

## **Unhappy Campers in a Big Tent: Rebels' Use of Diverse Recruitment Appeals and the Intractability of Civil Conflicts**

### **Abstract:**

Do rebel groups benefit from attempting to appeal to larger segments of society by mobilizing around more diverse grievances? Prior work has examined a variety of dimensions of grievance-based recruitment in civil wars but has tended to overlook the ways in which the breadth of recruitment appeals made by rebels matters. I argue that rebel organizations suffer from attempts to appeal to a diversity of grievances. Specifically, when rebel organizations represent a diversity of interests, more veto players are introduced and credible commitment problems are exacerbated. These issues complicate the bargaining process, rendering conflicts more intractable. Using novel data on the diversity of grievance-based recruitment appeals employed by armed groups, I find that rebel groups that mobilize around a greater number of grievances fight in more protracted conflicts.

Do rebel organizations benefit from attempting to mobilize constituencies with diverse grievances and ideological beliefs? Scholarship on rebel ideology and civil war outcomes typically focuses on the effects of either (1) the extent to which militant movements rely on ideological appeals, relative to material incentives, for recruitment (Weinstein 2005, 2007) or (2) specific types of ideologies, including religious ideologies (Basedau et al. 2022; Keels and Wiegand 2020; Nilsson and Svensson 2021; Svensson 2007), ethnonationalism (Goodard 2006; Keels and Wiegand 2020), and Marxism (Balcells and Kalyvas 2022).

However, this research tends to overlook the fact that armed groups often mobilize around a mixture of different grievances (e.g., Piazza 2009; Soules 2023). Indeed, militant movements often adopt multiple ideologies, including militant groups that are both religious and ethnonationalist (e.g., the Ninjas, FIAA, Kamajors, ADF), left-wing and ethnonationalist (e.g., the PKK, JVP), religious and left-wing (e.g., MeK), and a variety of other combinations. Relatedly, groups often combine these broader, established ideologies, with more specific grievances. For instance, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb mobilizes around its broader religious ideology as well as local political grievances (Armstrong 2011).<sup>1</sup> Such mobilization strategies appear to be common practice. Nearly 60% of the rebel groups in the Rebel Appeals and Incentives Dataset (RAID) employed at least two kinds of ideological and/or grievance-based recruitment appeals (Soules 2023). Said differently, some rebel groups mobilize around more diverse, grievance-based platforms than others.

Scholars are somewhat divided on the question of how tapping into multiple grievances affects rebels' ability to mobilize support. Militant groups often diversify their grievance-based

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<sup>1</sup> For more information about these groups, see the qualitative narratives that accompany Rebel Appeals and Incentives Dataset (Soules 2023), the dataset used for the analysis in this paper.

appeals in the hopes of increasing their popularity and subsequently gaining more recruits and material support (Gabbay 2008; Schwab 2023; Thaler 2022; Tokdemir et al. 2021). Other scholars posit, however, that rebel movements that organize around a variety of grievances or ideologies often struggle to garner sufficient support and are plagued by internal divisions between factions with diverse beliefs and interests (Khan and Whiteside 2021).

Given both the frequency at which rebel groups diversify the grievance-based platforms they mobilize around, as well as the scholarly divide over the effectiveness of this diversification, it is important to examine the consequences of rebel organizations employing broad recruitment appeals. In this article, I argue that rebels with diverse platforms will fight more prolonged civil wars because this diversification introduces a variety of problems into the bargaining process. First, such recruitment strategies create more actors whose approval is needed to agree to a peaceful settlement (veto players), which might spoil or otherwise undermine negotiations.

Second and relatedly, rebel movements with diverse, grievance-based platforms have difficulty credibly committing that the multiple interests within their organizations have all been satisfied by negotiations, and that certain, more dissatisfied factions will not splinter off or remobilize to continue fighting. These issues are related, as when more veto players are involved, the opposition will have difficulty credibly committing that all veto players (who might have divergent interests from each other) will abide by the peace agreement. Thus, when rebel groups mobilize around multiple issues, it complicates the bargaining process, resulting in prolonged conflicts, as negotiated settlements become more difficult to reach.

Using novel data on the diversity of recruitment appeals employed by 232 rebel groups, active across the world, I find strong support for my central argument. Specifically, the results indicate that conflicts last significantly longer when rebel organizations employ multiple types of

ideological and/or grievance-based recruitment appeals. These findings are robust to a battery of alternative tests.

I conduct subsequent analysis showing that rebels are less likely to make it to the negotiating table with governments when they mobilize around a diversity of grievances, further highlighting how such recruitment strategies are associated with the intractability of conflicts. In additional tests, I also do not find evidence that these groups are more or less likely to achieve favorable outcomes, such as entering negotiated settlements or defeating government forces outright. Thus, groups that recruit with diverse appeals are involved in more intractable conflicts, that are less likely to feature negotiations, but are not more (or less) likely to end in favorable outcomes for rebels.

This study makes at least two contributions. First, it provides one of the only quantitative analyses, to the best of my knowledge, on the *consequences* of rebel organizations mobilizing around multiple issues. In a related study, Olzak (2022) finds the terrorist organizations with ambiguous ideologies have a harder time garnering support, which diminishes their operational capacity and decreases their lifespans. However, I examine issue diversity, rather than ambiguity. The data I employ also cover a greater diversity of issues, beyond the typical categories covered in such studies, such as religious, left-wing, and nationalist ideologies.

Furthermore, I show that in the context of civil wars, employing multiple, non-material recruitment appeals is associated with longer, not shorter, conflicts. Again, most studies tend to focus on the consequences of either specific types of ideologies (e.g., Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Basedau et al. 2022; Hoover Green 2016, 2018; Keels and Wiegand 2020; Nilsson and Svensson 2021; Piazza 2009; Polo 2020; Polo and Gleditsch 2016; Sarwari 2021; Svensson 2007) or reliance on ideological appeals over material incentives for recruitment (Humphreys

and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2005, 2007). This study shows that the *diversity* of rebel organizations' recruitment appeals is also important.

Second, this study contributes to our understanding of how rebel recruitment tactics affect their fate. While existing work expects that rebel groups will suffer from relying more heavily on material incentives than ideological appeals for recruitment (Weinstein 2005, 2007), the results of this paper show that, relative to using exclusively material incentives or mobilizing around just a single ideological or grievance-based issue, employing multiple recruitment appeals makes it more difficult for rebel organizations to bring their conflicts to a definitive end. Thus, I show that the breadth of recruitment appeals rebels employ is consequential, not just the choice of relying more on material or ideological appeals. Related work shows that multi-party civil wars are particularly intractable because there are more actors who must agree to a settlement (Cunningham 2006, 2011). However, this paper examines how diverse interests *within* rebel organizations make conflicts difficult to settle.

### **Defining Recruitment Diversity**

Before delving into the rest of the paper, it is important to establish what I mean by *diversity* in rebel groups' recruitment strategies. First, I am interested in the diversity of *grievances* that armed groups organize around. In the context of civil wars, grievances can be thought of as the dissatisfaction caused by the failure of material reality to meet expectations (Buhaug et al. 2014). Grievances can stem from a variety of issues, ranging from ethnic and/or economic inequalities, to more general dissatisfaction with poor governance or changing social norms.

Ideology is an important and related concept. Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2014, p. 215) define ideology as “a more or less systematic set of ideas that includes the identification of a

referent group (a class, ethnic, or other social group), an enunciation of the grievances or challenges that the group confronts, the identification of objectives on behalf of that group (political change – or defense against its threat), and a (perhaps vaguely defined) program of action.” Commonly represented rebel ideologies in civil wars include radical jihadism, Marxism, and ethnonationalism. As Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood explain, these ideologies all include the identification of grievances that these systems of beliefs attempt to address.

However, I take a broader view of grievances, analyzing both grievances commonly associated with these major ideologies, as well as various other grievances that rebels mobilize around that are not specifically associated with a well-defined ideology, like Marxism or radical jihadism. Beyond recruiting with common ideological appeals related to ethnonationalism, religion, or left-wing politics, militant organizations often tap into a diversity of other grievances, including dissatisfaction with local governance and opposition to the exploitation of local resources by external actors, among a variety of other issues (Soules 2023).

I expect the specific grievances rebels organize around to be relevant, not just their broader ideologies, as the more issues they tap into, the more interests they represent. As I detail throughout the paper, I expect that the greater number of grievance-based interests (whether tied to a specific ideology or not) that are represented in rebel groups, the more difficulty these organizations will have in bringing their conflicts to an end. Much of the literature I engage with in this paper focuses on ideological mobilization, which is related to some (but often not all) of the types of grievances militant organizations recruit around. Throughout the paper, in my discussion of rebel organizations diversifying the number of grievances they mobilize around, I use the terms grievances, grievance-based appeals, and platforms interchangeably.

Second, scholars are particularly interested in the intractability of conflicts and the factors that make some conflicts more likely to be brought to a quick end than others. These studies are often concerned with how factors that undermine the bargaining process decrease the probability of conflicts terminating (e.g., Sawyer et al. 2017; Wood and Allemang 2022). Thus, I focus on how the diversity of grievances (broadly defined) that rebel organizations mobilize around affects the probability that their conflicts are brought to a definitive end.

### **Grievance-Based Mobilization and Conflict Intractability**

As noted earlier, previous literature tends to focus on both the effects of relative reliance on ideological appeals and material incentives, as well as specific categories of ideologies that rebel organizations frequently mobilize around. Weinstein (2005, 2007) posits that militant movements with access to significant material resources for recruitment face a “resource curse.” He argues that material-based recruitment strategies, such as the offer of salaries or promises of loot, tend to attract a significant number of opportunistic individuals who care more about short-term material benefits than long-term political or social change. Consequently, material appeals often draw in uncommitted recruits who prioritize individual gains over the good of the group.

In contrast, Weinstein argues that when groups do not have access to large “material endowments,” they instead rely on “social endowments,” such as shared ideological and identity-based ties, to recruit. These appeals tend to attract highly committed individuals, as they must be willing to sacrifice short-term gains for the possibility of long-term benefits. Weinstein expects that recruits motivated by grievances will be more committed, including being better disciplined and less likely to desert or defect, than their materially driven counterparts. Weinstein thus posits that groups that rely more on material incentives than ideological or grievance-based appeals for

recruitment will encounter a variety of problems. In line with Weinstein's argument, other studies find that ideologically motivated recruits are less likely to desert or defect (Altier et al. 2017; Oppenheim et al. 2015). Relatedly, lack of ideological cohesion within militant organizations increases the risk of groups splintering (Schubiger 2023).

There is also a significant portion of the literature that examines how specific types of rebel group ideologies influence conflict outcomes. These studies tend to focus on the broader ideologies of groups, rather than the specific grievances (related to the ideology or not) that they mobilize around. This includes work on how ideologically driven recruits, particularly religiously motivated rebels, are more devoted to the cause, and thus, continue fighting, even when their groups are struggling (e.g., Basedau et al. 2022). There is also scholarship examining how ideological extremism alienates potential supporters and increases the probability of rebel infighting, which decreases the probability that such rebels can bring about swift victory (Hafez 2018). Scholars also examine how ideology introduces problems into the bargaining process, which contributes to the intractability of conflicts (Keels and Wiegand 2020; Nilsson and Svensson 2021; Svensson 2007).

### **Ideological Diversity and Bargaining Problems**

I expect that employing diverse recruitment appeals introduces two interrelated problems into the bargaining process that render conflicts more intractable. First, when there are multiple rebel factions, which have divergent goals and preferences from each other, the range of mutually acceptable peace agreements narrows, as it becomes more difficult to satisfy all actors (Cunningham 2006). Similarly, I expect that when multiple interests are represented within a single rebel organization, the range of acceptable bargains decreases, as it becomes difficult to



satisfy all factions *within* a single militant group.<sup>2</sup> Second and relatedly, when a rebel group represents multiple interests, it will have a harder time credibly committing to peace, as peace agreements might satisfy some factions more than others, which could drive the dissatisfied factions to rearm.<sup>3</sup> These two issues reinforce each other, as movements with multiple factions that serve as veto players will have a difficult time credibly committing that all factions will be willing to abide by terms of the peace agreement (Cunningham 2013).

### ***Veto Players***

In general, I expect that the diversity of interests represented within rebel groups that mobilize around multiple issues will narrow the bargaining range, making it more difficult to achieve a negotiated settlement. This point builds off Cunningham (2006), who argues that the presence of multiple rebel factions introduces various problems to the bargaining process, which increases the duration of conflicts. Cunningham employs a “veto player” framework to help illuminate why the presence of multiple rebel groups contributes to the intractability of conflicts.

Veto players are actors whose approval or agreement is needed for a (policy) change to occur (Cunningham 2006; Tsebelis 2002). Veto players in civil wars include rebel factions who are

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<sup>2</sup> It is possible that mobilizing around diverse grievances also creates uncertainty about the capabilities and resolve of rebel groups. Indeed, while platform diversification can draw in large numbers of recruits by tapping into wider recruitment pools (e.g., Gabbay 2008; Schwab 2023; Tokdemir et al. 2021), it can also lead to internal divisions that weaken groups (e.g., Khan and Whiteside 2021). However, given that these countervailing mechanisms do not directly impede the ability of the government to observe the material strength of rebels, I do not expect that platform diversification will have a significant effect on information asymmetries about rebel capabilities and resolve.

<sup>3</sup> It is also possible that recruiting with diverse appeals increases the probability of issue indivisibilities arising, as there are a larger number of individual issues that have the potential to be viewed as indivisible. However, issue indivisibilities are linked to more radical ideologies (Svensson 2007), which should not be conflated with the number of ideological appeals groups mobilize around. Furthermore, issue indivisibilities can often be solved through linking together multiple issues that need to be comprised on (Fearon 1995). Furthermore, credible commitment problems can make an issue appear indivisible, even if it is not (Fearon 1995). Credible commitment problems are addressed later.

willing and able to continue fighting if they are dissatisfied with the potential terms of a negotiated settlement (Cunningham 2006). For a civil war actor to be a veto player, including a rebel group, it must (1) have preferences that are sufficiently different from other actors in the war; (2) be internally cohesive enough to maintain its bargaining position; and (3) must be able to continue fighting, even if other parties come to a negotiated settlement (Cunningham 2006).

Cunningham (2006) posits that one of the reasons why the presence of multiple veto players increases the duration of civil wars is that the introduction of new actors with distinct preferences shrinks the range of outcomes that all parties view as acceptable. This is particularly salient when the veto players have substantially different preferences from each other, as this further narrows the range of mutually acceptable bargains. Thus, both the number of actors involved, and how divergent their preferences are, affect the size of the bargaining range, as it becomes more difficult to find an agreement that satisfies all parties (Cunningham 2006).

While Cunningham focuses on the effects of the presence of multiple, independent rebel factions, his argument translates well to factions *within* a single rebel group. Indeed, rebel groups often have multiple units or factions, led by subcommanders, whose support is important to maintain, including during negotiations (e.g., Duursma and Fliervoet 2021; Plank 2015). An underlying risk during the negotiation process is that at least one unit subcommander becomes dissatisfied with the terms of the proposed settlement and forms a breakaway faction with their subordinates. This fractionalization during the peace process can threaten negotiations and prolong conflicts (e.g., e.g., Duursma and Fliervoet 2021; Plank 2015). Furthermore, the fewer members that are satisfied with a peace agreement, the higher the likelihood that group splinters, undermining the negotiation process (Plank 2015). For instance, various factions of the Moro

National Liberation Front (MNLF) felt that their interests were not well-represented in the Mindanao Final Agreement, leading the organization to eventually splinter (Plank 2015).

Building off this, I expect that rebel groups mobilizing around multiple issues narrows the range of acceptable settlements. Rebel leaders risk alienating some factions of their organizations if they are perceived to prioritize certain goals or interests over others. If these factions are sufficiently dissatisfied, they can splinter off, including during negotiations (Duursma and Fliervoet 2021). Even if they do not splinter, the presence of dissatisfied factions can undermine the cohesion of rebel groups, weakening their bargaining power. Consequently, when they can either splinter off and continue fighting, or undermine negotiations, various factions *within* rebel groups can serve as veto players.

Thus, if rebel leaders that mobilize cadres around diverse interests want to avoid alienating certain factions of their organization by trying to satisfy all their preferences, then range of potential settlements these rebels could agree to is fairly narrow. Rebel leaders want to avoid alienating certain factions, as a reduction in organizational cohesion, including the formation of splinter factions, could undermine their group's bargaining power. Ideological diversity can also generate related credible commitment issues, which I discuss next.

### ***Credible Commitment Problems***

Warring parties are less likely to bring the fighting to an end if they cannot trust each other to uphold potential peace settlements (Fearon 1995; Walter 1997). Thus, when actors in a conflict have an incentive to renege, they have difficulty getting their adversaries to trust them and to credibly commit that they will not violate the terms of any settlement (Fearon 1995). I expect

that ideological diversity exacerbates credible commitment problems for rebel groups because the negotiating process can satisfy certain ideological factions more than others, creating the risk that the more dissatisfied factions splinter off or remobilize in the future.

In general, ideologically driven groups do not always have the incentive to negotiate or compromise. Keels and Wiegand (2020) posit that when there are stark ideological divides between rebel groups and governments, rebel leaders risk alienating supporters by making concessions, as supporters might be dissatisfied about their ideological positions being compromised on. Relatedly, ideologically driven recruits are more likely to defect or demobilize when their groups shift ideological positions (Oppenheim et al. 2015).

Said differently, ideologically driven recruits who are committed to the cause could become quite alienated and aggrieved if their groups pursue compromises that they view as conceding too much ground. As a result, groups with ideologically committed recruits can have difficulty negotiating, as they risk alienating their cadres by compromising. Given this need to maintain a certain level of ideological purity, rebel organizations that employ ideological-based recruitment strategies can have difficulty credibly committing to negotiations because they often have strong incentives to *not* compromise (Keels and Wiegand 2020).

I posit that this problem is particularly poignant for groups that mobilize around multiple grievance-based issues. Given that there are a larger number of issues that these types of rebel groups can negotiate over, there are more contingents within a group that have the potential to feel alienated by the bargaining process. Said differently, when there are more issues to bargain over, there is greater opportunity for any one segment of an ideologically diverse rebel organization to become dissatisfied, as rebel leadership might find it difficult to satisfy all the interests within their organizations. Thus, the risk rebel leaders face of alienating at least some of

their supporters through compromising is exacerbated when multiple ideologies are represented in their ranks. The desire to remain ideologically pure makes it difficult for rebel groups to credibly commit to abiding to peace settlements (Keels and Wiegand 2020), so representing a diversity of interest might make it even more difficult for groups to credibly commit to uphold the peace.

Relatedly, rebel groups will have a difficult time credibly committing that all factions of their organization will be sufficiently satisfied with the terms of a negotiated settlement. In negotiating with governments, rebels with diverse platforms might have an easier time garnering concessions in some issue areas over others, particularly depending on how extreme certain ideological positions are perceived to be by the government (e.g., Jones and Libicki 2008). Said differently, rebel groups that mobilize around multiple issues might receive more concessions based on certain demands than others. Relatedly, rebel leaders might feel pressure to compromise on certain issues to receive greater concessions in other areas.

These processes could alienate some cadres if they perceive the rebel leadership to be prioritizing certain grievance-based goals over others. There is then the risk that rebel factions that do not feel as well represented in the bargaining process splinter off or remobilize later to try to achieve their goals. Indeed, rebel group splintering often occurs during peace processes (Duursma and Fliervoet 2021). Ideologically committed recruits are also more likely to remobilize when core issues in conflicts have not been resolved (Mironova et al. 2020).

For unity to be sustained within militant organizations, rebel leaders must continue to convince their cadres to work towards common goals (Schubiger 2023). However, I expect that such unity is more difficult to achieve when rebel movements mobilize around a greater diversity of grievances, as recruits are more likely to be invested in different (political) goals. Indeed,

Perkoski (2019) explains that rebel organizations vary in how wide their niches—or amount of people they appeal to—are. Rebel groups with small niches tend to mobilize around singular grievances. This attracts fewer recruits, but members tend to be more like-minded, and consequently, are more cohesive. In contrast, rebel movements with wide niches organize around multiple grievances attract individuals with diverse interests. Rebel groups with wide niches have a harder time satisfying all the different interests in their groups, and consequently, are more likely to be plagued by problems like high levels of defection and infighting (Perkoski 2019). This is relevant, as divided opposition movements will have difficulty credibly committing that they will be able to control all their factions and maintain peace following negotiations (Cunningham 2013).

Rebel groups vary significantly in their ability to foster internal cohesion and to align the preferences of the rank-and-file with that of the rebel leadership (e.g., Hoover Green 2016, 2018). However, I expect that it will be more difficult, on average, for rebel groups to achieve internal cohesion when they represent diverse interests. Thus, rebel leadership will have a difficult time credibly committing that less satisfied factions of their group will abide by a peace agreement and not splinter off or remobilize in the future to fight for the interests of their factions. Even if these dissatisfied factions do not splinter off or remobilize in certain contexts, the looming threat that they will continue fighting can be enough to deter governments from bargaining with such rebels.

### **Conflict Intractability**

Internal veto players and credible commitment introduce problems into the bargaining process, decreasing the probability that such conflicts will be settled. Indeed, the struggles of

rebel organizations with diverse platforms can be observed in a variety of contexts. For instance, the Irish National Liberation Army experienced an uptick in infighting between hardline nationalists and socialist factions during a ceasefire (Perkoski 2019). In the Philippines, at least at some points during the conflict, competing interests and goals of different factions in the Moro Islamic Liberation Front made it difficult for the group to compromise with the government (Malan and Solomon 2012). The Mouvement populaire de l'Azawad (MPA) in Mali was plagued by ideological and tribal differences that complicated efforts to negotiate with the government (Thurston and Lebovich 2013). In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD was hesitant to negotiate for a while because internal, ideological divisions undermined its coherence and subsequent ability to bargain (Nindorera 2012).

A potential counterargument is that platform diversification enhances rebels' recruitment, allowing them to draw in more members and survive longer. Said differently, rather than making conflicts more intractable because of bargaining issues, platform diversification could help increase groups' power to resist defeat by the government. For instance, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have been able to survive over 20 years, in part, because its appeals to Islamist, ethnonationalist, and secessionist goals help it to adapt to new challenges and continue to recruit new members (Nantulya 2019). However, while the group's ideological diversity might help it gain recruits, it has been involved in an intractable conflict. Multiple attempts between the ADF and Ugandan government to negotiate have failed (International Crisis Group 2012). O'Farrell (2021) argues that the group's mixture of local political issues with its connection to the Islamic State have complicated efforts for the government to deal with the group and that negotiations are now unlikely.

Thus, as the ADF highlights, even if recruitment diversification helps bring in more recruits, enhancing groups' survival, such diversity can still undermine the possibility that a conflict is settled. Again, platform diversification results in civil conflicts becoming more intractable by introducing a variety of problems into the bargaining process. This leads to the core hypothesis of this paper that:

*H1: Civil wars will last longer when rebel groups employ more types of grievance-based recruitment appeals.*

## **Research Design**

To test the central hypothesis, data are needed that capture the diversity of grievance-based appeals that rebel groups mobilize around. In response, I employ data from the Rebel Appeals and Incentives Dataset (RAID), which contains a variety of indicators that capture the recruitment practices of militant organizations (Soules 2023). RAID contains information on a large diversity of grievance-based appeals that rebel organizations mobilize recruits around, and thus, provides sufficient opportunity to capture extensive diversity of interests and beliefs within armed movements.

RAID contains a sample of 232 rebel movements, taken from the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham et al. 2013), that operated across the world, at least at some point between 1989 and 2011. However, a group can enter RAID before this period, or exit after, so long as it was active, at some point, during the aforementioned period. RAID excludes all coups and military-related factions from the NSA dataset (Soules 2023).



### *Explanatory Variable*


Prior work tends to focus either on specific ideologies of militant organizations (e.g., Basedau et al. 2022; Nilsson and Svensson 2021), or the level of ideological polarization between rebels and governments (Keels and Wiegand 2020). While valuable, these studies do not directly capture the effects of groups mobilizing around multiple grievance-based issues, even though many rebel organizations often employ diverse grievance-based appeals (Soules 2023).

RAID contains data not only on rebels' reliance on ideological and grievance-based appeals, relative to material incentives, for recruitment, but the specific types of grievance-based recruitment appeals they employ. RAID includes 10 separate binary indicators of whether groups do, or do not, make specific types of appeals. These include appeals to (1) women's rights; (2) fighting military intervention or Western dominance and imperialism; (3) protection against external exploitation of resources; (4) resisting violent government repression; (5) left-wing ideologies; (6) radical Islamist ideologies; (7) other religious ideologies; (8) ethnonationalist or regionalist appeals; (9) general grievances against the government; and (10) a miscellaneous or "other" category (Soules 2023).

These categories are based on the most predominant types of ideological recruitment appeals identified by Soules (2023), when he generated data based on detailed, qualitative narratives that were constructed on the recruitment practices of rebel organizations. While some of these ideological or grievance-based appeals are captured in other datasets, such as measures of left-wing, religious, and ethnonationalist ideologies (e.g., Basedau et al. 2022; Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020; Keels and Wiegand 2020; Wood and Thomas 2017), other types of appeals, including resistance to violent government repression and opposition to the external exploitation of resources, are typically not captured by other datasets (Soules 2023). Thus, I use RAID

instead of other datasets primarily because it captures a greater diversity of grievances and interests that rebels mobilize around. Due to the difficulties associated with the data collection process, the recruitment variables in RAID are time invariant.

Using these ten binary indicators, I create two different variables to use for the main analysis. The first is a count of the number of ideological appeals, based on these ten categories, that rebel groups made. This variable ranges from 0 (for the 14 groups in RAID that relied exclusively on material recruitment incentives and employed no grievance-based appeals) to 5. Among the cross-section of the 232 groups in RAID, the median number of appeals employed was 2. **Figure 1** below displays the distribution of this variable. To ensure that the irregular distribution of this measure does not drive the results, I also create a binary indicator of whether a group makes two or more grievance-based appeals. Approximately 59% of groups in RAID (137 organizations) mobilized around two or more grievance-based appeals.



**Figure 1: Distribution of the Count of Grievance-Based Recruitment Appeals**

Some of these grievance-based appeals will likely be more complimentary or compatible with some appeals than others. The more incompatible the appeals that rebel groups rely on are, the more they will likely struggle to bring their conflicts to a definitive end. For instance, groups with more divergent internal interests will likely have a particularly difficult time credibly committing that all their factions will be satisfied enough with negotiations to neither splinter off or remobilize in the future to continue fighting.

The current structure of the data makes it difficult to determine which combinations of recruitment appeals are more incompatible than others. However, employing this measure provides a conservative test of the hypothesis by potentially showing that diversifying recruitment appeals, no matter their potential compatibility, presents rebel organizations with difficulties in bringing their conflicts to a definitive end, when compared to mobilizing around only one or no grievance-based appeals. We return to this issue in more depth later.

### *Outcome Variable*

The central hypothesis is concerned with how long rebel organizations continue fighting with governments. To analyze the length of conflicts, I use data from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (version 3-2021), which contains information on how and when conflicts end, and is updated from the original version developed by Kreutz (2010). As noted earlier, the main independent variables are time invariant. Thus, following the precedent of Wood and Allemang (2022), who also employ a time invariant explanatory variable, I use a dyad-episode unit of analysis. Again, groups in RAID can enter the dataset before 1989 or exit after, so long as they

were active at some point during this period. Thus, a group can enter the analysis in this study before 1989 and exit after 2011.<sup>4</sup>

I employ semiparametric Cox Proportional Hazard models to assess how the diversity of rebel groups' grievance-based appeals affects the duration of a conflict episode, in years, from the date of the first battle-related death to when it is coded in the Conflict Termination Dataset as becoming inactive or terminating. I use semiparametric Cox models because they are flexible and do not assume an underlying functional form (Cox 1972). Additionally, these models are commonly used to study the duration of civil conflicts (e.g., Cunningham et al. 2009; Sawyer et al. 2017; Conrad et al. 2019; Wood and Allemang 2022).

While civil conflicts end in a variety of manners, some scholars have examined overall duration instead. This is due to a variety of reasons, including that the factors that drive whether a conflict ends often differ from those that affect how they end; negotiations and concessions can occur without formal peace agreements; and relatedly, formalized peace agreements might occur long after the fighting actually ends. Like these prior studies, I am primarily interested in the overall duration of conflicts, as the length of conflicts is indicative of the persistent failure of bargaining (e.g., Sawyer et al. 2017; Wood and Allemang 2022).

### *Controls Variables*

I hold constant a variety of potentially confounding variables. First, extending data from the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009), I control for whether a group has *secessionist aims*, as such goals affect rebel recruitment strategies (Soules 2022) and secessionist

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<sup>4</sup> However, to be included in the analysis, the dyad had to begin by at least 2011 (e.g., the Islamic State-Iraq dyad is included but NOT the Islamic State-Cameroon dyad).

conflicts tend to be more difficult to resolve (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). I also include a variety of indicators of rebel group capacity. Conflicts involving stronger rebels tend to end more quickly as more capable rebels can bring conflicts to an end sooner (Cunningham et al. 2009) and rebels' resources affect their recruitment strategies (Weinstein 2005, 2007). Thus, I control for the ordinal measure of *rebel group strength, relative to the government*, from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009). Natural resource wealth affects recruitment strategies (Weinstein 2005) and conflict termination (e.g., Conrad et al. 2019). Thus, I also control for a dichotomous indicator of whether an organization received *funding from natural resources* at any point during its lifespan with data from the Rebel Contraband Dataset (Walsh et al. 2018).

Furthermore, with data from the NSA dataset, I employ an ordinal indicator of groups' *strength of territorial control* (none, low, moderate, or high) because such control affects rebel recruitment strategies (de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2012) and rebel group outcomes (Cunningham et al. 2009). Additionally, with information from the NSA dataset, I include two binary indicators, one measuring external support for rebels, and the other capturing external support for the governments they are fighting. Material resources provided to rebel groups by foreign governments influence their recruitment tactics (Weinstein 2005). External support also affects conflict outcomes (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008). Competition from other armed non-state actors affects how rebel movements tailor their ideological platforms (e.g., Schwab 2023; Tokdemir et al. 2021) and the intractability of conflicts (e.g., Cunningham 2006). Thus, I include a binary indicator of whether any other rebel groups were active in the country the year a dyad-episode begins.

Additionally, I control for country-level factors. Specifically, I use the Varieties of Democracy dataset's measure of Electoral Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2022). I control for

regime type because it affects conflict resolution (Cunningham et al. 2009) and because rebel groups in democracies are more concerned about their reputations (Stanton 2013), which could shape the recruitment appeals they employ. With data from Fariss et al. (2022), I also control for the logged per capita GDP and logged population of the country of the government that the group is fighting. I do this because conflicts last longer in lower income countries (Cunningham et al. 2009) and state capacity and economic conditions could affect how rebels recruit.

## **Results**

The results are presented in **Table 1**. The standard errors are clustered on the rebel group. I include multiple models, gradually adding control variables to each, to address the concern that missing data could drive the results, particularly given the sample size. The hazard ratios are reported for every variable. Thus, values below one indicate a decreased probability a conflict ends and values above one indicate an increased probability that the conflict is terminated.

**Table 1: Diversity in Grievance-Based Recruitment Appeals and Conflict Termination**


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Count of Appeals	0.833*** (0.0402)	0.837*** (0.0405)	0.901** (0.0410)			
Multiple Appeals (Binary)				0.723*** (0.0622)	0.720*** (0.0610)	0.792*** (0.0674)
Secessionist Aims		1.014 (0.108)	1.085 (0.128)		1.018 (0.107)	1.085 (0.124)
Relative Rebel Strength		0.995 (0.0678)	0.980 (0.0741)		0.983 (0.0678)	0.985 (0.0744)
Natural Resource Wealth		0.639*** (0.0603)	0.708*** (0.0654)		0.644*** (0.0601)	0.719*** (0.0659)
Territorial Control		0.928 (0.0433)	0.911** (0.0386)		0.914* (0.0433)	0.898** (0.0379)
Externally Supported Rebels		0.847* (0.0774)	0.783*** (0.0656)		0.864 (0.0802)	0.783*** (0.0654)
Externally Supported State		0.973 (0.0876)	0.833* (0.0781)		0.947 (0.0829)	0.819** (0.0745)
Any Competition		0.945 (0.0921)	1.013 (0.0993)		0.952 (0.0931)	1.020 (0.102)
Democracy Score			1.609* (0.434)			1.542* (0.403)
per capita GDP (Logged)			0.900 (0.115)			0.913 (0.115)
Population (Logged)			0.803*** (0.0671)			0.812** (0.0670)
Observations	424	388	368	424	388	368

Standard errors in parentheses

Hazard ratios reported

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Across all models, I find strong support for the central hypothesis that conflicts will be less likely to terminate when rebel organizations mobilize around multiple grievance-based issues. Both the number of grievance-based appeals rebels make, as well the binary indicator of whether they make two or more appeals, have a strong association with the probability they continue fighting. In the models with the full set of control variables, the count of the number of grievance-based appeals is associated with an approximately 9.9% chance that a rebel group survives in a given period, while the binary indicator is associated with about a 20.8% chance of the group continuing to fight. **Figure 2** displays the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates with 90% confidence intervals.



**Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for the Use of Multiple Grievance-Based Appeals**

Thus, these results provide strong evidence for the argument that mobilizing recruits around a variety of issues generates barriers to resolving civil conflicts. This suggests that rebels' efforts to appeal to broad segments of society, or the "median rebel" (Gabbay 2008), might sometimes



backfire. These findings also provide nuance to our understanding of the benefits that ideological-based recruitment strategies are alleged to provide to militant movements (e.g., Weinstein 2005, 2007).

### **Living Long and Prospering?**

As discussed earlier, an alternative explanation of the main findings is that groups that make more diverse recruitment appeals survive longer because they are better at adapting to challenges and attracting more recruits. Said differently, the results could also be interpreted as indicating that recruitment diversification benefits rebels by increasing their power to resist government force. To differentiate whether recruitment diversity has deleterious or beneficial effects for rebel organizations, I examine whether and how these strategies affect the probability rebel groups make it to the negotiating table with governments. This is relevant as rebels' ability to make it to the negotiating stage affects the extent to which it is able to garner concessions from governments (e.g., Thomas 2014).

To do this, I replicate a study by Cunningham and Sawyer (2019), who examine how the ways in which rebel leaders come to power affect the probability that their groups enter negotiations with the governments they are fighting. The results are in the appendix. The authors built an original, binary indicator of whether a rebel-government dyad engaged in negotiations. Cunningham and Sawyer (p. 626) note that for negotiations to meet the threshold of inclusion: "The subject of the talks must concern an issue related to the conflict, for example the type of incompatibility, ceasefires, or exchange of prisoners. We exclude negotiations that were purely about the process, such as initial talks to outline parameters for negotiations to occur." As will be

discussed later, I also examine the specific ways in which rebel groups end, including through negotiated settlement. However, data on *how* rebel groups end do not capture whether there was an attempt to negotiate (Kreutz 2010). Given its relevance to the theory, I also examine whether recruitment strategies affect the probability of negotiations occurring in the first place.

Across all models, both the count (**Table A1**) and binary (**Table A2**) measures of recruitment diversity have a negative and statistically significant association with the probability that a rebel group enters negotiations. This supports the proposed mechanism that negotiations are less likely to occur because of bargaining problems associated with mobilizing around a diversity of ideological appeals. Thus, even if recruitment diversity does help increase rebel groups' power to resist in some regards, I still provide evidence that this strategy is deleterious for rebels overall, as it is associated with a decreased probability of negotiations occurring.

### **Are Some Appeals More (In)compatible?**

The main measures of recruitment diversity do not distinguish between types of appeals that are more or less compatible with each other. Indeed, the theory focuses on recruitment strategies in which rebel movements make *incompatible* recruitment appeals, as these are the most likely to induce bargaining issues for militant groups. Determining what types of grievance-based appeals are most compatible with each other is not a straightforward task, as there is likely to be variation based on how individual types of ideologies and grievances manifest in organizations (e.g., moderate religious appeals might be more compatible with other grievances than radical religious appeals).

To try to approximate incompatibility, I examine every possible pairing of individual recruitment appeals in RAID.<sup>5</sup> I examined the pairwise correlations between these appeals. I then identified which of these pairings had negative and statistically significant associations (i.e., whether the two variables in a pair had a negative and statistically significant relationship with each other). I did so to determine which types of recruitment appeals were less likely to be seen together, to try to proxy for incompatibility. While not a perfect measure of (in)compatibility, I view this as more systematic than trying to more arbitrarily determine which combinations of recruitment tactics were least compatible.

After identifying these combinations, I built a binary indicator of whether rebel groups made at least one of these combinations of appeals. Said differently, this variable indicates whether a rebel organization employs multiple types of recruitment appeals that are rarely used together. I rerun the main analysis, employing this measure as the main explanatory variable instead. The results are available in the appendix. Across all models, making incompatible recruitment appeals is associated with longer conflicts. However, this association is statistically significant in only the first two models, dropping below traditional levels of significance in the model with the full set of control variables (**Table A3**). The null results in the last model could be driven by the observations that are dropped from the full set of control variables being included or because of the impreciseness with which recruitment appeal incompatibility is measured. Future work should examine the compatibility of different types of recruitment appeals in more depth.

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<sup>5</sup> Each pair is counted only once. For instance, radical Islamist and ethno-nationalist *is one pair, not two* (e.g., radical Islamist-ethno-nationalist and ethno-nationalist-radical Islamist). Counting pairs twice, of course, would lead to an overestimation of the combinations of appeals groups make. Thus, each pair is counted only once.

## **Robustness Checks**

I conduct a battery of robustness checks to assess the strength of the findings. The results are available in the appendix.

### *Excluding Non-Ideological Groups*

First, it is possible that groups in the dataset that make no grievance-based appeals (i.e., they rely entirely on material incentives) are driving the results, as rebels that primarily pursue material wealth often fear losing access to such wealth as part of peace negotiations, leading conflicts over natural resources to last longer (e.g., Conrad et al. 2019). To address this issue, I rerun the main analysis, excluding all groups that are coded in RAID as relying exclusively on material incentives for recruitment (Soules 2023). Across all models, I continue to find strong support for the central hypothesis (**Table A4**). Thus, even among a sample of only groups that make at least some grievance-based appeals, employing a larger number of appeals is still associated with a lower probability of conflict termination.

### *Accounting for Reliance on Ideological Appeals*

Relatedly, the extent to which groups recruit with ideological or grievance-based appeals or material incentives could be driving the results. Specifically, rebel groups that rely more on ideological appeals than material incentives for recruitment are expected to be more resilient (Weinstein 2005, 2007). They are also likely in a better position to make a wider diversity of ideological appeals as well. In response, I use the aforementioned variable from RAID, which is a five-point ordinal indicator measuring the extent to which rebel groups rely on ideological

appeals, relative to material incentives, for recruitment. Higher values of this variable indicate greater reliance on ideological or grievance-based appeals, lower levels indicate greater reliance on material incentives, while middling levels capture more mixed approaches (Soules 2023).

I first rerun the main models, substituting this variable for the measures of ideological diversity. Across all models, I do not find a statistically significant association between groups' relative reliance on ideological or material appeals and their longevity (**Table A5**). Next, I reconduct the original analysis, and include measures of diversity in grievances and reliance on ideological appeals in the same model. Even when holding constant rebel organizations' relative reliance on grievance-based appeals, I continue to find strong support for the argument that a greater number of appeals contributes to conflicts becoming more intractable (**Table A6**).

### *Accounting for Specific Ideologies*

Another potential issue is that specific ideologies or grievances, rather than the number of grievances organized around, cause some conflicts to be more intractable than others. For instance, Nilsson and Svensson (2021) find that radical Islamist and left-wing rebel groups tend to last longer. I did not control for these ideologies in the main models out of concern that they would induce multicollinearity due to their high correlation with the specific types of ideological recruitment appeals groups employ. However, I run additional models in which I control for two separate binary indicators of whether groups have a radical Islamist or left-wing ideology, with combined data from the Women in Armed Rebellion Dataset (WARD) (Wood and Thomas 2017) and the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) dataset (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020). The main results hold across all models (**Table A7**).

### *Accounting for Specific Appeals*

To ensure that individual types of grievance-based appeals are not driving the results, I rerun all the main models again, each time excluding groups that make each of the ten types of ideological appeals individually across the different sets of tests (e.g., a set of tests excluding groups that make radical Islamist appeals; a set of tests excluding groups that make appeals against government violence; etc.). For nine of the ten types of appeals, the main independent variables have a statistically significant association with increased survival of rebel organizations, *across all models*, when these types of appeals are dropped from the analysis. The only exception is that when groups that employ ethno-nationalist appeals are excluded from the analysis, the main independent variable remains statistically significant in four of the six models. Due to space constraints in the appendix, the results of these ten different tests are summarized in **Table A8**. The results of these tests are available upon request.

### *Reverse Causality*

It is also important to account for the possibility of reverse causality. Specifically, it is possible that when groups survive longer, they both have more opportunity to make new types of ideological recruitment appeals and that they make new appeals out of desperation to continue surviving. Given that the data in RAID are time invariant, they cannot be used to account for the timing of when groups adopt specific recruitment strategies.

However, data in the aforementioned FORGE dataset (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020) capture the initial ideologies of rebel organizations, and thus, are not reflective of groups adopting these positions later in their lifespans. Using data from FORGE, which contains several

non-mutually exclusive, binary indicators of whether rebel groups were founded on specific ideologies (e.g., left-wing, religious, nationalist, etc.), I create a three-point ordinal variable measuring whether the group was founded around no, one, or two or more ideologies specified in FORGE. Across all models, having a larger number of ideologies has a statistically significant association with a lower probability of conflicts being terminated (**Table A9**). These findings suggest that conflicts are more intractable when rebels mobilize around multiple ideologies from the outset.

### *Outcomes*

Finally, it is possible that diverse grievance-based appeals benefit rebel organizations in the long-run by drawing in more recruits, thereby increasing their strength and subsequent bargaining power. To account for this possibility, I once again use data from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (version 3-2021) (Kreutz 2010). I employ competing risk analysis to assess how diversity in grievance-based appeals affect the probability that rebel groups experience the following outcomes: negotiated settlement, rebel victory, government victory, or the rebel group “fizzling out” through low levels of activity.

Recruitment diversity never has a statistically significant association with conflicts ending in negotiated settlement. Diverse recruitment appeals are associated with an increased probability that conflicts end in rebel victory, but this relationship is statistically significant in only one of six models. Recruitment diversity is also associated with an increased probability of government victory, but this relationship is only statistically significant in two of the six models. Thus, the findings for these two outcomes are very fragile. However, I do find consistent, statistically

significant evidence that diverse recruitment appeals are associated with a lower probability that groups end through low levels of activity. Overall, I do not find evidence of platform diversity helping rebels achieve their long-term goals, either through negotiated settlement or outright victory. These results are summarized in **Table A10** in the appendix due to space constraints. The results of these tests are available upon request.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

Rebel groups often attempt to mobilize recruits around a variety of grievances. In many cases, militant leaders likely hope that they will appeal to broad segments of the population and draw in a significant number of recruits and material resources if they do so. However, I posit that rebel organizations that mobilize around multiple grievances have more difficulty bringing their conflicts to definitive ends.

This is because rebel movements that organize around diverse grievances represent a greater number of interests, which, in turn, introduces a variety of problems into the bargaining process. Specifically, diverse interests within rebel organizations can create more veto players; generate credible commitment problems as there will be lower confidence that all factions of rebel movements are satisfied enough by negotiations to not take up arms again; lead to uncertainty about the resolve of these organizations; and exacerbate issue indivisibilities. Using novel data on the diversity of recruitment appeals made by rebel organizations, I find support for my argument that conflicts will be more intractable when armed groups mobilize around a larger number of grievances. Subsequent analysis revealed that groups that make a diversity of recruitment appeals are less likely to make it to the negotiating table, further highlighting the risks of this mobilization strategy.



This study provides one of the first quantitative examinations of the *consequences* of the breadth or diversity of rebel recruitment appeals. It also contributes to our understanding of how ideology and grievances affect the outcomes of civil conflicts. Moreover, these results suggest that it might actually be ineffective for rebels to try to appeal to the “median voter” or to take a “big tent” approach. Scholars can build off this study in a variety of ways. First, they can examine if and how rebel organizations are able to offset the problems of diverse constituencies, through practices such as indoctrinating members (e.g., Hoover Green 2016, 2018). Second, scholars could use the data to examine other consequences of making diverse recruitment appeals, including its effects on rebels’ treatment of civilians. Third, scholars could employ measures for this study to investigate the factors that drive armed movements to mobilize around wide or narrow grievance-based platforms.

Ideologies and grievances are factors that scholars of civil wars and other forms of political violence should continue to take seriously (e.g., Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2014; Leader Maynard 2019). However, in addition to examining the role of material versus ideological approaches, the degree of ideological extremeness, and persuasion versus coercion and force, we must more fully consider the breadth or diversity of issues that rebel organizations mobilize around. Indeed, this study provides evidence that conflicts become more intractable when rebel organizations take a “big tent” approach to recruitment.

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## Appendix

**Table A1: Diversity in Grievance-Based Recruitment Appeals and Negotiations (Count IV)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Count of Appeals	-0.236*** (0.0820)	-0.221** (0.0913)	-0.237*** (0.0825)	-0.224** (0.0909)	-0.240*** (0.0820)	-0.225** (0.0919)	-0.210** (0.0919)
Local Selection Process	0.439 (0.284)	0.491* (0.294)					
Orientation	-0.756** (0.370)	-0.893** (0.393)					
Election			0.639* (0.367)	0.806** (0.375)			0.651* (0.385)
Cadre			0.0940 (0.638)	0.00603 (0.641)			-0.166 (0.634)
Inherited			0.713 (0.514)	0.774 (0.557)			0.694 (0.571)
Founder					-1.124** (0.470)	-1.096** (0.462)	-0.993** (0.469)
Split					-0.212 (0.632)	-0.403 (0.714)	-0.311 (0.720)
Merged					-1.400** (0.713)	-2.287*** (0.834)	-2.184*** (0.840)
Third Party					1.565* (0.888)	1.795** (0.869)	1.962** (0.878)
ln(State Troops)	-0.449*** (0.0742)	-0.387*** (0.0906)	-0.442*** (0.0743)	-0.379*** (0.0893)	-0.459*** (0.0745)	-0.404*** (0.0909)	-0.398*** (0.0923)
ln(Rebel Troops)	0.317*** (0.0608)	0.330*** (0.0655)	0.325*** (0.0607)	0.340*** (0.0654)	0.328*** (0.0616)	0.343*** (0.0658)	0.332*** (0.0666)
External Intervention in Conflict	-0.643** (0.267)	-0.547** (0.276)	-0.632** (0.266)	-0.544** (0.273)	-0.686** (0.272)	-0.597** (0.282)	-0.618** (0.281)
ln(Battle Deaths)-Best Estimate	0.0991** (0.0498)	0.0915* (0.0540)	0.105** (0.0493)	0.0940* (0.0536)	0.0934* (0.0502)	0.0883 (0.0547)	0.0849 (0.0544)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.150 (0.420)		0.135 (0.419)		0.161 (0.425)	0.204 (0.425)
ln(Population)		-0.149 (0.0950)		-0.153 (0.0948)		-0.142 (0.0949)	-0.155 (0.0967)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.209 (0.134)		-0.233* (0.134)		-0.184 (0.133)	-0.227* (0.136)
Legal Political Wing		0.370 (0.312)		0.337 (0.312)		0.404 (0.312)	0.414 (0.315)
Democracy		0.789*** (0.278)		0.836*** (0.279)		0.756*** (0.276)	0.801*** (0.282)
t	-0.0290 (0.0517)	-0.0357 (0.0533)	0.0157 (0.0451)	0.0152 (0.0468)	-0.0436 (0.0510)	-0.0537 (0.0520)	-0.0348 (0.0537)
t <sup>2</sup>	0.00163 (0.00253)	0.00210 (0.00258)	-0.000267 (0.00231)	-4.95e-05 (0.00235)	0.00222 (0.00252)	0.00281 (0.00255)	0.00206 (0.00259)
t <sup>3</sup>	-1.70e-05 (3.27e-05)	-2.33e-05 (3.32e-05)	4.77e-06 (3.02e-05)	1.33e-06 (3.06e-05)	-2.34e-05 (3.26e-05)	-3.07e-05 (3.30e-05)	-2.25e-05 (3.32e-05)
Constant	1.497* (0.881)	3.481** (1.551)	1.037 (0.857)	3.201** (1.553)	1.676* (0.887)	3.466** (1.555)	3.757** (1.581)
Observations	866	850	866	850	866	850	850

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Table A2: Diversity in Grievance-Based Recruitment Appeals and Negotiations (Binary IV)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Multiple Appeals (Binary)	-0.546*** (0.186)	-0.545*** (0.210)	-0.561*** (0.185)	-0.569*** (0.207)	-0.542*** (0.185)	-0.533** (0.210)	-0.512** (0.210)
Local Selection Process	0.460 (0.285)	0.516* (0.295)					
Orientation	-0.717* (0.371)	-0.860** (0.393)					
Election			0.672* (0.372)	0.838** (0.376)			0.688* (0.387)
Cadre			0.0784 (0.621)	-0.0199 (0.624)			-0.186 (0.618)
Inherited			0.708 (0.516)	0.807 (0.559)			0.724 (0.568)
Founder					-1.078** (0.473)	-1.048** (0.464)	-0.942** (0.472)
Split					-0.208 (0.623)	-0.432 (0.705)	-0.337 (0.712)
Merged					-1.328* (0.730)	-2.209** (0.859)	-2.101** (0.865)
Third Party					1.465 (0.893)	1.727** (0.871)	1.906** (0.879)
ln(State Troops)	-0.436*** (0.0750)	-0.382*** (0.0901)	-0.430*** (0.0753)	-0.376*** (0.0892)	-0.446*** (0.0751)	-0.397*** (0.0903)	-0.392*** (0.0919)
ln(Rebel Troops)	0.303*** (0.0610)	0.322*** (0.0652)	0.311*** (0.0608)	0.333*** (0.0653)	0.313*** (0.0616)	0.334*** (0.0655)	0.324*** (0.0663)
External Intervention in Conflict	-0.649** (0.266)	-0.551** (0.275)	-0.642** (0.266)	-0.551** (0.273)	-0.691** (0.271)	-0.599** (0.281)	-0.621** (0.280)
ln(Battle Deaths)-Best Estimate	0.0976** (0.0497)	0.0863 (0.0540)	0.102** (0.0494)	0.0877 (0.0538)	0.0920* (0.0501)	0.0833 (0.0547)	0.0797 (0.0545)
Ethnic Fractionalization		0.249 (0.421)		0.238 (0.422)		0.260 (0.424)	0.298 (0.426)
ln(Population)		-0.130 (0.0964)		-0.132 (0.0963)		-0.125 (0.0958)	-0.138 (0.0980)
ln(GDPpc)		-0.214 (0.135)		-0.238* (0.135)		-0.190 (0.134)	-0.234* (0.137)
Legal Political Wing		0.382 (0.312)		0.345 (0.313)		0.419 (0.313)	0.426 (0.316)
Democracy		0.779*** (0.275)		0.832*** (0.276)		0.742*** (0.272)	0.793*** (0.278)
t	-0.0232 (0.0514)	-0.0271 (0.0533)	0.0196 (0.0448)	0.0224 (0.0465)	-0.0387 (0.0507)	-0.0462 (0.0519)	-0.0269 (0.0537)
t <sup>2</sup>	0.00113 (0.00251)	0.00152 (0.00257)	-0.000676 (0.00228)	-0.000564 (0.00233)	0.00174 (0.00249)	0.00226 (0.00254)	0.00152 (0.00258)
t <sup>3</sup>	-1.09e-05 (3.24e-05)	-1.65e-05 (3.30e-05)	9.78e-06 (2.99e-05)	7.30e-06 (3.04e-05)	-1.74e-05 (3.22e-05)	-2.41e-05 (3.28e-05)	-1.61e-05 (3.30e-05)
Constant	1.355 (0.882)	3.203** (1.562)	0.936 (0.864)	2.942* (1.562)	1.522* (0.886)	3.187** (1.565)	3.505** (1.593)
Observations	866	850	866	850	866	850	850

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A3: Incompatibility in Recruitment Appeals and Conflict Termination**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Appeal Incompatibility	0.815** (0.0834)	0.808** (0.0811)	0.903 (0.0832)
Secessionist Aims		1.026 (0.108)	1.108 (0.132)
Relative Rebel Strength		1.001 (0.0702)	0.971 (0.0734)
Natural Resource Wealth		0.622*** (0.0594)	0.707*** (0.0662)
Territorial Control		0.930 (0.0428)	0.908** (0.0387)
Externally Supported Rebels		0.849* (0.0779)	0.777*** (0.0651)
Externally Supported State		0.969 (0.0876)	0.833* (0.0789)
Any Competition		0.967 (0.0956)	1.025 (0.0999)
Democracy Score			1.485 (0.385)
per capita GDP (Logged)			0.882 (0.110)
Population (Logged)			0.795*** (0.0667)
Observations	424	388	368

Standard errors in parentheses

Hazard ratios reported

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

**Table A4: Diversity in Grievance-Based Appeals and Conflict Termination (Excluding Entirely Material-Based Recruitment Strategies)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Count of Appeals	0.814*** (0.0430)	0.814*** (0.0439)	0.896** (0.0452)			
Multiple Appeals (Binary)				0.721*** (0.0633)	0.718*** (0.0626)	0.796*** (0.0699)
Secessionist Aims		0.982 (0.103)	1.080 (0.127)		1.004 (0.105)	1.087 (0.124)
Relative Rebel Strength		0.988 (0.0695)	0.968 (0.0753)		0.971 (0.0696)	0.971 (0.0753)
Natural Resource Wealth		0.636*** (0.0611)	0.703*** (0.0658)		0.640*** (0.0611)	0.714*** (0.0665)
Territorial Control		0.935 (0.0434)	0.915** (0.0385)		0.922* (0.0442)	0.902** (0.0381)
Externally Supported Rebels		0.860* (0.0788)	0.793*** (0.0668)		0.879 (0.0823)	0.792*** (0.0665)
Externally Supported State		0.948 (0.0850)	0.818** (0.0786)		0.929 (0.0817)	0.805** (0.0754)
Any Competition		0.932 (0.0943)	1.010 (0.104)		0.935 (0.0949)	1.016 (0.106)
Democracy Score			1.510 (0.407)			1.450 (0.376)
per capita GDP (Logged)			0.924 (0.117)			0.934 (0.117)
Population (Logged)			0.796*** (0.0677)			0.805*** (0.0675)
Observations	405	369	350	405	369	350

Standard errors in parentheses

Hazard ratios reported

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A5: Relative Reliance on Ideological Appeals and Conflict Termination**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reliance on Ideological Appeals	1.012 (0.0350)	0.969 (0.0361)	0.956 (0.0346)
Secessionist Aims		1.053 (0.113)	1.156 (0.137)
Relative Rebel Strength		0.963 (0.0682)	0.951 (0.0705)
Natural Resource Wealth		0.610*** (0.0585)	0.697*** (0.0650)
Territorial Control		0.946 (0.0453)	0.912** (0.0401)
Externally Supported Rebels		0.865 (0.0809)	0.780*** (0.0656)
Externally Supported State		0.969 (0.0883)	0.835* (0.0792)
Any Competition		0.924 (0.0904)	0.997 (0.0955)
Democracy Score			1.491 (0.377)
per capita GDP (Logged)			0.872 (0.108)
Population (Logged)			0.791*** (0.0653)
Observations	424	388	368

Standard errors in parentheses

Hazard ratios reported

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

**Table A6: Diversity in Grievance-Based Appeals and Conflict Termination (Controlling for Reliance on Ideological Appeals)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Count of Appeals	0.820*** (0.0406)	0.829*** (0.0433)	0.909** (0.0437)			
Multiple Appeals (Binary)				0.716*** (0.0622)	0.720*** (0.0646)	0.803** (0.0708)
Reliance on Ideological Appeals	1.051 (0.0392)	1.021 (0.0434)	0.978 (0.0379)	1.030 (0.0351)	1.001 (0.0386)	0.975 (0.0358)
Secessionist Aims		0.998 (0.105)	1.104 (0.131)		1.017 (0.106)	1.106 (0.127)
Relative Rebel Strength		0.997 (0.0688)	0.977 (0.0730)		0.983 (0.0680)	0.982 (0.0733)
Natural Resource Wealth		0.644*** (0.0611)	0.704*** (0.0654)		0.644*** (0.0599)	0.714*** (0.0654)
Territorial Control		0.928 (0.0430)	0.911** (0.0389)		0.914* (0.0433)	0.898** (0.0382)
Externally Supported Rebels		0.848* (0.0774)	0.781*** (0.0659)		0.864 (0.0800)	0.781*** (0.0655)
Externally Supported State		0.967 (0.0873)	0.836* (0.0788)		0.947 (0.0825)	0.823** (0.0755)
Any Competition		0.949 (0.0927)	1.009 (0.0985)		0.952 (0.0935)	1.016 (0.101)
Democracy Score			1.614* (0.434)			1.555* (0.404)
per capita GDP (Logged)			0.895 (0.113)			0.908 (0.113)
Population (Logged)			0.802*** (0.0659)			0.810*** (0.0658)
Observations	424	388	368	424	388	368

Standard errors in parentheses

Hazard ratios reported

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A7: Diversity in Grievance-Based Appeals and Conflict Termination (Controlling for Broader Ideologies)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Count of Appeals	0.850*** (0.0396)	0.871*** (0.0415)	0.896** (0.0417)			
Multiple Appeals (Binary)				0.759*** (0.0695)	0.787*** (0.0706)	0.786** (0.0742)
Radical Islamist	0.847 (0.103)	0.805 (0.106)	1.038 (0.131)	0.835 (0.106)	0.783* (0.105)	1.048 (0.136)
Left-Wing	0.799* (0.0918)	0.751** (0.0895)	0.803* (0.0995)	0.798** (0.0897)	0.749** (0.0862)	0.811* (0.0972)
Secessionist Aims		0.952 (0.103)	1.008 (0.128)		0.952 (0.103)	1.012 (0.125)
Relative Rebel Strength		0.932 (0.0683)	0.971 (0.0711)		0.921 (0.0680)	0.975 (0.0716)
Natural Resource Wealth		0.638*** (0.0614)	0.699*** (0.0667)		0.641*** (0.0611)	0.712*** (0.0669)
Territorial Control		0.932 (0.0450)	0.940 (0.0430)		0.921* (0.0442)	0.926* (0.0418)
Externally Supported Rebels		0.870 (0.0808)	0.782*** (0.0660)		0.884 (0.0833)	0.781*** (0.0655)
Externally Supported State		0.998 (0.0910)	0.845* (0.0824)		0.980 (0.0873)	0.827** (0.0782)
Any Competition		0.939 (0.0924)	0.991 (0.0992)		0.944 (0.0933)	0.998 (0.101)
Democracy Score			1.662* (0.478)			1.593* (0.446)
per capita GDP (Logged)			0.939 (0.133)			0.945 (0.134)
Population (Logged)			0.856 (0.0827)			0.863 (0.0824)
Observations	424	388	368	424	388	368

Standard errors in parentheses

Hazard ratios reported

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A8: Summary of Results for Tests Dropping Different Types of Ideological Appeals**

<b>Type of Ideological Appeal Dropped</b>	<b>Results</b>
Radical Islamist	Support for H1 in all Six Models
Other Religious	Support for H1 in all Six Models
Left-Wing	Support for H1 in all Six Models
Ethnonationalist	Support for H1 in Four of Six Models (two are statistically insignificant)
Anti-Intervention	Support for H1 in all Six Models
Anti-Resource Exploitation	Support for H1 in all Six Models
Anti-Government Violence	Support for H1 in all Six Models
Feminist	Support for H1 in all Six Models
General Anti-Government	Support for H1 in all Six Models
Other	Support for H1 in all Six Models

**Table A9: Ideological Diversity and Conflict Termination**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ideological Diversity	0.831*** (0.0488)	0.780*** (0.0518)	0.820*** (0.0626)
Secessionist Aims		1.096 (0.118)	1.099 (0.133)
Relative Rebel Strength		0.891 (0.0668)	0.941 (0.0678)
Natural Resource Wealth		0.635*** (0.0611)	0.697*** (0.0643)
Territorial Control		0.945 (0.0456)	0.933 (0.0428)
Externally Supported Rebels		0.929 (0.0896)	0.813** (0.0696)
Externally Supported State		0.949 (0.0849)	0.853 (0.0838)
Any Competition		0.967 (0.0960)	1.019 (0.0984)
Democracy Score			1.492 (0.384)
per capita GDP (Logged)			0.977 (0.136)
Population (Logged)			0.860* (0.0777)
Observations	412	382	363

Standard errors in parentheses

Hazard ratios reported

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1



**Table A10: Summary of Results for Effects of Recruitment Diversity on Types of Conflict Termination**

<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Result</b>
Negotiated Settlement	Recruitment diversity associated with quicker time until negotiated settlement; not statistically significant in any model
Rebel Victory	Recruitment diversity associated with quicker time until rebel victory; statistically significant in only one of six models
Government Victory	Recruitment diversity associated with quicker time until government victory; statistically significant in only two of six models
Rebels Fizzling Out	Recruitment diversity associated with slower time until government victory; statistically significant in all six models