Fighting to the Bitter End: Rebel Recruitment Tactics and Civil War Outcomes

Job Market Paper

Michael J. Soules

PhD Candidate

Department of Political Science

The Pennsylvania State University

mjs825@psu.edu

Abstract:

How do recruitment tactics affect the longevity and success of rebel groups in civil wars? The conventional wisdom holds that recruitment strategies that rely more on ideological appeals, relative to material incentives, will attract more committed recruits who are more invested in the success of their groups than their materially motivated counterparts. However, I argue that highly committed recruits provide rebel organizations with a double-edged sword. Specifically, I posit that while ideological recruitment appeals will help groups survive longer by attracting individuals who are less likely to desert or defect, the most devoted militants will also be less willing to compromise with governments and can spark internal clashes over ideological issues, making it difficult for such groups to achieve their long-term objectives. Thus, I expect that while ideologically based recruitment strategies will increase rebel group longevity, such mobilization tactics will not help rebels achieve long-term success. To test these hypotheses, I introduce novel data on the persuasive recruitment practices of African rebel groups that operated between 1989 and 2011. In line with my expectations, I find that while groups that rely more on ideological appeals than material incentives for recruitment survive longer, they are not more likely to achieve their goals. This paper makes an important theoretical contribution by highlighting the drawbacks of ideologically based recruitment strategies and an empirical contribution by introducing novel data on the persuasive recruitment tactics of rebel organizations.

What consequences do rebel groups face for their choices of recruitment tactics? Much of the relevant literature focuses on how the types of recruitment incentives offered (Weinstein 2005, 2007), and the screening mechanisms used during the recruitment process (Fair 2004, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Weinstein 2005, 2007; Hegghammer 2013; Forney 2015), affect the quality of recruits that join rebel groups. These choices are expected to have important consequences, including for the resilience and success of armed groups (Weinstein 2005, 2007).

Weinstein's (2005, 2007) "Rebel Resource Curse" theory holds that groups will be flooded with opportunistic recruits if they utilize material wealth for recruitment. However, Weinstein expects that if groups mobilize around shared grievances and/or identities, they will attract individuals who are more committed to the long-term goals and success of their groups, thereby increasing the resilience of these organizations. Oppenheim et al. (2015) find that materially driven recruits are more likely to leave groups than their ideologically motivated counterparts. Similarly, Altier et al. (2017) argue that ideological commitment can reduce the probability that pull factors (i.e., influences that are external to rebel organizations) drive militants out of groups. Rebel organizations with left-wing ideologies or that mobilize around shared ethnic identities are less likely to splinter because they have stronger social networks that create obstacles for the formation of competing factions (Fjelde and Nilsson 2018).

While these studies suggest that ideologically driven recruits provide significant benefits to rebel groups, strict adherence to some ideologies can also be detrimental. Scholars predict that militant organizations with radical goals that involve the complete transformation or destruction of existing political and social institutions will be less successful than rebels with moderate aims. This is because governments will be less likely to grant concessions to, and civilians will be less

likely to support, militants that are perceived to be radically transforming society (e.g., Abrahms 2006, Jones and Libicki 2008; Joo 2019).

Additionally, ideologically committed recruits are often unable to be "bought off" by government peace offers or amnesty programs (Gutiérrez Sanín 2004). While a surface-level view might suggest that this is beneficial for militant organizations as their members will be less willing to desert or defect, it also suggests that ideologically fervent recruits will be less likely to surrender, which can make negotiations more difficult. Radical factions of militant groups will often attempt to "spoil" negotiations between moderate rebels and governments by attacking civilians because they believe the moderates are selling out and undermining the cause (Kydd and Walter 2006; Findley and Young 2015).

Thus, we are left with an unclear picture of the utility of ideological recruitment appeals. On one hand, such strategies might provide groups with cadres who are loyal and disciplined, while on the other hand, ideologically driven recruits might be perceived by governments as too radical to negotiate with, and the rebels themselves might be unwilling to negotiate.

Given that the consequences of rebel recruitment strategies have received significant scholarly attention, it is important to evaluate how ideological recruitment appeals and material incentives affect rebel groups. Despite the important implications, there has been little systematic, quantitative analyses of the impact of recruitment on rebel group survival and success.[1] This is in contrast to much of the quantitative literature on civil conflict, which has a significant focus on group survival (e.g., Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009; Buhaug,

[1] One notable exception, for quantitative work, is the literature on female combatants. Scholars have examined how the recruitment of female fighters affects rebel longevity (Giri and Haer 2021; Wood and Allemang 2021) and success (Braithwaite and Ruiz 2018). However, quantitative studies have not examined how ideological appeals and material incentives affect rebel longevity and success.

Gates, and Lujala 2009; Phillips 2014; Fortna 2015; Conrad et al. 2019) and success (e.g., Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009; Akcinaroglu 2012; Thomas 2014; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014).

This gap is largely the result of a lack of systematically collected, cross-group data on the persuasive recruitment strategies of rebel groups. To remedy this, I introduce the Rebel Appeals and Incentives Dataset (RAID), which contains information on the persuasive recruitment strategies of rebel groups, including on the ideological and material appeals they employ. One of the highlights of the dataset is an ordinal indicator of the degree to which armed groups rely on ideological appeals, relative to material incentives, for recruitment. This variable allows for direct testing of many theoretical arguments about the consequences of employing material and ideological recruitment appeals.

Using these data, I analyze how recruitment tactics affect rebel group longevity and success. The results indicate that groups that rely more on ideological appeals than material incentives for recruitment survive longer. This finding holds when subjected to a battery of robustness checks. I find some evidence that greater reliance on ideological recruitment appeals decreases the probability that rebel groups experience unfavorable outcomes (i.e., government victory or ending through low levels of activity). However, this finding is less robust. I do not find evidence that persuasive recruitment tactics affect the probability of obtaining favorable outcomes (i.e., rebel victory or peace agreements). These findings highlight the potential disadvantages of ideological-based recruitment appeals.

This paper makes several contributions. First, it introduces new data on the persuasive recruitment strategies of rebel organizations. While systematically collected, cross-group data exist for forced recruitment (e.g., Cohen 2013), there are no such data for the ideological appeals

and material incentives offered by groups for recruitment, making it difficult to test a variety of propositions stemming from theories of rebel group recruitment. To remedy this, I provide novel data on the persuasive recruitment tactics of rebel organizations. Second, the results bolster the notion that recruitment processes play a key role in the longevity of armed groups (Weinstein 2005, 2007). Thus, scholars should not ignore the meaningful impact of variation in recruitment tactics across rebel groups.

Third, the findings highlight the limits of the utility of ideologically motivated recruits. While I find evidence of an association between recruitment appeals and group longevity, there is less clear support for an association between recruitment strategies and types of conflict termination. This underscores that some resources help make groups more resilient to government repression but do not provide them with enough strength to coerce governments into negotiations or defeat (e.g., Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). While ideological extremists are loyal and committed to the cause of their groups, they are not necessarily more effective combatants, and might even be liabilities on the battlefield compared to more professional soldiers (Gates and Podder 2015).

Fourth and finally, the results of this study have important implications for the literature on natural resources and conflict duration. Scholars have found that conflicts involving certain natural resources, and groups that profit from smuggling such resources, last longer. Disputes over natural resource control can hinder peace talks; natural resources can provide groups with the necessary resources to resist government repression; and some groups might value continuing to profit from such resources over victory, all of which prolong conflicts (e.g., Ross 2004; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Fearon 2004; Weinstein 2007; Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009; Lujala 2010; Conrad et al. 2019). However, ideologically based recruitment appears to make

groups more resilient, suggesting that while natural resources can provide groups with funding to continue their campaigns, using such funds for recruitment does not help groups survive.

I begin by discussing the theoretical implications of choosing ideological appeals over material incentives, examining the impact of these choices on group longevity and success. I present an explanation of why ideologically based recruitment strategies can help groups survive but not help them win. This is followed with a description of the research design and discussion of the findings. I implement several case-based examples to highlight why ideologically driven recruits strengthen the resilience of groups, but not their capacity to be successful. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my findings.

Recruiting Committed Rebels

The implementation of recruitment practices has received significant attention. This includes work on how rebel leaders screen recruits for commitment (Weinstein 2005, 2007), quality (Fair 2004, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita 2005), and loyalty (Hegghammer 2013; Gates and Podder 2015). The role of social networks in mobilizing and screening recruits has also been examined (Della Porta 1988; Sageman 2004; Forney 2015; Larson and Lewis 2018).

Scholars likewise examine how recruitment appeals themselves attract or filter out certain types of recruits. Weinstein (2005, 2007) argues that groups with access to significant material wealth experience a "Rebel Resource Curse." He posits that leaders of groups face different conditions when mobilizing recruits, focusing primarily on two types of conditions.

First, groups with access to economic resources (e.g., natural resources, external state funding, etc.) can more immediately acquire supplies (e.g., weapons and uniforms) and pay

recruits. Weinstein asserts that reliance on such "economic endowments" discourages the building of trust between leaders and recruits because these benefits can be acquired immediately. The material strength groups can gain through large economic endowments also lowers the costs of participation. Lower costs of participation and the promises of immediate material payoffs flood groups with opportunistic joiners. Rebel leaders in these situations do not have sufficient information to filter out opportunistic joiners from recruits who are committed to the cause in the long run, as uncommitted recruits have the incentive to misrepresent their commitment level so they can acquire material benefits from participation.

Second, Weinstein argues that groups without access to significant material resources from the outset must instead rely on "social endowments." Leaders of such groups must be able to make credible commitments that participation will garner benefits in the future. He explains that mobilizing around shared identities and grievances is an effective way for rebel leaders to build trust, strengthening the credibility of their commitment to providing long term benefits. The willingness of recruits to forgo short term benefits for the promise of future gains signals their commitment. Thus, it is easier for rebel leaders with strong social endowments to identify committed recruits than it is for leaders with significant economic endowments.

Weinstein (2007) explicitly predicts that groups will be more resilient if they depend on social, rather than material, endowments for recruitment. In the following section, I explore how persuasive recruitment strategies influence the resilience and success of groups.

Commitment and Longevity

If different types of recruitment tactics affect the quality of recruits, and the reputation of groups, then there is a strong possibility that differing recruitment tactics lead to differing outcomes. I examine the lifespan of rebel movements and the outcomes they experience. Specifically, I examine whether groups achieve "positive outcomes," such as earning peace agreements or winning total victory, or "negative outcomes," like ending through low levels of activity or by being defeated by government forces (e.g., Fortna 2015).

Loyalty

To reiterate, Weinstein (2005, 2007) posits that material incentives attract opportunistic joiners who are primarily interested in acquiring wealth in the short-term, while ideological appeals attract a higher percentage of committed recruits. To survive, armed groups need combatants who are willing to endure the dangers of intense security crackdowns by governments. Committed recruits will be less likely to desert when the fighting becomes prolonged and bloodier. Uncommitted recruits, however, will be more likely to defect when the costs of participation outweigh the material benefits they receive from fighting (Gates 2002).

To compound this, the material resources available to groups often become depleted as conflicts draw on and become more intense (Weinstein 2005, 2007). Opportunistic joiners in these situations are more likely to abandon their groups as there are no longer as many economic resources to benefit from. There is evidence that economically motivated recruits are more likely to demobilize or defect than their ideologically driven counterparts (Oppenheim et al. 2015).

These dynamics also likely affect the decisions of rebel leaders. If leaders know they have committed recruits, they might be less likely to surrender or enter into unfavorable negotiations

because they can depend on their cadres to not give up easily. However, with uncommitted members, surrender might be more appealing for rebel leaders to avoid the risks of continued fighting because leaders know many members will not back them as fighting draws on.

Competition

Recruits who are motivated by material gain will sometimes defect to other parties in the conflict if they are offered better economic incentives. Gutiérrez Sanín (2008) argues that governments promote defection from rebel groups through the provision of goods to reduce the ranks of rebels, impose reputational costs by showing that many individuals are unwilling to stick with the rebels, and because they can gain intelligence from defectors. Governments have used such strategies in Colombia, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Oppenheim et al. 2015). Oppenheim et al. (2015) find that individuals motivated by material appeals are more likely to defect or demobilize than ideologically driven recruits, partially attributing this to their susceptibility to better offers of material goods by competitors.

Using case studies of the ELN and FARC in Colombia, Gutiérrez Sanín (2004) notes that there was little defection from these groups, despite government amnesty programs that provided material incentives and offers by paramilitaries groups to pay salaries and allow looting. He argues that these groups attracted primarily committed recruits because they did not offer substantial economic benefits and joining was dangerous. Thus, efforts by the Colombian government and paramilitaries to incentivize rebels to defect were ineffective because the FARC and ELN drew in committed recruits by relying on social endowments.

Similarly, groups that rely primarily on economic rewards for recruitment should suffer higher levels of defection and desertion because their members can be more easily enticed to

leave by competitors. The presence of large economic endowments can induce competition for resources with other armed groups and criminal organizations, further hampering group resilience (Weinstein 2007). However, recruits that are brought together by shared identities and ideologies will be more committed to each other and the group (e.g., Weinstein 2007; McLauchlin 2015), decreasing the probability that they can be persuaded to switch sides.

Internal Cohesion

Large economic endowments can undermine group cohesion. Competition for resources within groups can foster corruption (Weinstein 2007). Gutiérrez Sanín (2004) argues that one reason groups avoid providing material benefits to members is that such provisions threaten group cohesion if some members desert the group immediately upon receiving payouts. It is more difficult to foster bonds among combatants when they are primarily motivated by material gain and do not share any common social or ideological ties (Weinstein 2007).

Groups that depend more on economic endowments tend to be more socially heterogeneous than organizations that rely on social endowments because the former do not depend on shared social ties to make credible commitments about future payoffs (Weinstein 2007). Social heterogeneity increases desertion among volunteers in armed factions as members are less trusting of each other and have less comradery (McLauchlin 2015). Ethnically homogenous groups can tap into social networks to determine the commitment of potential recruits (Weinstein 2007). Thus, ideologically driven rebel organizations tend to be more homogenous and can better filter out recruits who are ill-disciplined and undermine group cohesion.

Group Reputation

Militant groups tailor their behavior based on how they calculate civilians (e.g., Huber 2019) and governments (e.g., Stanton 2013) will react. Armed groups that extensively engage in crime and/or the extraction of natural resources face significant reputational risks. These groups may be viewed as spreading violence for self-gain and can struggle to garner domestic and international legitimacy. Groups that rely heavily on economic endowments for recruitment, such as the RUF in Sierra Leone (Abdullah 1998; Weinstein 2005), and the ATNMC in Mali (Souaré 2010; Westerfield 2012), are often publicly labeled as criminal organizations by governments.

Groups that are flooded with opportunistic joiners also face an increased risk of being unable to prevent the rank-and-file from abusing civilians. While rebel leaders often have the incentive to prohibit their subordinates from abusing civilians to avoid the associated reputational costs, they have inadequate resources to monitor all actions of foot soldiers (e.g., Hoover Green 2016). Instead, leaders can attempt to socialize recruits so that the preferences of the rank-and-file become more aligned with that of the leadership, thereby decreasing insubordination (Hoover Green 2016; Gates 2017).

Relatedly, rebel groups with internal political education processes commit lower levels of sexual violence as they are better able to socialize their cadres to be disciplined (Hoover Green 2016). Gates and Podder (2015) argue that prior beliefs of recruits also matter because deeply internalized beliefs will make individuals less inclined to subvert the goals of their groups. Thus, ideologically motivated recruits might be less likely to commit unsanctioned violence because their preferences will be more aligned with those of the leadership, making it easier for groups to maintain positive reputations.

Thus, groups that recruit primarily with material appeals can have worse reputations because they are viewed as opportunistic, criminal organizations, and because they tend to treat civilians worse. The public has little reason to trust that materially motivated armed groups will attempt to enact changes that benefit large segments of society. As a result, materially driven groups are likely to struggle to achieve the necessary public support to sustain their campaigns.

Ideological Recruitment and Success

As discussed above, scholars generally expect that ideological recruitment appeals are more effective than material incentives because the former draw in recruits who are more loyal, cooperative, and have better reputations. While scholars have focused more on how these dynamics affect rebel group longevity (e.g., Weinstein 2005, 2007), a logical extension of these arguments is that groups will be more likely to achieve their long-term objectives when they rely more on ideological appeals, relative to material incentives, for recruitment. This is because ideologically motivated recruits should be more committed to helping groups achieve their goals and be better at generating sufficient civilian support for their organizations to be successful.

However, I posit that ideological recruitment appeals, and the ideologically fervent recruits that they tend to attract, introduce problems into the bargaining process that make it difficult for rebel groups to both enter into and conduct negotiations. Relatedly, I posit that some of the benefits of ideological recruitment appeals, such increased discipline and cohesion, have been exaggerated in the literature. This is not to say that material recruitment incentives do not invite a host of problems. Rather, I argue that ideological appeals and material incentives often produce similar problems, but that these similarities are typically overlooked by scholars.

As primer to this argument, consider the distinction that Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) make between a rebel group's "power to resist" and its "power to hurt". A group's power to resist is its ability to stave of annihilation by government forces or its ability to survive, whereas a group's power to hurt is the military capacity it possesses to coerce governments into making concessions or to defeat them outright. Cunningham and coauthors note that factors that increase one type of power do not necessarily increase the other type.

Relatedly, I expect that ideological appeals increase groups' power to resist by attracting individuals who are less likely to desert or defect, thereby helping groups live longer. However, I do not expect that ideological based recruitment strategies will help increase groups' power to hurt because ideologically fervent individuals can introduce problems into the bargaining process that complicate negotiations, making it difficult for rebels to win any sort of concessions. Below, I propose four different causal mechanisms through which ideological based recruitment strategies make it difficult for rebel organizations to achieve their primary objectives.

Acceptable Bargaining Range

First, consider the difficulties associated with there being a relatively narrow range of mutually acceptable bargains between rebel groups and governments. Keels and Wiegand (2020) explain that when there are stark ideological divides between rebels and governments, conflicts become prolonged, but are less likely to end in peace agreements, because both sides are less willing to negotiate with each other, as there is less common ground to bargain over. Relatedly, other scholars posit that when militant groups are perceived as being ideologically extreme or having maximalist objectives, governments are less willing to negotiate with rebels in the first place because they do not want to grant what they view as significant concessions (Jones and

Libicki 2008). Indeed, governments do not want to send the signal that they easily grant concessions (Toft 2003). Furthermore, fewer civilians will be supportive of an organization that they perceive as trying to fundamentally alter or destroy existing societal structures, making it difficult for groups that are perceived as extremists to generate sufficient civilian support to be successful (Jones and Libicki 2008).

Rebels are also often hesitant to enter negotiations because they do not want to be victims of government persecution (Walter 1997). Rebels affiliated with persecuted ethnic or religious identities might particularly fear government persecution following the end of a conflict, making them less willing to surrender. Thus, groups that mobilize around ethnic or religious based ideological appeals might be especially hesitant to enter negotiations.

In sum, when a group mobilizes around a publicly declared, ideological platform, it risks being perceived as ideologically extreme, thereby sending the signal (intentionally or unintentionally) that there is little to nothing it is willing to compromise on. Certain ideological appeals can also alienate significant portions of the civilian population, making it difficult for such groups to garner enough civilian support to be successful. For their part, deeply committed rebels might also being less willing to negotiate, as they fear government persecution for their beliefs or because they sincerely cling to certain, maximalist objectives. All of this can prolong conflicts, by preventing them from coming to a definitive end, but make it difficult for rebels to win any sort of concessions, as negotiations become difficult to conduct.

Discipline and Restraint

As noted earlier, shared ideological ties can help increase discipline among the rank-and-file, which can lead to a reduction in certain forms of violence against civilians, particularly

sexual violence (Hoover-Green 2016). More generally, scholars expect that groups that exploit natural resources for profit will show less restraint in their treatment of civilians because they depend less on these populations for support (e.g., Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2007; Fortna, Lotito, and Rubin 2018).

However, the killing of civilians in conflicts is often ideologically motivated, particularly against ethnic and religious out-groups (e.g., Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Piazza 2009; Polo 2020). Terrorism can erode public support for militant organizations (Arves, Cunningham, and McCulloch 2019), making it difficult for them to gain the necessary civilian support to be successful (Abrahms 2006). Thus, while shared ideological ties can reduce violence against civilians in some contexts, it can spur such actions in other situations. We should therefore not expect ideology to have a universal restraining effect on rebel violence against civilians, and as a result, ideologically driven groups will not always be better at garnering civilian support.

Defection and Desertion

As noted earlier, scholars generally laud the unwillingness of ideologically committed recruits to defect as a net positive for groups that employ them. However, I argue that when rebels reject peace offers by governments, including amnesty offers, then groups send the signal that there is little to nothing they are willing to compromise on. Fortna (2015) makes a similar argument in the context of terrorism, explaining that when militant groups use this tactic, they signal an unwillingness to compromise and that they will do anything to win. Fortna posits that this ultimately makes it difficult for perpetrating groups to achieve their objectives, as they become less likely to be granted negotiations by governments who come to believe that rebels will not compromise.

In the same way, I expect that when rebels reject initial peace offers by governments, that they will have difficulty winning any concessions in the long run because (1) they reject any concessions that governments are actually willing to make and (2) they might make governments less willing to negotiate in the future, as they come to believe the rebels will not compromise.

Internal Cohesion

As discussed above, at least some types of ideological ties can increase cohesion among the rank-and-file and lead to a decreased probability of groups splintering into multiple factions. However, rebel groups can still suffer from ideological divisions. Indeed, violent infighting or fratricide tends to be highest among the most ideologically extreme organizations, as cadres fear that their own beliefs and preferences will lose out to more radical elements of their own movements, so they turn to violence to try to prevent this from happening (Hafez 2020).

Relatedly, in a process that is often referred to as "spoiling" in the terrorism and civil wars literature, more radical factions of rebel movements will increase their use of violence during periods of time in which more moderate factions are attempting to negotiate with governments, to undermine the efforts of the moderates who they view as selling out the cause (Kydd and Walter 2006; Findley and Young 2015). Spoiling leads governments to believe that the more moderate factions are unable and/or unwilling to control their more radical factions, which decreases trust between rebels and governments, making negotiations more likely to fail (Kydd and Walter 2006). Internal ideological divisions can also lead to groups splintering during the negotiation process (Kydd and Walter 2006). Furthermore, governments might crackdown harder on groups that use terrorism, making it more difficult for perpetrating organizations to achieve their goals (Fortna 2015).

Testable Implications

In sum, we are left with a somewhat unclear picture of the consequences of rebel groups' choices in persuasive recruitment tactics. While ideologically driven recruits might be more disciplined and cohesive in certain contexts, rebel movements of certain ideological persuasions still frequently suffer from internal divisions and are abusive towards civilians. I ultimately expect that ideologically based recruitment strategies will not make groups more successful in the long run because such tactics narrow the range of mutually acceptable bargains between rebel groups and governments; there are associated reputational costs with being perceived as ideologically extreme; and more radical, ideologically driven factions of rebel movements often attempt to undermine efforts of both governments, and their own, more moderate factions, to negotiate. These issues make it challenging for rebel groups to both enter into and conduct negotiations, ultimately undermining their power to hurt.

Furthermore, ideologically motivated recruits are not necessarily more effective combatants (Gates and Podder 2015), and just because they are willing to stick around longer does not mean that they are inherently capable enough to help defeat (the typically) stronger government forces. Particularly early on in conflicts, groups are often able to attract a larger number of recruits with material incentives, relative to ideological appeals (Weinstein 2007). Thus, ideological recruitment appeals do not inherently attract more capable or larger numbers of recruits, and thus, do not necessarily increase the coercive capacity of rebel organizations.

However, I still expect that even if not all the benefits of ideological appeals that are articulated by scholars are consistently recognized, that these appeals will still help increase groups' power to resist. While the unwillingness of ideologically fervent recruits to defect, or

even compromise, can make it difficult for groups to win concessions, I still expect that such commitment will help groups survive longer as fewer of their members will abandon the cause.

As an important caveat, I am not arguing that rebel groups will be more successful if they recruit with material incentives. Indeed, these groups also tend to be plagued by internal divisions, but over the distribution of material resources (Gutiérrez Sanín 2004; Weinstein 2007). Such groups also suffer significantly from ill-disciplined among the rank-and-file, which leads to high levels of violence against civilians (e.g., Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2007; Fortna, Lotito, and Rubin 2018), making it difficult for such groups to generate civilian support. Thus, using material recruitment incentives also poses challenges for achieving success. However, I am arguing that the benefits of ideological based recruitment strategies have been overstated by the previous literature and that they will ultimately not aid groups in achieving their long-term goals. Thus, my two core hypotheses are that:

H1: Rebel groups that rely more on ideological recruitment appeals, relative to material incentives, survive longer.

And

*H2: Rebel groups that rely more on ideological recruitment appeals, relative to material incentives, are **not** more likely to achieve favorable outcomes.*

The Need for New Data

There are issues with existing empirical evaluations of rebel group recruitment tactics, making it challenging to apply these approaches to testing my hypotheses. First, most existing quantitative studies of rebel recruitment rely on data from one, or a small number of, groups or

conflicts (e.g., Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Oyefusi 2008; Oppenheim et al. 2015). More commonly, national (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) or subnational (e.g., Dube and Vargas 2013) indicators are employed, which are theorized to be highly correlated with recruitment appeals. Systematic, cross-group data have been collected on the use of forced recruitment by armed groups (e.g., Cohen 2013; Henshaw 2016; Wood and Thomas 2017; Haer, Faulkner, and Whitaker 2020).

However, research on rebel recruitment suffers from a lack of systematic, cross-group data on the persuasive recruitment appeals employed by rebel organizations. This lack of cross-rebel group data on the ideological appeals and material incentives used for mobilization makes it difficult to test specific theoretical mechanisms and produce generalizable results. It also makes it difficult to evaluate the effect that variation in recruitment tactics have on the behavior, longevity, and success of groups, as current data do not allow for organizations to be compared.

Second, relying on subnational or country-level measures as proxies for recruitment is problematic. Conflating structural factors with recruitment incentives ignores the agency that rebel groups have in choosing their own recruitment strategies (Eck 2009). Many quantitative studies assume that changes in explanatory variables that are associated with increases in armed conflict are also associated with an increased recruitment of civilians. Scholars have argued that a variety of factors, including fewer economic opportunities for individuals (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Dal Bó and Dal Bó 2011; Dube and Vargas 2013), ethnic discrimination (e.g., Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Piazza 2011), and other human rights abuses (e.g., Regan and Norton 2005; Daxecker 2017), are associated with increased political violence because more of the population is aggrieved and willing to take up arms.

However, it is not evident from these studies which specific issues civilians are mobilizing around. For instance, is an individual facing economic hardship more likely to join a rebel group because they are persuaded by the offer of payment? Or does increasing economic hardship radicalize the affected individuals against the status quo (e.g., capitalism), making them more susceptible to ideological appeals, such as those made by left-wing organizations? Is economic hardship lowering the opportunity costs of participating in rebellion, making both material and ideological appeals more persuasive to individuals? Is it some combination of these explanations? To sort through the plethora of possible explanations that can all be related to the same country or region-level variable, it is useful to examine which factors groups actually mobilize around.

Introducing RAID

To remedy these issues, I introduce the Rebel Appeals and Incentives Dataset (RAID), which contains information on the persuasive recruitment appeals employed by rebel groups in civil wars. RAID includes a measure of groups' reliance on ideological recruitment appeals, relative to material incentives. It also contains data on the specific types of ideological recruitment appeals made by groups. I now turn to discussing RAID in more depth.

Sample

RAID is a group-year dataset that includes 100 rebel organizations from the Non-State Actor (NSA) Database (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009, 2013), which extends data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Armed Conflict Database (ACD) (Themnér

and Wallensteen 2012).[2] Specifically, the NSA database contains all groups in the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008). Groups enter RAID the first year they form, not the first year of fighting that involves at least 25 battle-related deaths recorded in the UCDP Dyadic Dataset.[3] In line with Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009), I code a group as ending when the violence ends.

The data are setup this way because the quality of recruit brought in before fighting escalates should still affect groups once they begin fighting. I derive the start date of each group from the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020). Intervening years of a group's existence, in which the 25 battle-death threshold is not crossed, are also included. RAID currently includes only rebel groups in the NSA dataset that operated in Africa during the period of 1989 – 2011. The data are *not* left-censored; if a group forms before 1989, every year of its existence before this point is also included. A group simply needs to have been active from at least 1989 or after to enter the dataset. I am currently working on expanding RAID to include all groups in every region of the world. However, for this analysis, I focus exclusively on African rebel groups due to the time and resource constraints associated with completing the global sample.[4]

[2] Coups are excluded from RAID. This follows the precedent of the Women in Armed Rebellion Dataset (WARD), which also excludes these factions (Wood and Thomas 2017). Participants in coups are initially recruited into state militaries and then later mobilize with the rebelling faction of the military. These soldiers initially join a legal organization (state militaries) but later participate in illegal activities (coups). Thus, participants in coups likely undergo somewhat different stages of "recruitment" than individuals who mobilize into "traditional" rebel groups.
[3] Nine groups in the NSA database that meet the above criteria are excluded from RAID because adequate information could not be found on their recruitment practices. This issue, however, is not unique to RAID. WARD, for instance, excludes several groups that otherwise meet its inclusion criteria because adequate information could not be found on their recruitment of female combatants (Wood and Thomas 2017).
[4] The group-year data structure results in 760 observations. FLEC-FAC and UNITA in Angola, and Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa in Nigeria, are the only groups in the Africa-only sample to change their recruitment tactics over time. However, the group-year data structure allows for the behavior of groups to be analyzed over time. Jo (2015) takes a similar approach in the construction of her data on rebel diplomacy. However, as a robustness check, I collapse the data down to a single observation per group. The results remain consistent.

Data Collection Procedure

Numerous sources were consulted to gather information on the recruitment practices of rebel groups. This information was used to construct qualitative narratives for each group to facilitate the data coding process. Research assistants helped me write these narratives, which I then used to code the data. We followed a detailed procedure when building each narrative. To train the research assistants, I provided them with (1) a document explaining what information needed to be collected and good sources to consult to find this information; (2) a document containing information on how to conduct queries in Nexis-Uni, including search strings to find relevant information; and (3) example narratives that I had already written. Additionally, for the first narrative I assigned to each research assistant, I wrote narratives for the same armed groups to ensure that the research assistants and I found similar information on groups and constructed the narratives in the same ways. Below, I describe the process we followed to construct these narratives.

First, we consulted a variety of existing narratives on armed groups, including those available in the Big, Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) database (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015), the Mapping Militant Organizations profiles, case notes from the NSA dataset (Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan 2013), and group narratives available on the UCDP's website.

Next, we employed Google Scholar to find academic articles and books that provided case studies of the groups in question. Regular Google searches were also conducted, which produced a variety of sources including news stories and reports from the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC), Congressional Research Service (CRS), Human Rights Watch (HRW), RAND Corporation, various governments, and a variety of other sources. These searches often produced

detailed case studies on the recruitment practices of groups and/or surveys of group participants. Finally, we queried Nexis-Uni with specific search strings to discover other news stories.[5]

The narratives created from this information all follow the same structure. First, relevant background information on each group is provided. The next section lays out the specific types of ideological and material appeals that groups offer potential recruits. This is followed with an evaluation of the relative frequency at which material and ideological appeals are employed. Using these narratives, a variety of variables were collected on the types of persuasive recruitment tactics used, and the extent to which they were employed. Persuasive appeals include the types and extent to which ideological and material incentives were used for recruitment.

Persuasive Appeals

In this section, I describe the variables measuring the extent to which groups use ideological recruitment appeals, relative to material incentives, and the specific types of ideological appeals they employ.

Reliance on Ideological Appeals

Rebel groups often employ multiple types of recruitment appeals and individual recruits are often motivated by multiple factors (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). However, Weinstein (2007) argues that some rebel groups still have more ideologically pure recruitment strategies

[5] The qualitative narratives will be made publicly available.

than others. Put another way, some rebel groups still rely more heavily on ideological appeals, relative to other types of recruitment strategies.

To try to capture this dynamic, I have created a five-point ordinal indicator measuring the extent to which groups rely on ideological appeals, relative to material incentives, for recruitment. Groups that make exclusively material appeals are coded as 0, mostly material (and some ideological) as 1, mixed approaches as 2, mostly ideological (and some material) as 3, and exclusively ideological as 4.[6] Put another way, higher values of this variable correspond to a higher percentage of a group's persuasive recruitment strategies that are ideologically based. This, in turn, should translate to a higher percentage of the rank-and-file being deeply committed.

It is important to discuss how "material" and "ideological" appeals are defined. In line with Lichbach (1994, 1995), I consider material incentives to be private goods that are provided to individuals as rewards contingent on their participation in the group. Examples of such "selective incentives," as detailed by Lichbach, include salaries, loot, land, and/or food and clothing, which are offered in direct in exchange for participation. These are material incentives that can only be obtained in exchange for joining the group. Providing resources such as food or living stipends should not be considered material appeals unless they are explicitly part of the incentives offered by groups to join.

[6] The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is the only group from the NSA database that does not really fit into the continuum of persuasive recruitment appeals described above because, other than the core officer group that helped form the organization, all other members have been recruited by force (United Nations 2012). Even the RUF in Sierra Leone, which forced upwards of 90% of its recruits to join, made persuasive appeals to other joiners (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Thus, the LRA is excluded from the main analysis. However, as a robustness check, I include the LRA, as evidence suggests that the group used ideological appeals very early on to form the officer core (see corresponding narrative). The results remain consistent.

Additionally, I consider promises of personal protection to be a form of material appeals as they are offered as immediate benefits in exchange for participation, and do not center on political, economic, or social issues. These are distinct from broader appeals to protect the interests of specific religious or ethnic groups (e.g., from abuses by domestic or foreign governments), which are not materially based, as they are not forms of direct personal gain that are given in exchange for participation. However, only three groups in the data offer personal protection, and of these, only the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité Impartiales de Côte d`Ivoire (FDSI-CI) does *not* offer other material incentives. Thus, material recruitment appeals almost always constitute some form of economic payment.

Weinstein (2005, 2007) describes how rebel leaders with social endowments rely on shared social ties (e.g., religious and/or ethnic identity) and ideology (e.g., Marxism, ethnonationalism, etc.) to strength social bonds in groups and to make promises of future rewards more credible. Based on this, I define ideological recruitment tactics as appeals to representing, and mobilizing around, the interests of specific religious and/or ethnic group(s) and/or addressing grievances by calling on civilians to help bring about social, economic, and/or political changes to the status quo.

Examples of such appeals are calls to fight for the protection of ethnic/religious minority rights, economic redistribution, implementing religious-based governance, or advocating for democratic reforms, among a variety of other appeals. For instance, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) reached out to civilians and directly emphasized shared Islamic identity, the idea that the religion was under threat, the need to end French military intervention, and the failures of the Malian government to meet its population's needs. Thus, groups such as AQIM

are considered to employ ideological recruitment appeals when they tap into shared grievances and/or identities to convince individuals to join their ranks.

To mobilize recruits around shared grievances, groups might tap into the rhetoric of their broader ideologies, such as Marxism or Jihadism, to address these grievances. However, the broader ideology of the group should not be conflated with the issues they mobilize around. For instance, while Boko Haram and al-Shabab both have Islamist ideologies, the former often mobilized around narratives of revenge against government violence, while the latter called on civilians to help dislodge foreign military occupiers. This is not to say that their broader ideology did not play an important role in their recruitment strategies or overall conduct. However, it is important to measure the specific grievances that groups mobilize around, because they often include more issues than their broader ideologies.

To determine the extent to which a group employed a specific type of recruitment appeal, I consulted a variety of sources (described above), relying both on expert opinion on the recruitment practices of groups as well as reports of such behavior. Groups on the far ends of the ordinal scale were typically the easiest to identify. These were groups that I could only find evidence of making either exclusively material or ideological appeals, and never employing the other type. For instance, the Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) made a variety of ideological recruitment appeals, including mobilizing around ethnic-based grievances, political discrimination, and economic exploitation. However, I did not find evidence of the BDK offering material goods in exchange for participation. On the other end of the spectrum in the DRC, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) attracted recruits through the promise of employment in mines, while the Alliance of Democratic Forces

for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) frequently entered schools to offer children money and food in exchange for participation.

Many groups also employed a mix of material and ideological appeals. A subset of groups that use both types of appeals still clearly rely on one more than the other. For instance, as noted above, expert opinion holds that the recruitment propaganda of AQIM focuses predominantly on a diversity of grievances. However, experts still note that payment attracts *some* members to AQIM, as the group offers higher wages than many employers in the legitimate economy in the region. Thus, groups such as AQIM are coded as making "mostly ideological" recruitment appeals when there is evidence that they employ both types of incentives, but that most of their recruitment efforts focus on ideological issues.

Similarly, groups are coded as providing "mostly material" recruitment incentives when they use both types of appeals but depend more on offering material incentives to recruits. Survey evidence from former combatants in the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) reveals that a small number of individuals joined the group because they supported its "political goals," while economic incentives were much more common motivators.

Finally, there are groups that employ both ideological and material appeals, but do not consistently rely on one more than the other. Case studies and survey evidence reveal that most members joined Boko Haram both because of the desire for revenge against government violence and through the offering of money and employment. Thus, joiners were attracted by both material and non-material incentives simultaneously. There tends to be much greater variation in the types of ideological appeals made than the types of material incentives offered. Information on the distribution of this variable across groups is provided in **Figures 1 and 2**. Below, I provide a summary of the standards used to code each category of the variable.

(0) Fully Material: There is only evidence of the group offering material incentives for recruitment. Evidence either explicitly indicates that the group did not mobilize around any ideological issue or there is an absence of information indicating that the group did such.

(1) Mostly Material: There is evidence of the group employing both material incentives and ideological appeals for recruitment. However, there is evidence of the group relying more on material incentives than ideological appeals. The evidence suggests that the group more frequently employs material appeals and that most recruits are offered these incentives, rather than ideological appeals. Put another way, the evidence suggests that most recruits were directly offered material goods, or the promise of such goods, in exchange for participation, while calls to address grievances were used only for a small proportion of recruits. The use of ideological appeals by the group is rare or idiosyncratic.

(2) Mixed: There is evidence of the group employing both material incentives and ideological appeals for recruitment. The evidence suggests that the group frequently uses both appeals and does not rely substantially on one more than the other. These types of appeals are often used together and recruits might be drawn-in by both. While it is not plausible to determine an exact 50-50 split, a group in this category is defined by using both types of appeals at the same relative frequency, rather than employing one far more frequently than the other.

(3) Mostly Ideological: There is evidence of the group employing both material incentives and ideological appeals for recruitment. However, there is evidence of the group relying more on ideological appeals than material incentives. The evidence suggests that the group more frequently employs ideological appeals and that most recruits are mobilized around rhetoric addressing specific grievances. Put another way, the evidence suggests that most recruits were targeted with the idea of joining the group as a means of addressing grievances, while offers of material goods in exchange for participation were used only for a small proportion of recruits. The use of material incentives by the group is rare or idiosyncratic.

(4) Fully Ideological: There is only evidence of the group mobilizing recruits around shared grievances and/or ethnic or religious identities. Evidence either explicitly indicates that the group did not offer material incentives in exchange for participation or there is an absence of information indicating that the group did such.

Figure 1: Distribution of Persuasive Appeals by Group-Year



Figure 2: Distribution of Persuasive Appeals by Group



Figure 2 displays the time-invariant distribution of the ordinal variable by group. The modal value (40 groups) is 4 (fully ideological), and an additional 25 groups have a value of 3 (mostly ideological), suggesting that many groups rely heavily on social endowments for recruitment. The distribution among the lower three categories is more even, though slightly

more groups employ exclusively material appeals than mostly material appeals or mixed approaches. The distribution of the variable across group-year observations is similar (**Figure 1**). This challenges the perception that conflict in Africa is largely driven by competition over natural resources. Even if the core leadership of some groups are motivated by material gain, many more rebels in Africa appear to mobilize around ideology than material gain.

Such a coding scheme is, of course, subjective. However, I take steps to mitigate potential consequences of this subjectivity. As robustness checks, I include two simpler measures of the extent to which groups rely on ideological appeals to ensure that the results are not driven by idiosyncrasies of how the variable is constructed. The first alternative variable simplifies the five-point scale to three-points: exclusively material (0), any combination (1), and exclusively ideological (2). The other is a binary indicator measuring exclusive reliance on ideological appeals.

It is also important to consider why this variable has not been operationalized in other ways. One potential critique is that ideological and material appeals should be measured separately, as they have a potential to be used as compliments or substitutes. However, the current coding scheme already captures this dynamic, as it measures whether one type of appeal is used more predominantly, or if they are employed as compliments. Reseachers could easily transform this variable to measure whether groups use one or both types of recruitment appeals.

However, in this section, I do discuss some of the differences in types of ideological appeals presented by groups to highlight the diversity of variables available in RAID and the variation in types of ideological appeals used by groups. Based on groups in the sample that incorporated at least some ideological dimensions into their recruitment strategies, I was able to identify six dominant types of recruitment appeals: mobilization around or against (1) ethnic or

clan-based grievances, (2) Islamist goals, (3) violent government repression, (4) foreign military interventions, (5) protection of resources from external extraction, and (6) an "other" category comprised of more idiosyncratic appeals and general dissatisfaction with the government.

Figure 3: Types of Ideological Appeals by Group-Year



Figure 4: Types of Ideological Appeals by Group



Figure 3 displays the distribution of these variables by the group-year while **Figure 4** provides the distribution across the time-invariant, cross-section of the groups. Note that specific types of ideological appeals are *not* coded as being mutually exclusive. Additionally, the 14 rebel organizations that rely exclusively on material incentives are not included in these measures as their recruitment portfolios do not feature any sort of ideological appeals. Thus, unlike the variables described in the prior section, the frequency of these variables is not equal to the total number of observations or groups in RAID. In future projects, I intend to examine how different types of ideological appeals affect rebel group behavior and outcomes, as well as the effects that combining certain ideological appeals have.

Research Design

To test the hypotheses, I conduct two sets of analyses. The first examines how ideological appeals affect group survival and the second analyzes how ideological appeals influence group success. Both sets of analyses use the group-year sample from RAID.

Independent Variable

The hypotheses posit that groups that rely more on ideological recruitment appeals, relative to material incentives, will endure longer, but that they will not be more likely to achieve favorable outcomes. Thus, I employ the aforementioned five-point, ordinal measure of groups' reliance on ideological appeals, relative to material incentives for recruitment. I conduct a series of group-year analyses, with the standard errors clustered by group.

For the first hypothesis, I am interested in the longevity of groups, and thus, survival analysis provides a useful tool. This method is effective at dealing with time varying covariates and right-censoring in data, both of which pose issues in traditional regression models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The dependent variable is the number of years a group has been in existence, with the failure event indicating when a group ends. Specifically, I use semiparametric Cox proportional hazard models, which are effective for testing the impact of a set of variables on the probability that a subject experiences the failure event. These models have been frequently used to examine factors that affect militant group longevity (e.g., Piazza and Piazza 2017; Conrad et al. 2019; Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020; Ryckman 2020).

To test the second hypothesis, I employ data on the ways in which groups end. Following the precedent of several studies on civil war termination (e.g., Fortna 2015; Gurses 2015; Greig, Mason, and Hamner 2016; Phayal, Mason, and Gurses 2019), I use Kreutz's (2010) data on civil war termination to create a categorical measure of whether groups experience a "favorable" outcome (i.e., ending through a peace agreement or rebel victory), "unfavorable" outcome (i.e., ending through low levels of activity or government victory), or the continuation of a conflict in a given year. As Phayal, Mason, and Gurses (2019) argue, both rebel victory and peace agreements leave rebels better off than being defeated by the government or by maintaining the status quo through fizzling out. I employ competing-risk duration models because they allow for the analysis of the probability that conflicts end favorably or unfavorably for rebels, relative to the probability that the war continues (Phayal, Mason, and Gurses 2019, 490).

Control Variables

I use the same control variables for both hypotheses. I control for the ordinal measure of rebel group strength, relative to the government, from the NSA dataset. Conflicts involving stronger groups end sooner and more favorably for rebels (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). I include a binary indicator of whether a group controls territory, from the NSA dataset. Conflicts in which rebels control territory last longer (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009) and holding territory affects recruitment tactics (de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2012).

Groups with political wings fight in shorter conflicts (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). Political wings could also aid groups in building ideological platforms and with recruiting. Thus, using a binary indicator from the NSA dataset, I account for whether a group has a political wing. Relatedly, I control for the NSA dataset's measure of rebel groups' ability to mobilize personnel, relative to the government. Competition affects the incentives of rebel organizations to continue fighting (Metternich and Wucherpfenning 2020) and places pressure on groups to offer material incentives for recruitment (Weinstein 2007). Thus, I also control for a binary indicator of whether there are other rebel groups operating in the same country.

Material resources provided to rebel groups by foreign governments can draw in opportunistic recruits (Weinstein 2005). Certain types of external support also prolong conflicts (Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed 2017) and affect outcomes (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008). In response, I use a binary indicator of whether a group receives support from the government of a foreign state, which is taken from the NSA dataset. Additionally, I control for whether a group has secessionist goals. Secessionist conflicts tend to last longer (e.g., Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000) and secessionist groups are more likely to make ideological recruitment appeals (Soules 2021). Militant group ideology also affects survival (Blomberg,

Gaibulloev, and Sandler 2011) and left-wing groups have strong political indoctrination programs (Hoover Green 2016). Using data from the FORGE dataset (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020), I control for whether the group has a left-wing ideology.

Groups that rely more on ideological appeals tend to be socially homogenous (Weinstein 2007). Rebels with linkages to politically excluded ethnic groups survive longer (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012), so I include a binary indicator of whether an organization has a multi-ethnic recruitment base, with data from Vogt et al. (2015). Next, I account for whether a group employs forced recruitment. When rebels that rely on economic endowments run out of resources, they often turn to forced recruitment (Weinstein 2005). I also control for a dichotomous indicator of whether a group receives funding from natural resources, as this affects recruitment strategies (Weinstein 2005). This variable is taken from the Rebel Contraband Dataset (Walsh et al. 2018).

Additionally, I control for the logged per capita GDP of the government that the group is fighting. Civil wars last longer in lower income countries (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009) and material recruitment appeals will also likely be more effective in these countries. Similarly, I control for regime type because conflicts in democracies last longer (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009) and because rebel groups in democracies are more concerned about their reputations (Stanton 2013), which could incentivize them to rely on ideological recruitment appeals. I use the polity2 measure of regime type from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2019). Finally, I employ the Neopatrimonial Rule Index from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Sigman and Lindberg 2017). Groups are more likely to use material incentives for recruitment in societies with strong neopatrimonial rule (Soules 2021) and regimes that depend on patronage networks have difficulty sustaining fighting because of high levels of defection in the military (Phayal, Mason, and Gurses 2019).

Results

I begin by presenting the results for Hypothesis 1. The hazard ratios produced by the Cox proportional hazard models are presented in **Table 1**. Some of the control variables have a fair number of missing observations. To mitigate the possibility that missingness is driving the results, I present four different models that gradually add control variables, beginning with a naïve model that tests only the effect of the main independent variable.

I find substantial support for Hypothesis 1 across all four models. Greater reliance on ideological appeals is associated with a decreased probability that a rebel group dies in a given year. The hazard ratio in the naïve model (**Model 1**) indicates that a one unit increase in reliance on ideological recruitment tactics is associated with an approximately 35% decrease in the probability that a group ends in a given year, while the hazard ratio in the model with the full set of control variables (**Model 4**) indicates about a 44% decreased chance of demise. I also present a Kaplan-Meier survival curve (**Figure 5**), which compares the probability of groups failing that use exclusively ideological recruitment appeals to all others. The plot reveals that groups that make exclusively ideological appeals (the highest score of the ordinal measure) live longer than groups that make *at least* some material appeals.

Table 1: Use of Ideological Recruitment Appeals and Rebel Group Survival – Cox PH Models

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ideological Recruitment	0.649***	0.686***	0.628***	0.558***
	(0.0728)	(0.0769)	(0.0829)	(0.0741)
Relative Rebel Strength		1.666***	1.740**	1.673**
		(0.305)	(0.377)	(0.408)
Territorial Control		0.682	0.525	0.965
		(0.266)	(0.216)	(0.341)
Rebel Political Wing		0.492*	0.405**	0.306***
		(0.180)	(0.164)	(0.111)
State Supported Rebels		1.569	1.947*	2.566***
		(0.558)	(0.760)	(0.860)
Mobilization Capacity		0.811	1.033	1.119
		(0.238)	(0.502)	(0.436)
Rebel Competition		6.025***	2.828**	2.449*
		(3.438)	(1.474)	(1.128)
Secessionist Aims		0.156***	0.0600***	0.0481***
		(0.0985)	(0.0469)	(0.0504)
Left-Wing		0.107***	0.0865***	0.0631***
		(0.0814)	(0.0777)	(0.0629)
Multi-Ethnic Recruitment Base			0.769	0.873
			(0.544)	(0.540)
Forced Recruitment			0.622	0.684
			(0.273)	(0.280)
Natural Resource Exploitation			0.396**	0.259***
			(0.150)	(0.103)
per capita GDP (Logged)				0.951
				(0.179)
Polity				1.172***
				(0.0345)
Neopatrimonial Rule Index				0.185*
				(0.170)
Observations	760	670	595	486

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Hazard ratios reported



Moving to Hypothesis 2, the results of the competing-risk analysis are presented in **Table 2**. The hazard ratios are reported. The outcomes that are favorable and unfavorable to rebel groups are compared to the baseline category of continued fighting in a given year. Greater reliance on ideological recruitment appeals decreases the probability that groups experience undesirable outcomes (e.g., defeat or fizzling out) in a given year. The main independent variable does not have a statistically significant association with groups experiencing favorable outcomes. Thus, while ideological appeals appear to help groups stave off unfavorable outcomes, they do not appear to ultimately help groups achieve success, in line with the expectation of the second hypothesis. **Figure 6** displays the cumulative incidence rate for unfavorable outcomes from the competing risks analysis. The figure shows that while groups that recruit exclusively with ideological appeals can stave of undesirable outcomes for longer, the impact is small.

Table 2: Rebel Recruitment Appeals and Group Success -- Competing Risk Models

	(1) Favorable Outcomes	(2) Unfavorable Outcomes
Ideological Recruitment	1.081	0.586***
	(0.211)	(0.107)
Relative Rebel Strength	2.956***	0.869
	(1.242)	(0.334)
Territorial Control	0.610	0.694
	(0.366)	(0.400)
Rebel Political Wing	0.491	0.323**
	(0.333)	(0.178)
State Supported Rebels	6.469***	0.778
	(3.943)	(0.499)
Mobilization Capacity	0.556	1.939
	(0.321)	(1.410)
Competition	4.614**	0.951
	(3.546)	(0.533)
Secessionist	0.349	0.184*
	(0.389)	(0.174)
Left-Wing	0.471	0.0774*
	(0.403)	(0.119)
Multi-Ethnic Recruitment Base	0.438	1.951
	(0.315)	(1.880)
Forced Recruitment Binary	0.604	0.785
	(0.445)	(0.471)
Natural Resource Exploitation	1.065	0.180**
	(0.581)	(0.129)
per capita GDP (Logged)	0.497**	1.002
	(0.156)	(0.277)
Polity2	1.164**	1.085
	(0.0734)	(0.0598)
Neopatrimonial Rule Index	16.75	0.0801*
	(34.55)	(0.109)
Observations	486	486

Robust standard errors in parentheses
Hazard ratios reported
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Robustness Checks

I conduct a battery of alternative tests to assess the robustness of the findings. For each alternative test, I rerun both types of survival analyses. The first category of checks employs simpler measures of the primary explanatory variable to ensure that the results are not driven by idiosyncrasies of how the five-point ordinal variable is coded. The first alternative variable simplifies the five-point scale to a three-point scale: exclusively material (0), any combination (1), and exclusively ideological (2) appeals. The second is a binary indicator of whether a group relies exclusively on ideological appeals.

Across all alternative tests, I continue to find support for Hypothesis 1 that groups that rely more on ideological appeals live longer than other groups. Thus, I find robust evidence to

suggest that committed recruits help make groups more resilient. I also continue to find evidence that ideological appeals make groups less likely to experience unfavorable outcomes but that they have no statistically significant effect on the probability of achieving favorable outcomes.

Next, I reassess the findings for Hypothesis 2 by employing an alternative dependent variable that is more disaggregated. Using multinomial logistic regression analysis, I compare the probability that conflicts end by negotiated settlement, government victory, rebel victory, or through low or no activity, with the baseline category of an ongoing conflict. This coding scheme is also used in research on civil war termination (e.g., Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009).

However, this variable has a very uneven distribution in the sample. Among groups that ended, 37 entered negotiated settlements, 42 fizzled out, 7 defeated the government, and 8 were defeated by the government, while the rest were involved in conflicts that were still ongoing by the end of 2011. This odd distribution leads to separation in the data. Specifically, some values of the main independent variable (ideological appeals) perfectly predict some outcomes. For instance, groups with a value of 2 or higher for the independent variable never face defeat by the government. Separation can bias results (Zorn 2005; Rainey 2016), so I follow Cook, Niehaus, and Zuhlke's (2018) recommendation of employing a generalization of the penalized likelihood estimator developed by Firth (1993) when conducting multinomial logistic regression analysis on data that suffer from separation.

The main independent variable has a negative and statistically significant relationship with government victory and a positive and significant association with rebel victory. Ideological recruitment appeals have no statistically significant relationship with negotiated settlements or fizzling out. These results should be interpreted with caution because there are very few

instances of outright government victory. Given the null finding for fizzling out in these models, the small number of government victories might be driving the results for the other tests of Hypothesis 2. However, I continue to not find evidence of ideological appeals making groups more successful, despite strong expectations in the prior literature.

Cases

I now turn to a brief discussion of three cases of groups that employed predominantly ideological recruitment appeals. I examine the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques la Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal, the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) in Algeria, and the Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Peru. All three groups lived beyond the mean and median number of years of groups in the sample. These examples are not intended to serve as systematically developed case studies. Instead, they are brief examples of the effects that ideological appeals have on rebel group longevity and success.

MFDC

Humphreys and Mohamed (2003) conduct a case study of the MFDC to evaluate the greed vs. grievance debate, and I primarily draw on their study for this example. In the early 1980s, conflict arose over the mistreatment, including the unfavorable distribution of educational and land resources, of people living in the Casamance region of Senegal. Violent government crackdowns against peaceful protests eventually resulted in the outbreak of conflict.

Humphreys and Mohamed note that even when the group began to earn income from natural resources, they did not offer material incentives for recruitment. Thus, the individual loyalty of rank-and-file members cannot be explained by the accumulation of personal wealth. Members of the group had a variety of motives including fighting against discrimination and government persecution of their communities and families (Evans 2004).

The MFDC and its various factions operated for extensive periods of time. The fighting began towards the end of 1983 and oscillated in activity level for decades after (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia a). While the MFDC declared the war to be over in 2003 and entered a peace agreement, low levels of fighting occurred sporadically over the next few years, including spikes in violence in 2011 and early 2012 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia a). Thus, many of the core issues underlying the conflict were not resolved.

Humphreys and Mohamed attribute the longevity of the group to its significant material resources. However, this does not appear to be the whole story. Indeed, the group was plagued by internal divisions and splintered several times, making achieving negotiations with the government difficult (Humphreys and Mohamed 2003; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia a). These splits were caused by a lack of agreement of goals across factions and a lack of unified political messaging (Humphreys and Mohamed 2003). There was also significant internal disagreement about how the organization should be structured and who should lead it (Humphreys and Mohamed 2003). Many members of the group choose to continue fighting through various rounds of negotiations because they believed the government was not adequately addressing issues of the treatment of the Casamance region (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia a). The group also employed religious ideologies to pressure members to stay. Cadres were required to take a

"mystical oath," and told that if they tried to leave the group without getting the oath undone by a priestess, they would fall ill and die painfully (Home Office 2010).

Thus, the longevity of the group appears to have been driven, at least in part, by the ideological fervency, and indoctrination, of its members. The refusal of members to accept what they viewed as inadequate concessions, internal ideological divisions that disrupted negotiations, and rituals intended to pressure members into staying, all contributed to the group continuing its fighting. However, fractionalization and difficulties in compromising with the government made it difficult for the MFDC to achieve its goals. Thus, the MFDC provides an example of a group that lasted a long time, in part, because of its ideologically committed recruits, but that faced obstacles to its success because of these same cadres.

GIA

The GIA was a radical Islamist group that formed in Algeria in 1992 with the goal of overthrowing the government, establishing an Islamic state, and implementing Sharia law. The group was notorious for frequent violence against civilians and launching high-profile attacks. The GIA clashed frequently with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a moderate Islamic political party, as the former rejected the latter's efforts to establish an Islamic state through electoral processes (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

By the end of the decade, the organization declined due to internal divisions. One of the factions was the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which became AQIM. Many members left the group in 1999 when the Algerian government offered amnesty. This is particularly noteworthy as it suggests that even ideologically committed recruits are sometimes

willing to accept government amnesty. The GIA ceased operations in 2004 following a government crackdown that resulted in the deaths and arrests of many members (Mapping Militant Organizations 2018).

Recruitment efforts relied exclusively on ideological appeals. Membership expanded rapidly because of a variety of political grievances (Vriens 2009) and the GIA spread its recruitment messaging through the internet, literature, and audio recordings (Lia and Kjøk 2009). Despite relying exclusively on ideological recruitment appeals and stringently adhering to an extremist ideology, the GIA was ultimately unsuccessful. It was plagued by internal divisions and the group's use of ideologically motivated violence created fierce opposition to the GIA. The group even refused to work with other organizations, like the FIS, that wanted to establish an Islamic state in Algeria as well. Thus, in many ways, strong ideological commitments undermined the group's ability to achieve its goals.

SL

Next, I consider one out-of-sample case, the SL in Peru. The group was formed by former college professor Abimael Guzmán in the late 1960s and fighting began in 1980. The SL was a Maoist organization that wanted to overthrow the Peruvian government and install a left-wing government (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia b). When Guzmán was captured by government forces in 1992, the group went through a significant period of decline and splintered into two factions (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia b). While fighting declined in the 1990s, the hard-line faction of the group resumed low-levels of fighting in the mid-2000s. The group ended through low levels of activity (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009).

The SL employed primarily ideological recruitment appeals as it explicitly sought to attract only individuals who were committed to the movement (Weinstein 2007; Garcia-Ponce 2017). Members had a variety of motives, including fighting discrimination against indigenous communities (Graves 1992) and addressing local political grievances (Rix 1992). Recruitment was a long and rigorous, multi-stage process, that concluded with the requirement of killing a police officer and taking their weapon (Blake 2017). Recruits also underwent ideological indoctrination for extensive periods of time (Graves 1992).

While the group appears to have relied primarily on ideological appeals, material incentives appeared to have played a minor role because some former military members, who suffered from severe pay cuts due to economic downturn in the late 1980s, joined the group because of their economic vulnerability (Graves 1992; Rix 1992).

Why was the SL not more successful, despite explicitly seeking out individuals that were known to be committed to left-wing causes? It appears that the SL's commitment to its own ideology and goals may have hampered the group in the long run. While garnering significant popularity and its height, the SL lost popular support because of the rigidity of its ideology, which led to difficulties compromising with peasants (Blake 2017). There was significant enough backlash that some peasants even turned against the SL and participated in a counterinsurgency campaign (Blake 2017). Furthermore, the group refused to work with other left-wing groups in Peru that it viewed as too moderate, and it often ostracized the communist governments of other countries, which made it difficult to gain external supporters (Blake 2017).

The SL's ideological rigidity also made working with the Peruvian government difficult. In the 1980s, the SL turned down multiple offers by the Peruvian government to enter negotiations, declaring that it would only stop fighting when the government had surrendered

(McCormick 1990, 13-14). The SL's strict adherence to its goals and ideologies made it less willing to negotiate with the government when it had the opportunity to. While Abimael Guzmán sought peace agreements once he was imprisoned (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia b), his efforts appear to have been too late. Additionally, because a cult of personality had been built around Guzmán, his arrest deflated morale in the SL, and many members were captured, surrendered, or defected (Blake 2017). This suggests that commitment to an individual leader presents some of the same liabilities that having uncommitted, materially motivated recruits does.

If the group had been more willing to compromise, it might have garnered more favorable concessions. Thus, while the SL was able to wage a high intensity war for over a decade, and operate sporadically afterwards, its ideological commitment might have resulted in the group fighting a long time for nothing.

Conclusion

Rebel recruitment strategies have long been considered an essential dynamic in explaining the conduct and outcome of civil wars. Scholars have theorized that the recruitment appeals made by groups affect the quality of recruits they draw in. However, a lack of data has prevented direct tests of many of these theoretical implications. To address this problem, I leverage novel data to examine how recruitment appeals affect militant group longevity and success. The results indicate that groups that rely more on ideological appeals than material incentives for recruitment survive longer.

However, I do not find clear evidence of a relationship between recruitment incentives and rebel group outcomes. I find some evidence that these appeals help groups stave off

government defeat, but the relationship between recruitment appeals and group outcomes is unclear overall. This suggests that while recruitment tactics might draw in committed individuals that provide groups with the power to resist government force, it does not provide them with sufficient power to force governments into making concessions. This paper highlights the importance of considering the recruitment tactics of militant groups, not just the resources available to them. Scholars must not take recruitment for granted when studying civil war.

References

Abdullah, Ibrahim.1998. “Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 36 (2): 203-235.

Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why terrorism does not work.” *International Security 31* (2): 42-78.

Arves, Stephen, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Caitlin McCulloch. 2019. “Rebel tactics and external public opinion.” *Research & Politics.*

Asal, Victor H. and R. Karl Rethemeyer. 2008. “The nature of the beast: Organizational structures and the lethality of terrorist attacks.” *The Journal of Politics 70* (2): 437-449.

Asal, Victor H. and R. Karl Rethemeyer. 2015. “Big Allied and Dangerous Dataset Version 2.” www.start.umd.edu/baad/database

Balch-Lindsay, Dylan and Andrew J. Enterline. 2000. “Killing time: The world politics of civil war duration, 1820–1992.” International Studies Quarterly 44 (4): 615-642.

Bapat, Navin A., and Kanisha D. Bond. 2012. “Alliances between militant groups.” British Journal of Political Science 42 (4): 793-824.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. and Bradford S. Jones. 2004. Event history modeling: A guide for social scientists. Cambridge University Press.

Braithwaite, Alex and Luna B. Ruiz. 2018. “Female combatants, forced recruitment, and civil conflict outcomes.” *Research & Politics*.

Braithwaite, Jessica Maves, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 2020. “When Organizations Rebel: Introducing the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) Dataset.” International Studies Quarterly 64 (1): 183-193.

Clayton, Govinda. 2013. “Relative rebel strength and the onset and outcome of civil war mediation.” Journal of Peace Research 50 (5): 609-622.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. “On economic causes of civil war.” *Oxford economic papers 50* (4): 563-573.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and grievance in civil war.” Oxford economic papers 56 (4): 563-595.

Conrad, Justin M., Kevin T. Greene, James Igoe Walsh, and Beth Elise Whitaker. 2019. “Rebel natural resource exploitation and conflict duration.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (3): 591-616.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. "It takes two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome." Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (4): 570-597.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2013. "Non-state actors in civil wars: A new dataset." Conflict Management and Peace Science 30 (5): 516-531.

de la Calle, L., & Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2012). Rebels without a territory: An analysis of nonterritorial conflicts in the world, 1970–1997. Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (4): 580-603.

DeRouen Jr, Karl R., and David Sobek. 2004. "The dynamics of civil war duration and outcome." Journal of Peace Research 41 (3): 303-320.

Dube, Oeindrila, and Juan F. Vargas. 2013. "Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia." The review of economic studies 80 (4): 1384-1421.

Eck, Kristine. 2014. "Coercion in rebel recruitment." Security Studies 23 (2): 364-398.

Fearon, James D., 2004. 'Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?' Journal of Peace Research 41 (3): 275–301.

Findley, Michael G. and Joseph K. Young. 2015. "Terrorism, spoiling, and the resolution of civil wars." *The Journal of Politics 77* (4): 1115-1128.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2015. "Do terrorists win? Rebels' use of terrorism and civil war outcomes." International Organization 69 (3): 519-556.

Gates, Scott. 2002. "Recruitment and allegiance: The microfoundations of rebellion." Journal of Conflict resolution 46 (1): 111-130.

Gates, Scott, and Sukanya Podder. 2015. "Social media, recruitment, allegiance and the Islamic State." Perspectives on Terrorism 9 (4): 107-116.

Giri, Keshab, and Roos Haer. 2021. "Female combatants and durability of civil war." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. Accepted and Forthcoming.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, David Cunningham, and Idean Salehyan. 2013. "Non-state actor data: Version 3.4." Case Notes. Available At: http://ksgleditsch.com/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf

Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. 2004. "Criminal rebels? A discussion of civil war and criminality from the Colombian experience." Politics & Society 32 (2): 257-285.

Haer, Roos, and Tobias Böhmelt. 2018. "Girl soldiering in rebel groups, 1989–2013: Introducing a new dataset." Journal of Peace Research 55 (3): 395-403.

Haer, Roos, Christopher Michael Faulkner, and Beth Elise Whitaker. 2020. “Rebel funding and child soldiers: Exploring the relationship between natural resources and forcible recruitment.” European Journal of International Relations 26 (1): 236-262.

Henderson, Errol A. 2009. “Disturbing the peace: African warfare, political inversion and the universality of the democratic peace thesis.” British journal of political science 39 (1): 25-58.

Hoover Green, Amelia. 2016. “The commander’s dilemma: Creating and controlling armed group violence.” Journal of Peace Research 53 (5): 619-632.

Huber, Laura. 2019. “When civilians are attacked: gender equality and terrorist targeting.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (10): 2289-2318.

Humphreys, Macartan, and Habaye Ag Mohamed. 2005. “Senegal and Mali. Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis.” 247-302.

Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2008. “Who fights? The determinants of participation in civil war.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (2): 436-455.

Jo, Hyeran. 2015. Compliant Rebels. Cambridge University Press.

Jones, Seth G. and Martin C. Libicki. 2008. *How terrorist groups end: Lessons for countering al Qa'ida*. Vol. 741. Rand Corporation.

Joo, Min Hyung. 2019. “Industrial Organization of Rebel Groups and the Duration of Civil Conflicts.” PhD Dissertation. Pennsylvania State University.

Keels, Eric, and Krista Wiegand. 2020. “Mutually assured distrust: Ideology and commitment problems in civil wars.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution 64* (10): 2022-2048.

Kreutz, Joakim, Peter Wallensteen, Lotta Harbom, Stina Högbladh, and Margareta Sollenberg. 2005. Armed conflict termination dataset codebook. Available At: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data.htm

Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. “The strategies of terrorism.” *International security 31* (1): 49-80.

Lemke, Douglas. 2011. “Intra-national IR in Africa.” Review of International Studiesv37 (1): 49-70.

Lichbach, Mark I. 1994. “What makes rational peasants revolutionary? Dilemma, paradox, and irony in peasant collective action.” World Politics 46 (3): 383-418.

Lichbach, Mark I. 1995. The rebel's dilemma. University of Michigan Press.

Lidow, Nicholai Hart. 2011. "Violent Order: Rebel Organization and Liberia's Civil War." PhD thesis, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.

Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University. 2020.

Marshall, Monty, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2019. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018 (dataset).” Center for Systemic Peace.

McLauchlin, Theodore. 2015. “Desertion and collective action in civil wars.” International Studies Quarterly 59 (4): 669-679.

Mkandawire, Thandika. 2002. “The terrible toll of post-colonial 'rebel movements' in Africa: Towards an explanation of the violence against the peasantry.” Journal of Modern African Studies 40 (2):181-215.

Oppenheim, Ben, Abbey Steele, Juan F. Vargas, and Michael Weintraub. 2015. “True believers, deserters, and traitors: Who leaves insurgent groups and why.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (5): 794-823.

Piazza, James A. 2009. “Is Islamist terrorism more dangerous?: An empirical study of group ideology, organization, and goal structure.” *Terrorism and Political Violence 21* (1): 62-88.

Piazza, James A., and Scott Piazza. 2017. “Crime pays: Terrorist group engagement in crime and survival.” Terrorism and Political Violence.

Ross, Michael L. 2004. “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War?: Evidence from Thirteen Cases.” International Organization 58 (1): 35-67.

Ross, Michael L. 2015. “What have we learned about the resource curse?.” Annual Review of Political Science 18: 239-259.

Rothchild, Donald and Caroline Hartzell. The Peace Process in the Sudan, 1971-1972 in Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, Roy Licklidder ed. New York: New York University Press: 235-268.

Ryckman, Kirssa Cline. 2020. “Lasting peace or temporary calm? Rebel group decapitation and civil war outcomes.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 37 (2): 172-192.

Sawyer, Katherine, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and William Reed. 2017. “The role of external support in civil war termination.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (6): 1174- 1202.

Souare, Issaka K. 2010. “A critical assessment of security challenges in West Africa.” Accessed At: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136860/18Oct2010WestAfrica.pdf

Soules, Michael J. 2021. “Choosing Recruitment Tactics,” draft dissertation chapter, The Pennsylvania State University.

Stanton, Jessica A. 2013. “Terrorism in the context of civil war.” The Journal of Politics 75 (4): 1009-1022.

Stewart, Megan A. 2018. “Civil war as state-making: Strategic governance in civil war.” International Organization 72 (1): 205-226.

Themnér, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. 2012. “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2011.” Journal of peace research 49 (4): 565-575.

Thomas, Jakana L. 2012. “Don't Stop Till You Get Enough: Rebel Group War Aims and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars.” PhD Dissertation. Pennsylvania State University.

Thomas, Jakana L. 2014. “Rewarding bad behavior: How governments respond to terrorism in civil war.” American Journal of Political Science 58 (4): 804-818.

Thomas, Jakana L., and Kanisha D. Bond. 2015. “Women's participation in violent political organizations.” American Political Science Review 109 (3): 488-506.

UCDPa. “MFDC.” Available At: https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/529

UCDPb. “Sendero Luminoso.” Available At: https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/750

Walsh, James Igoe, Justin M. Conrad, Beth Elise Whitaker, and Katelin M. Hudak. 2018. “Funding rebellion: The Rebel Contraband Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 55 (5): 699-707.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2005. “Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (4): 598-624.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence. Cambridge University Press.

Westerfield, Brian S. 2012. “Decentralization, counterinsurgency and conflict recurrence: a study of the Tuareg uprisings in Mali and Niger.” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, Department of National Security Affairs. Accessed At: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/841e/a158caa883df0d2782f46f00dbfa93f962cf.pdf

Wood, Reed M. 2014. “From loss to looting? Battlefield costs and rebel incentives for violence.” International Organization 68 (4): 979-999.

Wood, Reed M., and Lindsey Allemang. 2021. “Female fighters and the fates of rebellions: How mobilizing women influences conflict duration.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*.

Wood, Reed M. and Jakana L. Thomas. 2017. “Women on the frontline: Rebel group ideology and women’s participation in violent rebellion.” Journal of Peace Research 54 (1): 31- 46.

Wucherpfennig, Julian, Nils W. Metternich, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2012. “Ethnicity, the state, and the duration of civil war.” World Politics 64 (1): 79-115.