 2011). Other estimates are as high as 81.5% (Hauge 2011). However, most of the group's leaders were not Maya (Elgueta 2018). The group also recruited from leftist urban elites and working class leaders, such as trade unionists (Elgueta 2018). The ORPA recruited heads of families with the hope that they would bring more recruits with them (Bibler 2007). Forced recruitment was a common practice for both the government and the groups that comprised the URNG (International Committee of the Red Cross 2005).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: EZLN

Also Known As: Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN)

Narrative:

The EZLN formed in 1983 from the remnants of the National Liberation Forces (FLN), a leftist guerilla group that Mexican government essentially eliminated in the early 1970s (Estrada-Saavedra 2013). The EZLN pursued similar goals to that of the FLN (Estrada-Saavedra 2013). The EZLN originated in rural areas but had cells of students and workers in urban areas (Estrada-Saavedra 2013). The group did not seek to overthrow or destroy the Mexican state, but rather, sought to help democratic movements and put pressure on the anti-democratic PRI (Wager and Schulz 1994).

A combination of ideological appeals and social networks played an important role in the EZLN's recruitment efforts. More specifically, personal and familial networks played a vital role in EZLN recruitment, as recruits who had been trained in Marxism and practical life functions, such as cooking and mechanical maintenance, would return to their villages and become instructors themselves (O'Connor and Oikonomakis 2015). From 1983-1985, EZLN recruitment was limited and focused mostly on winning over community and trade union leaders (O'Connor and Oikonomakis 2015). From 1986-1989, the group took a much more active role in indigenous communities, building extensive networks in them, and leading the majority of the membership to be indigenous (O'Connor and Oikonomakis 2015). This community integration, including the construction of things like medical clinics and meeting spaces, also helped to strengthen these community ties (O'Connor and Oikonomakis 2015).

O'Connor and Oikonomakis (2015) discusses several factors that were important in explaining the EZLN's expansion in the late 1980s. The authors note that the most significant factor was likely President Salinas' reforms to Article 27 of the Constitution, which essentially eliminated all legal avenues for land reform. O'Connor and Oikonomakis further argue that electoral fraud in 1988 further helped the group expand. Global coffee prices had also collapsed, significantly lowering farmers' incomes. Finally, they argue that the EZLN's armed rebellion provided a straightforward solution for many of its sympathizers. O'Connor and Oikonomakis ultimately conclude that the EZLN distinguished itself from many other armed groups because of mobilization within its communities, which included the provision of social services and repackaging its ideology to resonate more with its constituents. Gunderson (2010) argues that the role of EZLN-based social networks in ideological indoctrination indigenous individuals in Mexico has been exaggerated, and that existing social structures and networks had already made many indigenous individuals inclined towards a leftist insurgency against the government. Thus, EZLN's ideological propaganda did have an appeal to potential recruits.

I did not find any direct evidence of material recruitment appeals being used. As noted above, scholars have commented on the important role of social service provision in the EZLN building local networks and generating support. However, I did not find evidence to suggest that

individuals received material benefits for becoming combatants. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Wager and Schulz (1994) note that by mid-1994, indigenous populations were becoming more vocal about the hardships they faced under guerrilla rule, especially forced recruitment (Wager and Schulz 1994, p. 18). The EZLN recruits mostly from indigenous Mayan communities. Specifically, the recruit from the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Tojolabal, and Chole groups (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 1998). Most of the irregulars were indigenous persons while most of the trained cadres were mestizo and Caucasian (Wager and Schulz 1994). Liberation theology adherents in the Catholic Church, and several campesino organizations, that had been fighting for indigenous land rights created a base that gave the EZLN a ready base for recruitment (Wager and Schulz 1994). In addition to the belief that former FLN members founded the EZLN, there are also reports that some EZLN members had fought alongside Central American insurgents (Wager and Schulz 1994).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative #: FDN/Contras

Also Known As: Ejercito de Resistencia (ERN); Nicaraguan Democratic Force; Counterrevolutionaries; Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN)

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, hereafter referred to as FDN) is reported to have formed in 1981 or 1982 through the unification of a number of Honduras based armed groups, including the Nicaraguan Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ADREN) and the Nicaraguan Democratic Union (UDN). FDN was based in Honduras, with the first reports of FDN fighters entering Nicaragua in July of 1982 (Immigration and Refugee Board Canada 2000)

FDN had its beginnings within a year of the Sandistas' capture of power. Only small groups of fighters existed in the beginning, but a "political-military alliance" between José Francisco Cardenal (former president of the Chamber of Construction) and Enrique Bermúdez (a former colonel in the National Guard) created what would come to be called the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the main Contras faction (Chimene-Weiss et al. n.d.). Eventually, the group consisted of: former National Guardsmen; ex-Sandista soldiers critical of the regime; some Protestant evangelicals and Catholics who were angered by government opposition to their religion; Nicaraguan Miskito Indian Creoles who opposed the regime; peasants and farmers upset with the "intrusive" land policies under the Sandista regime. They eventually gained further support among populations disaffected by Sandista economic policies (Chimene-Weiss et al. n.d.). This provides some evidence of the group mobilizing around ideological appeals.

While external support, particularly from the United States, contributed to the rapid growth of the FDN (Chimene-Weiss et al. n.d.), I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Indeed, the FDN was a volunteer/unpaid force and this was respected, desertions were only treated harshly when they took place on the battlefield inside of Nicaragua. The practice inside the base camps in Honduras was to let members in otherwise good standing leave the force if they desired to do so (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 1999). Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

There is also evidence of the group using coercion to mobilize support. FDN units would arrive in an undefended village, gather all the residents in the town square, and publicly execute all persons suspected of working for the government or the government's political party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), including police, militia members, party members, health workers, teachers, and farmers from government-sponsored cooperatives. After this display of force, it became easier to persuade able-bodied men left alive to return to FDN base camps in Honduras and enlist in the fighting force (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada

2000). The FDN occasionally accepted voluntary enlistments from other countries (small numbers of Hondurans, Salvadorans, Costa Ricans, and others) (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 1999). Based on information in the EPR Atlas, I code the group as multi-ethnic.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Sendero Luminoso

Also Known As: The Shining Path (Translation); SL

Narrative:

Sendero Luminoso (SL) was a Maoist rebel group that operated in Peru (Blake 2017). There is evidence of the SL employing ideological appeals. Early on, the SL controlled some faculty and curriculum at the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho, which served as a recruitment mechanism (Kent 1993). Recruitment campaigns and proselytizing often went hand-in-hand (Graves 1992). Joining the SL was an incredibly rigorous process. Blake (2017) details that the group used a multi-stage process to filter out those who were not highly committed in a grueling multi-stage process that ended with recruits being required to kill a police officer and take their weapon. Thus, the group sought only the most highly committed recruits. In line with this, scholars have noted that the group emphasized primarily ideological appeals as it was seeking only those most committed to the movement (Weinstein 2007; García-Ponce 2017). SL often strategically tailored its recruitment appeals and rhetoric based on local issues of communities (Rix 1992).

There is also evidence of the SL employing material recruitment incentives. The group targets much of its recruitment efforts in the poorest parts of the country (Council on Hemispheric Affairs 2008). The economic crisis that hit Peru in the second half of the 1980s resulted in the military paying soldier a meager wage (e.g., privates were making \$10 USD a month). Many left the military as a result, and some even joined the SL because of their vulnerable economic positions (Graves 1992). Rix (1992) notes that the economic downturn that occurred in Peru, beginning around 1987, served as one of the best recruitment tools for the group. Indeed, evidence indicates that the SL began recruiting with U.S. dollars in impoverished areas (Graves 1992, p. 135).

This was the earliest I could find evidence of the group using material recruitment appeals (I also did not find evidence of them ceasing to use these appeals afterwards). However, throughout its history, the group is still considered to have relied primarily on ideological appeals (e.g., Weinstein 2007). Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals before 1987, and mostly on ideological appeals from 1987 onwards*.

The group is primarily comprised of indigenous individuals who aggrieved by minority rule in the country (Graves 1992). Social networks play an important role in recruitment into the group as current members had to vouch for new members (Weinstein 2007). Youth organizations also played an important role, including through the establishment of “Popular Schools” and various branches of the group, including the Democratic Students Association (Graves 1992). At its peak, the group allegedly forcibly recruited thousands of children from indigenous communities in areas under SL’s control (Child Soldiers 2001). As mentioned above, recruiting in high schools has also long been a strategy employed by groups.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FARC

Also Known As: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC); The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

Narrative:

Both ideological and material appeals played an important role in FARC's recruitment. Arjona and Kalyvas (2011) conducted a survey of former combatants in the Colombian conflict (both guerilla and paramilitary groups), including former FARC members. The authors asked respondents both about why they decided to list and their "self-reported motives for recruitment." When asking about the general decision to list, 39% said they enlisted out of the belief that they would have a better life as a combatant. 31% said they wanted to defend society and 35% said they wanted to join a revolutionary group. Thus, combatants appeared to be motivated both by material and ideological concerns, and these concerns were not necessarily mutually exclusive. Arjona and Kalyvas also find that 30% of respondents said that they believed that joining FARC was a small commitment and that they would go home soon. The authors argue that this shows that emotion also plays an important role in the decision to join an armed group. However, while a third of combatants believed they would have a better life if they joined FARC, only 23% were attracted to the group by the promise of goods or money. The authors further note that FARC does not offer economic awards of salaries to combatants. Thus, Arjona and Kalyvas conclude that ideological concerns matter more than material concerns for FARC, but that there are a broad array of factors that motivated individual to join the fighting. Indeed, the FARC does also emphasis such factors as comradeship, security, and respect in their recruitment messaging (McCarthy 2013). The group also sometimes promises a more thrilling lifestyle for recruits (International Crisis Group 2013). Government repression also helped increased recruitment for FARC in the 1970s.

Early on, FARC recruited mainly uneducated agrarian peasants, but eventually also turned to urban areas, with a particular focus on laborers and university students (McCarthy 2013). The international crisis group finds that FARC targets the poor and marginalized in rural communities for recruitment (International Crisis Group 2013). While a 2010 report from the Council of Hemispheric Affairs notes that FARC recruits are not given material incentives to join, and do not receive fixed salaries, the group does provide pensions and economic support for the families of members. Furthermore, the report emphasizes that the group also provides women and children with economic opportunities that they are systematically excluded from in broader Colombian society. An official from UNICEF stated in 2007 that children often see FARC membership as a life-long employer and income source (United Nations 2007; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008).

While FARC initially had purely political goals, the organization eventually became heavily involved in crime, leading many to assume that mainly material-seeking individuals joined the group upon its turn to crime (McCarthy 2013). Indeed, membership began to greatly expand in the 1980s when FARC became more heavily involved in the drug trade. Specifically,

many unemployed youth did not have job prospects in the shrinking legitimate local economy, and as a result, joined FARC (Vargas 1999; Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). McCarthy (2013) argues that Colombian security forces found substantial evidence of local governance by FARC during their raids under President Uribe, suggesting that the group cared about more than just material gain. However, he also argues that during this period (2002-2010), FARC struggled to gain many ideologically committed recruits for several reasons. First, the group lost several key leaders who were difficult to replace. Second, there was an increase in the recruitment of children. Third, 90% of the group was illiterate and had little formal education. Fourth, the group had to cut back many of its political meetings as its operations were intensifying, so new members were not properly indoctrinated.

FARC clearly uses both ideological and material recruitment appeals. The use of ideological appeals appear to be consistent throughout the group's history. It is less clear when the group began using material recruitment appeals. As noted above, engagement in the drug trade, beginning in the 1980s, caused membership to soar. Individuals are not given material incentives to join, however, some of the sources above indicate that at least some individuals joined the group because they viewed FARC as a source of employment. Again, survey evidence also indicates that almost a quarter of individuals were attracted to the group by material incentives (Arjona and Kalyvas 2011). However, given both the survey evidence above, and the fact that the group does not explicitly use material incentives as a form of recruitment appeals, I code the group *as relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

Social networks appear to play a role in FARC's recruitment efforts. Arjona and Kalyvas (2011) find that 7% of respondents said they were motivated to join the group to be with someone from their community while 8% reported joining because friends had previously joined. FARC is ethnically diverse and has a much higher representation of indigenous populations than does Colombia as a whole (Kaplan 2017). While upwards of 25% of FARC recruits are younger than 18, forced recruitment is fairly rare in the organization, as they are able to garner a significant number of recruits from rural Colombia (McCarthy 2013). However, children were sometimes forced to join under the threat of violence and could be executed if they were caught trying to escape the group (Leech 2011).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Anti-government alliance

Also Known As: National Alliance; National Guard and Mkhedrioni

Narrative:

The Anti-government alliance was a coalition, dominated by the National Guard and Mkhedrioni, that sought to overthrow the government of Georgia. The National Guard's actions appear to have largely been driven by economic motives, including control over illicit markets (Zürcher 2007). Most individual soldiers were driven by the motives of looting (Zürcher 2007). The Mkhedrioni were deeply involved in criminal activities but also viewed themselves as a patriotic group seeking to protect Georgia (Zürcher 2007). Essentially, they were the private army for a businessman that could also be mobilized by the state (Zürcher 2007).

However, patriotic mobilization for these groups generally failed, and the leaders made decisions based on the desire to secure profits (Zürcher 2007). Driscoll (2015) also finds, with interview evidence of former participants in both groups, that some recruits were drawn to the criminal lifestyle. Driscoll also argues that such patriotic rhetoric was largely a façade, and these organizations, and individual members, were primarily materially driven. Thus, while patriotic sentiments were used some as a mobilizing tool, loot and participation in crime seem to be bigger driving factors. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material appeals*. Based on the group's goals and rhetoric, it likely had a predominantly Georgian membership.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya

Also Known As: al-Gama'at; Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya; GI; Islamic Gama'at; IG; Islamic Group; Jamaa Islamiyya; Jamaat al Islamiya; Gamaat Islamiya

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

This group originally formed in the late 1970's/early 1980 (United States Department of State 2018), after splitting from other Jihadist groups in Egypt in 1984 due to their following of the pro-violence and anti-governmental teaching of Sayed Qutb and Omar Abd al-Rahman (Sackur, 1994). Their formation was also a reaction to the Muslim Brotherhood's denunciation of violence (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2015). The group's goal was to oust the Egyptian government led by President Mubarak and to replace it with an Islamic republic.

It is important to note the two groups that al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya recruited from: local students and unemployed graduates from Egyptian universities and colleges (particularly from urban areas) and Upper Egyptians who fought in the war of independence in Afghanistan, being trained in armed combat, and then returned to their native country. The formation of an Islamic State in Afghanistan boosted the 1990's Egyptian fundamentalist movement. The rise in terrorist attacks in the 1990's against Egypt is largely a result of the fighters' return home, as they try to replicate their Afghan victory (Child Soldiers International 2001; Nedoroscik 2010).

This strengthening of the fundamentalist movement suggests an important role for ideology in mobilization in this conflict. The group also proselytized in an attempt to establish an "Islamic Order" in areas where they had a strong presence (Kellogg and el-Hamalawy, 2005). The use of ideological persuasive methods is made more evident through a 1996 interview with Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim, the publisher of al-Gamaa's first magazine, *Al-Murabitun* (the holy fighters)/ Qasim stated that "One must be involved in ideas and the propagation of new ideas in order to attract new adherents" (Qasim, Mubarak, Shadoud, & Tamari, 1996). The group was concerned more with domestic jihad than any transnational movement, but also suffered from internal, ideological divisions (Riquier 2019).

Al-Ahram Weekly commented in 2005 on the intensive recruitment efforts that al-Gamaa underwent during the 1970's and 1980's. "Recruits were ideologically indoctrinated and trained to engage in armed confrontation with the 'enemy': government officials, security agencies, Copts, secularists and ordinary people who happened to fall in the crossfire of their violence" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008).

In terms of material incentives, a large number of unemployed young people were employed by the group (Sackur 1994). Even the government-controlled press in Egypt addressed the role of socio-economic frustrations in the rise of militant Islam. Ailing infrastructure and a

poor service sector has allowed the group to present itself as alternatives to the government by offering these services. These actions widened the support base for this group (Sackur 1994). Mubarak claimed that the Islamist were really just mercenaries (Sackur 1994), but did not appear to provide evidence for this claim. Regardless, the provision of social services did seem to play somewhat of a role in the group garnering supporters.

However, while unemployed youth were frequently recruited, the group focused on indoctrinating all recruits (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008). The group also still targeted unemployed recruits with its Islamist ideology (Sackur 1994). Thus, while material appeals likely played somewhat of a role, ideological appeals still appear to be the dominant recruitment tactic. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, given that extent to which the group employed material incentives for recruitment is somewhat unclear, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The group appears to be comprised predominantly of Arab individuals (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MILF

Also Known As: Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Narrative:

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a militant organization in the Philippines that seeks autonomy for Filipino Muslims (Mapping Militant Organizations 2017). The group split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1977, but was not active, and did not go by MILF, until 1984 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). MILF controls territory in the southern part of the country is in negotiations for autonomy with the government (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019).

The group relies extensively on family networks and the passing down of support for the group's ideology and goals across generations to draw in more recruits (United Nations 2017). This implies that nationalist and religious rhetoric play an important role in the group's recruitment tactics. There is little evidence of material appeals mattering for MILF's recruitment efforts. Indeed, Kaufman (2011) argues that economic factors did not appear to motivate elites or followers in the Mindanao conflict. While the study focuses primarily on the MNLF, the MILF is subject to the same lack of natural resources that Kaufman discusses and the MILF split from MNLF when the latter lessened their demands of independence to self-governance (South and Joll 2016). This suggests that the group is still largely ideologically motivated. Additionally, I did not find evidence of the group drawing in individuals through material appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: LTTE

Also Known As: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); The Tamil Tigers

Narrative:

One grievance that LTTE combatants mobilized around was ethnic violence perpetrated by the Sri Lankan government. Following the anti-Tamil “Black July” riots in 1983, many moderate Tamils came to believe that peaceful cooperation with the Sinhalese was not possible, and some even joined the LTTE to fight for Tamil nationalism and to protect Tamils from ethnic violence (Richards 2014). The group’s promotion of gender equality and gendered rhetoric (even if they did not follow through with it (e.g., De Mel 2001)) was important in their efforts to recruit women (Dissanayake 2017; Friedman 2018). According to Lidow (2016), the LTTE is prime example of a group that maintains discipline without material incentives, as there are almost no reports of LTTE combatants looting and they do not receive salaries, only the basics (i.e., shelter, food, and clothing). Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The LTTE used both forced and voluntary recruitment to acquire child soldiers (Richards 2014). Conscription of children into the group was widespread (Friedman 2017). While the group claimed that all recruitment was voluntary, families were threatened with violence and property confiscation if they did not contribute their children to the group (Richards 2014). The group did informally require each family to provide a combatant, but they did not have a formal decree or law pertaining to this (Richards 2014).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Mujahideen e Khalq

Also Known As: National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA); MKO; Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK)

Narrative:

Sources place the founding of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK) as early as 1965 (Goulka et al. 2009, p. xi; Abrahamian 1989). MeK was founded by three graduates of the University of Tehran and they began by recruiting approximately 20 like-minded friends (Human Rights Watch 2005). While the group initially opposed the Shah and supported the Iranian Revolution, they soon came to oppose the new revolutionary government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Goulka et al. (2009, p. 73) note that during the height of the group's popularity, many individuals joined because they supported MeK's goals and its blend of Marxist and Islamist ideology. Some recruits were also attracted to the group's Feminist ideologies (Zambelis 2008). Goulka and coauthors further note that many of the supporters of MeK were young, middle-class Iranians. They further state that MeK had difficulties with recruitment even before moving to Iraq because the Islamic Republic of Iran greatly repressed MeK members.

Indeed, the group faced intense crackdowns from the Iranian government in the early 1970s, but they continued to recruit new members. However, there was also an ideological split, and in 1975, many MeK members left because they believed that MeK's religious ideology was incompatible with revolutionary goals, and these defectors went on to establish the Marxist Mojahedin/Peykar Organization (Human Rights Watch 2005). The MeK began an armed conflict with the Iranian government on June 20th, 1981 (Human Rights Watch 2005).

MeK has faced significant difficulties with recruitment since fleeing Iran in 1981. The group first fled to France in 1981 (Masters 2014). These problems were particularly exacerbated by their move to Iraq in 1986. Upwards of 3,000 MeK members were suspected of being held in slave-like conditions in Albania from 2013-2016 (Dehghan 2018). MeK faced more problems when they allied with Saddam Hussein and established their base of operations in Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq war, MeK worked closely with Saddam Hussein to acquire recruits. The Hussein regime gave Iranian prisoners of war the option to remain in Iraqi prison camp or to join MeK with the promise of eventually being repatriated. However, none of the hundreds of Iranians who joined MeK as part of this deal were repatriated (Goulka et al. 2009, p. 63).

Goulka et al. (2009) also discuss other MeK recruitment strategies around this time. Specifically, they identify that MeK often targeted Iranian dissidents. However, MeK provided a variety of false promises of material benefits to deceive dissident Iranians, especially economic refugees, into joining the group. For instance, "recruits were enticed through false promises of paid employment, land, assistance in processing asylum requests, free visits to family members, public-health volunteer opportunities, and even marriage" (Goulka et al. 2009, p. 63).

MeK has also long relied on coercive and forced recruitment. Goulka et al. (2009, p. 63) estimate that most individuals that have joined MeK since 1986 have not done so voluntarily. Not only did MeK receive hundreds of prisoners of war from Saddam Hussein, but the group's

leadership also instituted several mechanisms to prevent members from leaving the group. For instance, most recruits were required to hand-in their identification documents (e.g., passports) upon joining. MeK leadership claims that all these documents were destroyed during Operation Iraqi Freedom. MeK leadership used the absence of the documents to threaten members who tried to leave with the threat of prosecution and imprisonment for “illegal entry into the country.” The punishment could also include deportation to Iran, where these individuals would face the threat of persecution or even execution (Goulka et al. 2009, p. 63). However, there was still some use of ideological appeals, as the group still targeted Iranian dissidents for recruitment (Goulka et al. 2009). Thus, *from 1986 onwards, I code the group as relying mostly on material incentives.* However, prior to 1986, while there is evidence of the group employing ideological appeals, I did not find evidence of it using material incentives. Thus, before 1986, *I code the group as relying exclusively on ideological appeals.*

MeK also acquired many members through human trafficking. More specifically, MeK agents would pay for Iranians who were getting smuggled out of the country to be diverted to MeK’s camp instead of the countries that they were intending on going to. MeK would also smuggle family members of recruits out of Iran to visit them in Iraq, but then not allow them to leave (Goulka et al. 2009, p. 73). MeK members would also be punished for disagreeing with the group leadership or asking to leave (Goulka et al. 2009). The Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) estimates that from 1986, up until 2004, upwards of 70% of MeK’s members were recruited through deception and were forced to stay (Goulka et al. 2009, p. 73-74).

When MeK moved to Iraq in 1986, many observers noted that they began to shift their internal structures to be more cult-like to compensate for their difficulties with recruitment. MeK leadership argued that it was failing to achieve its goals because members had too much “sexual interest” in each other. Members were required to divorce their spouses, live in gender-segregated housing, practice celibacy, to cutoff communication with their friends and family (even those who were also in MeK), and to turn their love from their families and spouses to the Rajavis (the wife and husband leaders of MeK). With funding from Saddam Hussein, MeK was also able to maintain a self-sufficient camp that had resources such as medical clinics and schools, further isolating members from contacting the outside world (Goulka et al. 2009, p. 68). Goulka et al. (2009, p. 70) also note that MeK leadership used a combination of fear and ideological indoctrination to socialize recruits. MeK members had to watch films about the group, watch and listen to TV and radio stations that were broadcast by MeK, and to read internal documents, like bulletins and the Mojahed, MeK’s newspaper. Members were barred from consuming information from any non-MeK source. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), which MeK is part of, claims to be multi-ethnic (mek-rian.com 2018).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MNLF

Also Known As: Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Moro National Liberation Front, or MNLF, is an ethnically Filipino-Muslim militant group operating in the Philippines. The group arose as a response to Christian-Filipino encroachment of Muslim Filipino lands. The group began insurrections and bombings in response to this, in order to regain their lost land. The group has been at the center of many ethnic conflicts and has a very fluctuating past since its conception in 1972. The group has been through many splits and peace processes, which has largely changed both the make-up and legitimacy of the group (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019).

MNLF recruiters emphasized the need to villages to protect themselves from government violence (Kaufman 2011, p. 945). Evidence from interviews of former MNLF members from the Sulu Islands (as opposed to mainland Mindanao) indicate that injustices against Muslims and abuses by the military were the most common motivating factor, followed by identity-based issues, particularly the protection of Islam (Kaufman 2011). Overall, recruitment narratives of community defense were most prominent in Maguindanaoan areas and frames of injustices were most common in Sulu (Kaufman 2011, p. 945). Starting in the late 1970s, the MNLF began to mobilize around the frame of “Moro national liberation” (Kaufman 2011, p. 945). Overall, defense of communities and families seemed to be the biggest motivating factor among recruits (Kaufman 2011, p. 954). Women were used to increase recruitment by helping draw attention to the cause (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019).

Kaufman (2011, p. 953) also writes that: “This is the refrain also in MNLF commanders’ reports: the theme they used to recruit fighters was, “We are here to defend you, join us.” Other recruiting pitches appealed to social norms. Maranao, for example, were recruited with the pitch:

“a man who has lost his bangsa [nation] has no maratabat [honor or status],” and “a man without maratabat is nothing” (Che Man 1990:84).”

The Moro National Liberation Front is formed largely on ethnic and religious lines, this likely brings a sizable number of individuals identifying with that group who hold grievances against injustices, such as land encroachment, to join the MNLF (Kingsbury 2015).

While the MNLF frequently employed ideological appeals, I did not find any evidence of it using material recruitment incentives. As noted in the narrative for MILF:

“Indeed, Kaufman (2011) argues that economic factors did not appear to motivate elites or followers in the Mindanao conflict. While the study focuses primarily on the MNLF, the MILF is subject to the same lack of natural resources that Kaufman discusses and the MILF split from MNLF when the latter lessened their demands of independence to self-governance (South and Joll 2016).”

Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological recruitment appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Real IRA

Also Known As: Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) is an Irish militant separatist group based in both Ireland and Northern Ireland. Its main objective is to remove Northern Ireland from British control and integrate it into the republic of Ireland. The RIRA is a splinter group. It is a successor to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) of the 1920s, and a more immediate successor of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA or PIRA). The RIRA broke off from the PIRA in response to the latter's ceasefire and its move towards a peace process (English 2012).

The RIRA utilizes a host of tactics to increase recruitment. RIRA has a political wing that it utilizes with a variety of spokespersons to deliver their message to a large number of people (English 2012). As RIRA's position as a splinter group, it exists largely by means of siphoning off disenfranchised members from the Provisional IRA (Mooney 2005). The RIRA also indoctrinates minors, with children as young as 12 years old being indoctrinated and trained in IRA militancy at the group's training camps (Wilson, 2000). Social media pages, which include political messages, have also been used for recruitment (Warren and Leitch 2012). Overall, much of the group's recruitment focuses on the excess of British Security forces and the government (Tonge 2004).

I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. While the group had been attracting many recruits, the fallout from the Omagh Bombing of 1998 substantially decreased the influx of recruits (Morrison 2013).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Abu Sayyaf

Also Known As: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Narrative:

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is a splinter group from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), separating from the group in 1991. The ASG recruited disgruntled MNLF members who had more radical views about the establishment of an Islamic state than did the MNLF (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). The organization even formed in part to spoil negotiations between the MNLF and the government of the Philippines (CENTRA Technology, Inc. 2007). The profile of the group produced by the Mapping Militant Organizations (2018) argues that ASG benefited from growing political and economic inequalities between the Moros and Filipinos. These issues helped strengthened ASG's position as an alternative to the MNLF and MILF. The profile further notes that ASG benefited from a struggling economy, recruiting individuals with limited economic opportunities. The group operates in the southern part of the Philippines, primarily on the island of Mindanao (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

While the group was initially focused on forming an Islamic State, Rosenthal (2008) details how the group evolved to be primarily financially motivated. Following the death of its founder, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, in 1998, ASG had difficulty establishing a clear ideological purpose. At the same time, ASG was increasingly gaining profits from ransom payments for their kidnappings. The author further notes that after 1998, the group substantially increased its criminal activity and that many of its newer leaders came from the criminal underground. He also presents evidence that group membership soared from a few hundred to a few thousand after its first major kidnapping success, as many new recruits were attracted by the potential profits.² Indeed, with profits from these kidnappings, the salary of a combatant was \$1,000 a month in 2001, which helped draw in recruits from economically depressed areas (Manalo 2004). A Philippine security official in 2000 stated that new recruits were primarily joining ASG for the money (BBC 2000). In 2005, ASG still offered recruits a "substantial salary" for joining (Vargas 2005).

However, Rosenthal notes that around the time he was writing, ASG had seemed to gain back some of its focus on Islamist goals. Banlaoi (2006) likewise argues that ASG has positioned itself to fight for Islamist political goals following the uptick in its criminal activity. In 2005, Khadaffy Janjalani gained back control of factions of ASG and was able to shift the group back towards its initial political and ideological goals (Hutchison 2009). Hammerberg, Faber, and Powell (2017) place this ideological reemergence as occurring between 2002-2006. They argue that ASG reverted back to more of a criminal network between 2006-2014, when the group incurred heavy loss of leadership, including the death of Janjalani, due to a major counterterrorism campaign launched by the government. Indeed, this led to divisions in ASG

² However, other size estimates of the group are substantially smaller (Banlaoi 2006), making the exact uptick in membership unclear.

along clan lines, which contributed to the reversion to their prior activities (Counter Extremism Project 2019). Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals from 1991-1998 and 2002-2006*. I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives from 1999-2001 and 2007-2011*.

Members have close ties with each other, as many are family, friends, classmates, or neighbors (Hutchison 2009). Relatedly, clan ties are used to facilitate recruitment (Alindogan 2016). In 2002, there were also reports that ASG and MILF were recruiting secondary and college students in Zamboanga city (Child Soldiers International 2004). The group was even reportedly recruiting Christians around 2005 (Vargas 2005). The military of the Philippines also claims that ASG uses drugs to draw in young individuals and then recruit them once they are addicted (World Bulletin 2016). ASG uses both money and force to recruit children (Solmerin 2011). ASG has also forcibly taken land from civilians (Alindogan 2016).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MNLF – NM

Also Known As: Moro National Liberation Front – Nur Misuari faction; MNLF Misuari Breakaway Group (MNLF-MBG)

Narrative:

There is very little information on the MNLF – NM. The MNLF – NM was comprised of members loyal to Nur Misuari and split from the MNLF in 2001 (UCDP). The split was due to internal power struggles and Misuari's dissatisfaction with the 1996 peace agreement (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). In 2013, likely in protest to MILF's negotiations with the government to create a new autonomous region, the MNLF – NM declared an independent Moro state in Zamboanga City (UCDP).

There is indirect evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Members of the MNLF – NM began to rapidly members and rise up after President Gloria Arroyo refused to endorse Misuari's candidacy in the regional elections (AFP 2002). Additionally, as noted in the narrative for the original MNLF, the group recruited exclusively with ideological appeals (see corresponding narrative). The split was driven by a power struggle and disagreements over negotiations with the government. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, due to the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: JVP

Also Known As: Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or JVP is a Communist-Marxist political group, and formerly a radical insurgent group from Sri Lanka. The movement was created in 1965 to spark a communist revolution in Sri Lanka. Radical individuals elected to split off from Sri Lanka's other Leftist parties, such as the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), and the Peking Left, on the grounds that the aforementioned parties did nothing to address the crises plaguing the country at the time. In the years after JVP's formation, the group has been responsible for two violent uprisings, after which the militant wing of the organization was left largely defeated, resulting in its career as a small political party (Gunaratna 2001).

JVP began as a split from the Leftist Sri Lankan movements of the 1960's. As a result, the group was able to attract a large amount of disillusioned and disgruntled individuals towards their cause. JVP's leadership at the time centered around their young and charismatic leader, Rohana Wijeweera, who concerned himself largely with the education of Sri Lankan youth in the ideologies of Communism. To that end, Wijeweera travelled throughout the country, giving speeches to youths and instructing them in JVP political thought. These rallies attracted young males between the ages of 16 - 25, many of whom joined the organization upon their indoctrination (Gunaratna 2001). Both Sinhala nationalism and Marxism played an important role in the group's mobilization strategy (Venugopal 2010). Anti-government and anti-foreign intervention also played into the group's recruitment strategy (Manoharan 2006).

The group used a series of "lectures" for recruitment, including focusing on Indian expansionism (Moore 1993). Most of the group's recruits were unemployed college students, dropouts, or teachers who were dissatisfied with the current economic situation (Moore 1993).

These lectures, which typically occurred after members were initially drawn-in, also included Marxist critiques of existing economic and political systems (Dewasiri 2010). Indeed, the group's left-wing ideology helped draw-in many economically dissatisfied individuals (De Zylva 2018). The group also indoctrinated school children, and many eagerly joined the group later in life as a result (Moore 1993).

I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. The group primarily recruited individuals from low caste, rural backgrounds (Goodhand et al. 2005). I found evidence of JVP recruiting from the Sinhalese ethnic group (EPR Atlas), but no other ethnic group.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Republic of Abkhazia

Also Known As:

Narrative:

There is evidence of Abkhazian militants employing ideological recruitment appeals. Zürcher, Baev, and Koehler (2005) argue that imagined ethnic solidarity played a vital role in mobilization efforts in the Abkhazian war. In general, ethnonationalism, including fears of mobilization by other ethnic groups, drove mobilization by rebels in this conflict (Zürcher 2007). The Georgian National guard was particularly motivated by material gain in these conflicts (Zürcher 2007), however, the discussion of mobilization of Abkhazian militants seems to focus on ethnonationalism. In addition to Abkhazian members, many Chechen militants also fought with the rebels (Zürcher 2007). Thus, the fighting forces of the Republic of Abkhazia appear to have been multi-ethnic. While the Georgian National Guard had many opportunistic recruits, I did not find direct evidence of such for this group. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: KDPI

Also Known As: Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Established in 1945 as a pan-Kurdish party (members from both Iraq and Iran) and based in Mahabad, KDPI was originally part of KDP, the Kurdish Democratic Party. For most of 1946, Mahabad became the capital of a de facto independent Kurdish republic under the leadership of KDP. But after its collapse, the party went underground and shifted to the left. During the Iranian Revolution in 1979, leaders who had been jailed were released and built up a strong party organization. Aided by Kurdish army officers who joined them, they were able to construct a military organization. KDP soon established itself as the Kurdish organization most firmly rooted in the population, especially in the area that had comprised the Mahabad Republic in 1946 (Bruinessen 1986). According to van Bruinessen (1986), KDP/KDPI defined its objectives in the 1980s in its program: "the right of self-determination for the Kurdish people *within the framework of Iran*; the struggle against the political, economic, military, and cultural influences of imperialism; and the establishment of a socialist society 'responsive to the specific conditions in our country'" (van Bruinessen 1986). Thus, KDPI is not only an organization with a goal of autonomy but with a conventional leftist ideology (Wuthrich 2018).

In a study of recruitment into the KDPI, Ghazanjani (2020, p. 107) notes that recruitment motives can be categorized into seven different categories: "(1) Family conditions; (2) Community and kinship ties; (3) Friendship networks and emotional relationships; (4) Prison experience; (5) Grievances (ethnic and ideological); (6) Unemployment/financial incentives; and (7) Gaining position and status."

There is some evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group used various media platforms to try to sell its ethnonationalist ideology, and ethnonationalist ideology was a central feature of its recruitment (Ghazanjani 2020). Anti-government grievances were also an important mobilizing tool (Ghazanjani 2020). There was an announcement by KDPI's secretary-general, Mustafa Hijri, urging Kurdish youth to join its ranks and participate in the liberation struggle throughout the area was interpreted as a call to renew Kurdish armed resistance against Iran and clashes between the country and the group erupted in late June 2016 (King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies 2016). Furthermore, Kurdish political parties reached the public through limited radio programs broadcasting from Iraqi Kurdistan stations. KDPI established its radio station, the Voice of Iranian Kurdistan, in 1980 and moved 15 times by 1995 due to security concerns (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield 2010). However, digital satellite TV broadcasting has revolutionized the parties' abilities to communicate with their public. Iranian Kurdish parties were able to utilize this medium

beginning in 2006, and as of 2010, KDPI had Tishk TV, based in Paris, France, as its mouthpiece (Ahmadzadeh & Stansfield, 2010).

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives, as some members reported that they joined to acquire employment and financial resources (Ghazanjani 2020). However, most of the evidence focuses on the group's use of ideological appeals. Again, ethnonationalist appeals were at the center of the group's recruitment strategy (Ghazanjani 2020). Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. Social networks are also vital to the group's recruitment processes (Ghazanjani 2020). Recruits go through a long, extensive period of ideological indoctrination once they join the organization (Ghazanjani 2020).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ATTF

Also Known As: All Tripura Tiger Forces (ATTF)

Narrative:

The ATTF was formed in 1990 by former members of the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) militant group (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2001). The group has three main goals: (1) expel all Bengali-speaking migrants that came to Tripura after 1956, (2) restore land to the tribes, and (3) prevent migrants who entered the region after 1956 from voting (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2001). Approximately 70% of the group's members are in Bangladesh, with many training in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2001). While most groups in the Tripura region are explicitly anti-leftist, the ATTF has important leftist elements (Bhaumik 2007). Additionally, while conflict between the Christian tribes and the Hindu Bengalis is salient for the conflict overall, the ATTF avoids the religious element of the conflict (Bhaumik 2007).

There is some evidence of the group using ideological recruitment appeals. During a recruitment drive in 2007, the ATTF distributed a 2-hour long documentary, full of propaganda, in an effort to raise funds and gain youth recruits (OneIndia 2007). Recruits also receive anti-Bengali indoctrination during training (Bhaumik 2012). Interviews with ATTF cadres that surrendered review that foot soldiers, who lived largely under harsh conditions, became increasingly dissatisfied with the fact that the group's leadership were living in lavish conditions (Prakash 2008).

There is also some evidence of the ATTF employing material recruitment appeals. Ghosh (2003) argues that groups, in general, in this conflict are often able to attract recruits by offering young, unemployed people jobs. Sharma (2016) likewise argues that financial incentives are the main driver of participation in this conflict. The Ghosh and Sharma studies discuss the conflict that the ATTF is involved in more broadly, rather than the specific group. However, this evidence still points to the important role of material incentives in the recruitment practices of the ATTF. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence for both ideological and material appeals, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. Approximately 90% of high-ranking members in the group are Hindu, and the rest are Christian (Prakash 2008). I found evidence of the group recruiting Indigenous Tripuri (EPR Atlas), but not members of other ethnic groups.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: NLFT

Also Known As: National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)

Written: Ahaan Bagwe

Edited: Michael Soules

Narrative:

The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) is a nationalist, Christian terrorist organization from the region of Tripura in India. It was founded in the 1980's by a missionary church founded by New Zealanders in Tripura known as the Baptist Church of Tripura. The extremist group was founded in the wake of ethnic riots in 1989 that targeted Christians. In years prior, the Church had only been able to gather a handful of converts. After the riots, the Baptist Church of Tripura elected to intensify recruitment and exert its influence via the armed group known as the National Liberation Front of Tripura, which it continues to fund and support today. The group's main goals are to exert its influence over the state of Tripura by attacking members of the Hindu majority and converting members as well as recruiting them into their cadres (Bhaumik 2000; Lawson 2000).

There is some (indirect) evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment incentives. The NLFT attempted to moderate their religious and ethnonationalist ideologies in order to try to attract more moderate Christian populace to the organization (The Times of India 2019). The former communication director of the group stated that "We took up arms for the sake of development of tribals; looking back, there is not regret that we did so" (Deb 2019). I did not find evidence of the group employing material incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The group also members from the Jamatia and Reang tribes of the Tripura ethnic group (Ghosh 2003).

The most prominent recruiting tactic used by the NLFT appears to be coercion. The NLFT's largest mission is converting Hindus to Christianity. It often does so by forcibly converting tribal Hindu villages - their prime targets - on pain of death or physical assault (Hussain 2001). These individuals are then further pushed towards joining in arms with the NLFT

as forced conscripts. The NLFT is also known to use sexual abuse as an intimidation strategy. The threat or the act often pushes individuals to convert to Christianity and/or join the group to spare either themselves or their loved ones (Adam et al. 2007). The organization also allies with other groups operating in India, such as the Christian All Tripura Tiger Force ATTP - in order to increase their sphere of influence and attract recruits from a wider range of areas (Bhaumik 2000; Lawson 2000).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Republic of Croatia

Also Known As:

Narrative:

In the lead up to the conflict, Croatian separatist movements mobilized supports around nationalist and religious identities (UCDP). The work by Brown (2013) suggests that the irregulars might have recruited mostly with material incentives but that the main Croatian forces relied primarily on ideological appeals (see narrative for Croatian Irregulars). Furthermore, I did not find evidence of the forces of the Republic of Croatia employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Croatian Irregulars

Also Known As:

Narrative:

There is some evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. The Croatian irregulars were a set of various, independent militias that were collections of mercenaries (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). Remnants of the group eventually merged with the Croatian army (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013).

Brown (2013) argues that violent events and social events drove individuals to participate in the conflict, and that material-based explanations are insufficient. Brown (2013) also finds that local and central leaders pursued material incentives, though such incentives were not necessary for mass mobilization. Of note in this study, however, many former members of paramilitary groups refused to be interviewed, and these are often the groups described as being mercenary forces. Brown (2013) argues that many of the paramilitaries that paid recruits were smaller and ancillary to the main Croatian forces. Brown's findings ultimately suggest that experiences with violence were the main drivers of participation in the conflict. Brown further finds that the earliest joiners were motivated by social ties and the Croatian cause, while the later joiners were motivated by experiences of violence (Brown 2013). Very few of the former participations that had been interviewed early on, at least among those who joined early, had been paid salaries at all (Brown 2013). Brown further argues that rebel leaders in this conflict, not the rank-and-file, were the main individuals who sought material profits (Brown 2013). Brown concludes that material incentives did not play a central role in mobilizing the rank and file but did matter for elite participation.

However, the work by Brown seems to suggest that while the main Croatian forces were likely recruited primarily with ideological appeals, that material incentives played a more important role in recruiting the irregulars.

Croatian irregulars also fought in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The HOS was the primary Croatian irregular force (UCDPa). The HOS was comprised of Croats and Muslims who supported the proclaimed Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The HOS has "Croats, Muslim[s], [Croatian-]Serbs, foreigners, and women (Arielli 2012, p. 10). The group had many Bosnian Muslim members and even one Gambian Muslim member (Li 2016). Plana (2012, p. 69) provides a quote from (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, p. 206) that the HOS as one of the groups during the early stages of the conflict that operate as "warlords promoting personal interests and profits."

There is also evidence of the group employing non-material appeals. Camaraderie among combatants who had served together in Croatia was an important mobilizing factor (Arielli 2012, p. 10). Indeed, Arielli (2012) argues that camaraderie was more of an important factor for many foreign fighters than ideology. According to the Commission on Human Rights (1994), some sources argue that the HOS was created in response to Serbian aggression and that most, but not

all, members were Croatian. These sources further posit that the foreign volunteers in the HOS were not profit driven.

Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan (2013) note that the Croatian irregulars in Bosnia-Herzegovina who comprised of various militias that all had their own political agendas. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia explains that the main goal of the HOS was to restore the borders of fascist-led Croatia that existed during World War II (UCDPb). There is thus some evidence that the Croatian Irregulars that operated in B&H used both material incentives and ideological appeals.

Overall, while the regular Croatian forces might have relied more on ideological appeals, descriptions by Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan (2013), and others, suggest that the group was heavily comprised of mercenaries. However, appeals to nationalism also seemed to matter. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: KDP/DPK

Also Known As: Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP/DPK)

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was formed in 1946 and is the oldest Kurdish political party in Iraqi Kurdistan. Founded in the Kurdish region of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds were taking refuge from persecution. Since its inception, KDP has led the fight for autonomy and independence of Kurds from Iraq (The Kurdish Project, n.d.). In 1992, an autonomy arrangement between Iraq and the Kurdish political groups allowed these Kurdish groups, such as KDP, to have control over affairs in Northern Iraq (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). The KDP retains more influence in the northern, more mountainous regions of Iraqi Kurdistan (Katzman 2010).

Evidence presented shows three factors that address recruitment to Kurdish political groups, including KDP. The first is an economic factor, as Iraqi Kurdistan does not have a functional economy, approximately 70% of the population is unemployed. High prices are a result of a double embargo on Kurdistan (United Nations-authorized sanction on Iraq in general; Iraqi government sanction on Iraqi Kurdistan). These political groups receive funds from various sources, which allows them to attract recruits who are seeking a source of income. There is a political factor, where individuals in Iraqi Kurdistan could not find a government job unless they are affiliated with either KDP or PUK. Lastly, there is tribal factor. KDP and PUK have recruited along tribal/clan lines, with the practice more common in KDP. Many recruits for the group are from the Barzani tribe, however the tribal affiliation does not always align with political orientations (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 1996). The *peshmergas* used in KDP's militia are reported as being volunteers. There is no evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*.

The KDP is almost entirely comprised of Kurds, an indigenous people of the Mesopotamian plains and are the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East. Although they are comprised of one ethnicity, members of KDP are drawn from the entire Kurdistan region, which is why the group can be classified as enlisting foreign fighters. The KDP contains members from South-Eastern Turkey, North-Eastern Syria, Northern Iraq, North-Western Iran and South-Western Armenia. (BBC News 2019).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Republic of Slovenia

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The Slovenian Defense Force, which had been formed years before to function similarly to a national guard, was the main armed force fighting for the independence of Slovenia from Yugoslavia. National identity and the desire to protect Slovenian territory played a vital role in the mobilization process of the Slovenian Territorial Defense Force (Prebilič and Guštin 2019). Supporters and members of the Territorial Defense Force also discussed how they were willing to risk their lives for Slovenia to be free (Rosenblum 1991).

Both before and after independence, the Slovenian Territorial Defense Force heavily used conscription to fill its ranks (globalsecurity.org). Indeed, until the mid-2000s, the Slovenian military was conscription based (US Department of State). Thus, the majority of recruits appear to have been conscripted. However, nationalism still appeared to play somewhat of a mobilizing role. Additionally, there was no evidence of the group employing any sort of material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: al-Itahad al-Islami

Also Known As: AIAI

Narrative:

AIAI formed in 1984 when Al Jama'a Al Islamiya and Wahdat Al Shabaab Al Islam merged (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). Initially, the group sought to peacefully implement an Islamic state, but it eventually turned to fighting Sid Barre, the then dictator of Somalia (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). While the primary goal of the group was to overthrow the Barre regime and replace it with an Islamic state, it had a secondary objective of helping to force the independence of the Ogaden region from Ethiopia (Mackenzie Institute 2015). West (2006), however, claims that the goal of AIAI was to form an Islamic state in the entire Horn of Africa. However, Docking and Menkhaus (2004) argue that the group has little interest in global jihad, and it focuses mostly on issues within Somalia. The group disbanded in 1997 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019).

AIAI used its members to spread its ideology, as many of them work in the civil service, military, and academic institutions (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). Chazan (2002) notes that many group members entered teaching to recruit youth into the Islamist cause. Ideological appeals appear to have been essential to the group's recruitment efforts. Loewenstein (2010) argues that the AIAI was systematic in its recruitment efforts and recruited students and faculty at Somali National University by engaging with them. The group continued similar practices later in the conflict as well (Chazan 2002). Loewenstein further notes that the group's initial appeals were particularly successful because they offered an alternative to the very unpopular Barre regime. The Ogaden war had also helped draw in many recruits (Loewenstein 2010).

The group also did a lot to economically benefit its constituents. It opened Islamic social programs, such as orphanages, schools, banks, and aid organizations (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). It also employed many Somalis through the establishment of Islamic courts (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). The institutions were largely established after the group took control of some territory following the collapse of the Barre regime (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). Rabasa (2009) argues that the group gained a large domestic following primarily by offering jobs and social services. The group also used revenues it gained from controlling ports for recruitment (Rabasa 2009).

The group appears to make both ideological and material recruitment appeals. However, the group appears to rely more heavily on ideological appeals. First, the group underwent systematic efforts, before and after the start of the conflict, to recruit students through ideological indoctrination. Second, the group was viewed as an attractive alternative to the Barre regime. Third, much of the popularity the group garnered was through the provision of public goods, but this is not direct evidence that the AIAI attracted a substantial number of combatants through offering material incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, because there is some ambiguity as to how much the AIAI depends on material incentives, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

The group is decentralized and divided along clan lines, with the cells minimally cooperating and having little coherence in their policies (Docking and Menkhaus 2004). Prior to the Ethiopian invasion in 2006, there were very few foreign fighters and most of them were with Al-Qaeda (Page 2010). The group did welcome, and train with, ONLF members who were fleeing Ethiopian security forces (Page 2010). I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: PUK

Also Known As: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is currently the second largest Kurdish political party operating within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), representing the Kurdish majority of northern Iraq consistently at odds with the national Iraqi government since the 1960's (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013; Congressional Research Service 2019). The PUK has been officially battling the Iraqi government since 1975 and is said to be the primary ruling force in the Sulaymaniya province (CTC Sentinel 2017). The group acted as the left-wing alternative to the KDP (Gleditsch, Cunningham, & Salehyan, 2013). In 1992, an autonomy agreement was enacted that allowed Kurdish groups, including the PUK and the KDP, to have control over affairs in northern Iraq (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan, 2013).

There is evidence of the group using ideological recruitment appeals. The group tapped into nationalist sentiments to mobilize new supporters and existing activists (Hama 2019). There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Because of the absence of an entirely functional economy in Iraqi Kurdistan, approximately 70% of the population is unemployed. The PUK is able to attract recruits through offer of a good salary (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1996). Patronage networks play an important role in recruitment into militant groups in the region (van Wilgenburg and Fumerton 2015). Saleem and Skelton (2020) likewise discuss the vital role that patronage networks play for the functioning of the PUK. Thus, the PUK clearly employs both material and ideological appeals. However, patronage networks are discussed as the core mobilization feature of the PUK. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*.

The group is also reported to have bases and posts in Turkey and Iran, with close ties to Turkey's PKK rebel group (Gleditsch, Cunningham, & Salehyan, 2013). The group has a predominantly Kurdish membership. There is inconsistent evidence as to whether the PUK uses forced recruitment. Some sources claim that there is no evidence that the organization takes advantage of this tactic (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001), while others claim that there have been reports of forced recruitment by PUK since 1996 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1996).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: NSCN

Also Known As: National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN); National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Issac-Muivah faction (NSCN – IM)

Narrative:

The group wants to create a “Greater Nagaland,” based on Maoist ideology. The organization also draws on religion, using the slogan “Nagaland for Christ” (South Asia Terrorism Portal). Not all recruits are guaranteed a spot – many are removed following an extensive training period (Goswami 2008). There is some evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. The NSCN – IM appears to have used funding from the narcotics trade to run training camps, some of which are “on a purely mercenary basis” (South Asia Terrorism Portal). All members for the group receive monthly salaries ranging from Rs 2,000 – 5,000 (Goswami 2008, 417). There is some evidence that the NSCN attracts youth to the group through the promise of jobs (Ambrocia 2019; Anand 2019). However, officials claim that youth were joining on misinformation and that they would not actually get jobs from the group (INSIDENE 2019). Specifically, the group appears to be offering jobs in the government forces, under the assumption that they will soon be integrated (Singh 2017).

There is also evidence of the NSCN using ideological appeals. Goswami (2013) argues that while some analysts view the rhetoric of the group as insincere, there is reason to believe that that youth who join the group are aware of the group’s ideology and goals and that they support an independent state. Civilians in the area had a sympathetic view of the group’s goals and ideologies in the 1980s and 1990s, but support declined as fighting drew-on (Goswami 2008, 418). Goswami (2008) notes that Naga unification is an important mobilizing point for the group. While there is some evidence of the group having mercenaries, Goswami’s (2008) assessment appears to be that fighting for a Naga homeland is the group’s primary mobilization tool. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. The group has been accused by the Indian government of employing forced group, a claim which the organization denies (Ambrocia 2019). There is evidence of the NSCN recruiting members of the Naga ethnic group (EPR Atlas), but not individuals of other ethnicities.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Zviadists

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia describes the Zviadists as nationalists fighting to return the ousted Georgian president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, to power, as his supporters were unable to accept Georgia's new leadership. While I did not find direct evidence of how Zviad mobilized his supporters specifically for this conflict, he had gained many supporters as a politician in Georgia by mobilizing around ethnonationalist sentiments, anti-communism, and through personal popularity (Hansen 1998; Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013; Seguin 2016). I did not find any evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. Given that the evidence is somewhat indirect, I assign a moderate certainty to this coding. Zviadists were ethnic Georgians (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010). The group recruited ethnic Georgians (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Serbian irregulars

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The Serbian Irregulars is an umbrella term used by the UCDP to describe various militias of Serb nationalists that were fighting for their own political entity, following the collapse of Yugoslavia (UCDP). Gordon (2016) notes that the various Serbian militias “recruited disaffected co-ethnic youths, criminals and outcasts.” Gordon also explains that violent rhetoric played an important role in socializing recruits. Vojislav Šešelj, who recruited many militants, promoted Serbian unification (Bowcott 2016). The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia describes the group as “volunteers that joined to fight for a Serbian nation” (UCDP).

Schlichte (2010) argues that Serbian nationalism was likely a vital factor for why many disaffected youth joined militias in Serbia, but that the intensity of violence led to high levels of defection, as the violence undermined many recruits’ romanticized notions of fighting for Serbian unification. However, Schlichte notes that the motives of individual recruits across the various Serbian militias varied widely, and that personal motives often did not correspond to the broader goals of groups. Material incentives and nationalist rhetoric appear to have both been important mobilization tools across various Serbian militias (Bozanich 2017). Gendered rhetoric also played an important role in the mobilization process (Bozanich 2017).

One of the groups that comprises the Serbian Irregulars was the Serb Volunteer Guard (SDG). The SDG was considered one of the most powerful criminal organizations in all of Serbia (Schlichte 2010). The SDG distributed loot and provided pensions to the widows of members who were killed (Schlichte 2010). The group also hired soldiers of fortune from the criminal underworld (Bozanich 2017). Arkan, the leader of the SDG, had been president of the fan club supporting the Red Star Belgrade soccer team, and he mobilized many of these members into his militia (Bozanich 2017).

The promise of a political career was a primary motive for joining the Serbian Chetnik Movement (SCP) (Schlichte 2010), which is listed as one of the militias comprising the Serbian Irregulars in the UCDP (UCDP). Similarly, the Serbian Guard (SG) had many members who were primarily seeking political opportunities (Schlichte 2010).

Thus, both nationalist rhetoric and opportunism played an important role in the recruitment processes of the various militias comprising the Serbian irregulars. There was clearly variation across militias in terms of the types of recruitment appeals employed, but overall, both ideological and material appeals appear to have played prominent roles. Thus, I code the group as taking a *mixed approach*. However, given that there is ambiguity due to the large number of militias involved, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Also Known As: Bosnian Serb Forces

Narrative:

The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia notes that the Bosnian Serb forces were comprised of “nationalists, mercenaries and ordinary unemployed people.” The entry also notes that many had been officers and soldiers in the Yugoslavian National Army (UCDP). The distinction between the Bosnian Serb Forces and the Serbian Irregulars was often challenging to make (UCDP). As noted in the narrative for the Serbian Irregulars, evidence indicated a mix of ideological appeals and material incentives were employed by Serbian militias in this conflict (Bozanich 2017).

However, Malešević and Dochartaigh (2018, p. 297) argue that Bosnian Serb forces did not receive any substantial material incentives during the conflict. However, officers in the organization still tended to be paid and were former members of the Yugoslavian National Army (p. 303). The vast majority of members were conscripted (Malešević and Dochartaigh 2018). While nationalism mattered for mobilization, commentators have exaggerated its importance in this context, and many individual members did not have strong ideological beliefs (Malešević and Dochartaigh 2018). However, among the members with more clearly defined ideological beliefs, polarization was high. (Malešević and Dochartaigh 2018). Instead, social ties and comradeship played a major role in mobilization (Malešević and Dochartaigh 2018).

Overall, there is very limited evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Social ties appear to have been the biggest motivator, followed by nationalism. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The Bosnian Croats that were fighting for independence from Bosnia-Herzegovina were primarily organized into the HVO and irregular forces from Croatia (UCDP). The HVO contained mercenary units, including foreign fighters (Arielli 2012). Many of the foreign fighters were materially motivated, while some were ideologically motivated, as they fought against ethnic discrimination and oppression (Arielli 2012). However, Ferguson (2015) argues that many of the mercenaries were primarily motivated by a sense of adventure, rather than ideological or material gain. Furthermore, individuals wearing HVO uniforms were accused of engaging in looting and they were also accused of being primarily interested in this acquisition of loot (Božić 2018). Additionally, some of the irregulars might have been from the Croatian irregulars (UCDP), who largely relied on material incentives for recruitment (see corresponding narrative).

Božić (2018) also somewhat suggests that fighting over the Croat region of Bosnia was driven by the desire to protect the region. Furthermore, as mention above, at least some foreign fighters suggested that they were motivated by the desire to fight ethnic discrimination and oppression. However, more of the evidence focuses on the use of material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material recruitment incentives*. Given the indirect nature of much of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. Most members of the HVO were conscripts and reservists (Winokur 2018). There is also some evidence that the group as multiethnic, as it recruited broadly in the region it operated in (Božić 2018).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia

Also Known As: Republic of Western Bosnia

Narrative:

Fikret Abdic, who was a member of the Bosnian state presidency, argued that ethnic relations were good in his region – the Bihacka Krajina – so he declared the “Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia” in September of 1993, in response to the plan to divide Bosnia into three separate states (UCDP). Reportedly, Abdic was able to use cult-like propaganda to mobilize supporters, including armed supporters (Loyd 2001). Abdic also used his radio station to spread propaganda to those living in his region (Landay 1994). Abdic claimed that his call for independence was to separate from the alleged Islamic extremism of the Bosnian government as well as to pursue a free, capitalist market for the region (Lischer 1999). Followers of Abdic were described as pursuing both self-interest and loyalty to Abdic (Lischer 1999). Abdic himself stated that members of his armed forces wanted to allow people to return to their homes, to end suffering, and to reorganize political power based on the will of the people (BBC 1994).

Hasic (2012) argues that followers were attracted to Abdic’s ideology. While this was an intra-religious conflict, religion played an important role for the rebels (Hasic 2012). Olson (2014) argues that the high level of ideological commitment of many of the paramilitaries participating in the Yugoslavian civil wars made bringing the conflicts to an end difficult because there were too many competing interests.

A UN document posits that Abdic began operating like a warlord (UN Archives), though it did not go into specifics. Other sources consider Abdic to be a warlord as well (Toal and Dahlman 2011). The armed forces of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia were comprised of two defected Armija Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (ARBiH) brigades and Abdic’s followers (ACLED). Some of the ARBiH brigades were labeled as “armed criminal gangs” (ACLED), but it is unclear if either brigade that defected was profit-driven. Many employees of Agorkomerc, Abdic’s food company, joined his armed movement as they were very loyal to him (Olson 2014). Čekić (2018) argues that the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia armed forces enabled participation in criminal behavior.

However, most of the direct evidence focuses on the role of ideology in mobilizing troops, while a smaller quantity of less direct evidence discusses the role of material gain. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding due to the indirect nature of some of the evidence. The group recruited Bosniaks (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UCK

Also Known As: National Liberation Army (UCK)

Narrative:

The group was established in 1999 and began fighting the Macedonian government in 2001 (Vangelovski 2017, p. 266). There is some, indirect evidence of UCK employing ideological appeals for recruitment. The group sought increased rights for Albanians (Murphy 2001) as well as a Greater Albanian nation (Vangelovski 2017, p. 108-109, p. 187). Vangelovski (2017, p. 232) argues that Ali Ahmeti was able to “inspire” Albanian communities to provide thousands of recruits. However, many of the rank-and-file said they joined to protect their villages, and did not discuss fighting for a greater Albania (Wood 2001). I did not find evidence of the UCK employing material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals for recruitment*. However, due to the somewhat indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Some recruits were deserters from government security forces (Vangelovski 2017). Other members were Islamist veterans from the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo (Vangelovski 2017, p. 266-267). While most recruits were ethnic Albanians living in Albania or Macedonia, the group also drew foreign fighters in from Chechnya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (Vangelovski 2017, p. 266-267), making it likely that the group is multi-ethnic. Though the group did not really have a religious ideology, it did get support from many local mosques (Vangelovski 2017, 117).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UCK

Also Known As: Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

Narrative:

Kraja (2011) argues that familial and social, ethnic-based networks were at the center of the KLA's recruitment strategy, and that local dynamics were very important for recruitment efforts. Kraja further argues these mobilization efforts were aided by: "discriminatory state policies, an ethnically and ideologically homogenous population, failure of nonviolence movement to yield political results, high poverty rates, scarce government engagement in rural areas and disproportional and indiscriminate state violence" (Kraja 2011, p. 7).

Political and economic-based ethnic discrimination and violent government repression were two of the primary grievances that the KLA mobilized around (Kraja 2011). Indeed, many living in Kosovo were somewhat neutral at the outset of the conflict, and only joined the KLA after being victimized by Serbian government violence (NBC 1999; Kraja 2011). Indeed, the KLA mobilized around narratives of the Serbian military as a foreign, occupying military force (Kraja 2011). The KLA drew in many recruits displaced by government violence (Hedges 1999; Loeb and Williams 1999). Many individual recruits expressed the desire to protect Kosovo from Serb forces (The Guardian 1999). Others expressed that they wanted an independent Kosovo (Child Soldiers International 2001), including recruits from foreign countries (The Christian Science Monitor 1999).

Many recruits still flocked to the group to combat Serbian violence and fight for an independent Kosovo, even after the KLA suffered heavy losses on the battlefield (Hammer 1999). Indeed, many recruits wanted to avenge the fallen KLA soldiers (Borger 1999). Nadler (1999) argues that many recruits showed deep devotion to this cause. In a swearing-in ceremony, recruits swore that they would fight "for the freedom of occupied Albanian lands, for unity of the lands" (Associated Press International 1998). The KLA produced a recruitment video calling individuals to come fight for the creation of a Greater Albania (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1999).

Kraja (2011) notes that the recruitment strategies of the KLA were fluid and changed over time to adapt to the situation at hand. Indeed, recruitment soared following the increased use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by Serb forces (Kraja 2011). A KLA spokesperson stated that the group was looking for Albanians abroad who were willing to die for freedom (United Press International 1999). Outside observers and officials became concerned with the willingness of the KLA to "fight to the bitter end" (Finkenauer 1999).

Hedges (1999b) notes that a very high unemployment rate in the region – upwards of 70% – created a ripe recruiting pool for the KLA. Some members of the KLA also engaged in criminal behavior (Skeppström and Weibull 2011). A document from the European Parliament states that the KLA used external funding to acquire more weapons and recruits (European Parliament 1998).

In addition to recruiting Kosovar Albanians locally, the KLA recruited them from diaspora as well (Naegele 1999), allegedly sometimes with material incentives. The KLA also allegedly recruited mercenaries from multiple countries, including Canada, Morocco, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Setunsky 1999). The KLA also recruited British mercenaries to help train its recruits (Binyon 1999). Turk's living in Albania were also allegedly targeted for recruitment because of the belief that their poor financial situation would incentivize them to join the KLA (BBC Monitoring Europe 1999a). In Switzerland, where there is a large Kosovar community, the KLA only recruited unemployed men and only asked employed men for donations (Intelligence Newsletter 1999).

The group recruited from Germany's Albanian population as well (Associated Press International 1999a) as well as France (Associated Press International 1999b), Italy (United Press International 1999), Denmark, and Switzerland (Xinhua News Agency 1998). Some members of the KLA were veterans of the Yugoslav military (Nadler 1999). As noted above, social networks also played an important role in recruitment (Nadler 1999). Upon joining, new recruits were required to participate in an attack against government forces in order to prove their loyalty (Kraja 2011). Some members of the group also propagated Islamist beliefs within the group, though I found no evidence of this ideology being used as a mobilizing tool by the KLA (BBC Monitoring Europe 1998; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1998b).

Thus, there appears to be evidence of the KLA employing both ideological and material recruitment appeals. However, most of the evidence focuses on how the KLA was flooded by recruits who were attracted by appeals to greater Albanian rights as well as a unified Albanian nation and/or independent Kosovo. While there were some foreign fighters that were described as mercenaries, multiple described how thousands of foreign fighters were attracted to the KLA for ideological reasons. Thus, I code the group as *relying on mostly ideological appeal*.

The group recruited refugees, including through force (Associated Press 1999; BBC 1999). The KLA threatened reprisals for Albanian males who were fleeing, even in Albania (Causholli 1999). There was evidence that the KLA imprisoned and threatened refugees to force them to join (BBC Monitoring Europe 1999b).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ULFA

Also Known As: United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The United Liberation Front of Assam or ULFA is a terrorist group that operates in the northeast region of India, mostly the state of Assam. ULFA began in 1979 as a communist movement stemmed from marginalized ethnically Assamese individuals, who denounced an Indian national identity and felt their interests were superseded by those of the large number of recent immigrants. Instead, believing that Assam should secede from the Indian government, citing that Assam was never truly part of India. From the 1980s through the 1990s, ULFA became very popular, especially amongst young, impoverished Assamese individuals

There is evidence of the group employing ideological appeals. The Marxist ideals of the group helped recruit many to their cause, while alienating many of those in the upper class. After the 1990s, confrontation with Indian forces resulted in much bloodshed that led to a decrease in popularity and recruitment, with more wealthy Assamese writing off the ULFA as perpetrators of violent crimes. However, in recent times, ULFA has been able to gather recruits from rural and tribal Assamese regions, who identify with pro-Assamese sentiment, and adhere to a socialist ideology, in response to their marginalization. The ULFA has used recruitment drives to bring in such individuals but have also reached out via social media campaigns as well (see for instance, the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia entry for this group). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as I code the group as relying *exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The ULFA largely pulls its recruits from rural and tribal Assam and its neighboring regions. These recruits tend to be younger individuals that feel disenfranchised by the Indian government (Chauhan, 2017). While the ULFA relies mostly on large recruitment drives moving from village to village to conscript such individuals, there is also evidence of an increasing social media movement (Saha, 2020). ULFA uses this to spread their influence to a wider area of individuals extending from rural areas to more those in perhaps better wealth brackets in urban settings. While this type of conscription appears to be of voluntary young men in their late teens to early twenties, there is evidence of ULFA utilizing forced conscription on minors. Several missing minors have been rescued during raids on ULFA, who were then relocated to their parents. The ULFA, while a relatively small terrorist organization, it manages to persist given a lack of coordination and resources from the Assam police (Hindustan Times, 2020). However, ULFA recruitment has faltered in the past when the Indian military has stepped in to exert control over the region. In response to this, the ULFA has joined with other North-East Indian militant groups to better combat a more coordinated assault from Indian security forces (BBC 1990). Most recently, ULFA joined forces with the United Nationalist Liberation Front (UNLF),

the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). These groups, forming the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) allied together through a common notion of Burmese national identity, bringing together an even larger variety of North-East Indians on various ethno-linguistic levels. In doing so, the ULFA has massively expanded its reach in terms of recruitment.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Republic of South Ossetia

Also Known As:

Narrative:

Militias in South Ossetia at the time tended to be fractious, antagonistic towards each other, and organized around neighborhood and family lines (Demetriou 2002). There is (indirect) evidence of this group relying on ideological recruitment appeals. Baev (2018) notes that the opposition in South Ossetia mobilized around independence. Baev notes that there was an absence of lootable resources in the area to explaining the fueling of the conflict and that militants in the region had a very shallow resource base to mobilize around. Adamon Nykhas (aka the Popular Front of South Ossetia) was established by local activists with the agenda of seceding from Georgia and becoming an autonomous region of Russia (Barnovi 2005). Adamon Nykhas also mobilized to demand more autonomy following repressive government crackdowns, though it had difficulty forming a paramilitary structure (Zürcher, Baev, and Koehler 2005). In general, ethnonationalism, including fears of mobilization by other ethnic groups, drove mobilization by rebels in this conflict (Zürcher 2007).

South Ossetian forces received material support from North Ossetia (Zürcher, Baev, and Koehler 2005). Baev (2018) also argues that conflicts in the region were largely driven by elites trying to secure economic resources. Warlordism was common in the region. The Georgian National guard was particularly motivated by material gain in these conflicts (Zürcher 2007), however, the discussion of mobilization of Ossetian militants seems to focus on ethnonationalism. Existing local government structures also played an important role in mobilization (Daly 2012).

In the 2004 conflict, there were reports of Cossack and Abkhazian mercenaries in the area (König 2004), but it was unclear who they were fighting for (i.e., Russia or Ossetia). Overall, ethnonationalism appears to be the prominent driving force of this conflict. While the Georgian National Guard had many opportunistic recruits, I did not find direct evidence of such for this group. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, I given this uncertainty, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)

Also Known As: al-Majlis al-Ala li-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi'l-Iraq; Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI); Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) (post-2009); Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) (post-2003)

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Based in Southern Iraq, the Shia resistance group known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was formed in 1982 in opposition against Saddam Hussein's regime (The Oxford Dictionary of Islam 2020). Founded by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim and Muhammad Baqer al-Hakim when they were in Iran, SCIRI advocates for the creation of a separate, Shia controlled region in southern Iraq as well as political control in Iraq's government (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2015). More specifically, they aimed to overthrow Saddam Hussein and install an Iranian-style government (Mapping Militant Organizations 2012). After the United States' intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the collapse of the Hussein regime, SCIRI shifted from a militant rebellion group to an Iraqi political party aiming to represent all Shia groups.

SCIRI appears to employ both material and ideological forms of recruitment. In terms of ideological appeals, the organization preyed on the population of prisoners of war in Iranian detention camps, presenting them with guilt for being "bad Shias". and then persuaded to convert this guilt into a search for penance that they could manipulate, referring to these individuals as *Tawwabin* (penitents) (International Crisis Group 2007). SCIRI's brand of fundamentalist Shia Islam was far stricter than what most Iraqi Shias preferred (Thurber 2014). The group also heavily recruited individuals victimized by the Iraqi government's policy of mass expulsion (International Crisis Group 2007).

In terms of material incentives, for those Iraqi Shia Muslims facing deportation, SCIRI offered young recruits an opportunity for employment (including a modest stipend) as fighters in the Badr Brigade and provided them with access to subsidized food (International Crisis Group Middle East Report 2007). The group targeted unemployed Shiite citizens to rapidly expand its ranks (International Crisis Group 2007). There is evidence that SCIRI provided their own security and social services within Shia neighborhoods and were widely perceived to be better able to do so than any occupying forces or the Iraqi state. This increased their base of support and helped draw recruits from that base (Thurber 2014; Isakhan and Mulherin 2020).

Thus, SCIRI appears to have used both material and ideological recruitment appeals. The report from the International Crisis Group (2007) indicates that the group both heavily recruited individuals looking for revenge against the Iraqi government, as well as rapidly expanding its

ranks through offering material incentives to unemployed individuals. This indicates that material and ideological appeals both played an important role in SCIRI's recruitment strategy. Thus, I code the group as taking a *mixed approach*. However, because there is some ambiguity about which type of appeal the group relies on more, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The group recruits Shi'a Arabs (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: EPR

Also Known As: The Popular Revolutionary Army; Ejercito Popular Revolucionario

Written: Kate Howarth

Edited: Michael Soules

Narrative:

Operating primarily in the Mexican states of Guerrero and Oaxaca since 1996, EPR is a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist guerilla organization that is based on the concept of a prolonged people's war. The group's aim was to overthrow the PRI-based political system and install a socialist system in Mexico, however the details have always remained vague (Ronfeldt et al. 1998). The EPR also claimed to fight for improved rights for impoverished communities were necessary (Wrighte 2002).

There is evidence of the EPR extensively employing ideological recruitment appeal. In its early days, the EPR claimed to act on behalf of Mexico's "oppressed" and called for armed popular struggle as a "short-cut to democracy" (Bob 2001). The group engaged in a variety of recruitment activities including "distributing leaflets, talking with local people, holding rallies, painting graffiti in rural and urban areas, and delivering its "manifesto" to people's homes" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1997a). There is evidence that EPR sympathizers would distribute subversive propaganda during "raids" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1997b). The group also engaged in the dissemination of recruitment propaganda in various areas including the Oaxaca state, the Puebla state, and the Guerrero state (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1997a). It also engaged in extensive recruitment campaigns (Wrighte 2002).

There is some evidence of the group offering civilians material incentives in the state of Guerrero to fight for it (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1997b). However, reports of ideological-based recruitment strategies were present in multiple states, not just one. The group also engaged extensively in a variety of propaganda-based recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying on mostly ideological appeals*. I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative : Serbian Republic of Krajina

Also Known As: Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK)

Narrative:

In general, ethnonationalist rhetoric and ethnic-related grievances played an important role in mobilizing Croatian Serbs in this conflict (Pavković 2011). While this work does not address the specific armed unit, it does provide some (indirect) evidence of ethnonationalist appeals playing an important role in the mobilization process. The most direct evidence comes from a 1995 Los Angeles Times article that notes that Serbian rebels in Krajina explained that oppression of Serbs living in Croatia is one of the many reasons they did not want to live in an independent Croatia (Kraft 1995). I did not find evidence of the group employing any sort of material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding due to the indirect nature of the evidence. The RSK forcibly recruited many refugees from Krajina (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1994). I did not find evidence of any non-Serbs fighting for the RSK.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: KIO

Also Known As: Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Kachin Independence organization, also known as KIO, is a political organization that exists in the Kachin region of Myanmar. The organization exists to secure independence from Myanmar. It does so by committing insurgency through its military wing, known as the Kachin Independence Army, also known as KIA. The organization was formed in the late 1940s and began its insurgency against Myanmar in the 1960s. The group has gone through many conflicts and ceasefires, with tensions once again erupting between them and the Burmese government in 2010 (Smith 1999).

The Kachin Independence Organization and its affiliated military branch, the Kachin Independence Army is one of the most long-lived militant organizations in Myanmar. With a history that is steeped deeply in the ethnoreligious tensions of Myanmar, KIO has had an abundance of opportunity to recruit a large population of fighters into their cadres. During KIO's first operations against the Myanmar central government, which consisted of large-scale bank robberies, it is noted that during these attacks, many Kachin youth went into hiding. It is most likely that these youths that went underground likely did so to join the KIO resistance as a means to fight for their ideals of self-determination (Smith 1999).

The influx of youths bolstered the KIO's ranks, which was furthered strengthened in the 1960s when Buddhism was introduced as the state religion of Myanmar. This angered members of the KIO, many of whom were non-Buddhists. As such, the KIO was able to garner many non-Buddhist recruits who felt marginalized by the decisions of the central government. Another issue the KIO has had is with its relationship to communism. For a time, the KIO accepted communism and was able to garner support from communist nations, such as China. However, this ideological relationship changed when the KIO came into conflict with the Communist Party

of Burma (Fuller, 2009). Due to this conflict, the KIO took a step back from communism, but this moved likely bright about recruits from individuals who would have been otherwise alienated for having anti-communist sentiment. After this point, KIO began to decline. It did not have as much foreign aid, and the rival groups had begun culling many KIO leaders (Smith, 1999).

As numbers dwindled, the KIO agreed to a ceasefire that lasted from 1994 to 2011 (Leithead, 2010). However, in that time, the KIO attempted to recoup their numbers. In 2011, once KIO was back to a sizable strength, they began militant operations once again (Fuller, 2009). The KIO predominantly recruits from the Kachin ethnic group (EPR Atlas). However, the KIO is known to forcibly press ethnically Shan people into their ranks (Nyein 2016). Thus, the group has a multi-ethnic membership. All of the evidence indicates that the KIO recruited with ideological appeals, while there is no evidence of it employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: KNU

Also Known As: Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA); Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO); Karen National Union (KNU)

Narrative:

KNU recruited both Buddhists and Christians. The majority of the rank-and-file before the group fragmented were Buddhist and Pwo Karen, whereas most leaders and officers were Christian and Sgaw Karen (Gravers 1999). However, the split among the group was more between the elites and rank-and-file (vertical) than it was between Buddhists and Christians (horizontal) (Anwar 2016, p. 51-52). The Buddhist members were primarily recruited from poorer villages and were not as educated as the Christian members. Most of the rank-and-file did not have access to the same material benefits that the elites did (Anwar 2016, p. 51-52). The KNU also recruits from refugee camps at the border with Thailand (Horstmann 2010; McConnachie 2012). The KNU also has village tract committees that perform several local governance functions as well as finding recruits for the armed wing of the KNU (Jolliffe 2016).

Arterbury (2018) argues that continual abuse by Myanmar's military has threatened peace talks as it remains one of the primary grievances of supporters of the KNU. God's Army broke away from the KNU in 2000 because it believed that the KNU was not adequately protecting villagers (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). Thus, abuses by the state military seem to play an important role in the KNU generating support. While the elites in the group had access to material awards, as noted above, the rank-and-file appeared to have mobilized around fighting violent government repression. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

The KNU also employs conscription, which undermines this policy as families will offer under-aged children. In 2015, approximately 2,000 individuals fled their villages in the Karen State, allegedly in order to escape a recruitment drive by the KNU (Pwint 2015). How much the group relied on forced recruitment and labor varied based on its perceived ability to protect people from other armed actors (Jolliffe 2016, p. 37). Participation in large commercial projects, which benefited many KNU elites, also led to increased use of forced recruitment, extortion, and physical abuse (Jolliffe 2016, p. 37). The ranks of the KNLA have become primarily voluntary since 1995, though it still uses forced recruitment some (Malseed 2008, p. 326). The group is primarily Karen, but it does have Shan, Mon, and members of various other ethnic groups.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group : Shan State Army - South (SSA-S)

Also Known As: The Armed Wing of the Restoration Council of Shan State

Narrative:

The Shan State Arm is the armed wing of the Restoration Council of Shan State. It is an ethnic-based insurgent group that seeks an independent Shan State. There is evidence of the SSA-S employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group has relied on its substantial media presence (even online presence), including in parts of Thailand, to promote Shan nationalism (Jirattikorn 2011). In interviews with low-ranking soldiers in the SSA-S, Jirattikorn (2011) found that many of them had moved to Thailand for economic opportunities but became interested in the group through consumption of Thai and Shan media (p. 37). Some children joined allegedly for revenge against violent government repression (Japan Economic Newswire 2000), though the evidence below indicates that any children were forcibly recruited into the group.

There is also evidence of the SSA-S employing material incentives for recruitment. While the SSA-N struggles to draw in recruits, the SSA-S is able to draw in many recruits because it offers relatively high salaries (MacGregor and Aung 2016). Thus, both material and ideological appeals appear to have played an important role in the groups' recruitment tactics, and I could not find evidence that it relied on one type more than the other. Thus, I code the group as taking a *mixed approach*. However, given an overall lack of evidence about the groups' relative reliance on these tactics, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

There is some evidence of SSA-S engaging in forced recruitment. A 2018 article from Radio Free Asia claims that the group forcibly recruited "more than 50 young men" in Mon Pan township in the Shan state in eastern Myanmar. The article also quotes the chairman for the National League of Democracy (NLD) as saying that the "boys" went with the group so that the group would not threaten their parents. A 2015 article from Radio Free Asia reports that 1,000 civilians fled their homes in the Shan state to avoid forced recruitment.

The SSA-S is one of many insurgent groups in Myanmar that recruits children (Child Soldiers International 2016). Parents in Myanmar sometimes even hold fake funerals for their children so that armed groups, including SSA-S, stop trying to recruit them (Clarey 2019). The group also intentionally tries to block the distribution of contraceptives because they fear family planning resources would limit the number of available recruits (Quadrini 2019).

The SSA-S also has influence across borders. More specifically, because there is now a significant Shan population in Thailand, the group tries to appeal to both Shan and Thai migrants (Jirattikorn 2011, p. 18). Indeed, the group recruited Shan migrants from Chiang Mai, Thailand (Jirattikorn 2011, p. 29).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MTA

Also Known As: Mong Tai Army (MTA)

Narrative:

The MTA was a Shan rebel group led by Khun Sa (Hays 2014). Commentators argue that the group is essentially a private militia or a “Narco-army” that Khun Sa uses to help smuggle drugs (Human Rights Watch 2002; Le Bail and Tournier 2010; Hays 2014; UCDP). Khun Sa, however, claims that the drug smuggling is only for funding the rebellion and that the group is fighting for Shan independence (Hays 2014). Thus, the group likely employed at least some material incentives.

Interestingly, however, a large number of MTA recruits appear to have been ideologically motivated. A 2002 Human Rights Watch report argues that many of the members and officers of the group were Shan nationalists, despite the motives of Khun Sa. Many smaller, armed factions joined the Khun Sa in spite of the drug trade so that they could continue to fight for Shan independence (UCDP). Following a military assault by the government in 1995, upwards of 2/3 of the group mutinied, many joining rival factions, as they claimed Khun Sa was more interested in the drug trade than Shan independence (Hays 2014). Indeed, the Shan State National Army split from the MTA, claiming that the latter was only using the fight for independence as a cover for its drug trade (UCDP). While Khun Sa might have primarily ran the group as a drug smuggling operation, it appears that most recruits actually mobilized around Shan nationalism. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, I assign a high level of uncertainty to the coding because the evidence is scant and it is unclear what role ideological and material roles played in the recruitment strategies, as most commentary on the group focuses on the motives of its members. The MTA was believed to have the largest number of child soldiers in the conflict and they required one son from each family (Bray 2001).

Certainty Score: 1

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ABSU

Also Known As: All Bodo Students' Union

Narrative:

The ABSU was a rebel organization in India that fought for separatist claims for the Bodo tribal people (UCDP). While the ABSU issued 92 demands, it primarily focused on three issues: formation of an independent; Bodoland state; the formation of autonomous, district councils in the tribal areas of Brahmaputr; and for the Indian constitution to include the Bodo Kacharis of Karbi Anglong (George 1994, p. 880).

There is some evidence of the ABSU employing ideological recruitment appeals. For instance, reports indicate that the president of the ABSU, Upendra Nath Brahma, led the group with rhetoric against “Assamese Chauvinism” (Das 2014). Furthermore, when ABSU leadership decided it was time to take up arms and mobilize support, the group hosted large rallies and demonstrations against “Assamese Supremacy” (Vandekerckhove and Suykens 2008). Singh (2010) also argues that the group mobilized individuals against perceived Assamese chauvinism. A member of the group also claimed that the ABSU would lay down its arms if its political demands were met (Dasgupta 2004; p. 4469).

While the group engaged in criminal activities to help fund its operations (Basumatary 2013), I did not find evidence of the group employing material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: NMSP

Also Known As: Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) (Armed Wing)

Narrative:

The NMSP was firm in its stance of advocating for “including residuary powers to the ethnic states, independent taxation and separate defence forces” (Kyed and Gravers 2014, 16). One member of the group claimed he joined to “fight for peace” (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2014). Soldiers in the NMSP considered peace to include increased ethnic rights, social services, and security (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2014). Many of the cadres interviewed emphasized Mon identity and autonomy and self-determination for the ethnic group (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2014). They also emphasized returning to their ancestral homeland and regaining their heritage (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2014). In addition to increased rights for the Mon population, members of the NMSP also wanted increased economic opportunities for the Mon (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2014). Members of the group expressed approval of ceasefire efforts because they believed it increased the rights of those they were fighting for (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 2014). Following the ceasefire, many children joined the group because they could wear uniforms and visit their hometowns but did not have to worry about fighting (Human Rights Watch 2002).

I did not find evidence of the group offering material incentives for recruitment. As noted above, some children might have had more idiosyncratic motives for joining post-ceasefire, but this is unlikely to represent most members. While indirect, the evidence above notes that most members seemed to be motivated by a broad array of issues related to Mon rights. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological recruitment appeals*. Given the indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The group has Mon membership (Kyed and Gravers 2014). There is no evidence of the group using forced recruitment (2002).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: KNPP

Also Known As: Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Karenni National Progressive Party, also known as KNPP is a political party in Myanmar that is part of the Karenni State. The party operates a military wing known as the Karenni Army, also known as the KA. The history of the KNPP and the KA is rooted in the Burmese independence movement. The citizens of the Karenni region saw them as separate from mainland Myanmar, and therefore sought autonomy from the British before the Empire left the country. The British Empire recognized it as an autonomous region, but one that was still part of Myanmar. This has led to friction with the central government, which has at times wanted to exert more control over the Karenni state. In fact, the Central Myanmar government has been known to carry out assassinations against Karenni leaders in order to grasp more control. This friction has led to the creation of the KNPP's militant wing, in order to combat the central Myanmar government (USCIS, 2015).

A government military campaign that displaced many individuals led many of the displaced to actively seek to join the KNPP (Human Rights Watch 2007). A 2007 report from the Human Rights Watch states that many children are not interested in joining the KNPP, while they are interested in joining the SSA-A or the KNLA, because "Karenni youth are more interested in finding paid work or resettlement to another country," thus employing that the KNPP does not offer substantial salaries. In interviews, many members of the KNPP indicate that they wanted to end government violence and increase freedom of movement (Quinn, O'Keefe, and Breeze 2014). One of these recruits noted that they did not have money, which further suggests that recruits were not materially compensated (Quinn, O'Keefe, and Breeze 2014).

I also did not find any evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The group did not permit soldiers to leave without permission, and they could be recalled at any time (Constantine 2010).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: RSO

Also Known As: Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Rohingya Solidarity Organization, also known as RSO is an Islamist militant organization that operates in Myanmar. The RSO is heavily tied to the Rohingya minority within Burma as the group was founded as a means to combat the military junta Burmese government in favor of one oriented towards RSO ideals (Linter 2012).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological appeals. The RSO has a long and storied past within Myanmar. The group began in the early 1990's and was started by ethnic-Rohingya minorities who were dissatisfied with their treatment by the Burmese government. The group grew in popularity after one of the Burmese government's early campaigns against the Rohingyas, in which 250,000 of the minority group were displaced (Linter 2012). The group also formed in response to government oppression of Rohingya Muslims (Amza 2017).

There is also evidence of the RSO using material recruitment incentives. The RSO offered salaries to entice recruits in the early 2000s. It has been reported that recruits were paid \$175 monthly, and families were compensated with \$1,750 in the case of a militant's death. This likely caught the favor of many Rohingya men, many of whom were impoverished (Linter 2012). Such activity also attracts Rohingya youths to the RSO, whom the organization looks to recruit (Chauhan 2013).

Thus, the RSO appears to employ both ideological and material appeals. However, the evidence of material recruitment incentives is more direct, and based on evidence from both Linter (2012) and Chauhan (2013), every recruit appears to be offered salaries. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. However, given that the evidence related to ideological appeals is more indirect, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: BDSF/NDFB

Also Known As: Bodo Security Force (BDSF); National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) is a rebel organization operating in the Indian region of Bodoland and state of Assam. The group wishes to secede from India on the basis of Bodo ethnicity and Christian religion.

There is evidence of the group employing ideological appeals. The group was born out of heavy rhetoric from Bodo politicians in Assam who accused the Indian government of marginalizing ethnic Bodos in the wake of contention between them and tribal groups that had brought to Assam to work as tea laborers. This led to the mass arming of Bodo militants and the subsequent formation of the Bodo Security force (BDSF) which went on to become the NDFB (Rammohan 2005). The group began recruiting individuals in droves in order to take part in its ethnic cleansing pogroms. Notably, this led to the formation of another militant group, the Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF), which aims to counter the BDSF and protect tribals from them. The tactics used for recruiting individuals to BDSF include training camps, many of which have been found and destroyed by Indian forces (Bhaumik 2015). I did not find evidence of the NDFB employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

While made up of mostly ethnic Bodo peoples, the NDFB draws a distinction between Christian Bodos and Hindu Bodos. It recruits almost exclusively Christians, which has driven it to confrontations with Hindu Bodo groups, such as the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) (Chadha 2005). Of late, the NDFB has dwindled in its membership through a series of schisms. In 2005, the NDFB leadership agreed to a ceasefire with the Indian government, however, several factions split off and continued to engage in militancy. In 2008, these groups coalesced into a pro-talks faction (NDFB[p]) and the militant faction (NDFB[r]) (Times of India). In 2012,

the militant faction began acquiescing to peace talks, resulting in another split (NDFB[s]) (Indian Express 2014).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: God's Army

Also Known As:

Narrative:

God's army was a rebel group in Myanmar led by 12-year-old twins, Johnny and Luther Htoo, who are essentially viewed as invincible deities by their followers (Aglionby 2000). The group is a break-away faction of the Karen National Union (Richburg 2000). Members claim to witness miracles by the two boys (Mydans 2000).

There is evidence of God's Army using ideological appeals. The rebels are "motivated by a powerful cocktail of Christian militancy, decades of ethnic persecution, and fanatical loyalty to their child commanders" (Aglionby 2000). Ehrlich (2006) writes that "the brothers inspired local Karen men to successfully fight and protect their homes. As a result, poorly educated Karens hailed the twins as God-powered beings." O'Kane (2000) attributes the growth of the group to religious-based messages of salvation for the Karen people. In a New York Times article, political scientist Dr. Sunai Phasuk explains that charismatic men who claim to be holy and have magical powers often appear during periods of turmoil in the region, and because God's Army was a small group with little support or other material to reference, they depended on supernatural belief (Mydans 2000). The alleged powers of the leaders helped the group attract members (Child Soldiers International 2001). Thus, the group calls on joiners to protect their villages and inspiring them through religious beliefs. I did not find evidence of the group offering material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The group is highly regulated, as drinking, swearing, and eating pork and eggs is banned, and there are strict rules about interacting with members of the opposite sex in the group (Aglionby 2000). The group has Karen membership (Horn 2000; Ehrlich 2006). After the majority of members left the group, most remaining cadres were children (O'Kane 2000). Many of the child members were orphans of the conflict (Beech 2020).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MRTA

Also Known As: Tupac Amaru; The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement; Movimiento Revolucionario Tupact Amaru (MRTA)

Narrative:

The MRTA was a leftist, Marxist-Leninist armed group founded in Peru 1982, and became active in 1984 (McCormick 1993). The group served as a mid-point of leftist causes between the mainstream left and the radical Sendero Luminoso (SL) (McCormick 1993). The organization drew on nationalist, indigenous and populists principles, borrowing some of Marxism-Leninism (McCormick 1993). The group sought land and wealth redistribution, to fight existing class structures, and to expel Western/imperialist influence, especially that of the US, which the group blamed for economic troubles in Peru (McCormick 1993).

There is evidence of the MRTA employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group avoided recruiting peasantry, and instead, focused on students, dissident leftists, and the lower-middle class (Klarén 2017). However, the rural columns of the organization included many peasants (Central Intelligence Agency 1991). Those who joined the ranks from lower socio-economic classes were dissatisfied with the current distribution of wealth in the country (Choi 1997). The group experienced an upswing with the marginalization of the legal left (Forest 2007), suggesting that at least some turned to the group for ideological reasons (i.e., they could not advocate for their leftist policy preferences through legal and peaceful means). The group attempted to recruit part-time guerrillas in addition to its full-time members (Choi 1997). The group recruits young people from both urban and rural areas who display favorability towards leftist ideologies, who are associated with student groups connected to San Martin University as well as groups with Peruvian Communist Party (Choi 1997).

There is some evidence of the MRTA using material incentives for recruitment. Many members of the group were also described as being “full-time” and receiving a salary (Global Security). However, the vast majority of the evidence focuses on how the MRTA drew in many recruits, from various backgrounds, through ideological appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

The initial members of the group had participated in other Peruvian militias (EIR News Service 1997). Some of the members had participated in the FMLN in El Salvador and some in the National Liberation Army in Colombia (Central Intelligence Agency 1991).

Multiple sources discuss their leftist propaganda campaigns, but none mention the offer of material resources. The group recruited from a variety of civil society organizations and political parties. According to one source: “Revolutionary Vanguard (VR), Democratic Popular Union (UDP), Mariategui Unified Party (PUM), various ultra-left combinations, whose most notorious leaders are Javier Diez Canseco and Ricardo Letts Colmenares. The UDP is currently deactivated and was replaced by the PUM. These groups served as the constant recruiting-

grounds for the MRTA” (EIR 1997; p. 57). In later years, the group also recruited from the UDP and Peruvian Communist Youth Wing of the PCP (EIR 1997; p. 58).

The MRTA engaged in the widespread forcibly recruitment of children. MRTA was responsible for 47.8% of all forcibly recruited and kidnapped children in Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee’s findings (Nilsson 2013). Notably, I did not find any evidence of the forced recruitment of adults. The group recruited individuals who were white/mestizo and indigenous (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UWSA

Also Known As: United Wa State Army (UWSA)

Narrative:

The UWSA is the successor of the Communist Party of Burma (an armed group) and it tries to emulate the People's Republic of China in many of its state-making processes (Steinmüller 2018). Initially, the group recruited many former members of the Communist Party of Burma. The group's main goal is autonomy for the Wa state (O'Hara and Selling 2012). The group has predominantly Wa membership (Radio Free Asia 2020). However, the group might also have some Chinese members (Transnational Institute 2015).

The UWSA operates schools and employs nationalism in the curriculum (Gupte 2018). A 2019 article in the Bangkok Post argues that while the group receives significant support from China, the group taps into both local pride and animosity against the central government for support. While a few leaders in the UWSA have personally profited from the drug trade, the organization is able to mostly limit personal profiteering (Jonsson, Brennan, and O'Hara 2016). This, combined with the evidence that the group taps into animosity against the central government, would suggest that the group relies more on ideological appeals than material incentives, though they may use both. Thus, I code the group as relying *mostly on ideological appeals*.

The UWSA relies extensively on forced recruitment to fill its ranks (Steinmüller 2018). The group employs various methods of forced recruitment, including arresting the family members of deserters (Steinmüller 2018). However, its rules of conscription are non-transparent and inconsistently applied (Steinmüller 2018). At some points, the group has required one member per household (AFP 2019). Heads of villages also supply unwilling recruits, including children, to the UWSA, and families with weaker social networks are more vulnerable to this kind of recruitment (Steinmüller 2018). The UWSA is the largest non-state military force in East Asia, and as one soldier put it, "As a Wa, you have to serve the army" (Bangkok Post 2019).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ABSDF

Also Known As: All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The ABSDF, is a militant organization that operates in and in the vicinity of Myanmar. The group exists largely to oppose the military junta that currently holds power in Myanmar. The group was created during the period of British Rule in Myanmar and continues today as a force opposing the military junta in hopes of ushering a more democratic government (James 2017).

There is some evidence of the ABSDF employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group is well known for its activism and democratic values, which are likely strong reasons as to why its popularity has held so strongly since its conception amongst the Burmese people (James 2017). The group mobilized thousands of student activists who opposed the regime (UCDP). These students were on the run after a violent crackdown by the government, and formed under the protection of the KNU (Yoshimura 2011). Soldiers in the group also claimed they would only demobilize if true democracy was achieved (Quinn, O'Keefe, and Breeze 2014). Members of the group also claimed to fighting for the rights of all ethnic groups (Quinn, O'Keefe, and Breeze 2014). Some ABSDF members left the group to join non-violent, pro-democracy movements (Beatty 2011). Overall, because of the group's origins as a student organization, it had a strong revolutionary base from which it could mobilize recruits (O'Hanlon 2004). I did not, however, find any evidence of the ABSDF employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. The group is NOT ethnically based (Human Rights Watch 2007). Indeed, members come from a variety of ethnic groups (Boehler 2012).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front

Also Known As:

Narrative:

ARIF, formed by remnants of the RPF, and a few defectors from the RSO, was one of the more moderate Rohingya factions operate in Bangladesh (Linter 2001). ARIF and the RSO eventually merged to form the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO), though this group soon fell apart (Linter 2001). ARNO “represented the political, humanitarian, social, and economic concerns of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar” (Rowland 2018). The group is also fighting for an independent homeland (UCDP).

There is some (indirect) evidence of ARIF employing ideological appeals. The group engaged in political activities and recruited from refugee camps in Bangladesh (Human Rights Watch 1996) and grievances made these refugee camps a fertile ground for recruitment (Al Imran and Mian 2014). In the context of extremist jihadism, ARIF has also espoused violence against the government of Myanmar (Eurasia Review 2017). I did not find evidence of the group employing material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence, and that the group is a merger of multiple splinter groups, there is a fair amount of uncertainty surrounding this information. Thus, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 1

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Armed Group Recruitment Narratives: PLA

Also Known As: The Peoples Liberation Army

Narrative:

The PLA was a separatist and leftist group that was founded in India in 1978, arguing that Manipur was illegally annexed following India's independence (UCDP). The PLA wants to liberate Manipur and unite all of the ethnic groups in the region (SATP 2001). In the conflict in Manipur, money, phones, clothes, and other goods were all promised to children as recruitment incentives (Laishram 2017). While they were not very knowledgeable on the ideology of the group, many children were inspired to join the conflict by combatants that were in their communities or harbored in their homes (Laishram 2017). Thus material (i.e., money and goods) and non-material (i.e., inspiration from group members) appear to have played a role in recruitment into the PLA. However, Laishram (2017 p. 71) seems to suggest the primary driver of recruitment of children in the Manipur conflict is economic considerations and lack of social opportunity. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. However, I assign moderate certainty to this coding due to the fact that the available evidence on recruitment practices pertains predominantly to child soldiers, not all members of the PLA. The group is dominated by members of the Meiti tribe (SATP 2001). Children helped recruit each other in this conflict (Laishram 2017). I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: BMA

Also Known As: Beik Mon Army (BMA)

Narrative:

Very little information is available on this group. I did not find any direct evidence of the group's recruitment practices. The BMA is a faction of the NMSP that believed the leadership of the latter group had sold-out the struggle during peace negotiations (UCDP). The NMSP recruited exclusively with ideological appeals and sought increased rights and opportunities for the Mon people during negotiations (see corresponding narrative). Thus, because the BMA is a splinter of the NMSP, and because it believed the NMSP was not hard-line enough, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the lack of information available on the group, and because the coding is based solely on information from its parent organization, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 1

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Taliban

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The Taliban relies on a variety of recruitment tactics, but it does not have any formal processes for recruitment (Afsar et al. 2008). More specifically, they tap into religious beliefs, the provision of financial incentives, and the promise of status and glamour for recruitment (Afsar et al. 2008). In the 2000s, the Taliban also used the promise of revenge against coalition forces as a recruiting tool (Afsar et al. 2008). Indeed, the Taliban has often tried to highlight violence from the U.S. and the rest of NATO to strengthen their message of *badal* (revenge) (Afsar et al. 2008). More recently, the Taliban has been particularly successful in recruiting individuals disaffected with the Karzai regime (Qazi 2010).

The group has recruited from madrassas located in the Pashtun belt (Afsar et al. 2008), as well as madrassas in Karachi and Baluchistan (Qazi 2010). In the madrassas, Taliban recruiters seek out students who are emotional or have lost family members due to violence by the US or Afghan government (Johnson 2013). Recruits often have at least basic military skills (Afsar et al. 2008). The group also recruited from internally displaced people (IDP) camps in Afghanistan (Qazi 2010).

A variety of social networks, including family, tribal lineage, friends, and madrasa alumni play an important role in recruitment for the Taliban (Afsar et al. 2008). The Taliban recruits from both Afghanistan and Pakistan (Johnson 2013). Indeed, the group has a decentralized structure in which the lowest levels are comprised of smaller networks in which local leaders that personally recruit a small number of combatants around them. These smaller groups are tied together in progressively bigger networks at higher levels of the organization (Giustozzi 2005). While many combatants tend to be loyal to their individual commanders first-and-foremost, many combatants are recruited from madrassas, and these individuals tend to be much more ideologically committed (Giustozzi 2005). Indeed, Giustozzi (2005) notes that the most common form of recruitment for the Taliban has been clerics and clerical students. However, the ideology among these clerics shifted over time and from 2006 onwards, the group also went beyond recruiting primarily clerics, to attracting disgruntled village youth (Giustozzi 2005). While this cohort of youth cohorts was not motivated initially by the specific ideology of the Taliban, the group was able to successfully ideologically indoctrinate them over time (Giustozzi 2005).

Determining whether the group relies more on material or ideological appeals is somewhat difficult. Giustozzi (2012) notes that Afghan and NATO officials argue the primary source of recruitment is the offer of pay while other evidence suggests that religion and ideology, particularly among full-time fighters, are the main drivers of recruitment. Giustozzi (2012) further writes that “wider recruitment efforts were aimed at enlisting the support of local communities, exploiting local conflicts and gaps in governance” (p. 23-24). Finally, Giustozzi

(2012) finds that “from what can be gathered from ISAF concerning prisoner interrogation, it is rare for Taliban members to claim to have been induced to fight by the offer of economic rewards. They usually claim to be loyal to the Taliban and seem to be closely identified with the movement” (p. 25). However, other experts claim that material appeals are the most common type of persuasive recruitment appeal offered by the Taliban (European Asylum Support Office 2016). Johnson and Waheed (2011), however, argue that the Taliban use chants (taranas) as its primary recruitment tool. Johnson and Waheed find that the issues mostly commonly highlighted by these chants are: (1) foreign invasion, (2) foreigners trying to bring Christianity to Afghanistan, (3) “cowardly nature of the foreign invaders.” (4) defeat of the British empire, and (5) fighting against invaders (p. 8).

Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. This is because (1) clerics and madrassas (where ideological indoctrination is common) are common recruiting tools, (2) propaganda-based chants are a common/the most common recruitment tool, and (3) more generally, more sources tend to list ideology as the central recruitment tool and are much more specific than most sources that focus on the material dimensions of the Taliban’s recruitment. Furthermore, Afghan and NATO officials are two of the biggest proponents of the narrative that the group relies primarily on material appeals, but they likely have political motive to avoid highlighting the group’s political and social grievances.

While the group initially recruited predominantly from the Pashtun ethnic group, it has increasingly recruited from other ethnic groups, including Uzbeks, Turkmen, Jurms, Aimaqs, and Tajiks (Giustozzi 2010). The group particularly received many Jurm and Tajik recruits in madrassas in Pakistan (Giustozzi 2010). The group even began to try to recruit Shiites at one point (Giustozzi 2010). In some areas of Afghanistan where non-Pashtuns are recruited, however, joining seems to be more related to loyalty to local strongmen than loyalty to the Taliban itself (Giustozzi 2010). More recently, recruits have also been disgruntled Jamiat-I Islami commanders (Giustozzi 2010). However, an estimated 93% of the group is still Pashtun (Giustozzi 2012). While there is no evidence of forced recruitment in some areas of Afghanistan, the Taliban does appear to use forced recruitment in other areas, primarily through the threat of violence (European Asylum Support Office 2016).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Devrimci Sol

Also Known As: Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C); Dev Sol; Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; Dev Sol Silahlı Devrimci Birlikleri; Dev Sol SDB; Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi; Revolutionary Left; Revolutionary Way

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Devrimci Sol was established in 1978 as a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth) and Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front (THKP/C) by Dursun Karatas and was renamed to the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) in 1994 after factional infighting (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007; Sevinc 2008; United States Department of State 2018). The group advocates a Marxist/Leninist ideology and opposes the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Turkish establishments. It seeks to use rural and urban guerilla warfare and violence to weaken the authority of and eventually overthrow the government, establish a socialist state, and to abolish Turkish prisons (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 1994; United States Department of State 2018).

Dev-Sol recruits its members primarily from the unemployed, frustrated students, and alienated slum dwellers (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 1994). Most of the DHKP/C recruits come from poor, lower-class families, with 70% of the respondents to Teymur, Sahliyh, Yayla, and Yilmaz's 2007 study stating that their family had some connection with a terrorist organization. Regarding initial contact with the organization, "32 percent indicated friends had drawn them into the organization, 24% said a relative had introduced them to the organization; 15 percent reported they were attracted to the organization through its publications; 7 percent stated they were introduced to the DHKP/C while in prison; and 5 percent said an umbrella association established by the DHKP/C introduced them to the organization" (Teymur, Sahliyh, Yayla, & Yilmaz 2007). This information came from a study that "relied on captured DHKP/C documents that contained the results of a survey completed by potential senior members, as the survey results on individuals were submitted to the leaders of the central committee in their screening of candidates being considered for senior membership that would have qualified them to conduct more serious terrorist activities" (Teymur, Sahliyh, Yayla, & Yilmaz, 2007). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment. The group has both Kurdish and Turkish members (Teymur 2004).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: PKK/Kadek

Also Known As: Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)

Narrative:

The PKK formed in 1974, promoting a Marxist-Leninist ideology and seeking to create an independent Kurdish state (Bruno 2007). The majority of PKK recruits are from the Kurdish areas in southeast Turkey. However, the organization also recruits from some cities in Western Turkey, Kurdish areas in Iran and Syria, and from Kurdish diasporic communities in Europe (Byrne et al. 2012). Recruitment in Iran increased around 2004 (Ferris and Self 2015). Many Syrian Kurds were sympathetic towards the PKK, making it fertile ground for recruitment in the 1980s. The Syrian government and the PKK heavily cooperated to the point which Syrian Kurds could be exempt from military services if they joined the PKK. However, this strategy started to backfire for the PKK in the 1990s, as they lost Syrian Kurdish support because of the Assad regime's treatment of Syrian Kurds. The PKK was expelled from Syria in 1998. While the PKK still has some Syrian recruits, the expulsion greatly hindered their ability to recruit Syrian Kurds (McDowall 2005; Ferris and Self 2015). In rural areas of Turkey (where most of the recruits come from) recruitment is carried out through social networks. In larger cities and in Europe, the PKK conducts recruitment through some non-government organizations and Kurdish political parties (Byrne et al. 2012).

Özcan (2007) argues that from 1973-1990, the PKK had a very difficult time obtaining enough recruits because the tribal and feudal family structure of Kurdish Turkey kept Kurds safe. PKK leadership recognized these obstacles to recruitment, so the group responded by (1) to force evacuation of villages and (2) to improve the social status of women, who were at the bottom of the tribal hierarchy. This helped weaken these social structures, as popular support among Kurds shifted from these existing structures towards the PKK (Özcan 2007).

Özeren et al. (2014) argue that individuals joined the PKK for a variety of individual and organizational-level reasons. Based on accounts of individuals in the PKK, ideological, social, and material concerns all played a role for some recruits, and there were important interactive effects that drove members to join. Özeren et al. note that widespread propaganda efforts, especially broadcasts through the group's TV channel (Roj TV), have played a vital role in PKK's recruitment efforts (p. 345). Reports as early as 2007 also discuss the PKK using the internet for recruitment (Jamestown Foundation 2007).

Thus, more ideological appeals, especially those related to Kurdish nationalism, are vital for the PKK's recruitment strategies. Özeren and coauthors note that recruiters particular capitalize on sociopsychological issues faced by the Kurdish community, highlighting the important interaction between group-level recruitment approaches and individual-level dynamics (p. 344). They further note that individual trauma plays an important in the construction of ethnic nationalism that the PKK harnesses for recruitment (p. 345). Ideological educational programs

have been relied on by the PKK since the early 1990s to help find “committed recruits” (Özcan 2006, p. 190).

Özeren and coauthors also find that many individuals join the PKK for economic resources, as they are either unemployed or financially struggling. Indeed, one member who was interviewed stated that they were told by a friend that they would no longer have to worry about the economic problems facing their family if they joined the group (p. 336). Özeren et al. examine the distribution of reasons for organizational engagement given in official statements by PKK members. Party propaganda, family issues, and ethnic nationalism were the three most commonly cited factors for engaging with the organization, while concerns with unemployment and economic problems were the fifth most common (p. 342-343). The PKK also systematically developed some of their recruitment propaganda towards women, which greatly aided its efforts to acquire more female combatants (Özcan 2007).

Ekici and Phelps (2008) provide extensive information on the recruitment practices of the PKK. They note that the group’s recruitment occurs in four stages: (1) initial contact, (2) ideological indoctrination, (3) hands on phase, and (4) metamorphous (individuals become full-fledged members). Ekici and Phelps also find that the group tailors its recruitment tactics based on the region in which it is recruiting. At universities, the PKK made the ideological appeal that socialism was needed to fight against the colonization of Turkey. The PKK also offers material incentives to financially struggling university students. Ekici and Phelps note that in the slums, the PKK mobilizes recruits with left-wing ideological appeals. The authors note that the PKK has also worked with other organizations to help mobilize individuals with religious appeals. The authors also discuss how the PKK used ideological appeals to recruit individuals in prison. Ekici and Phelps note that youth were frequently offered material incentives. In addition to these persuasive appeals, the authors also note that the PKK frequently forcibly recruited youths and individuals living in rural areas.

Related to this discussion of recruiting youth with material incentives, Esentur (2007) finds that 86% of people surveyed that had been children in the PKK joined to help their families earn money (they also reported that the PKK often did not uphold its end of the deal). However, as noted earlier, Özeren et al. argue that ideological appeals were more commonly cited reasons than material incentives. Evidence from Ekici and Phelps notes that the group employs both material and ideological appeals, depending on context in which it is recruiting. Taken together, this evidence suggests that both ideological and material appeals were frequently employed. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*. However, given that there is some inconsistency in the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Force, coercion, and deception also play an important role in the PKK’s recruitment strategy. Özeren et al. (2014) discuss how many recruits were intimidated, and even kidnapped, into the group (p. 339). This might suggest that while ideological and material appeals both play an important role in the PKK’s recruitment strategy, ideological appeals are more heavily relied upon. The PKK has also been accused of employing a large number of child soldiers. The PKK might have thousands of child soldiers and comprise a little over 40% of the mountain forces (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). A 2007 report from by Özcan (2007) about

the recruitment of women into the PKK reveals that in the group's initial stages, they "recruited" many women via kidnapping and they forced the families of some of their child members to cooperate with the group. These practices have been employed since 1986, when the PKK created a Kurd army and required military services of all Kurds that were at least 18 years old (Ekici and Phelps 2008).

Özeren et al. (2014) also find that kinship networks play an important role in the PKK's recruitment efforts. The authors note that a substantial portion of group decided to join based on the recommendations of their relatives. Friendship and romantic partners (for both men and women) also matters, as other recruits joined because of encouragement from these friends and partners. While these social networks do serve as important recruitment tools, the authors cite first-person accounts from members who were convinced to join by family or friends who emphasized redressing grievances related to the treatment of the Kurdish population (p. 335). Thus, social networks appear to be an important tool through which the PKK makes other recruitment appeals.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UNLF

Also Known As: United National Liberation Front (UNLF); Manipur People's Army

Narrative:

The UNLF is a Meitei underground organization that formed in India in 1964 (Laishram 2017). The group seeks to establish an independent and socialist state in Manipur (UCDP). The group primarily focused on recruiting members in the 1970s and 1980s, but formed an armed wing (Manipur People's Army) in the 1990s and began an armed struggle with the government (Anurag 2010). The group began military training in 1969 in East Pakistan (modern day Bangladesh) (Anurag 2010).

All evidence of the UNLF employing material recruitment appeals is indirect. Sharma (2016) notes that historically, the UNLF engaged in extortion to raise much of its funding, as do many other groups in the same region. Sharma further notes that many groups in the region pay youth to run these extortion operations and that they pay them well to maintain loyalty. However, the author does not list specific groups that pay youth to run extortion operations. Alexander (2002) likewise argues that terrorism in Manipur has become about extorting money rather than advancing a certain ideology. Alexander further asserts that the failure of state and the lack of employment opportunities have also pushed people towards terrorism. However, the UNLF eventually stopped extorting funds because it was unpopular, and instead, took money from government salaries and contracts that were transferred from Manipur to New Delhi (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2011).

However, Goswami (2011, p. 14) argues that despite the assertion by security analysts that groups such as the UNLF is only pretending to advocate for the people, the youth cadres joining these organizations believe in the political and historical messaging of the groups, and they believe that fighting for an independent state will help address economic and social issues. Goswami cites Mahanta (2008), who argues that the Indian government has worsened the situation by failing to directly address these radical ideologies. The UNLF has strong formal recruitment structures and ties to local communities (Söder 2016). The group takes advantage of perceived social alienation and political exclusion of those in their area (Goswami 2012). Thus, there is directly evidence discussing the role of ideology in the recruitment practices of the UNLF. The evidence of material appeals is indirect at best, but I account for it given its importance in broader discussions of armed group activity in Manipur. Thus, I code the group as relying *mostly on ideological appeals*.

According to estimates by (Laishram 2017), the UNLF recruited approximately 70 child soldiers. I did not find evidence of the group engaging in the forced recruitment of children or adults. Unlike other groups in Manipur, the UNLF does not mobilize around ethnic or tribal ties (Söder 2016). Instead, they mobilize around the desire for a sovereign Manipur and leftist principles (Söder 2016).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: BRA

Also Known As: Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)

Narrative:

The BRA was a secessionist movement in Papua New Guinea from 1988 to 1997 (GlobalSecurity.org). The island was home to the Panguna copper mine that accounted for one-third of the country's export income (Adelphi Papers 1998). Those living on the island believed that they received little benefit from the copper mines, and that it was environmentally destructive (Adelphi Papers 1998). This led Bougainville landowners and the BRA to team up to close down the mine (Adelphi Papers 1998).

Government violence against civilians in the region increased support for the BRA (O'Callaghan 2002). While much of the BRA's violence was politically motivated, parts of the group originated from criminal elements and the BRA frequently engaged in robbery during the conflict (O'Callaghan 2002). Catholic ideology was strategically used in the group to promote Bougainville nationalism and independence as a holy goal as well as to socialize members more generally (Hermkens 2012).

Information on BRA recruitment tactics is limited, however, there is indirect evidence of ideological and material recruitment appeals. Braithwaite et al. (2010) argue that some members of the BRA wanted the mine to reopen with better conditions and wages, others likely wanted it closed for good, many wanted to end feelings of alienation perceived to be caused by the substantial presence of mainlanders and Australians, and many desired expel foreigners. The group was able to convince recruits that they could achieve all these goals. Braithwaite and coauthors, however, also note that many local commanders used their position to settle personal scores, including economic ones, and that criminal elements would often claim to be part of the BRA. Put another way, certain segments of the BRA also appear to have operated essentially as gangs for their whole existence, with no political motives. However, most of the evidence for most of the recruits point towards ideological motivations and appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. Given the indirect nature of some of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

While the group was primarily composed of natives to Bougainville, there were some mainlanders in the group (Braithwaite et al. 2010). While the conflict often divided many families (New Internationalist 1999), the group still tapped into kinship networks for support (Dureau 1998). I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MQM

Also Known As: Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

MQM is a political movement and radical organization founded in Karachi, Pakistan. Originally and officially, MQM is a political party that retains a high amount of support in Pakistan. MQM began as a movement that heavily opposed the quota system in Pakistan, which the party argued favored those of the Sindh ethnic group. As a result, the other prominent ethnic group of the region, the Urdu speaking Muhajirs, used the party as a platform to rally against the quota law. This greatly divided the area along ethnic lines, resulting in high levels of ethnic violence being carried out against Sindhis. These instances of violence have been seen as the party having committed radical acts within Pakistan, allowing the military to label the movement as a terrorist organization and begin purges of its supporters (Zahra-Malik 2015).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The MQM engages in grassroots style campaigning, appealing along ethnic lines, with muhajir university students encouraged to join the organization's college student youth wing – the All Pakistan Muttahida Students Organization. The youth Wing appeals to mostly university students, who remain a large demographic, seeing as the party originated in Karachi University (Ali 2016). Recruitment also through rallies and other highly publicized events. Such events tend to draw large crowds (NDTV 2014).

Other publicity events include media coverage of celebrities and politicians announcing formal "allegiances" or joining with the party all together (Pakistan News Releases 2013). Most notable of this would include famed cricket players, such as Sarfraz Nawaz (Plus Patent News 2011). This, in turn draws in more recognition towards the party, pulling many civilians into its influence. The party is also known to make deals with minority communities, offering concessions and opportunities to minority leaders in exchange for allegiance and loyalty. In this way, entire communities have been made to fall in line with MQM's ideals (Pakistan Press

International 2007). MQM maintains a base in London, England. MQM London appears to carry out recruitment largely through grassroots and community lines, appealing to Londoners of ethnic Muhajir Pakistani descent to fill their ranks. A similar form of recruitment is applied in North America, Europe, and Japan, within MQM's international chapters (MQM Official).

I did not find evidence of the MQM using material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. I did not find evidence of the MQM employing forced recruitment tactics.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ELN

Also Known As: National Liberation Army (ELN)

Narrative:

The ELN makes both ideological and material-based recruitment appeals. Arjona and Kalyvas (2011) asked a series of survey questions to individuals who had participated in the Colombian conflict, including former members of the ELN. First, respondents were asked to recall their decision to list, and were asked to pick all reasons that applied from a list of 6. Of the former ELN members, 49% reported that they wanted to join a revolutionary group, 49% said they joined to defend society, 41% said they believed they would have a better life as a combatant, and 30% believed it would be a small commitment and that they would not have to fight for very long. On the open-ended portion of the survey, 30% reported joining for ideological reasons, 13% for revenge, 20% for the promise of money or material goods, and 5% to escape from poverty. Based on this survey evidence, it would appear that the ELN employed both ideological and material appeals, but that they relied more heavily on ideological appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. The ELN extensively uses child soldiers. According to Springer (2012), 44% of the group are minors. The group forcibly recruits minors (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2013). A small number of the survey respondents in Arjona and Kalyvas (2011) also report being forcibly recruited. The ELN recruited some children from indigenous communities as well (Segovia, Ramírez, and Poliszuk 2022).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: EPL

Also Known As: Popular Liberation Army

Narrative:

The EPL formed in 1967 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Marxist-Leninist Party. In 1991, under half of the group demobilized and became political party, while the rest of the group continued as the Libardo Mora Toro Front (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Many members that stayed did not believe that entering politics was as effective as continuing to fight the government (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). However, the group also has more recently functioned more like a criminal organization (Cawley 2013).

Ideological appeals were an important part of the group's recruitment process. Florez-Morris (2007) finds in an interview with a former EPL recruiter that the group organized members by social sectors and had them recruit from these sectors, targeting ideologically outspoken and capable individuals. In its early years, members of the EPL also tried to infiltrate labor unions and workers' rights groups to try to indoctrinate and recruit individuals for the cause (Martin 2011). The group abandoned Maoist recruitment appeals in 1980 to try to attract more recruits (Martin 2011).

Material appeals appear to have played an important role in the EPL's recruitment efforts. Charles (2019) writes that children were often lured into the group with false promises of receiving material goods, such as hot meals, money, and other goods, even things like motorbikes. Charles further explains that the group rarely physically abducts children, and instead, relies on these false promises of material goods for recruitment. The aforementioned turn to crime and (misleading) use of material appeals, appears to have happened after the majority of the group demobilized. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals prior to 1992, and exclusively material appeals from 1992 onwards*.

Florez-Morris (2007) also finds, in interviews with former EPL members, evidence that family connections mattered for joining the group. The EPL drew on student movements and the youth wing of the Liberal Party for recruitment (Chernick 1999). Indeed, the group was formed mostly by students (Wickham-Crowley 1992). I did not find evidence of the ethnic composition of the EPL. As noted above, forced recruitment occurs in the group, but is relatively rare.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Fretilin

Also Known As: Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Timorese (CNRT); National Council of the Timorese Resistance

Narrative:

There is some (indirect) evidence of Fretilin employing ideological recruitment appeals. For instance, a former recruiter for Falintil—the armed wing of Fretilin—noted in an interview that recruitment happened primarily through word of mouth through trying to convince groups of people of the justice of the cause (Cohen 2016). Children, primarily motivated by government abuses and the desire for an independent East Timor, appear to have joined the group voluntarily (Child Soldiers International 2001). Members were also recruited to try to reverse the UDT insurrection (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, Soares 2012). While the organization provided some social services which made them popular, I found no evidence of them offering material incentives for joiners. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

There is anecdotal evidence of members joining with their friends and family (Cohen 2016). Other evidence suggests that familial and kinship networks were vital to the group's fight (Weldemichael 2013). Stanton (2016) argues that the Fretilin fought on behalf of the Timorese ethnic group, and therefore treated them well, but targeted the Javanese population. In the early years, the group had at least some veterans of the Portuguese military (Niner 2000). The group employed forced recruitment, but its use of the tactic was fairly limited (Cohen 2016).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: GAM

Also Known As: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), The Free Aceh Movement

Narrative:

Especially in its early stages, GAM recruited based on (1) shared identity and (2) and the belief that Achen's resources were being exploited without benefiting local populations (Schulze 2004). In early years, most individuals that GAM recruited from were from the suku Achen ethnic group (Schulze 2004). The average recruit in GAM was an unemployed young male with low levels of education from rural areas (Schulze 2004). More people joined the group in response to the brutal counterinsurgency campaign launched by the Indonesian government (Schulze 2004). Indeed, revenge was an important motivation for many recruits (Schulze 2004).

However, Schulze (2004) argues that as the group began seeking geographic expansion in 1999, the group became much more ethnically diverse³ and many of the new joiners were economically motivated, diluting the once ideologically based movement. Schulze further argues that GAM had difficulty recruiting in these new areas as drawing on the shared suku Achen identity was no longer as meaningful, and the government counterinsurgency had not really been active in these areas either. Indeed, many with criminal intentions joined the group (Grayman 2012). During the ceasefire from 2002-2003, the group obtained many new members, mostly from areas in which they had traditionally recruited (Schulze 2004). Schulze (2004) argues that because the group started recruiting again in these areas, the organization might have been once again recruiting ideologically committed individuals. The group was accused of actively recruiting members during the ceasefire, but it denies these claims, claiming instead that people came to them to join (Schulze 2004). Evidence suggests that many joined the group during the ceasefire because of how strong GAM had become (Schulze 2004). The group also used the second ceasefire to recruit and train more combatants (Schulze 2004).

Based on the timeline laid out by Schulze, it appears as though GAM relied more on material appeals from 1999-2001, but on ideological appeals other years. Thus, the group is coded as *relying mostly on material appeals from 1999-2001, and mostly on ideological appeals all other years*. However, given that the evidence is somewhat ambiguous as to the extent in which the shift in recruitment tactics occurred, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Social networks also appear to have mattered for recruitment. Indeed, many recruits already had family members in the organization (Schulze 2004). Following GAM's expansion, there was anecdotal evidence to suggest that it engaged in some forced recruitment (Schulze 2004). Specifically, GAM would order villages to provide one or two volunteers (Schulze 2004). These kinship ties were used purposefully for recruitment (Barron et al. 2013). The group recruited children to fill auxiliary roles (Clark and Galuh Wandita 2012).

³ In addition to the expansion to other Acehnese groups noted but Schulze, some members of the Gayo ethnic group supported GAM (Barron et al. 2013).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Republic of Chechnya

Also Known As:

Narrative:

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechnya has attempted to gain independence or autonomy (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). The “Republic of Chechnya” actor is a collection of several different anti-Russian, Chechen groups (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). The various groups were tied together by personal loyalties to militant leaders and broadly shared goals (UCDPa).

Rampant poverty, corruption, and violence created the groundwork for recruitment, and groups in the region mobilized both around Islamist-based ideologies appeals and through offering money (Shinar 2019). However, most of Shinar’s (2019) discussion still focuses on the importance of nationalist, and later, Islamist, ideologies in the organizing efforts of Chechen rebel groups. Allegedly, the group recruited hundreds of mercenaries who had been militants themselves in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). The brutality of the crackdown by the Russian military also helped Chechen militant organizations draw in a large number of recruits, including individuals who had not previously supported Chechen militant movements at all (Driscoll 2020).

Radical, Islamist foreign fighters from across the world have joined this group (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). Indeed, while this actor was primarily a separatist movement from the outset, it gained a significant, radical Islamist element in the mid-2000s, which eventually became the group’s primary ideology (UCDPb). Internal, ideological disputes between Nationalists and Islamists led to splintering in the movement (UCDPb).

Overall, while extreme poverty made many individuals in the region susceptible to recruitment, ethnic and religious identities and ideologies were a primary mobilizing tool (Cohen 2014). Put another way, while there is direct evidence of money being offered to recruits, most of the evidence focused on Chechen militants mobilizing around ethnic and religious-based grievances. Thus, I code this actor as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

The movement did have some non-Chechen volunteers (UCDPb). Arab fighters who had fought in Afghanistan were also recruited (Tumelty 2006). Overall, Arabs, North Africans, and Turks, were among the foreign fighters (Tumelty 2006).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: CPN-M/UPF

Also Known As: UCPN-M (Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist); Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist/United People's Front (CPN-M/UPF)

Narrative:

The country of Nepal transitioned to become a constitutional monarchy in 1990, with the people holding high expectations of greater political and economic freedom in the country (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist was founded in 1994, maintaining a leftist ideology (Project on Violent Conflict 2021). It modeled itself after Peru's Shining Path movement (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 2000). This greater freedom was delayed, and by the mid-1990s, government opposition grew to a climax in the form of a 1996 insurgency led by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist/United People's Front (CPN-M/UPF) against the constitutional monarchy. Centered in the remote areas of western Nepal, this group called for the overthrow of the constitutional monarchy and the establishment of a communist government in Nepal (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 2000; Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013).

Eck (2009) provides a comprehensive examination of the CPN-M's recruitment strategies. Overall, she notes that "indoctrination and other forms of political education" were the primary mobilization tool of the group (Eck 2009, p. 4). Eck explains that Maoist discourse, and tapping into local political grievances, were particularly effective recruitment tools in this context. Eck also explains that several conditions led to the rapid growth of the organization including a very powerful, abusive, and corrupt executive, marginalization of lower castes and certain ethnic groups, widespread poverty and economic inequality, and neglect of rural regions. Eck notes that mobilizing against ethnic discrimination and the caste system (particularly by advocating for a secular system) were also vital to the CPN-M's recruitment efforts. The group also made appeals to offering more effective and democratic governance (Eck 2009). Recruits also mobilized against violent government repression (Eck 2009).

Eck (2009) also details how the CPN-M underwent extensive recruitment campaigns. The group spread recruitment propaganda through a variety of means including "mass meetings, cultural campaigns, postering and walling, pamphlets, newspaper articles, and political classes" (Eck 2009). The CPN-M also did door-to-door recruitment as well (Eck 2009). The propaganda emphasized Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology and the need to use violence to alter the existing political system (Eck 2009). Martyrdom was also an important recruitment tool, as was rhetoric of fighting for gender equality (Eck 2009).

Overall, Eck (2009) argues that the CPN-M's primary persuasive recruitment strategy involved Maoist propaganda that was connected to individuals' everyday problems (Eck 2009, p. 16). Eck argues that these appeals towards the improvement of all aspects of civilians' lives were very persuasive because so many had so little to lose, because of the destitute conditions. The emphasis on meeting indigenous needs was also vital to the group's recruitment efforts (Eck 2009).

I did not find evidence of the CPN-M offering material recruitment incentives. Indeed, Eck (2009) discusses the use of indoctrination to help individuals fight for long-term benefits but makes no mention of short-term (material) benefits offered in direct exchange for participation. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

During the conflict, the recruitment of children by the Maoists was reported to take three primary forms: special recruitment campaigns such as ‘one family, one member for the Party,’ where children were recruited voluntarily or forcibly; through the community activities of Maoist cultural groups; and directly by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Child Soldiers International 2008). The CPN-M would also frequently enter schools, kidnap large numbers of school children, and then attempt to ideologically indoctrinate them (Eck 2009). As the group became larger and more successful, it relied increasingly on conscription to grow its ranks (Eck 2009). The CPN-M recruited from multiple ethnic groups (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Parliamentary Forces

Also Known As:

Narrative:

In October of 1993, deputies of the parliament led an attempted coup against Russian President Boris Yeltsin due to several, significant disagreements, including Yeltsin attempting to disband the legislature and hold new elections (UCDP). While there was no specific force or group fighting for the deputies, people who were sympathetic towards the cause of the deputies took up arms (UCDP). Supreme Soviet speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi allegedly “incited armed gangs of anti-Yeltsin protesters to attack the Ostankino television studio, the nerve center of Russia’s broadcast media, and the Moscow mayor’s office, Yeltsin declared a state of emergency and ordered the military assault on the Supreme Soviet” (Sokolov and Kirilenko 2013). However, they deny the accusation (Steele and Hearst 1993). The anti-Yeltsin rebels were almost more like a mob (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013) and were comprised of groups of many different ideologies, including communists, monarchists, and anarchists, among others (Serebryany 2018).

I did not find any evidence of the group employing material incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. I did not find evidence of the ethnic composition of the group or of the use of forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MODEL

Also Known As: Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)

Narrative:

Splintering from LURD, MODEL formed in 2003, also with the goal of disposing Charles Taylor as the leader of Liberia along with protecting the Krahn ethnic group (Podder 2011). In her survey of former child soldiers in MODEL, Podder (2011) finds that many recruits were motivated by the group's political goals and only a negligible amount were motivated by the economic benefits of joining. Most (child) soldiers in the group were volunteers and were primarily motivated by protecting the Krahn ethnic group as well as their own families. Other reasons included material benefits, avenging family members, and being forcibly recruited (Podder 2011). In terms of the more explicit recruitment appeals made to children, Podder (2011) finds that political mobilization and social networks were important, while coercion played a limited role. Podder (2011) quotes a former child soldier in MODEL who claimed that wages were not offered to joiners. However, a small number of individuals reported joining because of the promise of loot, and another small portion reported joining because of food or money. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

Members of MODEL were predominantly from the Krahn ethnic group, although the group was ethnically mixed (Podder 2011). Social networks played a role in the recruitment efforts of MODEL, though a relatively small percentage of child combatants reported joining because they had friends in the group (Podder 2011). Towards the very end of the conflict, the group came to rely more on abduction for recruitment (Podder 2011). The group treated civilian well, and recruited voluntarily in Krahn regions of the country, while it engaged in violence and coercive recruitment in non-Krahn regions of the country. Approximately 20% of recruits in the group were forced in overall (Pugel 2009).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UTO

Also Known As: United Tajik Opposition (UTO)

Narrative:

The group has been described as: “a loose coalition of Tajik nationalists, moderate Islamists, liberal democratic activists and advocates for greater self-determination for the linguistically and confessionally distinct Gorno-Badakhshan region” (Tomek 2018).

Driscoll (2015) discusses the recruitment tactics on various militant groups in Tajikistan. Driscoll notes that most militias in the region were not engaged in ideological indoctrination, as only 40% of participants “remember most people being motivated by politics” (Driscoll 2015, p. 39). Many recruits in the conflict also claimed to join to protect their communities (Driscoll 2015). Some also reported joining for excitement. Driscoll notes that many recruits were economically motivated, engaging in banditry and racketeering, among other criminal activities. Driscoll also interviewed many who had been motivated by acquiring economic resources for their families. 73% of participants reported they remained in their militias because of the promise of jobs (Driscoll 2015). About 30% of urban Tajik militants interviewed by Driscoll were opportunistic joiners who joined the group towards the end of the conflict.

Overall, Driscoll argues that militias in Tajikistan mobilized recruits primarily through offering a combination of protection and access to loot, as well as the promise of future economic rewards, including land and other rewards. According to Driscoll, many militants also emphasized joining for reasons other than money, including religious rhetoric and the charisma of commanders that made followers believe their militia would win. However, evidence from Driscoll still focuses most heavily on material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. However, given that this evidence is not specific to the UTO, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding.

Driscoll argues that while viewing the Tajik civil war as a conflict between family-based networks is oversimplified, birthplace was still a good predictor of what faction an individual supported. The group recruited many Tajik refugees in northern Afghanistan, where they also had bases (Hafez 2003). The group recruits both Tajiks and Pamiri Tajiks, which are two different ethnic groups (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 1

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Kashmir insurgents

Also Known As:

Narrative:

In the UCDP, “Kashmir insurgents” refers to upwards of 150 different militant organizations, who are all opposed to the current form of Indian rule over Kashmir (UCDP). Both Islamist and nationalist groups fall under this actor (UCDP). Prominent groups that comprise the Kashmir insurgents include JKFL, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Pasdaran-e-Inqilab-e-Islami, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) (UCDP).

The aforementioned LeT exploits Hindu-Muslim tensions in order to mobilize recruits (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018a). The LeT predominantly recruits Deobandis and Barelvis (Fair 2011), implying that ideological-based recruitment also matters. Most LeT recruits are from Punjab, though some came from other regions, and a small number came from other countries (Rassler et al. 2013). Rassler et al. (2013, p. 4 - 5) find 12 different channels through which LeT recruited. The most frequent modes included “a current LeT member (20 percent), a family member (20 percent), mosque or madrasa (17 percent), LeT speech or literature (12 percent), and friends (5 percent). Since 2000 there has been a strong upward trend in recruitment via family members and by 2004, this channel contributed to over 40 percent of LeT recruitment.”

Rassler et al. (2013) also found that recruits in LeT had a variety of motives including personal fulfillment, fighting societal corruption, protecting fellow Muslims, and fighting for a more religiously pure society. Family encouragement/discouragement, particularly from mothers, but also siblings, played an important role in individuals’ decision to join LeT (Rassler et al. 2013). Religious gatherings and family connections were the two biggest stream of recruitment (Fair 2007). The role of madrasas in recruitment has been exaggerated (Fair 2007). The group recruits both through proactively reaching out to individuals through a variety of social networks, as well as more indirectly through distributed literature (Rassler et al. 2013). Most recruits do not see combat after training, and instead, are sent back to their localities to proselytize (Rassler et al. 2013). While they do not explicitly rule out material incentives, Rassler et al. (2013) detail a variety of recruitment methods employed by LeT, none of which explicitly indicate the use of material incentives. Furthermore, Rassler and coauthors note that poverty is a poor predictor of recruitment into LeT. Fair (2007) notes that LeT attracts recruits through active proselytizing. However, some evidence indicates that The LeT has also increased the size of its recruitment pool through the provision of social services (Fair 2011).

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) is another organization that the UCDP considers to be under the label of the Kashmir insurgents. JeM wants to annex Kashmir to Pakistan and govern Pakistan under an extreme interpretation of Shariah law (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018b). The group has declared jihad on the United States, India, and Israel for violating the rights of Muslims, and the group wants to drive non-Muslims off of the subcontinent (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018b). There is evidence of the group employing ideological appeals for

recruitment. JeM used recruitment posters to call on volunteers to fight against Western forces in Afghanistan (Roggio 2016). The group also holds rallies throughout Pakistan in an attempt to motivate individuals to wage jihad (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018b). The group also disseminates recruitment propaganda (Howenstein 2008).

JeM primarily recruits in madrasas in rural areas and in small towns (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018b). The group recruits veteran Afghans and immigrants from Kashmir and Punjab living in the UK (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018b). JeM has members from Pakistan, Kashmir, and Afghanistan (Zimmerman, Logan, and Ligon 2019).

There is also evidence of JeM heavily using material incentives. Zimmerman, Logan, and Ligon (2019, p. 4) write that “The current estimate of JeM forces is only approximately several hundred, where most are semi-literate, unemployed youth who are recruited from small towns and madrasas with the promise of money and a better life (Hashim, 2019; Honawar, 2015).” Indeed, Honawar (2005) argues that Punjab has become a “jihad factory” as high levels of unemployment and lack of education make offers of payment and promises of a better life by groups like JeM attractive to many recruits.

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) is yet another group identified by the UCDP as being part of the Kashmir insurgents. While the group has some Pakistani volunteers, most members are Kashmiri, unlike other armed movements in the area, which depend heavily on foreign fighters (Howenstein 2008). HM was one of the two dominant groups in Kashmir in the 1990s and it mobilized individuals with Islamist appeals (Mehdi 2020). However, since then, the ideological motivations of Kashmiri recruits have become much more diverse, including a stronger pan-Islamist ideology (Mehdi 2020).

The desire for recognition of Kashmiri rights played an important role in mobilization into the JKLF early in this conflict (Rao 1999).

Since 2010, online anti-India and anti-Indian military propaganda have been essential to recruitment efforts (Chitralkha 2017; Taneja and Shah 2019), as well as Islamist propaganda (Narain 2016). Crackdowns by security forces and internet propaganda have also been important mobilizing factors for children in Kashmir (Shah 2019). A study from over a decade earlier also points to the role of abuses by security forces in mobilization into Kashmiri militant groups (Dewan 1994). More broadly, religious propaganda has played an important role in militant mobilization in Kashmir (Mahadevan 2008, Taniel 2016).

Dewan (1994) notes that recruits in Kashmir are motivated by a wide range of factors, including personal, political, and financial. More generally in Pakistan, family approval plays an important role in participation in militant organizations and economic rewards are often given to the family of militants (Asal, Fair, and Shellman 2008). In general, Afghan mercenaries also participated in the conflict in Kashmir (Parashar 2011). However, Fair (2014) also argues that at least among LeT and HM recruits, the average member is above the average level of educated for the region, and thus, economic development initiatives might not be successful at combating terrorism in the region. However, Fair does acknowledge that poorer individuals might be attracted to the group, and just more likely to be filtered out. Fair further argues that the

opportunity costs for individuals will still be lower during periods of economic downturn. Fair notes that the sample in the study is non-random. Given the diversity of foreign fights in the various Kashmiri militias, the group's membership is multi-ethnic.

Thus, there is evidence of Kashmiri insurgents employing both ideological and material recruitment appeals. However, while of the aforementioned groups employed material incentives, they all appeared to have used ideological appeals. Thus, I code this actor as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding due to the fact that information is not available for most of the approximately 150 actors that comprise the Kashmiri militants.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: National Salvation Front

Also Known As: NSF; The Front

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Originating in Romania in 1989, the National Salvation Front began during massive demonstrations against the Romanian government. Nicolae Ceaușescu had ruled the country as its communist, nationalist leader since 1974 and was popular until major recessions hit Romania in the 1980s (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). The revolution was a combination of a spontaneous uprising by the Romanian people and the disaffected elements of the Securitate and army (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2021). When major demonstrations began in late 1989, the state security forces/Romanian military initially responded by attacking the protestors but defected from the government and began backing the demonstrators five days after the protests began. Ceaușescu was then deposed, and the organizers of the demonstrations formed a new government (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013).

The revolution showed widespread discontent in Romania and the inability of coercive force to control the demonstrations and save the regime (Sislin 1991). The National Salvation Front was a group of former Communists, dissidents, intellectuals, students, and army generals. The group was formed with political ideas based on that the party was democratic and had the goal of modernizing the Romanian economy and organizing Romanian political institutions (Moisa 2014). The National Salvation Front allied itself with the military and the dissidents it could organize and put itself forward as the new leadership for Romania (Sislin 1991). Thus, the group appears to have mobilized activists opposed to the Ceaușescu regime. I did not find evidence of the group employing material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment. The group recruited predominantly Romanians (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: al-Qaida [The Base]

Also Known As: AQ; Al-Qaeda; al-Qaida [Central]

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Al-Qaida is a radical Islamic Salafist global terrorist organization. It originated in the 1980s under the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It has since grown in both size and notoriety, seeking to combat perceived U.S./Western efforts to attack Islam and Muslims.

Al-Qaida employs jihadist propaganda to acquire more recruits (Borum and Gelles 2005; Sivamurugan, Gomaa, and Pazil 2020). The group has long used the internet to mobilize individuals with jihadist propaganda (Sivamurugan, Gomaa, and Pazil 2020). Relatedly, Al-Qaida has used its magazine, Inspire, to recruit individuals with jihadist propaganda (Sivek 2013). Specifically, the group used online recruitment propaganda containing the messaging that Muslims and Islam are being violent oppressed and under threat from the U.S. and others (Postel 2013; Kamolnick 2014). Related, recruits in Al-Qaida tend to have a strong hatred for the U.S. and the West more generally and believe that the Middle East has faced significant humiliation and injustice (Sparago and Klarevas 2007). Al-Qaida also recruits individuals from schools with ideological appeals (Bloom 2017).

A variety of related factors also mattered for recruitment. Osama bin Laden was also viewed by many as so charismatic that he was an important mobilizing factor himself (Sparago and Klarevas 2007). Promises of spiritual rewards in the afterlife were also used as a recruitment tool, as was the social status of being a martyr (Sparago and Klarevas 2007). The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 also motivated many individuals to join the group (Sparago and Klarevas 2007). Violent propaganda was also used to inspire potential recruits to join by highlighting the capabilities and actions of the group (Sparago and Klarevas 2007).

There is some evidence of Al-Qaida employing material recruitment incentives. The group (especially in its early days) offered salaries and benefits to recruits, and presented itself as a form of employment for individuals also interested in pursuing jihad (Friedman 2011).

However, while the membership of the group is economically diverse, recruits in the organization tend to be relatively financially stable (Sparago and Klarevas 2007). Indeed, while ISIS frequently targeted the economically marginalized for recruitment, Al-Qaida never pursued such strategy (Choi 2016). Additionally, most of the evidence discusses Al-Qaida mobilizing around jihadist narratives and rhetoric related to protecting Islam. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

Al-Qaida frequently targets college students and diasporic communities for recruitment (Sivamurugan, Gomaa, and Pazil 2020). In addition to the extensive online recruitment discussed above, Al-Qaida also recruited individuals in-person in a variety of places including prisons, madrassas, mosques, and refugee camps (Sparago and Klarevas 2007). Al-Qaida has a very selective recruitment process and it seeks out individuals with desirable skills (Sparago and Klarevas 2007).

Recent converts often serve as “ideological foot soldiers” to help with ideological-based recruitment efforts (Postel 2013, p. 112). The group sought particularly to recruit zealous individuals (Bergen and Cruickshank 2012). Social connections also mattered for recruitment and radicalization into the group, and Postel (2013) argues that such connections are the primary explanatory factor in mobilizing Western extremists into Al-Qaida (Sparago and Klarevas 2007). However, recruits were often expected to cutoff their connections to individuals who did not share their ideologies (Sparago and Klarevas 2007). In Pakistan, Al-Qaida does not have formal structures for recruitment, and instead, relies on informal connections with other groups to find individuals to carryout operations in the country (Fair 2004). While it has a predominately Arab membership, the group also had Pashtun and Baloch members (Bolte and Soules, n.d.)

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh

Also Known As: Republic of Artsakh

Narrative:

According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, many Armenian citizens joined the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army, both through conscription and as contract soldiers (UCDP). Conscription is common in Nagorno-Karabakh, but children do receive patriotic training/indoctrination in schools (Child Soldiers International 2004). The Armenian militants also employed foreign mercenaries (Valiyev 2020).

However, there is also evidence of the group mobilizing around ideological appeals. Voronkova (2013) notes that the conflict was not completely driven by the desire for material wealth, and that building reputations of legitimacy mattered for the warring factions. Voronkova notes that mobilization occurred around a variety of issues related to the protection of land, protection of ethnic groups, and ethnic discrimination. Özkan (2008) likewise notes that ethnic identity and nationalism were important mobilizing tools. Overall, both material incentives and ideological appeals appear to have played an important role in the mobilization process in this conflict, and one type of appeal is not clearly more dominant than the other. Thus, I code the group as taking a *mixed approach*. It was also unclear what the nationality and ethnicity of the foreign fighters were.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative #: MIU

Also Known As: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Narrative:

IMU's primary goal is to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan and to replace it with an Islamic state (United States Department of State 2017). However, under influence from the Afghan Taliban, the group broadened its goals to establishing an Islamic caliphate in all of Central Asia (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). The group's main area of operations is the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, parts of Northern Afghanistan, and allegedly have some fighters in Syria (United States Department of State 2017).

The IMU recruits heavily in the Ferghana Valley (encompassing Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and capitalize on the rampant poverty in this region as part of their recruitment strategy (Sadibekov 2014; Parliament of Australia). Some observers have argued that IMU members have primarily material, not ideological motives, because of their frequent engagement in the drug trade and kidnapping (Naumkin 2003). Additionally, IMU members were paid between \$100 to \$500 a month, depending on their role (Sadibekov 2014).

The IMU also attempted to recruit more people by both showing its actions against unjust governments and by enforcing sharia law (Sadibekov 2014). In the early 2000s, IMU began to shift its goals to be more international as the platform of IJU (an IMU splinter group) had grown increasingly popular with IMU fighters (Zenn 2012). In a 2006 BBC interview, an expert on the group also argues that the group was expanding its goals beyond the regional level in order to garner more recruits, and that the surrounding recruitment rhetoric was so effective that hundreds of individuals from Pakistan joined the group. Online propaganda directed at Germans also strongly emphasizes the call to engage in jihad (Fitz, Sanderson, and Marshall 2014).

Thus, the IMU appears to employ both material and ideological recruitment appeals. However, the question of which appeal they rely on more heavily is less clear. As noted above, the group offers relatively high wages in impoverished areas of Central Asia and there is evidence to suggest that there are differing pay levels depending on the position within the group. However, the group also directly uses religious ideology for recruitment. Given that the group shifted its goals to be more international specifically because it believed it would garner more supporters, that it emphasizes government abuse, and that religious appeals are important in its propaganda, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, given that there is some ambiguity, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

The group recruits from several Central Asian and European countries (United States Department of State 2017). The group also admitted to recruiting in Afghanistan (United States Department of State 2017). Fighters also come from Africa, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and China (Counter Extremism Project). Several ethnic groups are represented in IMU, including Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Chechens, Uighurs, and Germans (though there are likely an extremely small number of Germans) (Parliament of Australia). The

group also has Arabs, Pakistanis, Slavs (Feldholm 2010; START 2015), Afghans, and Westerns (The Mackenzie Institute 2016). The Counter Extremism Project also offers a similar list of groups: Turkmen, Turks, Afghans, Pashtun and non-Pashtun Pakistanis, Arabs, Chinese, Germans, Norwegians, and Russians. This diversity has led the organization to shift many of goals closer to its base in Pakistan (START 2015). The IMU sometimes recruits through Islamic institutions (Sadibekov 2014). The group also uses women to recruit members, often targeting migrant workers in Kazakhstan (Sadibekov 2014). In the early 2000s, the IMU also gained recruits from Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Associated Press International 2003).

In mid-2014, IMU allied with ISIS. While there were a variety of factors that could have driven decision, one likely consideration is that such an alliance would help with recruitment (Mehl 2015). Prior to this, al-Qaeda and the Taliban helped IMU with recruitment (Sadibekov 2014). Recruits were often sent to Saudi Arabia instruction in religion and Arabic, however, it did not work very well as many recruits still embraced traditional forms of Islam (Sadibekov 2014).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Khmer Rouge/PDK

Also Known As: KR

Narrative:

The Khmer Rouge employed ideological recruitment appeals. Before the group took power in Cambodia, one of its main recruitment strategies was to use propaganda units at the village level, in which “educators” would go from hamlet to hamlet to spread recruitment propaganda (Nhem 2014). The group also had armed group propaganda units in the 1980s as well (Nhem 2014). Prior to the revolution, recruitment propaganda also emphasized the substantial damage done to Cambodia by America during the Vietnam War, arguing that joining the revolution was the only way to stop the destruction (Procknow 2009). During this time, many recruits were attracted by the ideology of the group and were intellectuals and/or from the middle class (Procknow 2009).

Other recruits wanted King Norodom Sihanouk (Procknow 2009) to be brought to power. Others joined the group to fight economic inequality as Khmer Rouge’s recruitment propaganda emphasized the creation of an egalitarian Cambodia as well as fostering resentment against the rich (Procknow 2009). The Khmer Rouge also emphasized revenge against the wealthier classes (Procknow 2009). The group also promised a high standard of living and rewards for participants once the conflict was over by promising to overthrow imperialist and capitalist elements in the country (Procknow 2009). Members were instructed to recruit individuals who they believed were (1) capable of comprehending the ideology of the group and (2) who had backgrounds close to the group (Procknow 2009).

When the Khmer Rouge took power, it ran schools that sought to indoctrinate youth to align with the group (Procknow 2009). Additionally, the regime ran reeducation/indoctrination camps for children as well as educated and uneducated adults (Procknow 2009). Once they joined, recruits would undergo continuous ideological training (Procknow 2009). The group also engaged in an intense socialization process for recruits which included sessions of self-criticism/discouraging individualism and brutal displays of violence (Procknow 2009). The group also had a magazine that was important in spreading its propaganda (Procknow 2009).

There is also evidence of the Khmer Rouge making material recruitment appeals. Kubota (2013) argues that the establishment of the CGDK in 1982 altered the group’s recruitment strategy. Indeed, I did not find evidence of the group making material recruitment appeals before 1982. Specifically, the Khmer Rouge was able to use its influence to utilize its foreign aid to offer gold, cash, and weapons to new recruits. One former member of the Khmer Rouge reported joining the group because the group “had motorbikes and lots of rice” (Goodman 1991). However, most of the evidence focuses on the variety of ideological appeals made by the Khmer Rouge. Thus, *before 1982, I code the group as relying exclusively on ideological appeals, and from 1982 onwards, I code the group as relying mostly on ideological appeals.*

The group was dominated by individuals from the Khmer ethnic group, the largest ethnic group in Cambodia. Indeed, the Khmer Rouge committed atrocities against minorities, including Vietnamese civilians, and when it took over, the Khmer Rouge sought to create a “pure Khmer race.” (Bartu and Wilford 2009). The group also recruited heavily from rural regions in the northeast of Cambodia, targeting impoverished and uneducated individuals, because Pol Pot believed that they would be the easiest to indoctrinate (Procknow 2009).

The Khmer Rouge recruited children, many between the ages of 12 and 15 (Procknow 2009). Other estimates put the age range of children from 10-18, including both boys and girls (Child Soldiers International 2001). They were often forced to join through depriving them of food and supplies in areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge (Child Soldiers International 2001). While some children served as combatants, most were in logistical support roles, such as carrying ammunition and cooking (Child Soldiers International 2001). There is also evidence of adults being forcibly recruited into logistical support roles (Goodman 1991). There are also more general reports of Khmer resistance groups engaging in forced recruitment in refugee camps in refugee camps along the Thai border (Russell 1988). Kubota (2013) provides direct evidence of the KR using coercion to recruit combatants and porters from refugee camps on the border.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ETA

Also Known As: Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA); Basque Homeland and Freedom

Narrative:

Ideological appeals played an important role in ETA's recruitment. Indeed, ETA specifically recruits in areas that they believe will have sympathizers (FATF 2018). For instance, ETA often mobilized around human rights abuses by the government. Woodworth (2018a) argues that the death squads of mercenaries that the Spanish government employed (at least during the 1980s) to fight ETA backfired, as ETA propagandists used the violence by these death squads to recruit a new generation of Basque radicals. Woodworth (2018b) also notes that the brutal police crackdowns that began in 1968 were beneficial for ETA's recruitment. Avazpour (2009) also quotes a citizen who argues that ETA has continued to persist because of grievances caused by widespread police torture. ETA also builds a culture around radical nationalism that it uses for recruitment (Avazpour 2009). ETA also infiltrated social movement which helped to socialize youth to align with the values of the group (Sánchez-Cuenca 2009).

Domínguez (1998) argues that personal networks were the most important way that ETA recruited new members. Sánchez-Cuenca (2009) expands on this, noting that the average combatant in ETA was someone who was socialized in the movement and has a friend or family member in the movement. ETA relied heavily on social networks for recruitment. Reinares (2004) found that many female combatants who joined ETA, though they were ideologically sympathetic, did so to join with male romantic partners.⁴ Before the mid-1980s, about 70% of ETA combatants came from rural and semi-rural areas, and in the mid-1980s, about 70% of ETA joiners came from urban areas (Reinares 2004). Since the 1990s, ETA's most important source of recruits has been youth who have participated in street violence, some of whom join the ranks of ETA to try to avoid arrest (Sánchez-Cuenca 2009).

I did not find evidence of ETA offering material incentives for recruitment. Indeed, many middle-class individuals have joined ETA, however, demographic patterns of the group have shifted over time (Reinares 2004). Early evidence also suggests that ETA joiners were psychologically healthy and had strong support from their families and ethnic community (Clark 1983). Furthermore, as noted above, social networks, ideological indoctrination, and mobilization in response to government repression were all important for explaining ETA's recruitment strategies. However, none of these sources discussed the role of material incentives in ETA's recruitment strategies. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

⁴ Nacos (2005) details how female terrorists are often stereotypically portrayed as joining armed groups to join with a romantic partner. While this is a pervasive stereotype that undermines the wide variety of reasons why women have mobilized into armed groups, this sort of social connection appeared to play a role in ETA recruitment specifically.

The vast majority of individuals joined ETA in their late teens or early twenties (Reinares 2004). More specifically, Reinares finds that 70% of ETA combatants were recruited between the ages of 18-23. Among 308 former ETA members, Reinares (2004) finds that 3.6% of individuals joined when they were younger than 18. From 1970-77, 1.8% were minors, from 1978-1982, 1.5% were, and from 1993-1995, 10.6% were under 18. ETA ran restaurants and bars in which contributions to the group could have been perceived as being coerced (FATF 2018). I did not find evidence of ETA using forced recruitment.

ETA has a youth wing, Haika, which it has used for recruitment (Wilkinson 2001). Indeed, the group had a wide network of associated organizations, and when the Spanish government crackdown on these in the late 1990s, recruitment into ETA suffered (Sánchez-Cuenca 2009). ETA also recruits in France (Wallance 2012).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Dniestr Republic

Also Known As: PMR (Pridnistrovs'ka Moldavs'ka Respublika); Transnistria; Transnistrian Moldovan Republic

Narrative:

Duffy (2021) notes that the PMR launched “an irregular recruitment drive and may have offered more political than strategic military weight.” Leaders in Dniestr emphasized the preservation of the Republic’s multi-ethnic society (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011). However, Kolstø and Malgin (1998) argue that more so than ethnic identity or ideology (i.e., communism vs. anti-communism), regional identity was extremely salient for the Dniestr Republic, and specifically became salient as part of the armed conflict.

Foreign volunteers from Ukraine and Russia largely fought on the side of the PMR (including Don and Kuban Cossacks) (Duffy 2021). While denying that they had invited them, authorities in Dniestr paid Cossack volunteers 3,000 rubles a month. However, while the Dniestr leadership was seeking independence, the Cossack volunteers were seeking to restore the tsarist Russian empire (Kolstø, Edemsky, Kalashnikova 1993). While the Cossack volunteers claimed to have done most of the fighting, the national Guard of Dniestr claimed to have done most of the work (Kolstø, Edemsky, Kalashnikova 1993). However, some observers claimed that the Guard was comprised of almost entirely Russian military personnel (Kolstø, Edemsky, Kalashnikova 1993), however, such participation was viewed as defensive (Kolstø, Edemsky, Kalashnikova 1993). The PMR denied this claim (Kolstø and Malgin 1998).

Troebst (2003) argues that primary motivation of the independence movement was the desire by regional elite to maintain their privileged economic and political positions. Troebst (2003) also notes that many ethnic Moldovans living in the PMR supported the separatists in order to maintain their privileged positions.

Troebst (2003, p. 332) provides another useful quote that:

“Klemens Büscher, a German expert on the TMR, has depicted the Transnistrian movement as “a complex combination of various cross-cutting and interactive driving forces.” Among them he names the “nationalism of the ethnic groups residing in Transnistria, Soviet patriotism, the beginnings of a regionalist movement, ideologically driven actors, and economic and political motivations of old and new elites.” “Mighty clan-like structures connecting the top echelons of the Party, town Soviets, state administration and enterprises – all being tangled up with each other – emerged in Transnistria,” according to Büscher’s analysis of the movement’s leading figures, “in the surroundings of strategically important heavy industry and arms industry.””

Troebst argues that mobilization in the PMR differed in at least three different ways from mobilization in other, former Soviet Republics: (1) the only example of the absence of ethnic conflict directed at Russians; (2) the only example of a Russian minority trying to form their own state; and (3) “did not figure in any scenario of late-Soviet or post-Soviet ethnopolitical conflict.”

The war was fairly unpopular with most people residing in the Dniestr region (Kolstø, Edemsky, Kalashnikova 1993).

Thus, the PMR appears to have employed both ideological and material recruitment appeals. While the elites might have been economically motivated, there were a variety of ideological motivations among everyone else. Even the foreign, Cossack volunteers had ideological motivations beyond the pay they received. Many recruits therefore appeared to have both ideological and material motives. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district

Also Known As: Islamic Djamaat of Dagestan

Narrative:

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. According to Souleimanov (2005) "Bagauddin Magomedov, 'the Emir of the Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan,' made an appeal to the 'Islamic patriots of the Caucasus' to 'take part in the jihad' and to do their share in 'liberating Dagestan and the Caucasus from the Russian colonial yoke.'" According to this prominent Dagestani Wahhabi's vision, proponents of the idea of a free Islamic Dagestan were to enlist in the "Islamic Army of the Caucasus" that he had founded and report to the army's headquarters (in the village of Karamakhi) for military duty." The villages that came together to form the group declared independence and advocated for Islamic law (Holland and O'Loughlin 2010).

Nationalist mobilizations of several ethnic groups in the conflict also played a role, although religion often became more of a dominant issue (Holland and O'Loughlin 2010). Many people living in the villages that comprised this movement bought into its ideology, and individuals from all over Dagestan as well as other parts of the North Caucasus were attracted to the movement by the desire to be part of "pure Islam" (Roshchin 2000). Ideological training also played an important role in socializing recruits (Roshchin 2000). While sources sometimes assert that poor economic conditions in Dagestan make it fertile ground for extremist recruitment (Walker 2000), I do not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Republic of Armenia and ANM

Also Known As:

Narrative:

See the corresponding narrative for the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. They are coded the same because they are the same/a similar broader set of actors (*taking a mixed approach*).

Certainty Score: 2

Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Azerbaijani Popular Front

Also Known As: Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF)

Written by: RA #2

Edited by: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) was a militant organization in operating in the region of Azerbaijan in the 1980s and early 1990s. After this period of time, the APF largely left its role as a militant group and transitioned into a political party. The goals of the group during its time as a paramilitary organization consisted of gaining independence from the USSR as well as integrating the Nagorno-Karabakh region as part of Azerbaijan (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan). The group predominantly recruits members of the Azeri ethnic group (EPR Atlas).

The Azerbaijani Popular Front began after mass protests in 1988 against the Soviet handling of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. This magnitude of civil discontent enabled various like-minded individuals to band together to form what became the Azerbaijani Popular Front. This group pandered to a variety of ideologies, such as pan-Turkic, Islamist, and Communist. While initially, this allowed the group to garner followers of many different backgrounds, it ultimately led to the organization fracturing on these ideological lines, as factions could not agree on how to best achieve their political ends, leading to a decline in recruitment for the group. The paramilitary wings of the group during this time continued gathering volunteers at this time and eventually managed to bolster the popularity of the APF so much so that it was able to become a political party. There is scant research on whether the APF utilized child soldiers or forced conscription (UCDP). Given that the organization was formed by like-minded protestors and that there were ideological disagreements within the organization, the APF appears to have mobilized recruits with ideological appeals. I did not find evidence of the group employing material incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. Given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Democratic Republic of Yemen

Also Known As:

Narrative:

In 1990, North Yemen and South Yemen merged into a single country, however, their armies and administrations remain separate, and disputes eventually led to the south to attempt secession in 1994 (UCDP). Nationalist sentiments still remain strong in the south (UCDP).

There is relatively little information on the southern forces. Matters are also complicated by the fact that an existing military of a previously independent state (South Yemen) comprised the forces of the Democratic Republic of Yemen during the 1994 civil war. Indeed, the failure of the militaries of the two regions to merge was an important cause of the fighting in 1994 (Day 2012). Issues related to balance of power (Schmitz 1995) and discontent with the conduct of the reunification (Washington Institute 2010) promoted secessionist sentiments in the south. Secessionist leaders also sought to incorporate more moderate political movements to legitimize their claims (International Crisis Group 2003).

Day (2012) notes that politicians in both the north and south mobilized their populations by spreading propaganda about the other side. Whitaker (1997) argues that nationalist sentiments were not universal or even that strong in the south, but rather, there was a strong opposition to the ruling regime that drove the south's actions. Economic turmoil also played an important role in spurring the conflict (Detalle 1997).

In the conflict, ideological mobilization appeared to play a central role. I found no evidence of material recruitment incentives being used specifically in the context of recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given that this actor emerged from a standing military, it is likely that at least some individuals joined for economic reasons *before* the conflict. Given this fact, and the overall lack of information on the recruitment practices of this actor, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding. The group recruits are all classified as "Southerners" in the EPR Atlas.

Certainty Score: 1

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Lebanese Army (Aoun)

Also Known As: Forces of Michel Aoun, Forces of Michel Awn

Narrative:

The Lebanese Army (Aoun) was a Maronite Christian faction of the Lebanese regular forces that General Michel Awn (a.k.a. Aoun) led during the Lebanese civil war in the late 1980s. The resigning president appointed Aoun as the prime minister, however, there was already a Sunni Muslim prime minister and cabinet, leading Lebanon to have two competing governments. The Sunni Muslim government was the one that was internationally recognized. Aoun's forces were crushed by the Syrian-backed government forces (UCDP).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals, though the evidence is somewhat indirect. Aoun waged a "War of Liberation" against Syrian military occupation in Lebanon (Norton 1991). Aoun declared that Syrian troops were "a cancer that should be removed" and that he was recruiting volunteers to help fight the occupation (Xinhua 1989; St. Louis Dispatch 1989). Aoun also stated that he opened recruitment centers "all over the free (Christian) areas to take volunteers to share in the final battle for the defense of Lebanon" (Associated Press 1989).

Aoun opposed the Ta'if accords, including the Syrian plan to withdraw its military in two stages, and his followers subsequently launched attacks on all participants in the accords (Norton 1991). While his support rapidly declined because of the violence civilians faced, Aoun initially had significant support among the Maronites (Norton 1991).

Atlas and Licklider (1999, p. 49) notes that Aoun had loyal troops and that he "was seen as a hero by many in the Maronite enclave. Besides his own personal ambition, he was fighting for the status quo ante, which no longer existed; his vision of Lebanon harkened back to the days when the Maronites were the ruling majority in a unified state, and the country was free of Syrian occupation."

I did not find evidence of the group employing any sort of material incentives for recruitment. However, this is complicated by the fact that many of Aoun's forces had been part of the regular forces of Lebanon. The evidence noted above is based on the group's activity once it became a rebel faction. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological recruitment appeals*. While there was a fair amount of information on this actor, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding because of the ambiguity surrounding the recruits that had been part of the regular armed forces.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Fatah

Also Known As: Al-Fatah; Fatah al-Islam; Harekat At-Tahrir Al-Wataniyyeh Al-Filastiniyyeh; Palestinian National Liberation Movement; Al-`Asifa

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Fatah is a secular Palestinian group that was founded in 1959 as a militant insurgent group and joined the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1968, winning leadership of the PLO in 1969. The group amassed broad support in Palestinian networks under the leadership of Yassar Arafat and soon became the dominating force in the PLO.

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Zelkovitz (2015) explains that the main recruitment tool of Fatah was religious propaganda, particularly through its publications. Zelkovitz further notes that the ideology of the group was sufficiently vague enough that it attracted individuals of various ideologies, including left-wing and religious fighters. Zelkovitz also finds that student unions in Europe served as an important place for ideological recruitment, particularly for those with anti-imperialist sentiments. Relatedly, in recruiting individuals to be suicide bombers, Fatah sought out only very religiously committed individuals (Moghadam 2003).

More generally, most records point to their recruitment methods being primarily ideological and based in nationalism. Particularly in the early days of the organization, Palestinian youth would feel obligated to fight on behalf of their people during the 1967 Israeli occupation (Post 2005). Further evidence of ideological appeal based in nationalism is shown as after the Six-Day War in 1967, as Fatah resumed its raids on Israelis in October of 1967 and large groups of Palestinians enrolled under its banner. This nationalist appeal scared other Arab states, who encouraged the proliferation of other Fedayeen⁵ groups in an effort to prevent Fatah from being the sole mobilizer of the Palestinian resistance. This failed, however, as Fatah was not swept away by rival groups and came to be the dominant faction of the PLO (Rouleau 1975).

Fatah primarily portrayed this ideological appeal through propaganda efforts aimed not only towards young men who were able to fight, but women as well. Particularly, visual image propaganda displaying martyrs who sacrificed their lives (especially through suicide bombing) are praised and honored through these images (Combating Terrorism Center 2019). It is reported that other Fatah methods of propaganda include the distribution of their manifesto among Palestinian diasporic communities (Avineri 1970) and that they model their style of networking

⁵ Although this term is ancient in Islamic culture referring to a devotee of a religious or national group who is willing to engage in self-immolation, but from the 1950's on it came to mean guerilla fighters or commandos, particularly in this case those who are Palestinians operating against Israel (Encyclopedia Britannica 2003)

off the Viet Cong. Fatah members would enter a village, try to gather inhabitants together for lectures, and then encourage contributions and volunteering (Fareed 1973).

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Shapiro (2013) notes that when Fatah came back has head of the PA, jobs in the security services became a major form of patronage and that such recruits did not require ideological commitment, resulting in a very heterogenous recruitment pool. Furthermore, from early on, Fatah was an effective fundraiser, which provided the group with the resources to pay recruits, which provided it an edge over the competition (Connell 2001). Morrison (1984) argues that the perceived success of the group in fighting for its goals, and the offer of higher wages than could be typically obtained in the region, motivated many to join Fatah.

Thus, Fatah appears to employ both ideological and material recruitment appeals. The above evidence indicates that both religious appeals and high wages were primary recruitment tools. Furthermore, the analysis by Shapiro (2013) and Morrison (1984) would indicate members with mixed motives who had been attracted by both ideological and material appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying on a mixed approach*.

There is no evidence of Fatah employing forced recruitment (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). No evidence could be found of any ethnic groups belonging to Fatah other than Palestinian Arabs.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narratives: KPNLF

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The KPNLF formed in 1979 to serve as non-Communist resistance movement in Cambodia (Peang-Meth 1990).⁶ The group had three main goals when it formed: (1) end Vietnamese military occupation of Cambodia, (2) prevent the Khmer Rouge regime from retaking power in Cambodia, and (3) rebuild a new and independent Cambodia (Peang-Meth 1990). “Some considered the KPNLF-KPNLAF the right-wing element of the Khmer resistance” (Peang-Meth, p. 181). The group’s platform also included democratic ideals and nationalism tied to Buddhism (Becker 1985). The group was founded with the help of the Thai military and the core members had been commanders and politicians in the Khmer Republic.

There is evidence to suggest that the KPNLF employs both material and ideological recruitment appeals. Bultmann (2016) cites evidence from an interview with a former KPNLF member who noted that the group sometimes used ideological recruitment appeals (i.e., expelling the Vietnamese) and material appeals (i.e., money). The KPNLF member argued that the members that were recruited with ideological appeals stayed with the group longer, and were more honest, than those recruited with money. The recruit further notes that the group sometimes ran out of money for recruitment.

Social networks played an important role in the group’s recruitment efforts. Specifically, the group recruited outgoing and popular individuals so that they would be more likely to find other recruits that they can persuade to join (Kubota 2013). The group also opened schools for ideological indoctrination at training camps (Peang-Meth 1990). Recruits received a 6-week political indoctrination course (CIA 2007). A report released by the CIA in 2007, from the National Foreign Assessment Center, argues that while many Khmer freedom groups that operated along the border during the time were essentially criminal organizations, the KPNLF appeared to have sincere nationalist motives. Thus, while the group made ideological and material appeals, most of the evidence focuses on the ideological appeals made by the group and its ideological sincerity. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

The group had former members of the Cambodian military (Peang-Meth 1990). Many individuals were also recruited from refugee camps on the border (Bottomley 2003) and in refugee camps in Thailand (National Foreign Assessment Center 2007). Although I did not find direct evidence, the vast majority of the members of the group were likely Khmer, which is by far the largest ethnic group in the country. Vietnamese are a sizeable minority, however, Khmer groups specifically sought the removal of the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, making it unlikely that there were many Vietnamese members of the KPNLF.

⁶ Of note, Peang-Meth was a member of the KPNLF.

Evidence of the group using forced recruitment is indirect. I did not find reports explicitly implicating the KPNLF in forced recruitment, however, multiple reports note that forced recruitment of refugees by Khmer resistance groups was common (Russell 1988).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FUNCINPEC

Also Known As: United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC)

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Adams 2015), FUNCINPEC was formed in 1981 and shortly established the Sihanouk National Army (ANS). The group, in conjunction with others, continued to combat the government of Cambodia throughout the 1980's. The war wound down with the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces in 1989, which resulted in increased international pressure for the various warring factions conducting the conflict to reach a peace. The United Nations began brokering negotiations between the four primary factions (FUNCINPEC, KPNLF, Khmer Rouge, CPP) in 1987, but it was not until 1991 that there was a signing of peace agreements in Paris and a new power-sharing government led by FUNCINPEC was formed. (Dobbins et al., 2013; Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. First, FUNCINPEC recruited a large number of fighters through propaganda-based appeals it made during radio broadcasts (Guan 2013). Second, the group originally gained recruits by rallying royalist supporters (Hayes 2006).⁷ While FUNCINPEC became more materially than ideologically driven after it became a political party (McCargo 2005), I did not find evidence of it using material recruitment appeals when it was a rebel organization. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. There is also no evidence found of FUNCINPEC's use of forced recruitment. There is evidence of the group recruiting members from the Khmer ethnic group (EPR Atlas), but not from other ethnic groups.

Certainty Score: 3

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⁷ The armed forces of the group also recruited "hardliners" from the Khmer Rouge (Human Rights Watch 2007). However, this appears to be after the group formed into a political party.

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Also Known As: Abu Ghunaym Squad of the Hizballah Bayt Al-Maqdis; al-Awdah Brigades; al Quds Brigades; al-Quds Squads; Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini; Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filistin; Islamic Holy War; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad-Palestine Faction; Islamic Jihad in Palestine; Islamic Jihad of Palestine; Islamic Jihad Palestine; Palestine Islamic Jihad; Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shallah Faction; Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction; PIJ-Shallah Faction; PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction; Saraya al-Quds (Counter Extremism Project 2019)

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Currently the second-largest terrorist group in Gaza (behind Hamas), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was originally founded in 1979 as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (United States Department of State 2017). The organization is dedicated to eradicating Israel and establishing an autonomous Islamic Palestinian state in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. PIJ refuses to negotiate with Israel, rejects a two-state solution, and carries out terror attacks against Israeli targets and interest. The organization operates in Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria (Counter Extremism Project 2019).

Palestinian Islamic Jihad is believed to, as of 2002, have recruited thousands of followers from universities and mosques. (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 2002) Further, reports from March of 2015 suggest that approximately 200 new recruits between the ages of 19 and 22 were undergoing various PIJ training programs (United States Department of State 2017). Sources indicate that universities in Palestinian Occupied Territories, including the West Bank, are recruiting grounds for organizations such as PIJ. The radicalization and recruitment is said to be done through student organizations and “recruiters”. It is reported that PIJ uses some of these “recruiters” to find appropriate candidates for suicide missions, and that Palestinian Islamic Jihad “especially looks for women in northern West Bank Universities” to carry out these missions (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008).

The PIJ recruits young people by means of religious indoctrination, educating them in what they see as a “divine command” to wage war against infidels (Ganor 1993) In addition to utilizing recruiters who speak at universities (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2008), they frequently send recruiters to give sermons at mosques in attempts to persuade people (particularly younger ones) into joining PIJ (Ganor 1993). Furthermore, many of these younger recruits are intensely radicalized upon recruitment because the intent is for them to act as suicide bombers for the organization (Ganor 1993).

I did not find evidence of the PIJ using material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. The PIJ runs summer camps to provide Palestinian youth with military and ideological training (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). The organization also used the Elehssan Society, a charitable organization, for recruitment (US Treasury Department 2005).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Hamas

Also Known As: Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia (Islamic Resistance Movement); Al-Tiar Al-Islami (The Islamic Stream); Al-Athja Al-Islami (The Islamic Trend) (Counter Extremism Project 2019)

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Hamas emerged in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a radical Sunni Islamist fundamentalist organization that started to become more active during the early stages of the Palestinian intifada (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). Hamas's primary goals are the establishment of an Islamic state within the historic borders of Palestine, destruction of the state of Israel, and replacement of the Palestinian Authority (PA) with a Hamas-controlled government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2015).

There is evidence of Hamas employing ideological recruitment appeals. Religion plays a central role in mobilizing recruits (Levitt 2004). The group engages in radicalization campaigns, mobilizing individuals around issues including "Israeli occupation, military checkpoints, lack of Palestinian leadership, [and] lawlessness" (Levitt 2007a). Schwartz and Galily (2021, p. 44) argue that "Hamas is able to recruit supporters among the Palestinian community for its public image, as a defender of Islamic values, and Palestinian nationalism for concessions and capitulation to demands and dictates by Israelis." Hamas also strategically framed its religious messaging in order to recruit women (Zavislak 2019). Anti-Western rhetoric was also used for recruitment (Levitt 2007b).

Hamas also provides social services aimed towards children including children's television programs, schools, nurseries, and voluntary summer camps in Gaza. All these activities are understood to include a propaganda component; particularly the television programs, which are reported to include political content and glorification of martyrdom (Child Soldiers International 2008). Schools in particular serve as an area for the radicalization of (potential) future recruits (Levitt 2007a). The group also spreads propaganda across university campuses, as well as mosques (Levitt 2007a). In addition, there is some evidence that Hamas recruits through social networks between communities. After indoctrinating one person, they may use social networks to reach that person's relatives, friends, and acquaintances (Wells III & Horowitz 2007).

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives to help with the radicalization process (Levitt 2007a). Family members of recruits can also receive substantial cash payments (Gambill 2002). Hamas also runs many charitable and humanitarian organizations for various purposes including: funding the families of Hamas suicide bombers;

health projects; welfare projects; education projects. These organizations and projects serve to provide support for the group among the local population, as they are advertised in Islamist terms and designed to build support for the organization's religious agenda (Levitt 2008). Because these social services are offered to an abundance of the Palestinian population, particularly in Gaza, the entire family and community could be radicalized to Hamas's ideology (Levitt 2008). Bhat (2018) argues that these socioeconomic services were the group's key recruitment tactic. Knudsen (2005) likewise argues that social service provision was crucial to recruiting followers and adherents.

Furthermore, particularly during the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a state sponsor of Palestinian terrorists. Hamas, as one of the most active and deadliest Palestinian terrorist organizations clearly benefitted from offers from Iraq such as life insurance policy for terrorists, financial incentives for terrorists, and payments to the families of suicide bombers and operatives killed or injured during terror operations against Israel. There is some evidence that at the very least, the organization still provides some financial compensation to the families of suicide bombers (Levitt 2008).

Thus, there is clear evidence of Hamas employing both ideological and material recruitment appeals. Varden (2012) argues that Hamas views both its religious and social programs as key to its recruitment strategies, and that it engages in both ideological indoctrination, as well as the provision of jobs to operatives. Furthermore, as noted above, there is often an infusion of ideological indoctrination and material social services. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*. Hamas recruits in a variety of places, including "charity committees, mosque classes, student unions, sport clubs, and other organizations run" (Levitt 2004).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: LRM

Also Known As: Lao Resistance Movement (LRM)

Narrative:

The Lao Resistance Movement, known in short as LRM, was a collection of resistance groups in Laos between 1989 and 2000 (UCDP 2021). The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) describes it as “reportedly a loose umbrella organisation that in 2000 consisted of nine anti-government movements.” Thus, the LRM was comprised of factions with slightly different goals, but all with a vested interest in resisting the Laotian government of the time. The UCDP also notes that within the LRM, “The main opposition parties were of the Hmong (“free men”) tribe (sometimes referred to by the government as Meo, or “barbarians”), and right-wing royalist forces.” This suggests that a considerable portion of the ethnic makeup of the LRM consisted of Hmong people in Laos.

The strongest faction under the LRM umbrella was the Chao Fa, which later changed its name to the Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos (ELOL). (UCDP). Chao Fa had the goal of establishing a Hmong autonomous area (Baird 2018). Many members of Chao Fa believed that they were immune from bullets, and they engaged in rituals, involving waving wash cloths over themselves, that were believed to make them resistant to bullets (Baird 2018). Members of the group also believed that they could not lay down during battle, because if even just one of them did, they would all be shot (Baird 2018). Overall, Baird (2018) argues that members of the group were inspired by Messianic beliefs. The group also promised people who were desperately resisting the government of Laos that divine intervention would protect them from an evil giant and give them power to defeat the giant (Jacobs 1996). Lee (2020) further notes that the messianic leadership of Yong Youa attracted many people who had religious convictions and were desperate to fight the government.

The United Lao National Liberation Front (ULNLF) was another prominent faction of the LRM (UCDP). In its early years, the ULNLF promoted its cause among diasporic communities, gaining recruits and donations (Lee 2020). The government of Laos stated that the LRM was composed of right-wing insurgents, monarchists, and bandits (UCDP). However, despite the accusation of banditry, I did not find any evidence of the LRM employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

While the ELOL was a primarily Hmong movement, the ULNLF had both Lao and Hmong membership (Vang 2010). The CIA also recruited individuals to fight the communist regime in Laos (Vang 2010). The ULNLF, recruited refugees out of camps in Thailand, and that the Thai government was complicit “until the early 1990’s” (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Lebanese Forces

Also Known As: The Joint Command Council of the Lebanese Forces

Narrative:

The Lebanese Forces were comprised of several unified, Maronite Christian militias (UCDP). In the early 1980s, the group had up to 6,000 members, some of which were called up from its 15,000 reservists (Ottaway 1983).

There is some evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group justified its increase in recruitment efforts by arguing that Maronite Christians needed to be protected, though the degree to which the recruitment was voluntary was unclear (Ottaway 1983). The group has a variety of goals, including protecting Maronite Christians and filling a vacuum of governance, and Snider (1984, p. 32) argues that both the leadership and the rank-and-file are enthusiastic about trying to achieve these goals. The group is also ultra-nationalist and seeks to expel PLO forces (Miller 2014). Indeed, one of the militias that joined the Lebanese Forces, the Guardians of the Cedars, had the slogan “the duty of every Lebanese to kill one Palestinian” (Rabah 2016, p. 180). Rabah (2016, p. 179) argues that members of the Lebanese Forces perceived themselves to be ideologically motivated. The only evidence of material appeals is that some members joined out of self-defense (Snider 1984). However, the aforementioned evidence from Rabah (2016) would indicate that most recruits were ideologically motivated. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

The majority of members were recruits, however, the group did have a formalized recruitment system, which was instituted into secondary schools, and involved two years of training for juniors and seniors, before a more intensive training program after graduation (Snider 1984). The group conscripted both women and men (Snider 1984). While most members are Maronites, there were some “Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Assyrians and other Christians. The Lebanese Forces claim five to seven percent of the personnel are Muslim” (Snider 1984, p. 13). Many well-educated and well-employed individuals joined the Lebanese Forces, though there were many working-class members as well (Snider 1984). The group also engages in extensive provision of state-like services, but most of these activities are conducted by unpaid volunteers (Snider 1984).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Sikh insurgents

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The Sikh insurgents refers to a collection of upwards of 30 different Sikh militias in the UCDP that are all opposed to current Indian rule over Punjab and the Sikh religious community (UCDPa). More prominent militias include the BKI, AISSF, KLO, BTFK, and the KCF (UCDPa).

There is evidence of the Sikh insurgents employing ideologically based recruitment appeals. The insurgency was driven by a variety of factors, including economic deprivation among Sikhs, lack of devolved power, manipulation of religious identities, and harsh crackdown against intercommunal tension in Punjab by the Indian military (UCDPb). Further evidence indicates that the militants attempt to recruit religiously motivated individuals with no prior criminal records (Telford 2001). Universities became important places of recruitment and indoctrination for Sikh militant groups (Fair 2005). The group also distributes pro-Khalistan propaganda materials (Xinhua 1988).

A 1994 report from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, on the AISSF (one of the group's the UCDP considers part of the Sikh insurgents), states that:

"A professor of political science at McGill University in Montreal provided several examples of the types of militant activities AISSF member organizations have undertaken (7 Oct. 1994). According to the professor, militant AISSF activism starts with the adoption of an "extreme ideological position" like the establishment of an independent Punjab state, which is then reinforced by describing it as a religious duty of all Sikhs (ibid.). Another example of AISSF militant activism would be its constant "criticism" of the Punjab and Indian governments for their perceived neglect of the Punjab, as well as its promotion of a separate Punjab state in order to realize the Punjab's potential. AISSF militant activism also manifests itself in organizing parliamentary electoral boycotts, pressuring Punjab schools not to teach Hindi, and demanding that Punjab school girls wear only traditional Punjab dresses (ibid.). Finally, there is the use of "guerrilla terrorist attacks" against all symbols of the Indian state as well as people opposed to the drive toward Punjab statehood (ibid.)."

There is also some evidence of the group employing material incentives for recruitment. Telford (1992) argues that the Sikh nationalist movement in India is highly fractionalized, but that high rates of unemployment, and the offers of salaries, makes some Jat Sikhs who are sympathetic to the cause more likely to join. Recruitment often occurs Gurdwaras (Sikh temples) and there is at least one example of a financial reward being offered for the assassination of a political leader in Punjab (Telford 2001). Others have argued that this insurgency was fought by only a very small segment of the Sikh population, and specifically, only privileged members of this group who saw their positions of privilege diminishing (see Mitra 2007).

Most of the evidence points to the Sikh insurgents mobilizing around a variety of ideological appeals. However, as noted above, there is some evidence that some factions employed salaries for recruitment (though the source provides the caveat that the recruits were

ideologically sympathetic). Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, given that different factions of this broader umbrella appear to employ different recruitment tactics introduces some ambiguity into the coding, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. There is evidence of at least some Sikh militias using forced recruitment (United States Board of Immigration Reports 1992; United States Department of Justice 2012).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Naxalites/PWG

Also Known As: Peoples' War Group (PWG); Peoples' Guerilla Army (PGA)

Narrative:

The PWG seeks to create a communist state in India, drawing heavily on Mao's teachings about "the people's war." (UCDP). The group claims to represent the "landless and castles," recruiting among the poor (UCDP).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The PWG appears to form committees to educate and recruit people (Refugee Review Tribunal – Australia, 2006). For recruitment, it targeted "the tribal poor, including the low-caste Dalit and the Adivasis. In addition to Andhra Pradesh, the insurgency expanded towards Bihar, which has a similar caste social structure. Naxalites here recruited the underprivileged class, specifically the Dalits, a caste regarded as one that is "untouchable" within the Hindu system" (Manandgar 2019). (Ravikanti 1992) details how the issues the PWG organized around evolved somewhat overtime. In the 1970s, the group focused primarily on organizing people's movements, focusing mostly on organizing agricultural laborers and peasants, and opposing landlords and the ruling elite. The group broadened its scope in the 1980s to include tribal discrimination and then added women's issues to its platform in the 1990s. Ravikanti (1992) further explains that the group has always had a deep ideological commitment, so much so that it was criticized for neglecting certain socio-economic goals.

There was more indirect evidence of the PWG employing material recruitment incentives. The broader Maoist/Naxalite movement that the PWG became a part of also paid monthly salaries to its recruits (Tripathi 2013). However, most of the evidence still focuses on the use of ideological appeals by the PWG, and evidence of the use of material incentives is more indirect. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. Most members of the Naxalite movement are from indigenous communities (Roy 2021).

Certainty: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MCC

Also Known As: Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Maoist Communist Centre of India, or MCC is a Maoist Communist extremist group that operates throughout India, mainly in its Eastern states, such as Bihar and Bengal. The organization has a decades long history in India, tracing back to 1969. It began as Dakshin Desh, a more extremist version of the Communist Party of India (CPI), while also following Maoist philosophy instead of CPI's use of Marxist-Leninism. In 1975, the organization officially changed its name to MCC. Throughout the nearly 50 years of MCC's existence, the organization has seen vast success. However, due to its rather chaotic hierarchy, it has seen many splits as well as confrontations with other Communist organizations (Basu 2004).

There is evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Recruits in areas under the control of the MCC was provided privileged access to state resources (Shah 2006). In fact, Shah (2006) argues that the MCC did not garner support through shared ideological ties, but through providing protected access to state markets. The broader Maoist/Naxalite movement that the MCC became a part of also paid monthly salaries to its recruits (Tripathi 2013).

However, there is evidence of the MCC employing ideological recruitment appeals. Even among Naxalite groups, the MCC is considered ideologically extreme (Bhatia 2005). The MCC fought to overthrow the government and abolish the caste system in rural areas, and the Naxalite movement more generally was successfully able to tap into grievances in these areas (UCDP). However, given Shah's (2006) aforementioned, in-depth examination of the group, it appears that they still rely more heavily on material appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. Most members of the Naxalite movement are from indigenous communities (Roy 2021).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Jamiat-i-Islami

Also Known As: Jamiat-i-Islamic; Jamiat-e Islami; Jamiat Islami Afghanistan; Islamic Society; Jamiat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan; Society of Islam

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

This organization began as an Islamist movement at Kabul University in 1973 and was organized as Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society), led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was a lecturer at the sharia's faculty. The movement was suppressed that same year and its leaders fled into exile, where it split into Jamiat-i-Islami and the Hizb-i-Islami, with both groups recruiting from those who are newly educated with a rural background. Hizb was the more radical of the two, with Jamiat being a relatively moderate Islamist movement (Rubin 1993; Tchalakov 2013). Jamiat also became a military faction during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (TRAC: Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium 2020).

Jamiat-i-Islami is an Islamic fundamentalist organization in Afghanistan that was opposed to the secular communist government of 1978-1992, taking control of Kabul and becoming the government of Afghanistan through a power-sharing agreement among the Mujahideen factions in 1992 (Gleditsch, Cunningham and Salehyan 2013). Jamiat-i-Islami is mainly comprised of Tajiks, but also drew Pashtuns and Uzbeks to its ranks (Baczko and Dorronsoro 2016). Within Jamiat-i-Islami, there are divides between the networks of Ahmed Shad Massoud (Badakhshan, Takhar, Panjshir) and those linked to Ustad Ata Noor in Mazar-i Sharif. At the end of the 1990s, there was also a divide between the Taliban and Commander Massoud (Baczko and Dorronsoro 2016).

Originally, Jamiat-i-Islami attracted its recruits from government-sponsored schools (both religious and secular), from *ulema* or clerics in the north and west, and from northern Sufi orders. During the fight against Soviet occupation, Jamiat absorbed many more non-ideological and/or secular military leaders into its ranks. This approach led to the dilution of its ideological Islamist core and eventually strengthening its ethnic-based ideology (Tchalakov 2013). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

With regards to forced recruitment, there is evidence that between 2004 and 2006 Jamiat-i-Islami engaged in extensive forcible recruitment (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa 2007). An official at the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation indicated that Jamiat-i-Islami and another armed faction opposing it, Jonbesh-e Melli Islami's forced recruitment campaigns resulted in at least 2,000 families having to leave Afghanistan. It was reported that Jamiat-i-Islami's forces on the border of Tajikistan recruited people by force in the neighboring Takhar province (Research Directorate, Immigration and

Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa 2007). The group recruits both ethnic Tajiks and Pashtuns (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Hezb-i-Islami

Also Known As: Hezb-e Islami; Islamic Party; Party of Islam; Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin; HIG; Hezbi-Islami; Islamic Party of Gulbuddin

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Hezb-i-Islami, the second-largest insurgent group in Afghanistan, was originally formed in 1977 (Ruttig 2014). The organization operated with the goal of the “establishment of a pure Islamic state [by utilizing] a highly disciplined organizational structure built around a small cadre of educated elites” (Institute for the Study of War, n.d.). In 1979 the group fractured, and the various factions became known by the names of their leaders, with the Hezb-i-Islami most well-known today being referred to as Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG). The group conducted operations under the direction of Hekmatyar from then on. The organization also operates in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province in order to create staging areas for logistics, funding, and recruitment efforts, particularly in the Shamshatu refugee camp near Peshawar (National Counterterrorism Center, n.d.).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group focused more on ideological indoctrination than other factions in the conflict (Johnson 2018). Recruitment, at least in theory, focused on devotion and ideology, rather than tribal lineage or landholdings (Johnson 2018). The appeals the group make reach a much broader array of individuals, and are distinct ideologically, from the appeals made by the Taliban (Dorrnsoro 2010). At times, the group attempted to make more moderate religious appeals (Faerber 2002). The group has also been able to mobilize Pashtun communities who feel marginalized (Felbab-Brown 2012).

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. For instance, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the group used money from foreign donors to recruit from poor regions in Afghanistan and refugees in Pakistan, and the refugee camps served as a particularly important source of recruits (Faerber 2002). Economic incentives played an important role in the decision to support the group or its rivals (Felbab-Brown 2012).

Thus, there is evidence of the group frequently employing both ideological and material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*. The group recruited both in refugee camps in Pakistan as well as Arab fighters (Johnson 2018). The group has been more successful at recruiting non-Pashtun fighters than the Taliban has (Dorrnsoro 2009). The group has members who are Chechen, Pashtun, and Uzbek (Dorrnsoro 2010).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative #: Hezb-i-Wahdat

Also Known As: Hezbe Wahdat

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Hezb-i-Wahdat, also known as Hezb-e-Wahdat or Hezbe Wahdat, was a militant group operating in Afghanistan from the 1980s to the late 2000s. The group began to address ethnic issues with Soviet occupation and soon grew into a political force later in its tenure. However, the group has been plagued by several ideological splinters, leaving it relatively inert by 2008 (Niamutullah 2009).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Hezb-i-Wahdat began as a resistance group operating in Afghanistan, combating the forces of the Soviet Union in the region at that time. Given that there were multiple such Afghani organizations in that time also combating the Soviet forces, Hezb-i-Wahdat was able to forge many alliances (Harpviken 1998). Hezb-i-Wahdat was forced to adapt its strategy of militancy to one of a more political nature once the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended. Without a unifying enemy to bring such groups together, organizations such as Hezb-i-Wahdat were forced to retreat inwardly, relying on their ethnic bases for support. It was during this time period, that Hezb-i-Wahdat became a bastion for the political agenda of the ethnic Hazara people in Afghani politics (Harpviken 1998). The group also emphasized Islamic solidarity and uniting Islamist militants (Council of the European Union 2001).

I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given that most of the evidence on the recruitment practices of the group is indirect, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Despite the leaps Hezb-i-Wahdat made in adapting to its changing political environment, it was ultimately placed under great threat by the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s and early

2000s. The Taliban's attacks against Hezb-i-Wahdat damaged the group greatly, leaving its political influence a fraction of what it was in years before (Canfield 2004). After the decline of the Taliban, Hezb-i-Wahdat broke into 4 different splinter groups, greatly fracturing its member base, making its political influence quite negligible (Niamatullah 2009).

The group recruits from the Hazaras ethnic group (Council of the European Union 2001). Most members are volunteers and forced recruitment is rare, often resulting in individuals paying the group to avoid service (Council of the European Union 2001). The EPR Atlas notes that the group recruits from the Hazara ethnic group.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative : Movement for Peace in Tajikistan

Also Known As: Forces of Mahmud Khudoberdiyev

Narrative:

There is very little information available on this group. The group, led by Colonel Mahmud Khudoberdiyev, engaged in illegal activities and fought with another brigade in the military for control of the central market in Qurghonteppa because they were dissatisfied with their compensation (GlobalSecurity.org). Khudoberdiyev appeared to have primarily organized the rebellion because of his opposition to the power-sharing agreement in the 1997 peace agreement and the integration of UTO rebels into government forces (UCDP). Economic interests and the politics of family clans are also purported motives (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). The group, therefore, appears to have mobilized around the acquisition of economic resources. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*. However, given the dearth of information on this group, and that all of the evidence is indirect, I assign a low certainty to the coding. The leader of the group, Colonel Khudoberdiyev, was an ethnic Uzbek (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). The EPR Atlas lists the group as recruiting Uzbek members.

Certainty Score: 1

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: PFLP

Also Known As: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Narrative:

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group recruited foreign fighters who had no previous organizational experience but who stated their willingness to fight for the Palestinian cause (Schweitzer 2011, 22). The PFLP also tried to mobilize around class-based issues (Hudson 1999; Giacaman 2013), though these appeals did not appear to be very effective (Hudson 1999). By the late 1970s, the group had strict standards for membership that included six months of political training (Buck 2013). To be accepted into the organization, recruits needed to have accepted the group's political platform (Hudson 1999).

AbuKhalil (1987) argues that "In many cases, the charisma of the hero-idol serves as a major tool of party recruitment. The PFLP is no exception. In fact, it represents an extreme case of personality cult, given the enormous charisma and popularity that have surrounded the personality and leadership of George Habash." The group also used the fame of its member, Leila Khaled, to help generate support (Stack-O'Connor 2007). The group has also used prison as a space to indoctrinate and recruit (Speckhard and Shajkovci 2018). More recently, the group recruited from students cells in universities in the West Bank (Middle East Monitor 2020). It was a policy of the group for male members to actively recruit their sisters (Gentry 2009).

Byman (2011, 40) argues that members of the PFLP were even more idealistic than members of Fatah, and that recruits in the PFLP claimed not to receive salaries. I also did not find any evidence of the group offering material appeals in exchange for participation. Thus, I coded the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami

Also Known As: Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami (JUNBISH)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, also known as Junbish or the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan is an Islamist, left-leaning political party that has roots in militancy throughout the 1980's and the early 2000s. The group gained prominence in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was part of organizations such as the Northern Alliance (Katzman 2014).

There is some evidence of the group mobilizing around ideological issues. While it had a broad Islamist ideology, it has an ideologically-diverse membership, including leftist, Islamists, and ethnic nationalists (UCDPa).

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. The National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan began as a "self-defense" organization in the Sheberghan region of Afghanistan. The group's main goal was to protect oil fields amidst the chaos of the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. The organization's exploits were quite lucrative, a fact that resulted in nearly 40,000 individuals being recruited onto their forces. After the Soviet forces left, the Nation Islamic Movement of Afghanistan was thrown into the political chaos that ensued, embracing their militancy and combatting other organizations, such as Jamiat-e-Islami (Katzman 2014). The group also switched sides when the government was no longer able to provide financial incentives to the group (Otto 2018). The leader of the group was also described as a warlord (UCDPb).

Thus, there is evidence of the group employing both ideological and material recruitment appeals. However, much more of the evidence focuses on the use of material incentives, and this evidence tends to be more direct. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. The group is described as a non-Pashtun militia (Rubin 1996). Most members of the group were

Uzbek, while some were Ismaili or Turkomans (UCDPa). There was no evidence of the group employing forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UIFSA

Also Known As: United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA); Northern Alliance

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, also known as the Northern Alliance or the UIFSA was a military front that existed in the late '1990s and early 2000s. The group was created as a countermovement against the Taliban, who at the time controlled much of Afghanistan. UIFSA was comprised of about 13 different rebel movements that opposed the Taliban (UCDP). The three strongest groups under this umbrella were Jamiaat-i-Islami (predominantly Tajik membership), the Hezb-i-Wahdat (predominantly Hazara membership), and Jumbish-i-Milli-ye-Islami (predominantly Uzbek membership) (UCDP). The group was committed to expunging the Taliban from Kabul and most of Afghanistan, while also returning to previous political processes. The group lasted until the early 2000s when it disbanded after claiming victory over the Taliban with the help of the United States (BBC 2001).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. UIFSA was able to pull members from that specific ethnicity who felt discriminated against by the Taliban's policies. The Northern Alliance was ultimately a united military front, as such, it was by nature a coalition of leaders and organizations throughout Afghanistan. This coalition meant the UIFSA was able to pull recruits from different backgrounds and influence a wide range of Afghans (BBC 2001). Jones (2008) argues that, for groups opposed to the Taliban, the collapse of the state created permissive conditions for ideologically motivated rebel leaders to mobilize fighters, and that ethnic grievances did not play a very important role.

Across the three dominant factions of the group, Jamiaat-i-Islami and Hezb-i-Wahdat are coded as relying exclusively on ideological appeals, while Jumbish-i-Milli-ye-Islami is coded as relying mostly on material incentives. Thus, at least one faction of the movement employed

material recruitment incentives. The group has also been described as a coalition of warlords (Hulsman and Debat 2006). However, based on the Jones and BBC evidence, and the fact that two of three most powerful factions rely exclusively on ideological appeals, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, given that this information is based on just a few groups, and is somewhat indirect, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Due to its existence as a coalition, the Northern Alliance was also naturally inclined to decentralization, the operation of various regions under its control depended very much so on the personality of the leaders in charge of those regions. As such, in some regions, the UIFSA took to conscripting child soldiers in order to combat the Taliban (Associated Press 2001).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: AMB

Also Known As: Kateab al-Shaheed al Aqsa, Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades; AAMB

Narrative:

AMB is a secular nationalist group fighting for a complete withdraw of Israel from the occupied territories (Cordesman 2006). AMB is comprised of local armed activists who claim to be affiliated with Fatah, though the directness of their connection has been disputed by Fatah's leadership (Human Rights Watch 2002).

There is some evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group uses propaganda posters to help recruit suicide bombers (Durns 2019). Martyrdom is an important motive for suicide bombers in the group (The Gazette (Montreal) 2002). The martyrdom of female suicide bombers in the group was also used for recruitment (Bloom 2007). Despite being secular, the group also used religious-based rhetoric to help recruit suicide bombers (Hassan 2004).

There is also evidence of the group offering material recruitment incentives. Social pressuring and the promise of large payments to family members were also used by the group to recruit suicide bombers (Merari et al. 2009). Israeli intelligence officials claimed to have evidence that Arafat directly approved payments to members of AMB (CBS News 2002). However, many members of AMB received salaries through participation in various Palestinian security forces, making these claims difficult to confirm (UCDP). Again, while the connection between AMB and Fatah is disputed, Fatah is coded as taking a mixed approach to recruitment (see corresponding narrative).

There is evidence of the AMB recruiting with both material and ideological appeals, and overall, the evidence does not clearly suggest that one type is the predominant recruitment tool of the group. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*. However, given the indirect nature of some of the evidence, and that the extent to which salaries are paid has been questioned, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The group used children to recruit other children, including their friends and family members (Myre 2004).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: PNA

Also Known As: Palestinian Authority (PA); Palestinian National Authority (PNA)

Written: RA #1

Edited: RA #2

Narrative:

The Palestinian National Authority is the recognized government of the Palestinian Authority (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). It was created after the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords signed by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to act as the interim government in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza (Central Intelligence Agency 2002). The Oslo Accords agreed on mutual recognition and that governing functions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967 – would be progressively handed over to a Palestinian council. It called for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to take control over most populated areas in the occupied territories (Zeidan 2020). Under the terms of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority is not permitted to have a military force and is confined to a police force with paramilitary operations and a series of intelligence organizations (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 2003).

While the PNA has been controlled by Fatah, it is still coded as two different actors in the UCDP (UCDP). The PNA had its own armed forces—the General Security Services (GSS)—and the majority of recruits in these organizations were taken from Fatah. Indeed, the UCDP notes that the PNA and Fatah are essentially indistinguishable (UCDP). Fatah is coded as taking a mixed approach (see corresponding narrative). As noted in its narrative, the provision of jobs in the security section of the Palestinian Authority was a key form of patronage (Shapiro). However, as also noted in the narrative, ideology was also a key mobilizing tool for Fatah. Based on this, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*.

Under the Oslo II Interim Agreement, the PA is required to submit a list of all potential police recruits to Israel for approval. This is done to ensure that no known terrorists are enlisted into the Palestinian Security Forces. However, Israel claims that the PA has failed to do so and that as of 2003, there were 19 wanted terrorists known to be in the process of recruitment or actively serving in the security forces' ranks (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 2003).

With regards to child soldiers, the minimum age for volunteering in the Palestinian Authority Police Forces (the only armed forces Palestine can have under the Oslo Accords) is 18, and it is the same for any other servant in the administration. The draft Palestinian Child Rights Charter incorporates an article forbidding the enlistment of children under 18 in any armed forces. No military training is done in regular schools, however, it is estimated that in the summer of 2000 nearly 50,000 children were enrolled in military-style camps with rules of

discipline and use of light arms, organized by a government organization, the Political Guidance and Training Unit (Child Soldiers International 2001).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: PFLP – GC

Also Known As: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP - GC)

Narrative:

Much less is known about the recruitment processes of the PFLP – GC than the PFLP (Hudson 1999). The organization split from PFLP because it believed that the PFLP was not hard-lined enough in its approach, and the PFLP-GC wanted to focus more on fighting than politics (UCDP). In 2012, following demonstrations, the PFLP-GC began recruiting in the Yarmouk refugee camp (Rollins 2017). Based on the fact that the PFLP recruited exclusively with ideological appeals (see corresponding narrative), and that the group recruited from refugee camps after anti-government demonstrations, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, due to the very indirect and limited nature of this evidence, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 1

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UNRF II

Also Known As: United National Rescue Front II (UNRF II); UNRF-II

Narrative:

The UNRF II's ideology was somewhat unclear, however, there is still evidence of it employing ideological recruitment appeals. The group's leader argues that the movement was in direct response to the Museveni regime violating its agreement with the original UNRF (Lindemann 2010). This included alleged political and economic neglect of the Lugbara-Aringa communities as well as mistreatment of former UNRF soldiers, especially Muslim soldiers (Lindemann 2010). The group did not want to overthrow the state, but to reform it, which helped attract recruits (Day 2011). Some of the combatants might have mobilized because of grievances related to poverty and marginalization (Day 2011). The group struggled to provide a clear articulation of grievances related to loss of power following the collapse of the Amin regime, which made it difficult to attract a large number of recruits (Day 2011).

Herbert and Idris (2018) identify three reasons why the UNRF II formed. First, the aforementioned violation of the agreement with the UNRF I. Second, feelings of marginalization caused the lack of development in the West Nile region, while government development programs were being implemented in the south. Third, government arrests and killings, without trial, of people in the West Nile region. Thus, there were several grievances that the group clearly mobilized supporters around.

There is some (indirect) evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. In interviews with former participants in the conflict, Both and Reis (2014) find that some individuals joined a rebel camp based on the promise of money. However, there is little discussion of the UNRF II specifically. Most sources, instead, focus on the non-material aspects of recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

The UNRF II was led by individuals who had been elites in the Amin regime (Day 2011). The group also had veterans from the UNRF I (Bogner and Neubert 2012). The group recruited heavily from the Muslim enclave in the Yumbe district, where feelings of marginalization were particularly high (Herbert and Idris 2018). These recruits were primarily from the Aringa group (Bogner and Neubert 2012). As with other members of the Amin regime, members came from the Kakwa tribe (Day 2011). The group also eventually turned to forced recruitment, which helped contribute to its decline in popularity (Bogner and Neubert 2012).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: SLM/A

Also Known As: Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The SLM/A emerged in 2003 as one of the two primary armed opposition groups (the other being the Justice and Equality Movement, JEM) made up of and representing the non-Arab ethnic Sudanese in the Western Darfur regions. Both groups primarily combat the government-sponsored Arab militias and aim for increased representation of their ethnic groups but differ in the role religion should play in a democratic Sudan (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan, 2013). They claim that there was significant political, economic, and social marginalization of the region leading up to their declaration of armed resistance to the Sudanese government (United Kingdom: Home Office 2008).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Specifically, it made ideological appeals to several groups, including the African Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit tribes, based on the idea of fighting for a “New Sudan,” that would be multicultural and secular (Bodetti 2016). I did not find evidence of the SLM/A employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The SLM/A is primarily composed of members of one of the non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur, African sedentary tribes such as the Fur, Zaghawa, and the Massaleit (United Kingdom: Home Office 2008). Minority Rights Group International (MRG) reports that as of 2009, SLM/A was primarily composed of Fur and Massaleit individuals (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2014). There were also a small number of Arab individuals in the group (Tanner and Tubiana 2007). There is some evidence to suggest that the organization utilized forced conscription (United Kingdom: Home Office 2008).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: JEM

Also Known As: The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

Narrative:

JEM is an Islamist armed group in Sudan seeking regime change. The group was founded in 2001 after Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, dissolved the national assembly and declared a state of emergency (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. McGregor (2005) argues that it is unlikely that all of JEM's members support its Islamist goals, as some have joined the group as a pathway to revenge for the loss of a family member or farmland. The group also recruits Missiriya Arabs because they feel betrayed by the government who promised them certain rights (Small Arms Survey 2011). Brosché (2011) notes that one of the grievances that JEM mobilized around was economic inequality. JEM was also able to recruit Arabs in Sudan who were dissatisfied with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the SPLM in 2005 (Tubiana 2005; Tanner and Tubiana 2007).

There is also some evidence of JEM offering material incentives to new recruits (IRIN 2009). However, most of the evidence focuses on ideological appeals and the group appears to focus more on these types of appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

The organization recruits members from a variety of places. Most of the original members were former member of the Popular Congress Party (PCP) (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015). While most of the early leadership and general membership came from the Kobe ethnic group, a Zaghawa subgroup, it eventually recruited more locally in its areas of operation (Small Arms Survey 2013). JEM finds many recruits in the refugee camps of Chad (BBC 2009) and in the Fellata population (McGregor 2005). African Muslims who were forced out of Darfur also joined JEM (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015). While JEM is the only multiethnic armed group in Darfur, critics argue that the group is not as inclusive as it presents itself as being (Al Jazeera 2010). Tanner and Tubiana (2007) notes that JEM is still mostly a Zaghawa Kobe movement, but around 2005-2006, it did become more diverse. They further note that JEM has also recruited from multiple ethnic groups in Chad. Tubiana (2005) finds that many Kobe joined JEM through kinship ties rather than through its political organization. While the group fights the Janjawid, it has actively recruited from the Janjawid as well (Small Arms Survey 2013).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: EIJM

Also Known As: Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM)

Narrative:

EIJM was founded in Sudan in 1980 as a merger between the National Eritrean Islamic Liberation Front, the Islamic Vanguard, the Organization of Eritrean Pioneer Muslims, and the Islamic Awakening (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015). According to its profile in the Big, Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) database, the group has three goals. First, it wants to wage jihad against the Eritrean government. Second, it wants to create an Islamic State in Eritrea. Third and finally, it seeks retribution for anti-Muslim discrimination in Eritrea (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015).

Asal and Rethemeyer (2015) note that “the large majority of EIJM members are Muslim youth network members, conservative Eritreans, or refugees who have sought asylum in Sudan.” The group also has members that were dissidents from the ELF and EPLF (United States Institute of Peace 2004). There were also EIJM members who were veterans of the Afghan conflict (Rassler and Brown 2011). The organization also has very diverse membership including extremist and moderate Muslims, as well as secular individuals who oppose the PFDJ (United States Institute of Peace 2004). Thus, there is evidence of disaffected Eritrean rebels and civilians joining the group because of grievances against the government. I did not find evidence of the EIJM employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. While the group primarily has Eritrean nationalists, it has some non-Eritrean nationalists as well (Lefebvre

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FRCI

Also Known As: Forces Nouvelles (FN); New Forces

Narrative:

The UCDP/NSA is referring to the alliance called FN that was formed by the MPCl, MPIGO, and MJP (UCDP), not the later iteration of FRCI that was active in 2011. As noted in the corresponding narratives, the MPCl uses material and ideological recruitment appeals (but relies more on ideological), and the other two groups rely exclusively on material appeals. Thus, there is not a consistent recruitment pattern among the three groups. However, evidence suggests that the FN is dominated by leaders from the MPCl (UCDP). The FN was frequently concerned with its image, and its leadership had a difficult time controlling many of the bandit mercenary forces that were engaging in violence against civilians and looting (International Crisis Group 2003). In response, the FN attempted to purge itself of such allies (International Crisis Group 2003). However, unconfirmed reports suggest that the FN continued to be in contact with one of Charles Taylor's top commanders in order to receive more combatants from Liberia (International Crisis Group 2003), suggesting the FN was still recruiting mercenaries. The organization also continued to weaken due to warlordism within the ranks (International Crisis Group 2003).

Thus, there is some evidence that the group used ideological appeals because it included MPCl as one of its prominent factions. However, most of the evidence that is specific to the FN focuses on its recruitment of mercenaries. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. However, due to the indirect nature of the evidence (particularly for ideological appeals), I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. Given that each group that comprises the FN recruits from multiple ethnic groups (see corresponding narratives), the group is likely multi-ethnic. All individual groups in the FN also used forced recruitment (see corresponding narratives), I code the group as using forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 2

References

International Crisis Group. (2003). *Côte d'Ivoire: "the war is not yet over."* (No. 72).
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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative #: FLRN

Also Known As: National Liberation Front; National Resistance Front for the Liberation of Haiti; Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti; Front for the National Liberation and Reconstruction of Haiti

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Located in Haiti, the FLRN was the military wing of a legal political opposition. Francois Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier repressively ruled the country from 1957-1986 until political turmoil in the mid-1980s led Jean-Claude Duvalier to flee into exile. A series of military governments established through coups followed, and the turmoil resulting from the Leopard Corps battalion mutinying against President Avril led to democratic elections in 1990, bringing Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 2004, opposition to Astride and his Fanmi Lavalas Party organized into the National Liberation Front (FLRN) (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). Soldiers were former members of the Haitian Armed Forces, slipping into Haiti from the Dominican Republic. The group took control of northern Haiti and made gradual progress towards the capitol of Port-au-Prince. As he faced external pressure from France and the United States, Aristide was forced into exile (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). FLRN dissipated after Aristide had been driven from power, with over 400 of their men integrated into a post-coup police force as the leaders watched from the sidelines (Sprague 2012). The EPR lists the group as recruiting Haitians. However, I could not find sufficient information on the persuasive recruitment practices of this group. Thus, it is coded as missing.

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: OP Lavalas (Chimères)

Also Known As: Organisations Populaires Lavalas; Popular Organisations Lavalas

Narrative:

The group was comprised of civic groups and street gangs that fought in support of ex-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his party (UCDP). While there is no evidence of a direct connection between Aristide and the group, it is still suspected that supporters of the former president paid the group (UCDP). Chimères more generally did not have clear political aims, and instead, recruited in poor neighbors where individuals had very few employment options (International Crisis Group 2005). Indeed, I did not find any evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*.

Certainty Score: 3

References

International Crisis Group. 2005. "Spoiling Security in Haiti." May 2005. Available At: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/spoiling-security-haiti>

UCDP. "OP Lavalas." Available At: <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/766>

Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Al-Mahdi Army

Also Known As: Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)

Narrative:

The group formed in response to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2017). The Al-Mahdi Army also has a religious ideology (Schwarz 2007). There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. According to its profile in the Mapping Militant Organization Project (2017):

“Following the U.S. invasion in 2003, Sadr called upon the Sadrist to join his new militia, the Mahdi Army, with the goal of expelling the U.S. coalition from Iraq and establishing an Iraqi Shiite government. Some of the group’s initial three hundred fighters were recruited in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and together with their Iraqi counterparts were sent to Hezbollah camps in Lebanon for training.”

The profile further details that:

“Some of the initial recruitment for the Mahdi Army took place in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but the vast majority of the Mahdi Army’s members are Iraqi.” In the group’s early days, recruiters targeted young men near Shiite mosques, telling them that they would be helping to defend their country against American invaders.” The group was particularly successful in attracting young, unemployed men who had seen no benefit from “liberation” and were less secure than prior to the 2003 invasion.” The Mahdi Army saw a significant increase in their recruitment success after the Golden Mosque in Samarra was bombed in February 2006.” They were able to use the incident to portray themselves as the defenders of the Shiite faith in Iraq.”

A report from the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2011) notes that group sought to only recruit “the fiercest and most pious members.” Seeking out pious individuals suggests that the group was primarily interested in recruiting ideologically-driven individuals.

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. The group used money to attract children to the group (Child Soldiers International 2008). The Al-Mahdi army also sells and distributes videos of it fighting US occupying forces in order to draw-in recruits (Baldauf 2004).

While there is some evidence of the group offering money to children to join, much of the evidence suggests that the group sought out pious members and mobilized around opposition to US military occupation. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. I did not find evidence of the group having a multi-ethnic recruitment base. The ACD2EPR dataset codes the group as recruiting from only Shi’a Arabs (Wucherpennig et al. 2012).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Ansar al-Islam

Also Known As: Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam

Narrative:

Ansar al-Islam, founded in 2001, is a Kurdish separatist movement in Iraq that seeks to form an Islamic state (Gregory 2008). Various splinter groups from the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) formed Ansar al-Islam (Gregory 2008). An offshoot of the group named Ansar al-Sunnah formed in 2003, which might represent an effort by some elements of the group to start appealing to more than just Kurds post-2003, but that group changed its name back in 2007 (Gregory 2008). The group disbanded in 2014 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

The group appears to make some sorts of ideological recruitment appeals. Rubin (2004) argues that it used credit claiming for attacks, which were often against other Kurdish groups and foreigners in Iraq, for recruitment purposes. Fleishman (2005) argues that the segment of the group that changed its name to Ansar al-Sunna did so to attract more Sunnis to the fight against the United States. Brookes (2003) argues that the global Jihadist recruiting networks, including Ansar al-Islam, is very active in Europe and that recent converts who are ideologically fervent are often sought out. Indeed, the group benefit from a large campaign drive targeted “sympathetic foreign jihadists” (Rabasa et al. 2002, p. 139). I did not find any evidence of the group using material appeals for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Some experts believe that the group has recruited members in Italy (Gregory 2008). Specifically, North African and Kurdish Immigrants in northern Italy are recruited by the group (Rotella 2003). At least 40 combatants came from Italy (Rotella 2003). Syria and Iran served as important routes for recruits heading from Europe to Iraq (Rotella 2003). Many of the founding members came from other Arab countries and some were veterans of the war in Afghanistan (Schanzer 2004). Specifically, the foreign fighters were Iraqi, Lebanese, Jordanian, Moroccan, Syrian, Palestinian, and Afghani, with a total of between 80-120 foreign fighters (Schanzer 2004). Approximately 30 Al-Qaeda members joined the group as well (Schanzer 2004). The groups’ network also extended into other European countries besides Italy, including Spain, Germany, Sweden, and Norway; and the network is estimated to have hundreds of fighters from Europe (Cannistra 2005). However, it is unclear which of these countries, besides Italy, actually exported fighters versus which ones just had members operating in their borders. The estimates of the number of foreign fighters that joined Ansar al-Islam from Europe range from 100-3,000 (Nesser 2006). While the predominant ethnic group in Ansar al-Islam is Kurdish, the evidence discussed above reveals that other ethnic groups, particularly Arabs, are represented in the group because of the presence of foreign fighters.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: JIG

Also Known As: “Jamoat” (“Community”); “Jamaat”; Islamic Jihad Union (IJU); Islamic Jihad Group (IJG); Jamaat of Central Asia Mujahadins; Jihad Islamic Group (JIG)

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

This group surfaced in Uzbekistan in 2004, aiming to overthrow the country’s constitutional system and install Islamic rule. It was founded by former Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) members returning home from Afghanistan and Pakistan after fighting alongside Al-Qaeda against the United States (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). JIG was established in 2002 when part of the IMU disagreed regarding the resumption of operations in Uzbekistan, but it took a while before this new organization became known to the outside world (Wigen 2009).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological appeals. It appears the group attempted recruitment of young Turks and Germans through the Internet by advocating for them to join a “Jihad” against the West and presenting itself as a transnational organization with supporters in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Europe (Steinberg 2008). The group recruits mostly Uzbeks (EPR Atlas), though the above evidence suggests that the group is multi-ethnic. Beyond this, there is very little public information available regarding this organization. (Wigen 2009). I did not find evidence of the group employing material incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa

Also Known As: Followers of the Prophet

Narrative:

Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa was an Islamist movement formed in Nigeria in the early 2000s, which eventually evolved into the more well-known Boko Haram. Indeed, some datasets even consider Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa and Boko Haram to be the same organization (for example, see the FORGE dataset by Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020). In 2002, an Izala preacher named Mohammed Yusuf formed a religious complex with an Islamic school to attract “future jihadists” from poor Muslim families in Nigeria (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). A group of some of Yusuf’s followers formed Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa between 2002 - 2003 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

After regrouping in Maiduguri from heavy losses sustained at the end of 2003/beginning of 2004, the group established itself as a state-like entity (Walker 2012). It was able to attract many recruits through the provision of welfare, food, and housing (Walker 2012). Before turning to this form of recruitment in 2004, however, the group used an Islamic school to recruit most of its followers (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). I did not find any evidence of the group making material appeals before 2004. Based on this information, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals before 2004, and mostly on material incentives from 2004 onwards*. Given that the Kanuri ethnic group formed the majority of Boko Haram (see corresponding narrative), Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa also likely recruited predominantly from this group. I did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative#: ISI/Jama'at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad/Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

Also Known As: al-Qa'ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa'ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam'at al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa'idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as a Sunni Islam militant network, centered around its founder and former leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2015). The group was originally started by Zarqawi in Jordan in the 1990s (Kirdar 2011). After being released from a Jordanian prison for terrorism-related charges in 1999, al-Zarqawi built a terrorist network in Iraq (Fishman 2006). In Iraq, the group organized to oppose the presence of U.S. and Western military forces in the Islamic world and the West's support of and the existence of Israel (United States Department of State 2014). Prior to joining Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda core served as a terrorist patron, was instrumental in turning Zarqawi's cell into a global terrorist network, providing him with a venue to train and organize a network of cells throughout the Middle East and Europe (Kirdar 2011). When the United States invaded Iraq, al-Zarqawi and Bin Laden put their ideological differences aside and al-Zarqawi agreed to join Al Qaeda in 2004. Tawhid wal Jihad thus became Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Fishman 2006). AQI, at one point in time, was the most dangerous branch of Al-Qaeda, acting as a critical part of the organization. AQI gains a significant advantage being associated with a jihad in the heart of the region and has attracted thousands of foreign fighters from the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe (Brookshire 2009). AQI eventually split with Al-Qaeda central and became ISIS.

There is evidence of AQ employing ideological appeals. During Zarqawi's tenure as the leader of AQI, he discovered that a moderate ideology allows for mass appeal, while a more extreme ideology increases group cohesion but impairs recruiting (Fishman 2006). Al-Qaeda core's association with AQI aided in the group's recruitment efforts, as Zarqawi used the Al Qaeda brand to facilitate recruiting (Fishman 2006; Katzman 2008).

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. As 2008 report by Child Soldiers International, AQI used money to draw children to the organization and that they used children to carry out attacks. Bahney et al. (2013) analyze 3,799 payments to members of AQI, and they do not find evidence of greater compensation being provided based on risk or labor outputs. Thus, given that much of the evidence still focuses on ideological

appeals, and that financial incentives do not always correspond to roles within AQI, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: CPI–Maoist

Also Known As: Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI, better known as the Naxalites, consist of a radical communist element within the Eastern States of India that has been present since the 60's. Its mission is to wage war on what it sees as a capitalist feudal government by causing mass insurrection throughout India. The group became commonly known as the Naxalites during the Naxalbari insurrection, which was a radical movement in West Bengal in 1967. Today, CPI consists of a large conglomeration of various radical communist groups, such as the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and People's War Group (PWG) (Pandita 2011).

CPI was founded as a merger between multiple communist groups, such as MCC (Maoist) and PWG (Marxist-Leninist) as a whole engages in hybridization of the ideals referred to as Marxist-Leninist- Maoist (Singh 2010). In this way, it manages to attract recruits from both schools of thought, uniting the ideals by purporting the Indian state as the enemy of the people. On that note, the people that the CPI aims to serve consists mostly of tribal communities in the Eastern Indian region. CPI believes that the tribal communities are the most marginalized demographic in India, asserting that they are often overlooked by the government and taken advantage of by landlords and upper-caste as well as upper-class individuals (Pandita 2011). The CPI also makes ideological appeals to children related to discrimination by the state (Rajpurohit and Tripathi 2019).

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. The group paid monthly salaries to its recruits (Tripathi 2013). Its large budget enabled it to sustain its ranks and recruit new members (Tripathi 2013). Rajpurohit and Tripathi (2019) argue that the CPI often recruits from very poor villages by offering salaries, as many who join the group have no other options. Indeed, they estimate that 70 – 80% of the cadres in this group come very poor

villages. The group also offers material recruitment incentives to children (Rajpurohit and Tripathi 2019). Some children in the group are even motivated by trying to settle personal scores (Rajpurohit and Tripathi 2019). They also promise parents food and better lives for their children if they let them join (Rajpurohit and Tripathi 2019).

The Naxalites have been known to operate mobile medical units around tribal areas, providing primary care to these rural communities. Due to the remote nature of the areas, the CPI's use of medical units appears to fill in many of the gaps left by the governments' shorthanded medical capabilities, a fact that garners the CPI a great amount of sympathy as well as recruits from both tribal and metropolitan areas in India (Satanāma 2010).

Thus, the CPI appears to employ both ideological and material recruitment appeals. However, as noted earlier, Rajpurohit and Tripathi (2019) posit that the group primarily draws in recruits through offering salaries in poor villages. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*.

The CPI is known to have kidnapped children between the ages of 8 - 12 from their villages in order to brainwash them at a young age and train them in the use of explosives and other weapons (Mazumdar 2010). The most common tactic used by the CPI to achieve this is by intimidating villagers and forcing them not to report the kidnappings under the threat of violence (India Blooms 2013). The group also threatens children that they will kill their families if they do not join (Rajpurohit and Tripathi 2019). In addition to its forcible child recruitment, the CPI also operates multiple youth wings, in the form of student unions, such as the Radical Youth League and the Radical Student Union, to bring young, college aged individuals into their ranks (Hindustan Times, 2005). These new and aspiring recruits are often put through "leadership programs" which help youths ascend through the ranks of CPI's politburo and gain various contacts with the group (The Economist 2006).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FUCD

Also Known As: Front Unique pour le Changement Démocratique (FUCD); United Front for Democratic Change

Narrative:

Members of FUCD were from Arab and Tama backgrounds (UCDP), though the majority of members are Tama (International Crisis Group 2009). Indeed, the FUCD presents itself as the defender of the Tama peoples from the Déby regime and ethnic politics played a central role in the group's operations (International Crisis Group 2009). Additionally, the group also sought to prevent Déby from running for a third term for president (International Crisis Group 2006). The group also wanted to bring federalism to Chad (International Crisis Group 2006). The group also traveled to Libya to express some of its grievances (International Crisis Group 2006).

There is also indirect evidence of FUCD making material recruitment appeals. The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Both government and rebel soldiers use the instability in eastern Chad for banditry (International Crisis Group 2009). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Furthermore, Déby has been successful at buying off opponents to ward off rebellions (International Crisis Group 2009). Because Déby coopts warlords, their existence and domination of local politics is heavily incentivized (International Crisis Group 2009). As a result, taking up arms has become almost a way of life for many in northeastern Chad (International Crisis Group 2009).

Thus, evidence for both ideological and material recruitment appeals is indirect, making it difficult to discern what type of recruitment strategy FUCD relies on more. However, the most direct evidence comes from the 2009 International Crisis Group report that discuss the role of ethnic politics for the group. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, I assign a moderate level of certainty to the coding due to the fact that all evidence related to this group's recruitment tactics is indirect.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: NSCN – K

Also Known As: National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang faction (NSCN – K)

Narrative:

The NSCN – K is a Naga rebel group fighting for an independent Nagaland in India (UCDP). The group split from the NSCN in 1988 due to clan rivalries and different visions for the future of the group (UCDP). Specifically, the group was comprised primarily of members of the Konyak tribe (UCDP). Much of the group's activities revolved around providing weapons and other logistical support for a variety of rebel groups in the region (Swami 2017).

The NSCN – K recruits primarily from Naga tribes in Myanmar, as Naga living in Myanmar feel that discrimination has led to political, economic, and social deprivation (Mukherjee 2006; Reed 2013). After the Nagaland achieved statehood, the factions that kept fighting did so because they were not receiving the benefits of statehood (Reed 2013). A 2015 article from the Economic Times describes the group as conducting recruitment campaigns through brainwashing and motivating youth to join.

Some sources contain information on both the NSCN – K and the NSCN – M. For instance, as noted in the narrative for the NSCN: “Goswami (2013) argues that while some analysts view the rhetoric of the group as insincere, there is reason to believe that that youth who join the group are aware of the group's ideology and goals and that they support an independent state.”

Some former members of the group claimed that a few other members of the group, who had strong influence over the leader, SS Khaplang, were purely motivated by profit (Sharma 2015). More recent illicit activities have caused the NSCN – K to be labeled as a criminal organization (Goswami 2020). The NSCN – IM accuses the NSCN – K of being a criminal organization with no political goals, though such allegations are difficult to substantiate (Reed 2013) and have clear bias, as the two factions are rivals.

As detailed in the narrative for the NSCN, before the group splintered, it still relied mostly (but not exclusively) on ideological recruitment appeals. As noted above, ethnic grievances were a strong motivating factor for recruits. This was the most commonly discussed issue and had the most evidence. The evidence of material recruitment incentives was less frequent and more indirect. Thus, I code this group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. The group also began forcibly recruiting children at gunpoint (New Delhi Television 2015). Indeed, the abduction of children became the group's primary recruitment tactic (Kumar 2009).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MKP

Also Known As: Maoist Komünist Partisi, Maoist Communist Party (English Translation)

Written: RA #3

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Maoist Komünist Partisi (MKP) was an insurgency group in Turkey that might have formed as early as 2002 according to local sources, but was only violently active in 2005 (UCDP). According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Local sources said the Maoist Communist Party (MKP) was formed in 2002 when the outlawed Turkish Workers and Peasants Liberation Army (TIKKO), violently active in Tunceli area from 1970s through 1990s was disbanded (UCDP). With that said, “Other sources state that in January 2003, TKP/ML announced that it was changing its name to the Maoist Communist Party (MKP) with TIKKO changing its name to the Peoples Liberation Army (HKO) (UCDP). So, it is unclear exactly how the group was formed. What is known is that the group considers itself Maoist in ideology, and was active in Turkey in 2005.

There is very little information on the recruitment practices of the MKP. According to a description of the group in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: “couched its anti-government and anti-Western rhetoric and activities within a broader socialist revolutionary context. The group has also long been an advocate of the Kurdish independence movement.” Thus, the group’s public rhetoric centers on ideological issues. I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the lack of direct information, and the dearth of evidence more generally, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 1

References

UCDP. “Government of Turkey – MKP.” Available At: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/823>

Armed Group Recruitment Narratives: PJAK

Also Known As: Kurdistan Free Life Party; Eastern Kurdistan Units (YRK) (Armed Wing); Women's Defense Forces (HPJ) (Women's Armed Wing)

Narrative:

PJAK was a student-led movement founded in Iran (Brandon 2018). Reported starting dates of the organization run from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. A 2010 start department report even places the start of the group in 2004 in Iraq (START Center 2015). The organization operates under the same Marxist-based ideology that the PKK does and it seeks “democratic self-governance” for the Kurds, which is essentially ethnically-based self-governance (Brandon 2018). This goal is more limited in scope than the group’s initial goal of territorial independence. The group also operates under the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel), which is an umbrella organization of Kurdish movements (Brandon 2018). Brandon (2018) argues that PJAK essentially serves as the PKK’s Iranian-wing. Indeed, although they claim to be two separate organizations, their goals and leadership indicate deep ties (Cagaptay and Eroglu 2007; Renard 2008).

Although PJAK claims to represent the interests of all Iranians, its membership is predominantly Kurdish (Brandon 2018). The organization recruits Kurdish individuals from multiple countries including more locally in Iran and Iraq, as well from Kurds living in Germany (GlobalSecurity.org). The organization recruits both men and women (2013 Danish Refugee Council; Home Office). Because of its close relationship with the PKK, Kurdish militants from Turkey were sometimes deployed to Iran (Kardas 2009). PJAK claims that many women have joined the organization because of its radical feminist goals (Wood 2006). Upon joining, members go through ideological training that includes the history of Kurdistan and the importance of gender and women to the movement (2013 Danish Refugee Council; Home Office). *The group claims to welcome members that are not Kurds* (2013 Danish Refugee Council; Home Office).

Of note, PKK militants are often deployed to fight for PJAK (Kardas 2009), including the fact that Iranian, Syrian, and Turkish members of the HPG that enlisted in the PKK prior to the creation of PJAK were placed in the ranks of the founding cadre of PJAK (Ferris and Self 2015, p. 17-18). The PKK is coded as taking a mixed approach (see corresponding narrative), implying that some PJAK members (because they were originally PKK members) were drawn in by material incentives. However, most of the evidence that is specific to PJAK focuses on the group mobilizing recruits with nationalist and feminist rhetoric. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding because the evidence of material recruitment incentives is indirect.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Patani Insurgents

Also Known As:

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Patani Insurgency is located in the southernmost portion of Thailand. Patani was annexed from the northern Malay peninsula with the rest of Thailand's southernmost provinces in the Anglo-Siamese treaty in 1909 (Morch 2018). This established a Malay Muslim majority in the south of Thailand (approximately 85% of the population in these areas), in comparison to the otherwise mostly Buddhist country (Wheeler 2019). Three pillars have underscored Malay separatist identity in this region: a belief in the virtues and "greatness" of the kingdom of Patani, an identification with Malay ethnicity, and a religious orientation based on Islam (Chalk 2008). The insurgency is rooted in ethnic Malay nationalist resistance in a fight for independence from what they believe is Thai colonialist rule, thus classifying it as a parochial nationalist insurgency (Wheeler 2019).

The Patani Insurgency is distinguished by secrecy and reluctance to assert an organizational identity, as insurgents tend to identify as *juwae* (fighters) than as members of a militant group (Wheeler 2019). However, there is one group, founded in 1963, that is recognized as being the strongest group in the insurgency – Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu-Patani (Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front, or BRN) (Morch 2018). Bangkok has, in addition to the BRN, engaged in talks with the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Bersatu, and Gerakan Mujahadeen Islam Pattani (GMIP) (Bajoria and Zissis 2008). A notable politically oriented group within the insurgency is the Patani Consultative Council (Majlis Syura Patani, better known as MARA Patani), which stands as an umbrella group of Malay nationalist organizations in exile, although the Thai government is concerned that MARA Patani does not represent militants within Thailand (Wheeler 2019).

The group being classified as a nationalist insurgency rooted in ethno-religious ties, and has the belief that the land was colonized/stolen. The insurgency has been particularly difficult for the Thai government to root out in rural villages, where there exists a stark cultural divide highlighted by ethnicity, language, and religion (Morch 2018). Poor socioeconomic conditions also add to discontent with the Thai government from Malay Muslims, as the population has enduring grievances relating to education, employment in the public sector, language, and economic development (Melvin 2007; Bajoria and Zissis 2008).

Evidence exists that the heavy-handed tactics utilized by Thai security forces drive villagers into the hands of the insurgency and provide them with recruits (Morch 2018). Furthermore, there is evidence that schools/madrasas have been used to radicalize children by teaching them, particularly the vulnerable ones, how to fight (Morch 2018). However, the greatest evidence found in support of the argument of a predominantly ideological recruitment method would be the extremely strong sense of Malay-Muslim identity in Thailand's southern border provinces (Chalk 2008). Furthermore, there is evidence that recruitment is conducted by

respective unit leaders, with the majority of recruits being working-class males between 16 and 24 years old who are generally religiously pious and well-educated (Chalk 2008). I did not find evidence of the group using material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: NDPVF

Also Known As: Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF)

Narrative:

Ideological appeals play an important role in the NDPVF's recruitment efforts. Indeed, the group was able to engage in a propaganda war that effectively addressed many grievances of the local populations—particularly among youth—that was vital for recruitment (Hazen 2009). These grievances included the alleged rigging of the 2003 elections (a primary catalyst for the formation of the organization) and the promotion of Ijaw rights, especially in terms of calling for local control of oil resources in the Niger Delta (Hazen 2009). The group also calls for more autonomy for the region (Hazen and Horner 2007). In addition to its leader's charisma, however, the group also depended heavily on patronage networks for its formation (Hazen 2009).

The group engaged extensively in oil bunking (which is essentially oil theft) (Human Rights Watch 2005), however, I did not find evidence of the group directly offering material incentives for participation. Specifically, the group is sometimes described as a confederation of gangs that siphon oil and fight with competing militant gangs (Refugee Review Tribunal 2008). The group engaged in particularly brutal fighting with the NDV over the control and smuggling of oil (Human Rights Watch 2005). The NDPVF also extensively recruited unemployed young men, who were dissatisfied with years of economic troubles in the region, but many of whom had college degrees (Human Rights Watch 2005). Rhetoric surrounding resource control was likely an effective recruitment tool for the NDPVF to mobilize many unemployed young men (Human Rights Watch 2005). While the prospects of future material gain might have drawn in recruits, I did not find evidence of payment being directly offered for participation. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The group primarily recruits from Nigeria's Ijaw ethnic group (Hanson 2007). However, the NDPVF recruits from other ethnic groups in the Niger Delta as well (Hazen and Horner 2007). The NDPVF also brought together multiple, existing cult organizations (Hazen 2009). There is also evidence of the group recruiting from existing militant groups (Hazen and Horner 2007). The group also had affiliated youth groups and cults (which formed from college fraternities) that it worked with (Human Rights Watch 2005). I also did not find evidence of the group using forced recruitment. In fact, while some of the cults in the region had life-long membership, the NDPVF explicitly did not (Osaghae et al. 2011).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: RJF/Al-Jaysh al-Islami fi Iraq

Also Known As: Reform and Jihad Front, Jihad and Reform Front, Al-Jaysh al-Islami fi Iraq, Islamic Army of Iraq, Islamic Army in Iraq

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Reform and Jihad Front (RJF), also known as the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI), was an Iraqi insurgent (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). The group is predominantly consistent of Sunni Muslims, although, according to group leader in 2004, the group's entire ethnic composition was of "Kurds, Arabs, Shiites and Sunnis." (UCDP 2021). The group formed in response to the attempts of Al-Qaeda to control Iraq, and seeks to rid Iraq of foreign influence, especially from Iran and the United States (UCDP 2021). According to the group's profile on Mapping Militant Organizations (2019), "The group was relatively moderate in its ideology; it sought to establish an Iraqi federation with three autonomous regions—one Shiite, one Kurdish, and one Sunni—that would be unified under a national government which implemented a 'softer' version of Islamic law." In other words, the RJF wanted to create three regions in Iraq, and while they would be part of an Iraqi nation under some variation of Shari'a Law, the regions would be able to self-govern.

There is evidence of the RJF employing ideological recruitment appeals. Salafist references play a crucial role in the group's propaganda and efforts to gain support, and members of the group have been described as adamant jihadists (Siegel 2008). Indeed, even though some of the early members of the group had been members of the military under Saddam Hussein, they used religious rhetoric for recruitment, instead of Baathist symbols, due to the growing unpopularity of the latter (González Mendelejis 2020). The idea that Islam is under threat also plays an important role in the group's propaganda (Siegel 2008). Sunni identity and protection of Sunni rights also play an important role in the group's recruitment efforts (Knights and Mello 2016). Fighting the occupation of coalition forces is also another key part of the group's framing of its struggle (Haugh 2005). People may have also been influenced to join the group due to the prominence of one of its founders, Sheikh Ahmed al-Dabash (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UFDR

Also Known As: Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement; The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity; Seleka

Narrative:

The UFDR originally formed as an alliance of self-defense organizations, and the killing of civilians by the government was one of the catalysts for the formation of this group (Weyns et al. 2014). The group also initially mobilized around the marginalization of those living in the northeast of the Central African Republic (CAR) by the central government (Ingerstad 2014). General dissatisfaction with the ruling regime was also important for the formation of the group (Weyns et al. 2014). Mehler (2011) notes that observers have argued that the group has a variety of motives, including addressing ethnic-based grievances, lack of public services, and exclusion of Muslims from government leadership positions. Mehler, however, argues that UFDR had a mostly vague ideology and it instead much more frequently cited the need for protection from the government in order to mobilize support.

The group relied heavily on mercenaries from Sudan and Chad (Weyns et al. 2014). Furthermore, many UFDR members went on to join the Seleka alliance, with one of their major demands being unfulfilled compensation as part of the UFDR's negotiations with the government (Weyns et al. 2014). Survey evidence indicates that most children who joined the UFDR did so because for the economic incentives, access to basic services, and in response to ethnic stigmatization (United Nations Security Council 2009).

Based on the evidence cited above, the UFDR clearly made both material and non-material recruitment appeals. As Mehler notes, the group did make several recruitment appeals, but most of the non-material ones focused on protection. The UNSC survey reveals that children—who make up most of the group—were attracted to the group primarily by material and ethnic-based appeals. Weyns et al. also find that the group relies heavily on mercenaries, who of course, are attracted by material appeals. Based on the fact that material appeals are one of the dominant forms of recruiting children, and that the group as many mercenaries, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. UFDR members were primarily from the Gula ethnic group (Weyns et al. 2014). However, it also recruited some members from the Rounga and Kara ethnic groups (EPR Atlas). Many of the self-defense groups that formed the UFDR were park rangers who had extensive military training (Weyns et al. 2014).

Certainty: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Popular Resistance Committees

Also Known As: PRC; Nasser Saladin Brigades

Narrative:

There is very little information on the recruitment practices of the PRC. There is some indirect evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Halevi (2006) notes that the group drew former members of Palestinian Authority security forces, Fatah, Islamic Jihad, and others, and that the group sought to unify these organizations to fight against Israel. The group has an extremist Islamic ideology and will not consider any sort of political engagement with Israel (Halevi 2006). A spokesperson for the group emphasized that they are fighting because of the Israeli occupation of Palestine (Strickland 2015). Women in the organization stated they were fighting because men had failed to protect Arabs and Muslims (Toameh 2006).

There is also indirect evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. The group sometimes sends money to the family of PRC operatives (Halevi 2006). However, most of the organization's rhetoric, and the aforementioned statements of women in the group, revolve around ending Israeli occupation of Palestine. I found only one mention of money being given to the families of combatants. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological recruitment appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of much of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative #: NRF

Also Known As: National Redemption Front (NRF)

Narrative:

In 2006, the NRF formed from four factions of JEM and SLM/A that refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (Ploughsharers 2009). The alliance also included the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) (Dagne 2010). The NRF's demands are primarily related to more proportionate political power and representation for the population of Darfur (Amnesty International 2006). The group also claimed to fight for a multicultural, multiethnic, and multireligious Sudan (UCDP).

There is a dearth of information on the recruitment practices of the NRF. In terms of the alliances members, the SLM/A is coded as relying exclusively on ideological appeals, and JEM is coded as relying mostly on these types of appeals (see corresponding narratives). Additionally, as noted above, the NRF's primary contention was lack of representation for the people of Darfur. Beyond the activities of JEM, I did not find any evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The NRF was a multi-ethnic movement, recruiting from the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit ethnic groups (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: SLM/A – MM

Also Known As: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minni Minnawi

Narrative:

The group draws support primarily from the Zaghawa ethnic group (Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan 2012), specifically from the Wogi clan (McGregor 2017). Indeed, the SLM/A split along ethnic lines, between the Zaghawa and the Fur (Sudan Human Baseline Security Assessment 2010). Minni Minnawi built his power from the Zaghawa network (Flint and De Waal 2008; Jo and Yi 2019). Furthermore, many of the individuals from the Zaghawa who joined the SLM/A did so to fight Arabs, not the government (Sudan Human Baseline Security Assessment 2010). Thus, ethnic based grievances likely attracted individuals to the group. Furthermore, despite the split, this faction maintained the original goals of the SLM/A, and the original group recruits exclusively with ideological appeals (see corresponding narrative). I also did not find evidence of the SLM/A –MM making material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological recruitment appeals*. Given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ARS/UIC

Also Known As: Islamic Courts Union

Narrative:

The group formed around 2000 as a loose alliance of Islamic courts that served to provide security and fight crime during the chaos that followed the collapse of the Barre regime, disbanding in 2007 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). The group's primary goals were defeating the warlords and establishing Sharia law (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). Some members also had nationalist aspirations of uniting Somalia (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). However, the group was ideologically divided between moderates and radicals (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). The ICU is considered to be the first Somali militant group that wasn't run by a warlord and didn't recruit exclusively from a single clan (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). National identity would be based on religion, a uniting factor among the clans (Ahmad 2009). The group had been very popular for its provision of security and public goods, such as schools and hospitals (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). However, the group also engaged in strict moral and social policing in the areas it controlled, which undermined its popularity (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). Only a few months after capturing Mogadishu, the group was defeated by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopia.

The group made a variety of non-material/ideological appeals. When the group took over Mogadishu in 2006, it began recruiting former clan militia members (Barnes and Hassan 2007). Originally, the group had primarily Hawiye membership, but its emphasis on religion and unity helped draw in members of other clans (Ahmad 2009). However, while religious identity was important in the group, Ahmad (2009) argues that it was not ideology that drove many members to join, but rather, defecting clan militia members could find safety in the group as they would not be targeted for their clan identity. Ahmad (2009) also argues that charismatic leadership was a vital part of the mobilization process for the UIC. Specifically, stories of the leader, Sheikh Sharif, overcoming militias had important personal and spiritual impacts on aggrieved individuals, which aided the group in mobilizing support (Ahmad 2009). The invasion of Ethiopia also served as an important recruiting tool for the group, although the invasion led to its demise and the rise of its splinter, al-Shabab (Bruton and Williams 2013). Abbink (2008) finds that UIC recruited on the basis of Muslim identity "as expressed via local "(clan-based) shari'a courts" (p. 89). While the provision of public goods helped make the group popular, I did not find evidence of material appeals being used for recruitment.

The now infamous al-Shabab was the youth wing of UIC, and was much more radical than the much of the core leadership of UIC (Miriri 2019). Al-Shabab was founded by Aden Hashi Ayro in 2004 (Combating Terrorism Center 2008). While many viewed it as a ploy by Ayro to gain a personal security force, he employed a campaign drive that focused on "protecting" Islam and "infidels." (Combating Terrorism Center 2008). Ayro also intentionally sought after poor and downtrodden young men, who were desperate for work, by appealing to

them with a blend of nationalism and Islam, and specifically appealed to their self-respect and dignity (Combating Terrorism Center 2008).

The only evidence I found of material recruitment incentives was the aforementioned evidence that many individuals joined the group for personal protection. However, this evidence is somewhat indirect, as it does not speak to the group's actual recruitment tactics. Furthermore, religion, clan unity, and charismatic leadership were all discussed as important recruitment tactics. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: RAFD

Also Known As: Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques (RAFD)

Narrative:

RAFD is an alliance of multiple organizations, including SCUD (Human Rights Watch 2007). RAFD was led by Tom and Timan Erdimi, who were formerly two close confidants of President Déby (May and Massey 2007). The major reason the group formed was because the constitution was amended to allow Déby to run for a third term (UCDP). Déby's decision to try to keep power led to significant dissent, including from members of his own Zaghawa ethnic group (UCDP). The group also rejected the 2006 presidential elections as a sham (UCDP). Indeed, the group allegedly sought to organize early elections to replace Déby (GlobalSecurity.org). Thus, the group appeared to have mobilized individuals around grievances related to Déby's efforts to maintain power.

As with other groups in Chad, there is indirect evidence of RAFD employing material recruitment incentives. The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). This evidence, however, is even more indirect. However, this evidence is more indirect, and more of the evidence about RAFD focuses on the dissent caused by Déby's efforts to take a third term. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. Most members are from the Zaghawa ethnic group (May and Massey 2007). Many of the members that formed the group had been part of Déby's Republican Guard (May and Massey 2007). Many former members of FUC defected to RAFD as well (May and Massey 2007).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UFDD

Also Known As: Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement (UFDD); Union for Forces for Democracy and Development

Narrative:

Formed in 2006 (UCDP), the UFDD was led by Mahamat Nouri, who was Chad's former ambassador to Saudi Arabia (May and Massey 2007). The group claims that its primary objective is to overthrow President Idriss Déby (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016). The group is a coalition of several armed groups opposed to Deby, including FUC, CDR, UFPD, and RAFAD (IRBC 2016). The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). While the stated goal of the coalition was to overthrow Deby, some local analysts argue that some of the groups in the coalition simply want the government to make certain concessions about oil wealth (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016). Based on this information, the group likely depended primarily on material recruitment appeals, and might have also mobilized around the future promise of material payoff. I did not find any evidence of the group making ideological recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*. However, given that most of the available evidence speaks to groups in this conflict in general, rather than the UFDD specifically, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding.

The UFDD recruits primarily from the Gorane ethnic group (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016). There are also members of the Toubou ethnic group in the UFDD (May and Massey 2007). There are also many Arab members in the UFDD as well (May and Massey 2007). The group also had Ouaddaïans (Tubiana 2008). The multi-ethnic nature of this group appears to be driven largely by the fact that it is a coalition of several groups. Chad's Minister of Communication accused the group of recruiting children for 60% of its forces (May and Massey 2007). There is also evidence of at least some of these child soldiers being forcibly recruited (RFI 2019).

Certainty Score: 1

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Baloch Ittehad

Also Known As: Baloch Unity (English Translation)

Written: RA #3

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Baloch Ittehad was a Pakistani group formed in 2005. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, it “was a coalition consisting of several different political leaders and parties with a common goal of protecting the political and economic rights of the Baloch people against the Pakistani government” (UCDP). The group is comprised of Baloch people living within the borders of Pakistan.

There is some evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. According to an article from Plus Patent News (2011), Baloch Ittehad put on a rally, to celebrate the Baloch culture and put forth its message, presumably at least partially intended to grow its group (Baloch Cultural Day Celebrated, 2011). At the rally, a group leader named “Saeed Baloch said that Baloch culture was developed some 1,400 years back and the people of this community were patriotic but deprived of their rights. He said that the government had denied facilities and rights to Baloch nation but now they would get their rights through a struggle that had been launched in the country” (Plus Patent News 2011). The group also seems to have engaged in spreading propaganda: “BLA, and other movements, Baloch Ittehad and PONAM are mismatched concoction of ancient and modern, they are trying to run the modern media campaign but there are crucial gaps in that effort. They have created a list of Pakistani journalists who are supposed to be sympathetic to any move against the government and they are feeding them daily a mixture of truth and lies,” (Jabeen, 2010, pp. 48-9). Overall, there appears to be evidence of the group spreading propaganda to mobilize supporters to help fight for its cause. I did not find any evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given that there is little evidence of the group’s recruitment practices, and that most of it is indirect, I code assign a moderate certainty to this coding.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: BLA/Baluchistan Liberation Army

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The BLA is the main force in the Balochi insurgency (Bansal 2010). Samad (2014) argues that extraction of natural gas by Pakistan and various international actors, and the prospect of future extraction of resources, fosters discontent in Balochistan, but that resources are not directly causing the conflict, through providing motive or opportunity. Indeed, there is a feeling of resentment in Balochistan that natural resource extraction benefits the rest of the country, but not the province itself, leading many to want an independent region with control over their own natural resources (Gilani 2017). Other political and military policies have made Balochis feel alienated as well (Gilani 2017). More specifically, the Balochi insurgency was reinvigorated in the mid-2000s as Balochi nationalists became concerned that the influx of workers for new government projects would make Balochis the minority in the region, as did abuses by the military (Khan et al. 2018). The BLA frequently targeted infrastructure, construction equipment and gas pipelines for attacks as one of its main grievances was the extraction of Balochistan's mineral wealth from outside actors (Siddiqi 2012). The fears of Balochs being marginalized by government developments drove the insurgency from 2002-2005, and military abuses radicalized the movement even further from 2005 onwards.

The ethnic dimension of the conflict became particularly relevant in the past 2 years, with targeted killings of non-Balochs (Siddiqi 2012). The group believes that the government is unequally distributing the profits made from this region to Punjabis (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). The BLA believes that ethnic identity should take precedent over religious identity (Aamir 2017). The majority of the leadership and members are from the Marri and Bugti tribes (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019).

I could not find direct evidence of material appeals made by the group. Poverty is rampant in Balochistan and the many Balochs believe that the Pakistani government is not doing enough to address these issues (Hashim 2013), including providing inadequate levels of social services (Hashmi 2018). In 2017, the Pakistani government started a program to provide compensation for militants, including former BLA members, who surrendered to the government (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). The government of Pakistan also claims that insurgent leaders are simply fighting because they want a bigger share of the profits from natural resources in the region (Grare 2013). However, I could not find evidence of material appeals being offered directly for recruitment, and the aforementioned evidence suggests that natural resources do not fund the conflict. Demobilized Baloch militants noted that they left because of the group's unrelenting use of violence and the belief that commanders were taking advantage of the rank-and-file for their own gain, however, these demobilized combatants framed their participation in terms of the struggle for independence (Kakar 2017). Therefore, I did not find evidence of the BLA employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Jondullah

Also Known As: Jondollah, Jundallah, Jundullah, Jund Allah, Army of God/Soldiers of God (English Translation), Jonbesh mat-i-Mardom-i Iran; Popular Resistance Movement of Iran, Fedayeen-e-Islam, Baloch People's Resistance Movement

Written: RA #3

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Jondullah is an Iranian insurgency group that was most active from its founding in 2002 to the capture and killing of its leader by Iranian forces in 2010. Subsequently, the group splintered as its members left for different insurgency groups (UCDPa). According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, its stated goal was to “protect the human rights, culture and faith of the ethnic Baloch people against the government of Iran” (UCDP). The group saw itself as vital for protecting the Sunni Muslims in Sistan Balochistan, and improving their socioeconomic conditions (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological appeals. Jondullah is ethnically consistent of Baloch people (UCDPa). According to an article from Arab Center Washington DC, “Jundullah and its offshoots have recruited from Sunni religious communities and regarded the Baluch people’s Sunni Muslim identity as a key explanation for the underdevelopment in Iran’s Baluchistan region (Gurbuz 2018). Most fighters in the group are recruited from religious seminaries (Cappuccino 2017). In other words, the group has made ideological appeals based on purported oppression of its people. One scholar notes that “supporters of Jundallah in Pakistan and Iran regarded them as ‘Robin Hoods ... defenders of the interests of the local population’” (Elliott 2020, p. 85).

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Specifically, there is evidence that mercenaries participate in the group on an ad hoc basis (UCDPb). Furthermore, part of the reason why the group fell apart so quickly after the death of its commander, Abdolmalek Rigi, was that his connections sustained the group. According to Elliott, his connections abroad sustained the group in the face of significant unpopularity in local Iranian tribes (Elliott, 2020, p. 73). Rigi’s family “was known for smuggling and criminal enterprise prior to Jundallah’s establishment” (Elliott 2020, p. 6). In order for one to be successful in running a smuggling enterprise, it would make sense that one has connections across borders, and so “significant numbers” in Jondullah were “criminal associates of Rigi” through international smuggling operations (Elliott 2020, p. 76).

Thus, Jondullah appears to employ both ideological and material recruitment appeals. As noted from the evidence above, the group is described as recruiting with religious propaganda and recruits heavily from religious organizations. However, the evidence also indicates that many members are essentially criminals. Thus, material and ideological appeals both likely play an important role. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*.

Beyond the ideological appeals and connections to Abdolmalek Rigi, Elliott claims that a reason that Jondullah gained recruits and support was through Iranian actions that inadvertently gave credit to its cause: “Iran continuously sought to portray Jundallah as an American-supported puppet in order to discredit the organization. Ultimately, this tactic also backfired, since such a characterization created a larger international interest in Jundallah, and also in effect increased Jundallah’s domestic reputation as a legitimate threat to Iranian control” (Elliott, 2020, p. 37). In other words, Iran regularly attempted to attribute U.S. support to the group so that it would become unpopular within Iran. In doing so, however, Iran failed to anticipate the common perception that a group must be influential and strong if it has caused the United States to pay attention to it and support it. So, Jondullah got exposure, and many new members felt empowered, that they could make a real difference as part of Jondullah. (Elliott, 2020, p. 37).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: SPLM

Also Known As: Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A)

Narrative:

There is some evidence of the group making ideological recruitment appeals. At points in its history, the SPLM engaged very little in political education to the general public (Young 2003). However, internally, there was a school for political training (Pinaud 2015). Relatedly, the group ran a radio station, and used it to spread propaganda (Scott 1985). Scott (1985) argues that the radio station (Radio SPLA) played an important role in recruitment and was much easier than the prior method of sending members out to recruit in-person (Scott 1985). Indeed, poor infrastructure in the area made persuasive and coercive recruitment difficult for the group (Young 2003). Additionally, while the group espoused somewhat vague Marxist rhetoric, many civilian recruits opposed such ideologies, but instead, were motivated by their hatred for the government (Pinaud 2015). Many women who joined the group were politically motivated, but the group never expressed support for gender equality or women's issues (Pinaud 2015). Indeed, most were motivated by perceived oppression from northern Sudan (Pinaud 2015).

However, the ideology of the group has also been frequently vague. When the group was supported by Ethiopia, it employed Marxist rhetoric, but Marxism never really took deep roots in the movement (Young 2003). The SPLM has long promoted socialism, but at times in the past, denied being a separatist movement (Scott 1985). The group also opposed Sharia law (Scott 1985). Ethnicity, especially anti-Arabism, also played an important role in the group's rhetoric (Young 2003). Splits in the group were often along tribal lines and were over the distribution of power in the group, rather than over ideological differences (Young 2003). Relatedly, Young (2003) argues that the SPLM's goals and rhetoric is not reflective of the views of Southern Sudanese intellectuals or the public in general. The group's success in the past has been attributed to its maintenance of local administrative structures and customs (Johnson 1998). Baas (2011) notes that while the group employed nationalist and Marxist rhetoric to satisfy external actors, it did not rely on such ideologies for recruitment, and instead, focused on local grievances related to differences in treatment between the north and south (the SPLM was fighting against the perceived marginalization of the south).

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. The conflict was largely considered to be centered around resource acquisition as the government was interested in oil, cattle, and cheap labor, while the SPLA, SPLA splinters, and pro-government militias were interested in looting, stealing relief resources, and trades that they profited off of (Pinaud 2014). Joining the movement had huge economic appeals, especially because the marginal cost of joining was so small, and it provided many with the opportunity to start a new life (Pinaud 2014). Indeed, the group is often viewed as a criminal organization, rather than a sincere national liberation movement (Pinaud 2014). Rebel leaders in the various SPLM movements were also essentially warlords (Pinaud 2014). However, profits were distributed very unevenly across ranks, creating a class system within the SPLM (Pinaud 2014).

However, Baas (2011) argues that material recruitment incentives were a non-factor, and that recruits did not receive salaries. Baas argues that most of the ideological appeals made by the group focused on discrimination against the south. However, Baas also posits that the primary reason most individuals joined was for self-defense, as the conflict had become very violent and destructive.

Thus, there is somewhat inconsistent evidence of the group's recruitment practices. Some evidence suggests that the group primarily focuses on tapping into local political grievances (particularly related to regional discrimination), while other evidence indicates that economic appeals played a central role. Based on this, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*. However, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding because there are some contradictions in the evidence.

While the SPLM were dominated by the Dinka ethnic group, multiple other ethnicities were represented in the group as well (Pinaud 2014). The group also did little to settle tribal and ethnic divisions within the group (Young 2003). In 1984, John Garang, the then leader of the SPLA, established the Ketiba Banat, which was a battalion for girls that focused on social and political functions within the group (Pinaud 2015). The group also recruited from refugee camps in Ethiopia (Pinaud 2015). The SPLM also depended on tribal leaders to mobilize recruits (Lacher 2012, p. 9) as well as kinship networks (Pinaud 2014).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative #: Hezbollah

Also Known As:

Narrative:

Hezbollah formed in 1982 (or 1983) during the Israel occupation of southern Lebanon (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). Hezbollah initially focused on expelling Israeli and Western influence from Lebanon and the Middle East more broadly. However, the organization is now an established political party in Lebanon with broader goals (Butler 2011; Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). The group is sponsored by Iran and has become involved in the civil wars in both Syria and Yemen (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). Indeed, Hezbollah's heavy ties to Iran have had a significant influence over how the organization recruits individuals (Blanford 2011).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. Hezbollah had some difficulties with recruitment following their surge in the early 1980s to combat the IDF. However, the group was able to successfully combine social and religious propaganda to mobilize many civilians to join the group. These appeals include religious activism, abolishing ethnic discrimination, expulsion of foreign powers from Lebanon, and improving conditions for the Shiite population (Butler 2011). Thus, ideological appeals also appear to play a vital role in the organization's recruitment efforts

Ideological indoctrination also plays an important role in the recruitment process. Hezbollah recruits children from a very young age. Indeed, there are tens of thousands of children in Hezbollah's al-Mahdi Scouts (Cambanis 2010). This branch of Hezbollah provides education for children but also seeks to radicalize youth and align their preferences with those of Hezbollah's. While members of the al-Mahdi Scouts are not required to join Hezbollah when they become adults, many do. Hezbollah also uses schools more generally to recruit children who eventually become adult members (Blanford 2011).

There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. The organization not only provides robust social welfare programs to large parts of Lebanon's population, but they also offer material benefits for joining. Indeed, recruiters who go to cities and towns across Lebanon offer material incentives, such as education, to potential recruits (Butler 2011). Recruits are typically offered salaries, and some earn much higher incomes than most other jobs in the region can provide (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005). The broader social welfare apparatus of the organization is also used to feed potential recruits into the organization (Byman 2016). Hezbollah also has huge army reserve forces which it pays to be on standby (Butler 2011).

Based on the above evidence, Hezbollah appears to frequently employ both material and ideological recruitment appeals. The group appears to employ both frequently and the evidence does not indicate that one type of appeal is more commonly relied on. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*.

Hezbollah frequently engages in face-to-face recruiting. Blanford (2011) tells us that the recruitment process often begins by recruiters being sent to areas of Lebanon to areas of Lebanon in which the organization has substantial influence. The recruits then look for individuals who could “fit the Hezbollah way of life” and observe them for months, or even years, at a time to better assess their fitness. The recruiter may then approach the individual with an invitation to join Hezbollah. If the individual accepts the invitation, then they begin a long training and socialization process (Blanford 2011).

As mentioned above, Hezbollah draws in recruits from a wide variety of segments of the population. While recruitment from other revolutionary Shiite organizations was important in the formative years of the organization (Levitt 2013; Mapping Militant Organizations 2019), the recruitment pool has significantly increased. Indeed, Butler (2011) argues that Hezbollah has been able to recruit from the entire social strata of Shiites in Lebanon. The organization began by recruiting young males from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, but has since moved to recruit across class and from a large number of occupations. Indeed, some evidence suggests that the average Hezbollah militant might actually have slightly higher levels of educational achievement than the average citizens of Lebanon (Krueger and Maleckova 2003). As previously mentioned, youth camps, schools, and families play a large role in recruitment for the organization. Social networks were particularly important to recruitment efforts when Hezbollah encountered significant resource constraints because of their fight with the IDF (Parkinson 2013).

Hezbollah has recruited members from a variety of places. During a period of growth in the 1980s, they began recruiting individuals from various revolutionary Shia organizations (Levitt 2013; Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian civil war has helped them recruit thousands of foreign fighters. In addition to attracting members from other revolutionary organizations and foreign fighters, Hezbollah has also long relied on family and clan networks for recruitment (Blanford 2011).

However, there is some evidence of forced recruitment more generally. Evidence presented in a report from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2013) suggests that while direct forced recruitment is used, at most, in a limited capacity, Hezbollah still often pressures families that support the group to provide recruits. Indeed, even more recently, Hezbollah engaged in a fundraising campaign in which supporters could avoid recruitment into militia forces if they donated \$1,000 to the organization. This suggests that the group not only engages in coercive fundraising, but that they might also forcibly recruit combatants if individuals can pay to get out of these roles.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Faction of SPLM

Also Known As: National Democratic Alliance (NDA)

Narrative:

The NDA built off of the growing opposition to the National Islamic Front (NIF)—the ruling regime of Sudan at the time—to bring together diverse political and military organizations, under a single umbrella, in order to topple the government and replace it with a secular democracy (Committee on Foreign Relations – United States Senate 1998). Members of the group often act independently, both in terms of their military and diplomatic operations (UCDPa).

Finding information on the recruitment practices of the NDA is difficult, especially given that it is an umbrella organization. The SPLM, which made 95% of the military forces of the NDA (UCDPb), is coded as taking a mixed approach (see corresponding narrative). Given that other evidence about the NDA's recruitment tactics could not be found, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*, because most NDA troops are from the SPLM. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

The NDA is a diverse, multi-ethnic, Christian and Muslim, umbrella organization which includes individuals from the Beja ethnic group (Committee on Foreign Relations – United States Senate 1998). Furthermore, the SPLM/A, the dominant member of the NDA, is multi-ethnic but is dominated by members of the Dinka ethnic group (see corresponding narrative). The military branch of the group was formed largely by military officers who had been removed as part of the coup in 1989 (UCDPb).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narratives: CNDP

Also Known As: National Congress for the Defence of the People; Congr s national pour la defense de peuple (CNDP)

Narrative:

The CNDP formed in 2006, claiming to fight for the protection and political representation of Tutsis living in eastern Congo and the predominantly Tutsi-Congolese refugee population in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch 2017). The group claims to be protecting Tutsis from the FDLR (Amnesty International 2008). Many members were veterans of the RCD (Human Rights Watch 2017). The CNDP has also drawn recruits from the Rwandan army (Blair 2008). The group recruited from refugee camps in Rwanda and used radio stations, and had communication teams, in order to spread ideological propaganda (Pehle and Schwarz 2015). Thus, there is indirect evidence of the group using ideological recruitment appeals.

However, most recruits appeared to have joined for financial reasons. A (2008) report issued by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) finds that most former members that were interviewed stated that they joined because of the promise of a high salary. However, recruits typically did not receive such promised salaries and were subjected to horrible living conditions in the rebel camps. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*.

The majority of members, especially officers, were Tutsi (Smith 2012). However, the movement was multiethnic for time, but experienced mass defection from Hutu members (Stearns 2012). During its time, the CNDP was one of the main recruiters of children in the DRC (UN News 2007). The group recruited children from schools and internally displaced populations and would violently retaliate against families who didn't offer children as recruits (UN News 2007). The group forcibly recruits both children and adults and engages in abductions (Human Rights Watch 2013).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MNLF – HM

Also Known As: Moro National Liberation Front – Habier Malik faction

Narrative:

The MNLF – HM was a force loyal to Habier Malik, a former Islamic religious scholar, who split from the MNLF. Malik’s faction refused to lay down their arms after the 1996 peace agreement, arguing that the government did not fulfill its political and economic promises (UCDP). The group became an independent actor in 2007, declaring “jihad” against the government (UCDP). The faction was also driven by a desire for an independent Moro state (Divinagracia 2018). The group also called for better treatment of MNLF prisoners (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013).

Not much information was available on this group’s recruitment practices. As noted above, the group was primarily driven by nationalist and Islamist ideologies. It also split from the MNLF, a group that is coded as relying exclusively on ideological appeals (see corresponding narrative), due to ideological disagreements over the 1996 peace agreements (see above). I also did not find evidence of the group employing any sort of material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: SLM/A – Unity

Also Known As: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Unity

Narrative:

This group splintered from the SLM/A, launching its first attack in 2007 (UCDPP). Members of the SLM/A – Unity are predominantly from the Zaghawa ethnic group (UCDP). The group recruits from multiple tribes (HSBA 2010). Other than the above information, there is relatively little written about this group. The original SLM/A is coded as relying exclusively on ideological appeals (see corresponding narrative). Thus, I also code the SLM/A – Unity as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the very indirect nature of this evidence, and that there is almost no information available on this faction, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 1

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: ATNMC

Also Known As: The Alliance Touarègue du Nord Mali pour le Changement (ATNMC)

Narrative:

The ATNMC was formed in September of 2007 by Tuaregs in the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC), who were dissatisfied with the settlement between the ADC and the government of Mali (Lecocq and Klute 2013). At face value, this might appear as an ideological conflict. However, other sources have accused the group of operating primarily for profit. Specifically, leader Ibrahim Ag Bahanga and the ATNMC have been accused of drug trafficking and fighting for autonomy so that can more easily engage in trafficking (Souaré 2010; Westerfield 2012). Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The group appears to be primarily a Tuareg movement. The group wanted to merge with the Tuaregs in Niger, but the latter refused (Thurston and Lebovich 2013).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: BDK

Also Known As: The Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)

Narrative:

The BDK, a DRC based group, has been classified as both “politico-religious” and secessionist (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2018). The group has specifically called for an ethnically homogenous Kongo Central region and for the removal of President Joseph Kabila from power (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2018). It wants to “revive the ancient Kongo Kingdom,” through eliminating the borders imposed by colonialism, revival of the region’s spiritual and historical heritage, and ethnic-based federalism (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2018). The group is fighting (1) economic exploitation, driven by the existence of many natural resources and ports in the region, of the region and BaKongo peoples, and (2) the lack of BaKongo representation in state institutions and state-owned companies (Tull 2010). The BDK also wants to expel Rwandans from the DRC and has incited violence against them (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2018).

Indeed, ethnic mobilization is one of the group’s tools for mobilizing members (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2018). More specifically, the group mobilizes around the marginalization faced by the BaKongo ethnic group (Tull 2010). The group also tried to mobilize the public through calls to remove Kabila from the presidency (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2018). The group also draws on messianic traditions from the region (Tull 2010). The BDK’s religious appeals are much vaguer than its ethnic-based appeals, but the group does present itself as being sent by God to protect and uplift all black Africans (Tull 2010). While the group likely did not win many supporters with its religious appeals, it attracted many supporters by mobilizing around grievances related to ethnic, economic, and political discrimination (Tull 2010). Strong cultural identity, historical depth, and local legitimacy have all helped the group rise to be a prominent movement (Tull 2010). I did not find evidence of the group employing material appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. The group recruits primarily from the BaKongo ethnic group (Carayannis et al. 2017).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: EPRLF

Also Known As: Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) is a former communist radical separatist group from Sri Lanka and current political party. It was formed in 1980 after splitting from the youth group known as the Eelam Revolutionary Organization for Students. Shortly thereafter, the group formed a military wing with which it came into several ideological disputes with other militant groups. After various splits and devastating attacks from rival militants, such as the Tamil Tigers, the EPRLF became a political party with the aid of the Indian military (Fernando 2000).

The group used female members to recruit and spread propaganda (Thomas and Wood 2018). In context of growing animosity towards the caste system, the EPRLF intentionally recruited individuals from lower castes (Thiranagama 2014). The group's leadership encourages Marxist ideals and revolution to mobilize recruits (Canagaretna 1987). There was a debate within the organization about whether recruits should go through political indoctrination or military training first (Satkunanathan 2012). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. The group recruits Tamils (EPR Atlas).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: WSB

Also Known As: The West Side Boys (WSB)

Narrative:

The WSB was a militant group, active in Sierra Leone, that aimed to end gerontocracy and patronage in the government (UCDP). Many members of the WSB were the sons of soldiers and therefore were raised in the Wilberforce Barracks (Utas and Jörgel 2008). Some former RUF and AFRC members are also in the group (BBC 2000; Bona 2000). Some prisoners released during the coup in 1997 also joined the group (Woods and Reese 2008).

The group used mythology and culture cues from Sierra Leonean history to inspire recruits (Utas and Jörgel 2008). Again, the group also recruited disenfranchised youth to fight government corruption (UCDP). The WSB, however, frequently engaged in looting sprees that it referred to as “food-finding missions” (Utas and Jörgel 2008). These missions also included trading drugs, diamonds, and other looted goods (Utas and Jörgel 2008). Indeed, the group is sometimes described as being a “gang of bandits rather than a politically motivated fighting force” (BBC 2000). Indeed, the group appears to be much more materially than ideologically motivated (UCDP). As a result, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*.

The group had extensive connections to outside political networks that helped with operations (Utas and Jörgel 2008). Individuals would also often come with their families when they joined (Utas and Jörgel 2008). Given that the group was comprised of former members of two multi-ethnic groups—the RUF and the AFRC—the WSB was likely multi-ethnic as well (see corresponding narratives for these groups). The group engaged in forced recruitment, including abducting women to serve as sex slaves (McGreal 2000). Indeed, many of the members had been abducted into the group when they were younger than 15 (Woods and Reese 2008). The WSB recruited children, sometimes by force (Utas and Jörgel 2008). Members would “adopt” these captured children and often look after them, blurring the line between persuasion and coercion in the group’s socialization process (Utas and Jörgel 2008). Recreational drug use was also an important part of the group socialization process (Utas and Jörgel 2008).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: TNSM

Also Known As: Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) is a terrorist organization based in the rural Pakistan/Afghanistan border region. TNSM exerts control largely over the provinces of Dir, Swat and Malakand in Pakistan. The extremist group began with Sufi Muhammad, formerly a supporter of the Pakistani political party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Upon leaving the group, Muhammad formed TNSM - a group that espoused JI's political stances on turning Pakistan into a state enforced by Sharia law, albeit by way of extreme violence and militancy (Khan 2007).

The TNSM appeals largely to a fundamentalist, extremist religious base in the Pakistan-Afghan border. During its prime years, TNSM had a large following centered around their compound in the Swat district, which housed a mosque. The mosque attracted many worshippers, who in turn are more likely to be incorporated into the group, because of sermons and propaganda espoused at the compound (Khan 2007). Propaganda is also delivered through TNSM's robust radio presence. Sufi Muhammad's son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah known popularly as "Mullah Radio" maintained radio broadcasts throughout the regions of the Afghan-Pakistani border in order to recruit others to TNSM's cause (Agence France-Presse). TNSM also utilizes religion to further its cause. The group saw a resurgence of recruits after an earthquake ripped through Pakistan, which TNSM - over the radio - announced was an indication of "holy wrath". This proclamation drove many fundamentalist religious individuals to TNSM, in order to appease the purported "wrath" (Nasir 2006).

Fundamentalists are also in favor of TNSM's implementation of Sharia Law. Where the group is able to establish control, Sharia Law usually follows. TNSM has been able to strike deals with the Pakistan government in regions it has control over, giving it autonomy and the ability to implement Sharia without issue, further extending its influence on those regions (BBC 2009). TNSM has also increased its influence in other regions by allying itself with groups such

as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Geller 2009). The group's merger with Al-Qaeda has likely helped give TNSM a larger following in Afghanistan. In light of this, TNSM has sent individuals to combat American troops during the US' occupation of Afghanistan in 2001, many of these individuals being foreign fighters that TNSM recruited voluntarily during the beginning of the US' war on terror (Gannon 2007). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Mahaz-i Milli-yi Afghanistan

Also Known As: Mahaz-e-Melli, National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (English Translation), NIFA, NIF

Written: RA #2; RA #3

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan, also known as the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan or NIFA, is a political party that was formed by a militant organization that was active from the '80s to the '90s, during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the organization follows a moderate ideology based on the edicts of Sufism (Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 1998). The group is described as “moderate, liberal, nationalist, royalist and Islamic” (Migration Review Tribunal 2013).

There is (indirect) evidence of the group employing ideological appeals. Rubin (2002) notes that some members of the group stuck around because they favored the nationalist goals of the group over the Islamist and communist goals of other actors in the conflict. There is also evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Specifically, the group mobilized combatants primarily through a “patrimonial model,” that operated as a series of networks in which affiliates were provided resources (Bhatia 2008). Edwards (2002) argues that the leader of the group had no effective way to recruit individuals except for the resources they were prepared to provide. Thus, the evidence suggests that patronage networks and material appeals play a central role in the group’s recruitment strategies. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. Members of the organization are primarily from the Pashtun ethnic group (UCDP). However, there were a small number of non-Pashtun members as well (Rubin 2002).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MNJ

Also Known As: Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ); Niger Movement for Justice

Narrative:

Guichaoua (2012) details the complexities of the material and ideological dimensions of MNJ's recruitment efforts. He notes that the two founders of the MNJ had previously had the reputation as bandits. He further argues that "obtaining the promised financial assistance, getting secure positions and promotions in security forces – preferably in a military body mostly composed of Tuaregs – to permit the control of the vast northern territory and its lucrative cross-border businesses seems to have been the priority motivations of the initiators of the MNJ and their immediate Tuareg followers" (p. 13-14). Several groups with similar motives, including mercenaries that were former members of the military, Jeunesses Arabes (an Arab militia), and the Forces Armées Révolutionnaires du Sahara (FARS) (a Tubu militia), joined the MNJ (Guichaoua 2012). While most early joiners in the group were ex-combatants of the conflict in the 1990s, most of the rank-and-file joined around August of 2007 and had not previously participated in a conflict (Guichaoua 2012).

Guichaoua (2012), however, finds that the group took a turn when it appointed a new leader and issued a political platform. This shift helped improve the group's image with the general public (Guichaoua 2012). With the help of external support, the group was able to improve its image by focusing on the environmental destruction caused by uranium extraction in the region, and emphasized ethnic-based grievances and the local interest/economic interests (Guichaoua 2012). More specifically, the MNJ claims to be fighting because of (1) political and economic discrimination against the people of northern Niger and (2) exploitation and unequal distribution of uranium rents (Guichaoua 2012). The group spreads some of its propaganda through an online blog, which it updates daily (Guichaoua 2012). The group also expressed grievances of perceived failures by the government to uphold the peace accords from the 1990s (Ibrahim 2014). Much of its propaganda focuses on the group standing up to perceived abuses by the central government (Guichaoua 2012).

Guichaoua (2012) emphasizes that the motives of the rank-and-file were diverse. Indeed, he finds in interviews with former members that individual decision-making was considered an important part of the recruitment process and that there was a consensus that "everybody has to do his own revolution" (p. 21). Relatedly, rewards were banned in the organization because they promoted inequality (Guichaoua 2012). One of Guichaoua's major take away points is that we cannot assume that initial conditions of rebel groups will always determine the quality of their recruitment. Specifically, while many of the founders were opportunistic, the foot soldiers who joined later had different motives and the group's platform changed over time. Thus, the founders of the group were much more opportunistic than the joiners. The government accuses the rebels of being bandits (Al Jazeera 2008), but Guichaoua's micro-level study shows that this is not the motive of many of the members.

Given that the rank-and-file seem to have a diversity of motives, and giving the group's sanitization of its political platform, ideological appeals appear to play a central role in the MNJ's recruitment strategy. However, the core leadership still mobilized around material incentives, suggesting these appeals still played somewhat of a role. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, there is ambiguity about how long the group employed material incentives, and the extent to which they were used. Thus, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Most of the group's recruits come from the Aïr Mountains near Tamgak (Guichaoua 2012). Most members of the group are Tuaregs, and shared identity plays an important role in the solidarity of combatants in the MNJ (Guichaoua 2012). However, other ethnic groups are represented in the MNJ including Fulani nomads (Al Jazeera 2008). Fulani members also emphasize joining because of the suffering of their group due to government neglect and discrimination (Al Jazeera 2008). Guichaoua (2012) finds that the decision to join the MNJ was typically very personalized, and only close friends would be consulted. MNJ recruits had to swear an oath on the Qur'an to the group and went through rigorous military training (Guichaoua 2012). While there were some social pressures to stay, group members were told they were free to leave and there were no punishments for doing so in practice (Guichaoua 2012).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction

Also Known As: Hezb-e Islami (Khaless); HIK; HIG Khalis

Narrative:

The group was dominated by tribal ulama (Islamic Scholars) (International Crisis Group 2008, p. 3, footnote 12), who were Deobandi (Mufti and Lamb 2012). Khalis viewed the ulama as an essential part of creating an Islamic state (Mullins 2009). It was ideologically and politically similar to Hezb-e Islami, which it split from, but it favored cooperation with other Mujahideen parties (Refugee Review Tribunal – Australia 2013). The Khalis faction valued tribal institutions and local traditions over any sort of centralized government (Smart 2021). Smart (2021) argues that the group mobilized around an Islamic Afghan identity. Khalis tried to organize recruits to wage jihad, and while he struggled to mobilize members at first, he was eventually more successful (Bell 2013). I did not find evidence of the group using any material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological recruitment appeals*. The group had primarily/mostly Pashtun membership (International Crisis Group 2008; Bell 2013). Recruits came from both government and religious schools, Khugiangi and Jadran tribes, and the Kabul and Kandahar regions (Refugee Review Tribunal – Australia 2013).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FLAA

Also Known As: Front de libration de l'Ar et l'Azaouad (FLAA); Front for the Liberation of Air and Azawad (FLAA)

Narrative:

The FLAA formed in 1991 with the demands of autonomy for Tuaregs in Niger, quotas to increase the representation of Tuaregs in the government and military, substantially more economic development in northern Niger, and jobs for Tuaregs in the uranium mines in the region (Kisangani 2012). Subsequent Tuareg rebellions mobilized around similar issues that rebels believed had not been adequately addressed by the peace accords (Pezard and Shurkin 2015). Thus, there is indirect evidence of the group using ideological recruitment appeals as it mobilized support around a variety of issues related to discrimination against Tuareg communities in Niger. Hull and Imai (2013, p. 88) argue that economic shocks to the economy of Niger lowered the opportunity costs for young, unemployed men, incentivizing rebellion against the state. While the poor economic conditions appear to have contributed to the conflict, I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment appeals. Many of the grievances that the FLAA and other Tuareg armed groups had were related to economic development and resource exploitation, but it appears as though the rebellion was motivated by the desire to change these conditions rather than to compensate participants. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The group had hundreds of veterans from Gaddafi's Islamic Legion (Kisangani 2012). The clan and confederation systems that create divisions among Tuaregs more broadly also led to fracturing within the FLAA (Pezard and Shurkin 2015).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UFRA

Also Known As: Union des forces de la resistance armee (UFRA)

Narrative:

The UFRA formed in Niger in 1996 from multiple, smaller Tuareg organizations (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013). There is a dearth of information on the UFRA's recruitment practices. The group appeared to mobilize around the need for a more unified Tuareg front to fight the alleged failure of the Nigerien government to implement previous peace accords (UCDP; Banks et al. 2007). These demands included calls for Tuareg militants to be integrated into the armed forces of the state (Banks et al. 2007). However, it is unclear how the UFRA, or any of its individual members (for which there is also little information), mobilized fighters. Some groups that formed the UFRA came from the CRA (UCDP), which relied on ideological appeals (see corresponding narrative). However, there is not enough information on most members of the UFRA, or the UFRA itself, that allow me to code its recruitment practices.

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: KCP

Also Known As: Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

The Kangleipak Communist Party, known as KCP, is an Indian terrorist group from the region surrounding Manipur, India. The group seeks to secede from what it views as a feudal Indian state and form a Maoist-Communist sovereign state in Manipur. KCP has a long and storied history with the various radical groups in Manipur, most notably, The People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, or PREPAK, from which KCP split from in 1980. Since its split, KCP - led by Yendrebam Ibohanbi and Mutum Ibopishak - has involved itself in many different attacks in Manipur, and has been a source of ideological strife itself, with many other radical groups being born from it in the years to come (Shillong Times 2011).

Differences in ideology is possibly the biggest issue hampering KCP recruitment. The degrees of radicalism and various communist schools of thought have caused massive splits within the terrorist group. Since its split with PREPAK in the 1980's, KCP has split to form nearly 12 different Manipuri-secessionist communist groups. A lack of a unifying ideology has resulted in many potential recruits being either siphoned off to splinter groups or lost due to a lack of a truly organized recruiting strategy (Shillong Times 2011). Put another way, while it is disorganized and divisive, the KCP does frequently employ ideological recruitment appeals. Despite this, KCP does implement recruiting drives where it enlists individuals into its cadres in droves. These recruitment drives often involve reaching out to friends and family of known recruits, thus building a network of trusted militants (The Telegraph 2014). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: DHD – BW

Also Known As: Dima Haram Daogah - Black Widow; Dima Haram Daogah (Jewel); DHD (J)

Narrative:

The DHD-BW claims rights to an ethnic homeland in the state of Assam in northeastern India (UCDP). Specifically, the group argues that an independent Dimas state is that only way to protect its ethnic group from assimilation into Assamese culture (South Asia Terrorism Portal a; UCDP). The group attack members of other ethnic groups (UCDP). The DHD appears to have had multi-ethnic membership (Kolås 2017), though it is unclear if this spilled over into the DHD – BW as well. The Assam police recruit former DHD – BW members (South Asia Terrorism Portalb).

There is evidence of the DHD – BW recruiting with material incentives. The group siphons government funds, in part, to help pay for recruits (Allana 2018). Furthermore, Allana (2018) asserts that the DHD – BW is rooted in the desire to make money and that the group operates like a business. While the group has clearly stated ideological goals, I did not find evidence of it using ideology to mobilize recruits. No source indicates that the group actually mobilizes recruits with these ethnic-based appeals, while other evidence indicates that the group appears to primarily engage in economic activities. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: PREPAK

Also Known As: The People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)

Written: RA #2

Edited: RAID Author

Narratives:

The People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, also known as PREPAK is a Maoist communist militant group operating out of the North-Eastern Indian state of Manipur. The group demands complete independence and secession from India. The group began in the 1970s as part of political group meetings. Eventually those meetings evolved into calls for independence and for the opportunity to establish a communist state. As a result, the newly founded PREPAK conducted assaults on the Manipuri police and the Indian military to achieve their goals. In recent times, the group has faced many splits and reunification, and continues to operate to this day (Tiwari 1990).

PREPAK gains recruits through its influence over the public. It spreads communist propaganda throughout Manipur, turning individuals away from the Indian state and encouraging them to fight for their Maoist ideals (Imphal Free Press 2014). They have been known to utilize recruitment campaigns as well as flyers and slogans containing pro-communist sentiments in order to attract individuals to their cause. The group claims to fight on behalf of the Meitei ethnic group and mobilizes around grievances related to a perceived forced merger of Manipur to India in 1949 (UCDP). I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. PREPAK primarily recruits from the Meitei ethnic group (UCDP).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Narrative: AN

Also Known As: Alliance Nationale; National Alliance

Narrative:

The AN formed in 2008 as an alliance between the RFC, the UFDD-F, and its leader and largest group, the UFDD. There is almost no information on the recruitment practices of the AN. The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Furthermore, the UFDD—the leader of the AN—relied exclusively on material recruitment appeals (see corresponding narrative). Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*. However, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding due to the lack of information on the group and the indirect nature of the evidence. The UFDD included Toubou and Gorane members, while the UFDD-F had Arab members (May and Massey 2007; Tubiana 2008). Thus, the AN was a multiethnic alliance. The UFDD-F recruited some members from the Sudanese Janjaweed, which it was able to do through kinship networks (Tubiana 2011).

Certainty Score: 1

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: TTP

Also Known As: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Narrative:

The TTP formed in 2007 from a network of groups that had been operating in Pakistan at the time (Abbas 2008). According to its profile on the Mapping Militants Organization (2018), the TTP's three main goals are (1) execute Sharia law in Pakistan, (2) combat NATO forces in Afghanistan, and (3) "to conduct defensive jihad against Pakistan security forces."

Rampant anti-Americanism and the Pakistani government's support for the war in Afghanistan has created fertile grounds for recruitment for the TTP (Iqbal and De Silva 2013). General grievances against the government and government security forces in Pakistan were also important for the TTP's recruitment efforts (Iqbal and De Silva 2013). The TTP also spread jihadi propaganda through the internet, literature, and radio which helped with recruitment (Hashmi and Saqib 2017). As with the Afghan Taliban, madrassas also produced ideologically oriented recruits who became leaders of the TTP (Khan and Wei 2016). Many individuals also join the group for protection from Pakistani security forces (Refugee Review Tribunal 2013). The TTP has also recruited hundreds of Pashtuns in refugee camps, mobilizing around revenge for family members, poor conditions in the camps, and general grievances against the Pakistani government (Refugee Review Tribunal 2013). The group also uses social media for recruitment (Refugee Review Tribunal 2013).

The TTP also employs forced recruitment. Specifically, the group kidnaps children, and forces them into a variety of roles ranging from cook to combatant (Refugee Review Tribunal 2013). These abducted children are often radicalized at TTP-sponsored schools (Refugee Review Tribunal 2013). Overall, child recruitment plays a very prominent role in the organization (Siddique 2010). Indeed, the group employs extensive propaganda (e.g., videos) which emphasize the martyrdom of children (Siddique 2010). The TTP frames their use of children as one of the means by which God provides them to achieve his ends (Siddique 2010). The group's substantial influence in FATA and KPP creates an environment of fear that also plays into the TTP's recruitment (Siddique 2010).

The group also uses material appeals for recruitment. Indeed, the group attracts individuals from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds by offering them monthly stipends (Refugee Review Tribunal 2013). Both ideological and material play important roles, making it difficult to distinguish which one is more important. Indeed, recruits are often attracted to the TTP by both lucrative salary offers and because of grievances against Pakistani security forces (Siddique 2010). However, given that the TTP (1) ideological indoctrinates children from a young age, (2) sometimes seeks out religious hardliners, (3) mobilizes refugees and the general population around anti-government grievances, and (4) extensively spreads ideological propaganda, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

Social networks also appear to play an important role in the group's recruitment efforts as they rely on tribal loyalties and affiliations to gain new members (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). The TTP also recruits religious hard-liners from around the country (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). The group also has an extensive intelligence network into which it informally recruits many members, including women and children (Iqbal and De Silva 2013). The TTP recruits Pashtuns from a variety of areas in Pakistan, including FATA, KPK, and Karachi (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015). While the TTP is primarily Pashtun, it has an important base of Punjabi members as well (Kaltenthaler and Miller 2015).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Al-Shabaab

Also Known As: The Youth (English Translation)

Narrative:

Prior to 2006, al-Shabaab was a branch of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), however, the group grew stronger and more radical after Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia, rising to prominence with the collapse of the ICU during the invasion and occupation (Wise 2011).

Individuals join al-Shabaab for a wide variety of reasons (Botha and Abdile 2014). Ideological issues are one of the main drivers of recruitment. In a survey of former al-Shabaab combatants, Botha and Abdile find that 25% of the respondents joined for a combination of economic and religious reasons, while 15% joined for purely religious reasons. An additional 7% joined for a combination of religious and other reasons. Thus, nearly half (47%) of the respondents joined, at least in part, for religious reasons. Botha and Abdile also find that 98% of the respondents believe that Islam is under threat, further indicating the importance of ideology among group members. The authors also found that this feeling of threat is often linked to non-Muslim majority countries. Drawing on survey responses from local communities in Somalia, a report by the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) finds that al-Shabaab often uses religious rhetoric to draw in recruits, including promising them that membership in the group would guarantee that they got to enter paradise.

However, the group also emphasizes issues with the Somalia government as well as with foreigners, who they accuse of stealing natural resources from Somalia (UNSOM 2017, p. 12-13). Thus, from an ideological standpoint, al-Shabaab mobilizes around a constellation of religious, anti-government, anti-foreigner, and anti-Western sentiments. Recruitment also greatly expanded following the Ethiopian invasion in December of 2006 and subsequent military occupation that lasted until January of 2009 (Wise 2011). During this time, much of al-Shabaab's propaganda focused on expelling foreign occupiers and unifying Somalia, not on other ideological elements, such as religious goals (Wise 2011). Indeed, Wise (2011, p. 5) argues that most recruits joined during this period to defend their families and/or Somalia as a whole from foreign military occupation.

The group brought in recruits in a variety of ways. In their survey of former al-Shabaab combatants, Botha and Abdile (2014) find that while only 4% of respondents were encouraged to join the group by religious figures, 27% came into contact with al-Shabaab through a mosque. Recruits also came from a diversity of ethnic groups (Botha and Abdile 2014). However, in a survey of local communities in Somalia, the United Nations found that the group may offer individuals protection from rival ethnic groups and that the group attempts to eliminate clannism in certain cases (UNSOM 2017, p.12). al-Shabaab also recruits Somali nationals living in other countries as well as foreign fighters living in countries neighboring Somalia (Botha and Abdile 2014). The organization also uses undercover networks abroad and the internet for recruitment purposes (Botha and Abdile 2014). Shinn (2010) argues that while there are multiple ethnic

groups represented in al-Shabaab, the vast majority of members are still Somali, including most foreign fighters, who are recruited from diasporic Somali communities.

Economic factors also play a significant role in drawing in recruits. The single most common response (27%) was that the respondents joined al-Shabaab for economic reasons, while 25% joined for a mixture of economic and religious reasons. An additional 1% joined for a combination of economic reasons and to seek adventure. Thus, just over half of individuals (53%) joined for a combination of economic factors and other reasons. A 2019 report by the Counter Extremism Project argues that al-Shabaab provides robust social services in order to generate support in order to generate public support (Counter Extremism Project 2019). Indeed, following the collapse of the Somalia government, al-Shabaab's provision of social services, in absence of government action, bolstered their popularity and their recruitment (Wise 2011). For over a decade, the group has targeted impoverished children for recruitment, offering payment and basic necessities in exchange for joining (West 2016). Kenyan officials have also stated that al-Shabaab targets impoverished teenagers in Kenya for recruitment (Ringa and Mukinda 2015).

Botha and Abdile (2014) also find that family does NOT play a significant role in the recruitment process for al-Shabaab. Indeed, despite the fact that approximately 57% of respondents had told someone they knew that they were joining al-Shabaab, over 90% of the respondents did NOT tell parents or siblings that they were joining (let alone be influenced to join by these family members). However, the aforementioned survey evidence from UNSOM indicates that family and friends already in the group sometimes influence new recruits to join (UNSOM 2017, p. 13). While the authors of this study field survey questions about religious, they do not directly ask about foreign intervention, making it difficult to assess its effect on the motives of recruits. However, 98% of respondents said they believe that Islam is under threat, which is related to foreign intervention (i.e., Kenya and Ethiopia being viewed as Christian imperialists).

Based on the evidence discussed above, al-Shabaab clearly employs both ideological and material-based recruitment appeals. Wise (2011) argues that most individuals who joined al-Shabaab during the Ethiopian military occupation did so to protect their families and Somalia as a whole. Mueller (2018) likewise argues that harsh military interventions, including by Ethiopia, Kenya, and the forces of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), were vital for the group's recruitment efforts. However, as noted above, economic incentives were frequently used as well. Thus, the group appears to frequently employ both ideological and material recruitment appeals and does not clearly prefer one over the other. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*.

Coercion and force also play a role in al-Shabaab's recruitment efforts. Of those surveyed, Botha and Abdile (2014) find that 13% of respondents say that they were forced or pressured into joining al-Shabaab, while 4% claimed that they joined because of a combination of religious factors and force or pressure. More recently, reports have come indicating that al-Shabaab forcibly recruits a significant number of child soldiers. A 2018 report from the Human Rights Watch indicated that al-Shabaab had been abducting many civilians, including hundreds of children, since mid-2017. The report furthers that al-Shabaab recruited thousands of children

over the past decade to become combatants (Human Rights Watch 2018). The United Nations estimated that at least 60% of al-Shabaab members are children, with thousands of children being recruited in recent years (Lederer 2017). In addition to recruiting child soldiers, al-Shabaab also kidnaps girls and women and force them into marriages, rape them, and force them to complete domestic tasks for the group, such as cooking and cleaning (Human Rights Watch 2012). The group also denies that they recruit anyone younger than 15 and that they force anyone to join (Omar and Bhalla 2018). Because of the foreign fighters in the organization, the membership is multi-ethnic.

One of al-Shabaab's more recent methods of recruitment is through running schools to indoctrinate children to eventually recruit them (Human Rights Watch 2018). The group not only recruits in Somalia, but they also recruit internationally, including in Kenya, through the use of radical clerics in recruitment networks (Taylor 2013), and even in countries like the United States, through online propaganda (Counter Extremism Project 2019).

The group also spreads in recruitment appeals in a variety of ways. The aforementioned UNSOM study details a variety of recruitment tactics used by al-Shabaab. First, the organization requires current members to recruit additional individuals. This often takes the form of applying pressure to family and friends, which the study notes is yet another example of al-Shabaab's coercive recruitment tactics. The study further finds that the organization spreads its recruitment propaganda through a variety of ways including various social media platforms (e.g., Twitter, YouTube, etc.), websites (e.g., alfurqan.net and [somalimemo](http://somalimemo.com)), and Radio Andlus. Survey respondents also noted that they felt like mainstream media sources (e.g., BBC and Al Jazeera) unintentional aided the group's propaganda efforts by frequently playing its propaganda videos (UNSOM 2017, p.14).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Harakat Ras Kamboni

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The Harakat Ras Kamboni was an Islamist rebel group that formed around 2008 in Somalia and opposed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) until it disbanded in 2010 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). The group merged with three other militant groups in 2009 to form Hizbul-Islam but broke away from the group between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). There is a dearth of information on the recruitment tactics of this group. There is indirect evidence of the group making ideological recruitment appeals. The group merged with three other organizations to form Hizbul Islam with the goal of defeating the TFG to establish an Islamic state and expelling Ethiopian forces (Thomas 2013). Indeed, Hizbul Islam used the Ethiopian occupation to mobilize support (Shinn 2011). I could not, however, find evidence of the group making material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, because of the indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. Most of the group's members are from the Ogaden clan (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: PULF

Also Known As: People's United Liberation Front (PULF)

Narrative:

PULF was an Islamist, Pangal-based secessionist movement in India (UCDP). There is relatively little information on the recruitment practices of this group. The entry for the group in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia notes that backlash against Muslim settlers caused Pangals to form militant groups, including PULF, to defend the Muslim population and to create a separatist state governed by Muslim values (UCDP). Thus, this evidence directly suggests that members formed the group both for defense of Pangal Muslims and to form a separatist, Muslim state. I did not find any evidence of PULF employing material incentives for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the general lack of information on the recruitment practices of this group, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

References

UCDP. "PULF." Available At: <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/369>

Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Forces of the Caucasus Emirate

Also Known As: Imarat Kavkaz; IK; Caucasus Emirate; CE

Narrative:

Established in 2007, the primary goal of the Caucasus Emirate is to establish an independent region in the North Caucasus that is ruled by Sharia law (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Prior to 2012 (when many combatants went to Syrian and Iraq), the group operated primarily throughout the North Caucasus (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

The brutality of the counterterrorism campaign by the Russian government has led to the radicalization of many youth in the region and has led to an increase in recruitment from local communities (Ter 2015; Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). While religion has played an increasing role in recruitment for the insurgency, anecdotal evidence still suggests that many individuals join because of more personal grievances, especially because of the violence of Russian security forces. This is all contextualized by the high levels of deprivation and exclusion in the region (IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security 2014). The group has also called on Muslims in the region to join the jihad and fight Russian forces (BBC 2010). In one specific appeal, a group leader noted stated that Islam is the superior ideology, so the group does not recognize democracy, socialism, or communism (BBC 2010). The group provides youth programs promoting Islamic education, which has helped increase its youth membership (Hahn 2010; Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). There is some evidence to suggest that social and economic problems contribute to growing recruitment in the region (Nichol 2010). The group also engages extensively in crime. However, I did not find evidence that the group explicitly used material appeals to incentivize recruits to join. Thus, I coded the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The founding of the group marked an important transition from a Chechen independence movement to a jihadist movement with broader goals (Ter 2015). Indeed, the organization took on pan-Caucasian features and included multiple ethnic groups (Chechens, Ingushetians, Dagestanis, Kabardians, Circassians, Karachay, Azeris, and Russians) (Ter 2015). Moroccan-Belgian citizens also try to recruit for the group in Belgium (Khan 2011). The group is highly decentralized and each tier of the organization is responsible for recruiting its own members (The Mackenzie Institute 2015).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: BRA/Baluchistan Republican Army

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The BRA formed in Balochistan in 2006 to fight for independence from Pakistan (Mapping Militant Organizations 2015). The primary target of the group is the Pakistani military (Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium). The BRA is allegedly the political wing of the Baloch Republican Party (Samad 2014).

Samad (2014) argues that extraction of natural gas by Pakistan and various international actors, and the prospect of future extraction of resources, fosters discontent in Balochistan, but that resources are not directly causing the conflict, through providing motive or opportunity. Indeed, there is a feeling of resentment in Balochistan that natural resource extraction benefits the rest of the country, but not the province itself, leading many to want an independent region with control over their own natural resources (Gilani 2017). Other political and military policies have made Balochis feel alienated as well (Gilani 2017). More specifically, the Balochi insurgency was reinvigorated in the mid-2000s as Balochi nationalists became concerned that the influx of workers for new government projects would make Balochis the minority in the region, as did abuses by the military (Khan and Muhammad 2018). Poverty is rampant in Balochistan and the many Balochs believe that the Pakistani government is not doing enough to address these issues (Hashim 2013), including providing inadequate levels of social services (Hashmi 2018). The government of Pakistan also claims that insurgent leaders are simply fighting because they want a bigger share of the profits from natural resources in the region (Grare 2013).

I did not find any evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given that this evidence is all very indirect, and because there is little information on the BRA, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding. The ethnic dimension of the conflict became particularly relevant in the past 2 years, with targeted killings of non-Balochs (Siddiqi 2012). Hashmi (2018) notes that the Baloch insurgent groups are not connected to foreign extremists.

Certainty Score: 1

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas)

Also Known As:

Narrative:

There is very little information on this group. The group was a faction of the military, led by Interior Minister Maldoum Bada Abbas, that unsuccessfully attempted a coup in Chad in 1991 (UCDP). Thus, while the group is coded as participating in a civil war in the Non-State Actor Dataset (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013), both coups and related military factions are still excluded from this dataset.

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: PLO/Fatah

Also Known As:

Narrative:

A 1999 report from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada argues that the PLO itself does not recruit as it is an umbrella organization. However, Fatah took control of the organization in 1968 (UCDP). Thus, I assume the PLO's recruitment strategies were largely driven by Fatah, who took a mixed approach (see corresponding narrative). Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

References

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UCDP. "Government of Israel – PLO." Available At: <https://ucdp.uu.se/statebased/472>

Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: CPJP

Also Known As: Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP); Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace

Narrative:

The CPJP is an armed group that originated in 2008 in that is primarily comprised of the Rouga ethnic group. The group's primary contention is that the Rouga were pushed off their diamond fields by the UFDR, which is mostly comprised of members of the Goula ethnic group (Global Security). In June of 2011, CPJP signed a ceasefire with the government, but still fought with the UFDR over diamond fields until a ceasefire that October (Freedom House 2013).

There is evidence of the group employing ideological recruitment appeals. The CPJP uses ethnic solidarity to mobilize youth to serve as combatants and as miners (The Sentry 2018). Specifically, vulnerable children were targeted for recruitment (e.g., one's whose families had been killed) and child soldiers were treated horribly once they joined the group (Poole 2012). Leaders of the group also claimed to form the CPJP to help protect members of the Rouga ethnic group from the UFDR (Amnesty International 2011). Overall, ethnic identity played an important role in the group's mobilizing efforts (Isaacs-Martin 2016).

There is also evidence of the group using material incentives for recruitment. Specifically, the CPJP employs foreign mercenaries (The Sentry 2018). However, it is unclear how many mercenaries the group employs, or what ethnic groups they are part of. Overall, the evidence focuses largely on the role of ethnic identity in mobilizing recruits (e.g., Isaacs-Martin 2016). Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. The group also has former members of UFDR who are Rouga as well as potentially having former members of the presidential guard (Global Security).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: UFR

Also Known As: Union des forces de la résistance; Union of Resistance Forces

Narrative:

The UFR attempted to mobilize civilians and defectors from the military by mobilizing around multiple issues including Deby strengthening his stranglehold on the presidency, Chad's relationship with Sudan, and the growing influence of Déby's wife, who is ethnically Arab (Moncrieff and Lesueur 2019). Furthermore, the UFR appealed specifically to soldiers of the national armed forces to defect and join them by declaring that the government "sends Chadian soldiers to die abroad without honour and without money for their families" (Moncrieff and Lesueur 2019). However, the group largely failed to attract aggrieved civilians because they feared backlash from the government and did not want more violence (Moncrieff and Lesueur 2019). The UFR also pushed an ambiguous agenda for political change (Tubiana 2011).

The last three presidents of Chad, and many of its politicians, have risen to power as the result of an insurgency (Tubiana and Debos 2017). As a result, many view rebellion as a normal pathway to power in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Ousted politicians often rebel with the hopes of regaining political power (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Both government and rebel soldiers use the instability in eastern Chad for banditry (International Crisis Group 2009). Additionally, rebellion serves as a common source of employment in Chad (Tubiana and Debos 2017). Furthermore, Déby has been successful at buying off opponents to ward off rebellions (International Crisis Group 2009). Because Déby coopts warlords, their existence and domination of local politics is heavily incentivized (International Crisis Group 2009). As a result, taking up arms has become almost a way of life for many in northeastern Chad (International Crisis Group 2009).

Overall, the evidence of ideological appeals is more direct and more commonly discussed. However, there is also indirect evidence, as noted above, of the group using material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. Given the indirect nature of some of the evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. The UFR recruited primarily from the Zaghawa ethnic group (Moncrieff and Lesueur 2019). However, the group also recruited Arabs and Waddayans (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017) as well as Gorans (Tubiana 2011).

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Also Known As: al-Qa'ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa'ida in Yemen; al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa'ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY; Ansar al-Shari'a; Sons of Abyan; Sons of Hadramawt; Sons of Hadramawt Committee; Civil Council of Hadramawt; and National Hadramawt Council

Written: RA #1

Edited: RAID Author

Narrative:

AQAP is based in southern/southeastern Yemen (Mapping Militants Organization 2020) is a highly active affiliate of the al-Qaeda core. It was formed in 2009 as a merger between al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) and al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia when the Saudi's pushed the al-Qaeda affiliate across the border into Yemen.

Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia Recruitment

After the Iraqi conflict, al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia became a more formidable force. It became easier for the group to sell their point of view to potential recruits in the kingdom (Riedel and Saab 2008). A very important recruitment channel utilized by al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia was religious gatherings. Jihadists would hold recruitment meetings that were presented as innocent religious lectures or classes, in addition to organizing religious summer camps for young Saudis (Hegghammer 2006). I did not find evidence of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia employing material recruitment incentives.

Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) Recruitment

The original al-Qaeda in Yemen group was destroyed in 2004. The initial group was very idiosyncratic and was willing to engage in the Yemeni tradition of negotiation in addition to agreeing to non-aggression agreements with the Yemeni government. The group experienced a resurgence when a group of radicalized prison escapees rebuilt the organization and weaved it into the international jihadist agenda while still being tied to Yemeni cultural norms (O'Neill 2009). AQY put regional and local goals before their international jihad endeavors, which improved their reputation and standing among Yemeni citizens and tribesmen. By standing with the tribes against the government and working for the people, advocating for fighting for villages, AQY provided a personal ideological incentive. This incentive allowed the group to improve their numbers in terms of recruitment and encourage foot soldiers to continue fighting for their cause (O'Neill 2009).

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

AQAP is a Sunni terrorist organization with the self-stated goals of breaking down secular government establishments, creating theocratic regimes, establishing an Islamic caliphate throughout the peninsula, and imposing Sharia law throughout both the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East (United States Department of State 2018). It is also has a global jihadist agenda – seeking to expel foreigners and spread jihad to Israel in order to “liberate Muslim holy sites and brethren in Gaza.” They also seek to free imprisoned jihadists in Saudi Arabia and form the Islamic caliphate through the unification of states in the Arabian Peninsula (Mapping Militants Organization 2020). The current civil war in Yemen that began in 2015 has provided AQAP with opportunities to refine their tactics while growing their organization. Increasingly, day-to-day operations are more pragmatic and focus less on ideology. Yemen’s war has forced AQAP to become a more indigenous organization that prioritizes local/national issues over transnational jihad (Jamestown Foundation 2018).

The organization utilizes propaganda for recruitment methods, the issuing of threats, and to garner international support for their efforts. The topics of the propaganda include the importance of Islamic law, the establishment of a caliphate, and the destruction of the West (Jamestown Foundation 2018). This propaganda is regularly published in their bimonthly magazine, “Sada al-Malahim” (“The Echo of Battles”), which is tailored to a Yemeni audience by addressing more localized issues. AQAP also publishes an English magazine aimed towards Western audiences called “Inspire,” which contains not only anti-West propaganda, but instructions on how to build bombs, conduct terror attacks, and various pro-terrorist activity speeches and writings by major influencers (Counter Extremism Project 2019a). Both magazines are published by AQAP’s media channel, “al-Malahem”, which is frequently referred to as AQAP’s “official propaganda arm” (Counter Extremism Project 2019b).

AQAP communicates with potential recruits through their propaganda and publications, particularly their magazine “Sada al-Malahim”. AQAP establishes its religious legitimacy and credibility, which provides backing for using religion as their rationale for attacks. Articles quoting the Qur’an and *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet) are used to influence potential recruits into joining the AQAP (Page, Challita, and Harris 2011).

It is reported that AQAP focuses on two types of audiences very different from each other: a primarily non-Yemeni, elite, educated Muslim audience heavily invested in international politics; local Yemeni audiences who focus on everyday issues, suffering from severe socioeconomic conditions and illiteracy (Page, Challita, and Harris 2011). All these articles, however, are rooted in religious ideology (Page, Challita, and Harris 2011). Through these publications, AQAP combines the victimization experienced directly or indirectly by Muslims with the humiliation caused by Muslims who have not defended their honor. AQAP also takes advantage of strong gender hierarchies in their propaganda by “shaming” men into carrying out jihad as they compare men’s cowardice to the acts of women towards jihad that the organization deems “heroic” (Page, Challita, and Harris 2011).

I did not find evidence of the group employing material recruitment incentives. There is some evidence of the group employing material incentives for recruitment. Specifically, the group provides financial assistance to communities in exchange for families allowing AQAP to recruit their sons (Mapping Militant Organizations 2020). However, this use of material recruitment incentives is more indirect. Indeed, most of the evidence focuses on AQAP making ideological appeals related to religion and local political grievances. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*.

AQAP primarily relies on local recruits (Mendelsohn 2011). However, there are many reports from tribal leaders that the group has accepted foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and other nations (Raghavan 2019). While most members are Arab, the group also recruited Somali fighters, particularly during 2011 and 2012 (Horton 2017).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: NDFB – RD

Also Known As: National Democratic Front of Bodoland – Ranjan Daimary faction

Narrative:

The NDFB-RD, a splinter faction of the NDFB, formed when other leaders of the group ousted incumbent leader Ranjan Daimary for allegedly breaking a ceasefire with the Indian government (UCDP). Daimary's faction opposed the ceasefire because it wanted to continue fighting for an independent Bodoland (Fisas 2012). The group essentially has the same goals as the NDFB (UCDP). Daimary and his followers have been described as radicals that abandoned dialogue in favor of violence (Saikia 2009).

Very little information exists about this faction and I found no direct evidence of the group's recruitment practices (including how many new members, if at all, they recruited). As noted above, the group split off from the NDFB when Ranjan Daimary was expelled from the group for violating the ceasefire as he and his followers wanted to keep fighting for total independence of Bodoland. The NDFB is coded as relying exclusively on ideological appeals (see corresponding narrative), and as the UCDP notes, the splinter faction had essentially the same goals as the parent organization. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: KNF

Also Known As:

Narrative:

I did not find information on this group's recruitment practices. Thus, this group is coded as missing.

References

Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Boko Haram

Also Known As:

Narrative:

The group formed in 2002 and is still active (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018). Material incentives play a vital role in Boko Haram's recruitment efforts. Specifically, many joiners either received loans directly prior to joining or joined with the hope of receiving a loan (Inks et al. 2016). However, the same study does not find a clear link between employment, education, and participation in Boko Haram (Inks et al. 2016). A recent survey of almost 500 former members of al-Shabab and Boko Haram found that finding a job was the most salient issue found among respondents, but that approximately 70% of individuals were at least partially motivated to join by the death of a family member or friend (BBC 2017). Boko Haram has also attracted many criminals as recruits (Zenn 2014).

Ideological incentives are also important for the group's recruitment. Especially in its early year, Boko Haram called on youth to save Islam from decline as part of its recruitment rhetoric, but religious appeals drew in fewer recruits, starting in 2009, because of the unpopularity of the group's brutal violence (Inks et al. 2016). The group still continued to make religious appeals during this time, but they faced public backlash and it never really had a clear and coherent ideology (Inks et al. 2016).

Campbell (2014) identifies the four main aspects of Boko Haram's recruitment strategies. The first is financial incentives, as some members have been enticed to join through payments for committing violent and criminal acts. Immigrants from surrounding countries are also attracted to the group because of material incentives. The second factor Campbell identifies is kinship networks, as many individuals have affiliated with Boko Haram because they have family members in the group. The third motivating factor is inter-religious and government violence as some individuals joined to seek revenge on Christians or the Nigerian government. The fourth and final factor Campbell posits is that many join because they have been radicalized by Nigerian imams, focusing on issues such as being anti-vaccination and anti-beauty pageants. Inks et al. (2016) note that many individuals join for some combination of material, ideological, and social reasons. Boko Haram, therefore, appears to frequently employ both ideological and material recruitment appeals, and does not clearly favor one over the other. Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*.

Social networks are also vital for Boko Haram's recruitment efforts. Indeed, survey evidence indicates that most former members cited family, friends, or coworkers as one of the factors that drove them to join the group (Inks et al. 2016). Kanuri are the major ethnic group represented in Boko Haram, but the group is still very ethnically diverse. Boko Haram also recruits foreign fighters. In addition to the aforementioned evidence that some individuals from bordering countries join for economic reasons, Babatunde (2018) also provides evidence that Nigeriens, Chadians, and Cameroonians join as well. Indeed, the author quotes a Nigerian

military official who claims that 60% of members are not Nigerian. The author further argues that foreign fighters in Boko Haram were primarily attracted to the group by money. Overall, the group is multi-ethnic (Linden 2014).

Boko Haram frequently employs coercion and force in its recruitment. The group has forced many male and female adults and children into joining the group through abduction, and many women and girls are forced to marry fighters (Inks et al. 2016). The group using abduction and the threat of violence for coercive and forced recruitment (Inks et al. 2016). Members could also be killed for attempting to escape (Inks et al. 2016). Additionally, the group often gives individuals loans that are almost impossible to pay off, and conscript those who are not able to repay the loans (Babatunde 2018).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: MNDAA

Also Known As: Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA); Kokang Army

Narrative:

The MNDAA claims to be fighting on behalf of the Kokang people against the oppressive, authoritarian rule of Myanmar's military (Reuters 2017). The MNDAA is active in the production and trade of methamphetamines (Reuters 2017).

There is evidence of the group recruiting with material incentives. Chinese mercenaries are reportedly offered 30,000 yuan (U.S. \$4,830) to join the MNDAA for at least a month (Radio Free Asia 2015). Fighters can allegedly go home after a month or continue fighting for 1,000 yuan a month (Radio Free Asia 2015). However, members of the group claimed that they had difficulty attracting recruits because this is relatively low pay, given the associated risks (Radio Free Asia 2015). The group is supported by former Chinese soldiers as mercenaries, though China denies the allegations (Bashar 2015).

The group is predominantly, ethnically Chinese (Amnesty International 2013, 17; Reuters 2017). However, there are also Kokang members (Moe 2019), including veteran Kokang nationalists (Transnational Institute 2015). Indeed, members of opposition groups noted that they supported the MNDAA because it fought for Kokang rights. The group still practices conscription (Radio Free Asia 2015). The group uses child soldiers (Bashar 2015). The MNDAA also employs forced recruitment, demanding villagers (Moe 2019). The group also abducts individuals during military raids (Human Rights Council 2019). Thus, there is some evidence of the group mobilizing around ethnic-based, ideological appeals. However, most of the evidence focuses on the salaries used to draw members in. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*.

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Hizbul-Islam

Also Known As:

Narrative:

Hizbul-Islam formed in 2009 to oppose the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). The group formed from the merger of four Islamic groups (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). These organizations caused significant division within Hizbul-Islam (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). It was absorbed by its rival, Al-Shabaab in 2010, but split from the group in 2012 and disbanded in 2013 (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). The group has a Salafist Islamist ideology (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019) as well as Somali nationalist ideology (Counter Extremism Project 2022). The group also engaged in strict moral policing in areas it controlled, including a range of practices from banning music to executing people (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). There is evidence of the group using ideological recruitment appeals. Shinn (2011) finds that the invasion and occupation of Ethiopian forces served as an important rallying point for the group. I did not find evidence of the group using material recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*. The group is comprised primarily of members from the Marehan and Daron clans (Floyd 2010).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: DKBA 5

Also Known As: The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army – Brigade 5 (DKBA 5)

Narrative:

The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia notes that the DKBA is a breakaway faction of the Karen National Union (KNU), mostly comprised of ethnically-Karen Buddhists, who agreed to a ceasefire with the government in exchange for militarily and financially aiding the government's military efforts against the KNU (UCDPa).

There is some (indirect) evidence of the group employing ideological appeals. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia notes that several factors contributed to the formation of the DKBA. While the majority of members of the KNU, and the majority of the Karen population, are Buddhist, the KNU's leadership was primarily Christian. While not an issue for many years, corruption within the organization, lack of accommodations, and the lack of promotion of Buddhist cadres, led to many members splitting and forming the DKBA (UCDPa). Christian and Animist members also joined the DKBA (Human Rights Watch 2002). Indeed, general dissatisfaction with the KNU was an important motive driving the DKBA's formation (Human Rights Watch 2002). The DKBA5 splintered from the DKBA when the DKBA became the border guard, which dissatisfied some members (UCDPb). This highlighted the political issues the government had in integrating rebel groups into the militia system (Buchanan 2016).

There is also some evidence of the group using material incentives for recruitment. A 2002 Human Rights Watch report notes that the group began extorting villages for money and exploiting natural resources, and that the group no longer has a clear political ideology. Material incentives played a larger role in ceasefire negotiations than political agreements in the 1990s (Kyed and Gravers 2014). While the group does not offer salaries to joiners, its provision of food and shelter draws in impoverished and internally displaced children whose parents want safety for them (Child Soldiers International 2013). According to DKBA leadership, children in DKBA camps often wear uniforms to signal that they want to be part of the armed struggle (Child Soldiers International 2013).

While dissatisfaction with the KNU and the peace agreement played a role in the mobilization of the DKBA, the above evidence suggests that the group operated largely for material profit (Kyed and Gravers 2014) and drew children in through providing material protection (Child Soldiers International 2013). Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence, I assign a moderate level of certainty to the coding.

The DKBA has both volunteers and conscripts, and it has a somewhat systematic conscription system, in which it requires quotas of members from each village (Human Rights Watch 2007). The group also recruits child soldiers, some of whom wanted to join, and some of who were conscripted (Human Rights Watch 2007). The group also captures some KNLA

soldiers and forces them to join (Human Rights Watch 2002). After its formation, the DKBA5 stepped up its efforts to conscript recruits (Karen Human Rights Group 2009).

Certainty Score: 2

Narrative:

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: PFNR

Also Known As:

Narrative:

There is very little information on this group. Indeed, there is not even a profile of the group in the Non-State Actor (NSA) data narratives (Gleditsch, Cunningham, Salehyan 2013). Thus, I was unable to code any recruitment practices for the group, and the lack of information on the group makes even the use of indirect evidence of recruitment practices unreliable.

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Forces of George Athor

Also Known As: South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A)

Narrative:

George Athor formed the SSDM when he lost the election for the governor of Jonglei, to the SPLM/A candidate, claiming that the election was rigged (UCDPa). The group continued fighting the newly independent South Sudanese government in 2011 (UCDPb). The group was comprised of dissident SPLM/A members, including ex-commanders who had failed to acquire government positions (UCDPb).

Athor frequently persuaded Nuer youth to join his movement in exchange for weapons (Leff 2012). However, this strategy proved counterproductive, as these youths often used the weapons to attack civilians from the Murle ethnic group rather than SPLA forces (Leff 2012). Economic and political marginalization and competition for resources exacerbated this ethnic conflict (Leff 2012). The group was also motivated by ethnic grievances (International Development Committee 2012). Thus, there appears to be at least some evidence of non-material appeals. However, Spittaels and Weyns (2014) argue that there is little evidence of the group having grievance-based motives and that it was primarily formed for the personal gain of these involved, with a particular focus on securing government positions for its leaders. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on material incentives*. The SSDM is a multi-ethnic movement (Spittaels and Weyns 2014). Most members of the SSDM are from the Nuer ethnic group, but some are from the Murle and Dinka ethnic groups (Wyss 2016).

Certainty Score: 3

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: IGLF

Also Known As: Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF); Iil Tire

Narrative:

The IGLF claims to be fighting for greater autonomy for the eastern Hararghe region (UCDP). The group claims to be primarily comprised of individuals from the Isa and Gurgura clans (Africa Watch 1991 UCDP). The group eventually joined the EPRDF (Africa Watch 1991). Some sources claim that the IGLF was a former division of the WSLF called Iil Tire (Africa Watch 1991). However, others claim that the movement was original and did not form until 1991 (UCDP). The group claims to represent, and have members from, the Issa and Guraga ethnic groups (UCDP). I could not find any information on the IGLF's recruitment tactics. Additionally, it is unclear whether the group originated from the WSLF, making it problematic to examine the WSLF's recruitment tactics to try to determine recruitment patterns in the IGLF. Thus, this group is coded as missing for the recruitment tactics.

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: SPLM/A – North

Also Known As: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army – North

Narrative:

This faction split from the SPLM/A in 2011 but maintained the political goals of the former SPLM/A leader, John Garang, which included overthrowing the government of Sudan at replacing it with one that was more inclusive of all ethnicity, religions, and genders (UCDP). The group has actively recruited since 2011 (De Alessi 2015). The SPLM/A – North claims to be fighting against the political and economic marginalization of the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states by the Sudanese government (Asylum Research Consultancy 2016). The group was able to recruit among various Nuba tribes that were supportive of the organization's narrative of marginalization (Asylum Research Consultancy 2016). The group paints itself as being forced into the conflict but also uses the vision of a "New Sudan" as a political tool (Asylum Research Consultancy 2016). The failures of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to maintain peace also attracted recruits to the group (De Alessi 2015). While the SPLM/A relied primarily on material recruitment appeals (see corresponding narrative), I did not find evidence of the SPLM/A-North using them. Indeed, the evidence above suggests that it employed ideological recruitment appeals. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on ideological appeals*.

The leadership of the SPLM/A – North was ethnically diverse (UCDP). Most members are from the various ethnic and tribal groups of the Nuba (Asylum Research Consultancy 2016). There were also members from the Missiriya ethnic group (Asylum Research Consultancy 2016). The group recruited from refugee camps in South Sudan (UCDP). This included Missiriya who had been part of the Debab force that was allied with the SPLA (De Alessi 2015). Social networks appear to have mattered for recruitment, as recruitment often had to be done through tribal chiefs (De Alessi 2015). However, the group also sometimes forced these tribal leaders to provide recruits (De Alessi 2015).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: SSLM/A

Also Known As: South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A)

Narrative:

There is relatively little information on the recruitment tactics of the SSLM/A. In general, most groups operating in South Sudan at the time recruited from communities that held grievances against the state and national governments (International Crisis Group 2015). The group opposed the perceived dominance of the SPLM/A, and wanted to fight government corruption, and bring about democratic reform (UCDP). Brosché and Höglund (2016), however, argue that the group's true motives were less about contesting elections, but about gaining political and economic advantages, as well as being spurred by divisions between the north and south. However, the authors attribute most of the grab for political power to the leadership of the group. As the International Crisis Group (2015) report suggests, the rank-and-file were often recruited from aggrieved populations. Additionally, the north-south divisions described by Brosché and Höglund are often just as much about non-material issues as they are material ones. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. However, given the indirect nature of the evidence, and the general lack of information overall, I assign a low level of certainty to the coding. The majority of SSLM/A members are from the Nuer ethnic group (UCDP).

Certainty Score: 1

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Republic of South Sudan

Also Known As:

Narrative:

In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) granted autonomy for South Sudan for 6 years, leading up to a 2011 independence referendum (UCDP). The SPLA became the military of the newly autonomous South Sudan (UCDP). South Sudan and Sudan fought over the oil rich region of Abyei (UCDP), which caused the SPLA/Republic of South Sudan to enter back into the data. However, I did not find evidence of different recruitment practices during this time. Therefore, I the recruitment practices of the Republic of South Sudan as being the same as those of the SPLA (see corresponding narrative). Thus, I code the group as *taking a mixed approach*. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding.

Certainty Score: 2

References

UCDP. "Republic of South Sudan." Available At: <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/1129>

Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FDSI-CI

Also Known As: Invisible Commandos; Republican Forces of Ivory Coast

Narrative:

After Laurent Gbagbo lost the 2010 presidential election to Alassane Ouattara, but refused to concede, the FDSI-CI formed in 2010 with the goal of removing Gbagbo and installing Ouattara (UCDP). However, there is no evidence of a direct link between Ouattara and the FDSI-CI (UCDP). The group is based in Abidjan. Information on the recruitment tactics of the FDSI is fairly scarce. While the group was decidedly anti-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara, it had an ambiguous political position (European Asylum Support Office 2019). However, government attacks against civilians led to an increase in recruits in the area (International Criminal Court 2014). The group recruited youth who had resisted the FDS as well as many who had broken out of prison (Abidde et al. 2014). Further evidence suggests the group formed to protect Ouattara supporters (Associated Press 2011). There are also uncorroborated allegations of the group employing mercenaries from Burkina Faso, France, and Mali (International Criminal Court 2014). Indeed, both sides in the conflict were accused of employing Liberian mercenaries (Human Rights Watch 2011). The group also issued the demand of being integrated into the security forces of the new government if Ouattara's supporters were successful (Quist-Arcton 2011). There appear to be a variety of material-based appeals, however, the mostly commonly cited motive of recruits appears to be joining for personal and community safety. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*. However, given the indirect nature of this evidence, I assign a moderate certainty to the coding. There is evidence of the group recruiting nationals from multiple, unspecified countries (International Criminal Court 2014).

Certainty Score: 2

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: NTC

Also Known As: National Transitional Council of Libya; TNC; Libyan Rebels; Free Libyan Army; National Liberation army; Libyan National Army (UCDP)

Narrative:

The NTC formed, in large part, to bring political organization to the mass, anti-government protests that had turned violent in Libya (Bell and Witter 2011). The NTC's grievances included economic inequality, government abuses, and lack of democracy in Libya (Serafimov 2012). Furthermore, many defected from the government, particularly in response to the regime's violent crackdown on civilians (Lacher 2011). Others joined the NTC forces to fight ethnic and tribal-based discrimination (Lacher 2011). In the Libya civil war, both sides used mercenaries, however, the Forces of Muammar Gaddafi relied on them much more heavily, especially as the conflict drew on (Reuters 2011). Based on this, it appears that the NTC made both ideological and material appeals but relied more heavily on ideological ones. Thus, I code the group as *relying mostly on ideological appeals*. The NTC was a multi-ethnic movement that included members of Berber and Toubou communities (Lacher 2011). Both sides of the conflict used tribal loyalties to mobilize support (Lacher 2011). More specifically, mobilization was often based on family, tribal, and local interests (Lacher 2011). The NTC forces also had defectors from the Libyan military (Serafimov 2012).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: Forces of Muammar Gaddafi

Also Known As:

Narrative:

In the Libya civil war, both sides used mercenaries, however, the Forces of Muammar Gaddafi relied on them much more heavily, especially as the conflict drew on (Reuters 2011). During the revolution, Gaddafi also released many prisoners and paid them to fight the rebels (Al Jazeera 2017). Furthermore, once Gaddafi was ousted, he recruited even more mercenaries from multiple African countries including (Associated Press 2011). I did not find evidence of the group employing ideological appeals for recruitment. Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*.

Many of the government forces that fought for Gaddafi during the revolution were part of the security brigades that were separate from the regular armed forces, and which were predominantly recruited from tribes loyal to the Gaddafi regime (Lacher and Cole 2014). He recruited most prominently from the Tripolitania and Fezzan tribes (Bell and Witter 2011). Gaddafi also offered money to members of the Warfalla tribe to fight for him during the revolution (Bell and Witter 2011). While most Libyans are either Arab or Arab-Berber, Gaddafi's forces also included members of the Tuareg ethnic group (Bell and Witter 2011). Thus, the group was likely multi-ethnic. Social and patronage networks historically played an important role in Gaddafi's efforts to bring in loyal supporters (Bell and Witter 2011). Both sides of the conflict used tribal loyalties to mobilize support (Lacher 2011). More specifically, mobilization was often based on family, tribal, and local interests (Lacher 2011).

Certainty Score: 3

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: SSPP

Also Known As: Shan State Progress Party (SSPP); Shan State Army – North (SSA – N)

Narrative:

There is not much information about the recruitment practices of the group. The group claims to fight for a multi-ethnic homeland (Tønnesson et al. 2021). However, I did not find evidence of the group employing ideological appeals. There is evidence of the group employing forced recruitment. The SSPP has been accused of arresting people for drug crimes, and demanding money for their release from their families, as a form of recruitment (Radio Free Asia 2019). The group also abducts civilians and forces them to recruit other troops as well (Pwint 2019). The SSPP requires one man from every household and claims that anyone between the ages of 13 and 60 is eligible but claim that they “try not to” use children under 15 (MacGregor and Aung 2016). The only way to avoid the system is to hire someone to take your place (MacGregor and Aung 2016). However, I did not find evidence of the group itself employing material incentives for recruitment. The group also intentionally tries to block the distribution of contraceptives because they fear family planning resources would limit the number of available recruits (Quadrini 2019). Similar to the LRA (see corresponding narrative), I am unable to classify the persuasive recruitment tactics of this group, because I can only find evidence of its use of forced recruitment. The group has predominantly Shan membership (MacGregor and Aung 2016).

References

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Armed Group Recruitment Narrative: FDLR

Also Known As: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda; Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda; Armée de Libération du Rwanda (AliR); Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR)

Narrative:

The group formed from the remnants of Armée de Libération du Rwanda (AliR) in 2000 (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015). The group seeks to overthrow the current government, bring Hutu leaders to power, and negotiate safe return to Rwanda for its members. The group now primarily operates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The director of Virunga National Park, Emmanuel de Merode, told the BBC that the FDLR are “very intent on making money,” as they loot mining communities and cut down forests for charcoal (BBC 2014). An interview with captured FDLR members also offers some interesting insights into how the group recruits. One individual was recruited for the group while in Uganda and was promised a job in a gold mine in the DRC. Another was told that if he joined the group, he would be given a well-paying job and other incentives once the group overthrew the Rwandan government (Umurengezi 2019). I did not find evidence of the group using ideological recruitment appeals (it seems to mostly just indoctrinate children who are already in the group). Thus, I code the group as *relying exclusively on material incentives*.

The majority of the group members are Hutu (Rakisits 2009). The group also exploited Rwandan refugees for recruitment (Debelle and Florquin 2015). In 2009, 20% of the former FDLR combatants that joined the UN Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDR-RR) program were Congolese and 30% of joiners were Congolese in 2010 (Debelle and Florquin 2015), suggesting that the group did recruit heavily outside of Rwandan populations. Since its loss of territory, the group began recruiting from more diverse background (Debelle and Florquin 2015).

The group both recruits children and uses forced recruitment (Debelle and Florquin 2015), including the forced recruitment of children (ECCHR 2019). Many members of the FDLR are too young to have participated in the Rwandan genocide (BBC 2014), and as a result, children are often indoctrinated to view Tutsis as the source of all their problems, as group leaders convince them that killing Tutsis in Rwanda and overthrowing the government will solve many of their problems (McGreal 2008). The group also ran military schools for child members, but these operations were disrupted by its loss of territory (Debelle and Florquin 2015). The FDLR drew on the Rwandan refugee population for both voluntary and forced recruitment (Debelle and Florquin 2015).

Certainty Score: 3

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