Women's Status and the Gender Gap in Support for Political Violence

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Abstract:

Women tend to be less supportive of military intervention than men, and countries where women's political empowerment is higher experience less internal conflict. However, little is known about the relationship between gender and attitudes toward political violence within one's own country. We test between competing possibilities on the presence and variation of a gender gap in these attitudes. One strand of research suggests that as societal gender equality increases, the gender gap will decrease because the erosion of masculinist norms of solving disputes with violence reduces men's support for political violence. A second strand suggests that the gender gap would increase in egalitarian societies because women's political attitudes are more liberal and anti-war under more egalitarian conditions. A third strand is agnostic on what levels of gender inequality do, but suggests that sudden increase in equality may lead sexist men to turn to political violence to counteract perceived dominance threats. Using large-scale survey data, find that the gender gap, while generally present, is higher in more egalitarian societies. There is no evidence that support for political violence surges among sexist men in response to advances in women's empowerment.

Introduction

Where women have more social and political power, both the instigation of inter-state war (Caprioli 2000; Cohen and Karim 2022; Gizelis 2009; Saiya et al. 2017) and civil conflict (Caprioli 2005; Dahlum and Wig 2020; Harris and Milton 2016; Hudson and Hodgson 2022; McDermott 2020; Melander 2005; Nagel 2020) is less common. This appears, at least in part, to be driven by public opinion. On average, women are less supportive of military intervention than men (Conover and Sapiro 1993; Eichenberg 2019; Nincic and Nincic 2002). This gender gap, however, varies with context. The gap is narrower for interventions with humanitarian goals (Brooks and Valentino 2011; Eichenberg 2019). Contextually, where gender equality is higher, the gender gap is stronger (Eichenberg 2019).

The macro-level association between women's empowerment and internal conflict resolution can occur with a number of micro-level processes. One explanation for it could be a gender gap in support for political violence. If women are less supportive of political violence than men, then as their influence increases, they have a stronger chance of influencing leaders to resolve conflicts peaceably. However, it could be that gender equality, and changes in social norms associated with it, lead both men and women to turn away from political violence. However, with a few exceptions (Dyrstad 2020; Wood and Ramirez 2018), we know little about the relationship between gender, societal-level gender equality and support for political violence in one's own country.

In this paper, we test between several competing possibilities on the relationship between gender, societal-level gender equality, and support for political violence. The, first, which we dub the 'amelioration' hypothesis, is that the gender gap, whereby men support political violence more than women, is strongest in unequal societies. The gender gap becomes smaller or

disappears in more egalitarian societies because men are less likely to be socialized to value violence as a tool to solve disputes (Huber 2019; Melander 2005; Wood and Ramirez 2018). The second, which we dub the 'differentiation' hypothesis, predicts the opposite. The gender gap increases in egalitarian societies because processes of modernization liberalize women's political attitudes both in absolute terms and relative to men (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Shorrocks 2018). The third, which we dub the 'backlash' hypothesis, implicates changes rather than levels of gender equality in support for political violence. In times of increasing gender equality, the gender gap increases because sexist men come to embrace political violence to counteract perceived status loss (Kattelman and Burns 2023; Matfess et al. 2023; Mills et al. 2020).

Using large-scale cross-national survey data spanning 59 countries, our evidence largely supports the 'differentiation hypothesis' rather than the 'amelioration hypothesis.' In most countries, there is not a significant gender gap in support for political violence. However, where the gap exists, men almost always support political violence more than women. The gender gap is strongest in contexts with high gender equality because women's support for political violence is lower in more egalitarian contexts, while men's support does not vary by societal gender equality. Furthermore, we find no support for the 'backlash hypothesis.' There is no evidence that the gender gap is affected by short-term changes in gender equality. While sexism is associated with higher support for political violence, its effects are similar among men and women, and do not change with context.

These findings have several important implications. First, they clarify the macro-level relationship between women's empowerment and internal violence at the macro-level. More egalitarian contexts experience less political violence because women, who support political violence less than men, have more influence on political decision-making. However, it is also the

case that living in a more gender-egalitarian society is concomitant with women's opposition to political violence in the first place.

Second, they bolster a burgeoning literature on the contextual determinants of the gender gap in support for war. In the context of inter-state war, the gender gap in support emerges for interventions without a humanitarian component (Brooks and Valentino 2011; Eichenberg 2019). However, those patterns alone do not illustrate the mechanism for gender disparities. Our findings, by generalizing to political violence within the nation-state, make clear that it is indeed violence, rather than government intervention that does not prioritize social welfare, that leads to the emergence of a gender gap.

Third, these findings suggest that the progress societies have made towards gender inequality provides a check on extralegal violence's emergence as a tool of resolving disputes. In an era where democratic norms are weakening, there is significant worry that political violence will emerge as an acceptable tactic in liberal democracies (Kalmoe and Mason 2022). If citizens, especially women, in more gender-egalitarian contexts stridently oppose its use, a weakening of the norm against political violence is less likely to develop.

Gender, Gender Inequality, and Political Violence: Three Explanations

At the macro-level, the greater a country's level of gender egalitarianism, the less likely it is to engage in international conflict (Caprioli 2000, 2003; Caprioli and Boyer 2001), or experience civil war (Caprioli 2005; Hudson and Matfess 2017; Melander 2005) or terrorism (Harris and Milton 2016; Huber 2019; Hudson and Hodgson 2022; Saiya et al. 2017; Salman 2015). Due to men's historical dominance, differences in gender egalitarianism largely index differences in women's empowerment. Indeed, women tend to be less tolerant than men of the use of force in

conventional war (Eichenberg 2003; 2016; 2019; Eichenberg and Stoll 2017; Fite et al. 1990; Gallagher 1993; Lizotte 2019; Mueller 1973; Welch and Thomas 1988; Wilcox et al. 1996). However, it does not automatically follow that this same pattern exists for domestic political conflict. Nor is it the case that macro-level findings are driven specifically by women. Existing evidence suggests a few key competing sets of expectations, which we detail here.

Amelioration Hypothesis

The first set of expectations, which we refer to as the 'amelioration hypothesis,' argues that the gender gap in support for political violence will be strongest in patriarchal societies and weakest in more gender-egalitarian societies. While living in a more gender-equal society might still produce increased opposition to political violence among women, men are much more responsive to changes in context than women. Both this hypothesis, and the 'differentiation hypothesis' below, require gender differences in attitudes and behavior to vary with context. In other words, they must not be universal. Gender differences in attitudes and behavior are indeed highly context-variant (Eagly and Wood 1999), including aggression (Lightdale and Prentice 1994; Richardson and Hammock 2007), which is a key predictor of support for political violence (Kalmoe 2014; Kalmoe and Mason 2022).

One major route through which gender differences emerge is in gender role socialization. Social Learning Theory (Bandura 1977) and the related Social Cognitive Theory of Gender Development (Bussey and Bandura 1999) argue that people learn which attitudes and behaviors are acceptable through observation and feedback from peers and adults. Boys are socialized to confront threats directly (Caprioli 2000; Umberson 2003) and use physical aggression to manage

disputes (Richardson and Hammock 2007). By contrast, girls are socialized to be cooperative and use avoidance in response to perceived threats (Umberson 2003).

While these differences in socialization still occur in more egalitarian cultures (see Bussey and Bandura 1999; Lawless 2015; Lawless and Fox 2005), they are particularly pronounced in more patriarchal cultures. Many patriarchal cultures are also honor cultures, in which men must be willing to defend their reputations via violence against adversaries and controlling women in their lives (Glick et al. 2016; Saucier et al. 2016). These personal beliefs carry over into politics, where men internalize masculine norms come to see violence as an acceptable – if not useful – tool for resolving disputes (Bjarnegård et al. 2017; 2023; Cohen and Karim 2022; Melander 2005), and women would turn away from these same tactics. If more egalitarian cultures promote the use of cooperation over violence as a means to resolve disputes (Goldstein 2003; Tickner 1992, 2001), then egalitarianism entails much more of a shift in cooperative norms for men than for women. Consistent with this pattern, Wood and Ramirez (2018) find that highly sexist men (who strongly endorse patriarchal norms) are more supportive of political violence than highly sexist women. However, this discrepancy closes at higher levels of endorsement of gender equality, mainly as a function of men's changing attitudes. If the ameliorative hypothesis holds, we would observe the following:

1) On average, men display higher support for political violence than women.
2) As societies become more gender-egalitarian, men's and women's attitudes toward political violence will become more similar.
3) The decreasing gender gap will be a function of gender equality having a stronger (negative) effect on support for political violence among men than women.

Differentiation Hypothesis

A second set of possible expectations can be encapsulated in what we call the 'differentiation hypothesis.' Like the 'amelioration hypothesis,' the 'differentiation hypothesis' accepts that gender role socialization leads men to be more supportive of political violence than women, and that egalitarian contexts socialize men and women differently from more patriarchal contexts. However, instead of the gender gap decreasing with higher levels of gender equality, the gender gap becomes *stronger* with increased levels of gender equality. This is because women's opposition to political violence hardens faster than men's concomitant with increasing gender egalitarianism.

There are two sets of evidence to indicate this pattern is plausible. First, in nearly every society, women endorse sexism less than men. However, in societies where men strongly endorse sexist beliefs, so do women (Brandt 2011; Glick et al. 2000). Societies with highly sexist men and women also tend to have higher levels of gender inequality (Brandt 2011). Women who internalize the norms of highly patriarchal societies might internalize expectations for interpersonal cooperativeness (Bussey and Bandura 1999; Umberson 2003). However, in politics, these same women might also face internal and external pressure to endorse similar political attitudes as their fathers and/or husbands. In more egalitarian societies, this pressure decreases, and women can express more discrepant attitudes from men. By contrast, while men in patriarchal societies face pressure to endorse the use of violence to resolve disputes (Glick et al. 2016; Saucier et al. 2016), the pressure will be weaker. As a result, in more egalitarian societies, differences in men's attitudes will not be as striking.

A second and more directly relevant set of literature that supports the 'differentiation' hypothesis is the literature on the gender gap in political attitudes beyond the use of force. Over

time, in several advanced democracies, women have come to endorse more left-wing political attitudes (Norrander and Wilcox 2008; Shorrock 2018) and political parties (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004) both in absolute terms and relative to men. In a cross-national investigation, Inglehart and Norris (2003) find that these gender gaps emerge once societal-level gender equality begins to increase. In other words, gender egalitarianism brings gender differences, not similarities. If the differentiation hypothesis holds, we would observe the following:

1) On average, men display higher support for political violence than women.
2) As societies become more gender-egalitarian, men's and women's attitudes toward political violence will become more distinct.
3) The decreasing gender gap will be a function of gender equality having a stronger (negative) effect on support for political violence among women than men.

Backlash Hypothesis

The third set of expectations implicates not levels, but changes, in societal gender inequality. It holds that the gender gap in support for political violence will be largest when societies are undergoing more dramatic changes in favor of gender equality. This gender gap is driven by men disproportionately turning to violence to resist perceived status loss (Mills et al. 2020; Piazza 2017).

Indeed, at the macro-level, political violence often increases in the short-term in response to expansions in women's rights (Kattelman and Burns 2023; Matfess et al. 2023; Mills et al. 2020; Perliger 2012; Piazza 2017), with perpetrators often driven by misogynistic ideologies (Díaz and Valji 2019; Kattelman and Burns 2023; Robison et al. 2006) and a resentment of women's advancement (Anduiza and Rico 2024). This violence might directly be employed to

halt and/or reverse the expansion of women's rights in order to privilege men's dominance (Håkansson 2021; Matfess et al. 2023). Women politicians in particular may be targeted by these elements (Håkansson 2021; Krook and Restrepo Sanín 2016a, 2016b, 2019; Matfess et al. 2023).

Furthermore, it would not be the only instance in which citizens respond to changes in circumstances rather than absolute circumstances. For example, some literature on the relationship between ethnic diversity and political attitudes argues that the mere presence of ethnic outgroups is not enough to raise prejudice (Johnston et al. 2015; Newman and Johnson 2012). A high concentration of outgroup members might even be salutary for outgroup attitudes (Kaufmann 2017). However, an influx of outgroup members compared to their previous numbers can produce a backlash (Johnston et al. 2015; Kaufmann 2017; Newman and Johnson 2012). If the backlash hypothesis holds, the following will be the case:

1) Regardless of the initial gender gap in support for political violence, the gap will increase concomitant with the magnitude of societal shifts toward gender equality.
2) This increase will be driven by men becoming more supportive of political violence in times of more rapidly increasing gender equality.
3) The increase among men will be primarily driven among men high in sexism.

Research Design

Data

Testing our hypotheses requires cross-national data measuring support for political violence with high enough statistical power to detect gender differences in support, as well as substantial between-country variation in societal gender equality. The seventh wave of the World Values Survey (Haerpfer et al. 2022), fielded between 2017 and 2022, fits all criteria. 94,278 adults in

64 countries filled out the survey. After accounting missingness in key variables, we retained 70,736 respondents in 59 countries. While several other waves of the World Values survey have been fielded, no other wave contains a measure of direct support for political violence.

Measures and Analytic Strategy

We measure support for political violence using a single item. Respondents filled out a series of items on the justifiability of certain actions with the following question stem: "Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card… Political violence." Respondents answered on a scale from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). This scale is recoded to span from 0-1 for easier interpretation. Respondents in Turkey did not fill out this measure.

While it would have been ideal to measure gender using an open-ended response to maximize respondents' own understanding of their gender identity (Fraser et al. 2020), this type of measure was not available in the World Values Survey. Gender was instead measured as the interviewer's observation of a respondent's sex. This variable was dichotomous, taking on a value of 1 for men and 0 for women.

To test the backlash hypothesis, in line with Napier et al. (2010) and Brandt (2011), we measure sexism using two items. They both used the following question stem: "For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly you gree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, or strongly disagree?" The two items were "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do," and "On the whole, men make better business executives than women do." Responses were coded on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 4

(strongly agree). While there are other items that tap gender roles, these items are most closely tap into evaluations of women relative to men. These items cohered into a reliable index (α=.79).

Societal-level gender inequality was measured using the United Nations Gender Inequality Index (United Nations n.d.) value for the the respondent's country in the year the respondent was surveyed. This measure was not available for respondents in Taiwan. The measure represents a composite of indicators of women's empowerment, including the maternal mortality ratio, adolescent birth rate, ratio of women to men with at least a secondary education, women's share of legislative seats, and the ratio of women's to men's labor force participation. In the dataset, the range of the measure spanned from .025 to .675, with higher values indicating higher inequality. To assess changes in inequality, we used the same Gender Inequality Index from five years prior (range: .029, .677), and measured change by subtracting the lagged value from the current value. Changes tended to be minor, but in the direction of decreasing inequality (*M*: -.030, Range: [-.119, .039]).

We specify our models in three different ways. The first model is a base model without controls. The second is a model that controls for demographic predictors of support for political violence (age, income, education, and religion). The third includes the demographic controls as well as several variables that may both predict support for political violence and be subject to gender differences (trust in people, confidence in the government, pro-immigrant beliefs, and anti-democratic sentiment). Full information on these measures can be found in Table A1 of the Appendix. All analyses include country fixed effects to account for time-invariant country-level predictors of support for political violence.

Results

The Gender Gap Exists as Expected, But It Varies

Figure 1: Support for political violence by country.



Figure 1 depicts levels of support for political violence by country. Respondents in the Philippines showed the strongest endorsement, with respondents Vietnam, Mongolia, Malaysia, Serbia, and Kenya not far behind. Respondents from all surveyed countries support political violence at less than the midpoint (*Mean*=0.114, 95% CI: [0.112, 0.115], Range: 0-1). 67.4% of respondents reported that political violence was never justifiable, and only 1.5% reported that it was always justifiable. These findings indicate that while support for political violence varies, it tends to be low among most people throughout the world.

Figure 2: Gender gap in support for political violence by country. Black = statistically significant at p<.05, Gray = non-significant.



In the full sample, on a scale from 0-1, men's average support is 0.119, while women's is 0.103 (p<.001), a difference of 1.6% of the scale. In other words, we find evidence for the presence of a gender gap overall. However, as per Figure 2, which depicts the gender gap by country, there is non-trivial variation in the size and direction of the gender gap. At one extreme, in post-conflict Serbia, men were 7.8% higher on the scale of support than women. At the other extreme, in the Philippines, also a site of conflict, women were 3.3% higher. Out of 59 country samples, 41 (69.5%) indicated that men were higher in support than women, while 18 (30.5%) indicated that women displayed higher support. However, only 17 gender comparisons (28.8%) were statistically significant. All but one of the significant comparisons indicated higher support

among men than women. The lone exception was Tajikistan, where women were 2.8% higher on the scale of support. We now turn to systematically testing the source of this variation.

The Gender Gap is Wider in More Egalitarian Societies

Figure 3: Effects of gender and gender equality on support for political violence.



In this section, we move to a more formal test of the ameliorative and differentiation hypotheses. To this end, we estimated models that contain gender and a gender by inequality interaction (the main effect for inequality is removed from the model as it is fully collinear with fixed effects), along with previously mentioned control variables. Inequality is centered at its mean to facilitate interpretation of constituent terms. Full results for these models can be found in Table A3 in the Appendix.

Figure 3 depicts the point estimates for both the main effect of gender and the gender x inequality interaction. Across specifications, main effect of being male is positive and statistically significant (p<.001). More concretely, at means level of gender inequality, men are 1% higher on the scale of support than women. Both the ameliorative and differentiation hypotheses also expect the effect of gender to change with context. Consistent with this expectation, the gender x inequality interaction is also statistically significant across specifications (p<.001).

Figure 4: Relationship between gender and support for political violence at different levels of inequality. The left panel (a) depicts the marginal effect of being male, while the right panel (b) depicts predicted support among men and women.



Figure 4 decomposes the interaction further. According to both the ameliorative and differentiation hypotheses, men will generally support political violence more than women.

However, they diverge on when the gender gap will be largest. According to the ameliorative hypothesis, in more equal societies, the gender gap will be largest in societies with the highest gender inequality. The differentiation hypothesis, by contrast, expects the gender gap to be largest in the most egalitarian societies.

The left panel (Figure 4a) depicts the marginal effect of being male across the scale of gender inequality. Consistent with both hypotheses, across most levels of gender inequality, men are significantly more supportive of political violence than women. However, when it comes to how the gender gap varies, it is the differentiation hypothesis (but not the ameliorative hypothesis) that receives support. In the most egalitarian societies, the gender gap is at its widest ($p<.001$), around 2% of the scale. By contrast, the gender gap closes in countries with the highest levels of gender inequality.

However, because the gender gap represents the attitudinal difference between two subgroups, changes one or both subgroups can affect the gap. According to the ameliorative hypothesis, the gender gap closes because of changes in men's attitudes. According to the differentiation hypothesis, the gender gap closes because of changes in women's attitudes. The right panel (Figure 4b) depicts predicted levels of support for political violence separately among men and women at low (-1SD), medium (mean), and high (+1SD) levels of gender inequality.[1] Again, in support of the differentiation hypothesis (but not the ameliorative hypothesis), men's support for political violence does not change much with context. By contrast, women in more egalitarian societies are 1.5% on the scale less supportive of political violence than women in the

[1] Because it was not possible to generate reliable predictions in R using a fixed effects model, these predictions come from an OLS model omitting country fixed effects. However, estimates from the OLS model are substantively similar to the fixed effects models.

least egalitarian societies. More concretely, the gender gap's size depends on women's attitudes, not men's.

The Gender Gap Does Not Respond to Short-Term Changes in Inequality

Figure 5: The relationship between changes in gender inequality and support for political violence. The left panel (a) depicts the effect of being male at different combinations of sexism and country-level changes in gender inequality. The right panel (b) depicts the relationship between sexism and support for political violence at different combinations of gender and country-level changes in gender inequality.



The backlash hypothesis is agnostic as to how levels of gender inequality shape men's and women's attitudes toward political violence. However, it explicitly implicates changes. In countries that experience sharper reductions in inequality, the gender gap widens. To test this hypothesis, we estimated models containing a four-way interaction between respondent gender,

country-level gender inequality 5 years prior to the survey, changes in country-level gender inequality up until the time of survey, and respondent sexism. The full models can be found in Table A4 in the Appendix.

The top panel (Figure 5a) depicts the gender gap among respondents low and high in sexism, and under conditions of either no change or a standard deviation decrease in inequality.[2] If the backlash hypothesis holds, then the gender gap would be widest among those high in sexism in times of decreasing gender inequality. We find no support for this hypothesis. None of the marginal effects depicted differ dramatically from one another. Even more damningly, the only time the gender gap is non-significant is precisely among those high in sexism in times of decreasing inequality.

Even if the first part of the backlash hypothesis does not receive support, it is possible that focusing on the gender gap obscures our ability to test a slightly different possibility. If, at the societal level, women's and men's levels of sexism are strongly associated, it might be that sexist men and women alike embrace political violence more in response to decreases in inequality. To assess this possibility, the bottom panel (Figure 5b) depicts the marginal effect of sexism on support for political violence separately among men and women and in situations of decreased inequality or no change in inequality. If this hypothesis holds, sexism will have a stronger (positive) effect on support for political violence among men and women in situations of decreasing inequality than men and women where inequality is static. We find no support for this explanation either. Sexism has a positive and statistically significant effect on support for political violence that is similar in magnitude under all four conditions ($p<.001$). If anything,

[2] We did not examine marginal effects at increased levels of inequality because such increases were uncommon. We also do not depict the effects of level of inequality, which we hold at its mean for the purpose of extracting marginal effects.

sexism has the weakest effect on support for political violence among men in contexts of decreasing inequality.

Discussion/Conclusion

Scholars have long documented a variable, but present, gender gap in support for the use of force. They have also documented a positive macro-level association between women's empowerment and internal conflict resolution. However, little has been known about the gender gap in support for political violence and how much it varies by context. We tested between three possibilities: that the gender gap is narrower in more gender-egalitarian societies because of changes in men (ameliorative hypothesis), that the gender gap is wider in more gender-egalitarian societies because of changes in women (differentiation hypothesis), and that the gender gap is wider in countries undergoing shifts towards gender-egalitarianism due to changes in sexist men (backlash hypothesis).

Using data from over 70,000 respondents in 59 countries, we find that men support political violence more than women. However, the gender gap is present, and at its widest, in more gender-egalitarian societies. This is because women in gender-egalitarian societies are less supportive of political violence than women in more patriarchal societies, while men's support for political violence has no detectable association with contextual gender equality. These findings overwhelmingly support the differentiation hypothesis and contradict the amelioration hypothesis. We also find no support for the backlash hypothesis, as there is no evidence that shifts toward increasing equality are associated with increased embrace of political violence among sexist men or women.

This study is not without its limitations. The World Values Survey is incredibly valuable as a rare, statistically powerful cross-national survey. However, the sexism items it uses do not map neatly onto more established measures of sexism such as the two-factor Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick and Fiske 1996) or Modern Sexism scale (Swim et al. 1995). While measuring gender through interviewer observation is likely a strategic move to avoid causing offense to respondents unaccustomed to being asked their gender, it provides two problems. First, this creates opportunities for misgendering respondents. Second, through lacking identity- and expression-based measures of gender, non-binary respondents get erased, and it is impossible to separate the effects of sex and gender (Cohen and Karim 2022). Future work can build on these findings by using more standard measures of sexism, gender, and gender expression.

Methodologically, because the item on support for political violence only occurs in Wave 7 of the World Values Survey, it is not possible to trace how men and women change within a society over time. Relatedly, the cross-sectional nature of the survey limits our ability to make causal claims about the role of context in shaping the gender gap in support for political violence. All variation in levels of gender equality are between-, rather than within-country, meaning our findings might be affected by time-variant variables. Furthermore, we can only indirectly gain purchase on the role of societal changes in current attitudes. Future cross-national surveys, by incorporating this item, will make it possible to vary gender equality within-country to test the role of changing context more explicitly.

Despite these limitations, these findings have important implications for several different subfields. For work on gender differences in support for military intervention, these findings indicate that the gender gap in support for war is generalizable to both foreign and domestic conflicts. This gap comes from violence itself, not mere interventionism. These findings also

have implications for literature on political differences between men and women more generally. Gender in economic and social left-right issues show up in modernization (Inglehart and Norris 2003). However, they also show up in issues that defy clear categorization on a left-right axis. More broadly, for literature on democratization and democratic backsliding, these findings indicate that the norm against political violence is fairly strong across the world. While the gender gap in support for political violence is not particularly large, it is women in more gender-egalitarian societies that display the most opposition to it. This signals that in gender-egalitarian societies, even in an era of weakening democratic norms, women's attitudes can help safeguard at least the norm against political violence.

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Appendix

Table A1: Measurement strategy for control variables.

Variable	Measure/Question Wording	Mean (SD)
Age	1) Can you tell me your year of birth? 2) This means you are X years old (write in age in two digits).	42.77 (16.34)
Income	On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, and other incomes that come in. (10pt scale, 1=Lowest group, 10=Highest group)	4.91 (2.10)
Education	What is the highest educational level that you have obtained? (0=Early childhood education, 1=Primary education, 2=Lower secondary education, 3=Upper secondary education, 4=Post-secondary non-tertiary education, 5=Short-cycle tertiary education, 6=Bachelor or equivalent, 7=Master or equivalent, 8=Doctoral or equivalent)	3.56 (2.00)
Religion	Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one? (dichotomous variables: =1 if respondent is a Christian; =1 if respondent is a Muslim)	Christian: 40.80% Muslim: 25.99%
Trust in People	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? (1=Most people can be trusted, 0=Need to be very careful)	24.25%
Confidence in Government (Reversed)	I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (=1), quite a lot of confidence (=2), not very much confidence (=3), or none at all (=4)? The government	2.64 (1.36)
Pro-Immigrant Beliefs	Now we would like to know your opinion about the people from other countries who come to live in [your country] – the immigrants. How would you evaluate the impact of these people on the development of [your country]? (1=Very Bad, 2=Quite bad, 3=Neither good, nor bad, 4=Quite good, 5=Very good)	2.98 (1.07)
Anti-Democratic Sentiment	I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good (=1), fairly good (=2), fairly bad (=3), or very bad (=4) way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system	1.69 (0.81)

Table A2: Overall levels of support for political violence and gender gap by country, ordered by overall support. Used for Figures 1 and 2.

Country	Overall Support (0-1)	Men's Support (0-1)	Women's Support (0-1)	Gender Gap (* if p<.05)
Egypt	.013	.013	.012	.001
Armenia	.021	.029	.017	.012
Libya	.021	.020	.023	-.002
Maldives	.024	.031	.018	.013
Germany	.029	.033	.026	.007
Jordan	.034	.035	.032	.003
Cyprus	.036	.046	.029	.017
Tunisia	.039	.038	.039	-.001
Japan	.043	.052	.036	.016*
United Kingdom	.047	.056	.038	.018*
Burma	.048	.048	.049	-.001
Greece	.050	.060	.042	.018*
China	.056	.060	.053	.006
Romania	.057	.058	.056	.002
Kyrgyzstan	.059	.065	.056	.009
Netherlands	.061	.072	.052	.020*
Singapore	.061	.077	.048	.029*
Pakistan	.062	.057	.068	-.010
Ethiopia	.064	.060	.069	-.008
Brazil	.077	.076	.078	-.002
Nigeria	.078	.083	.073	.010
Zimbabwe	.078	.081	.075	.007
Australia	.079	.096	.069	.027*
Peru	.081	.085	.077	.008
Bangladesh	.083	.080	.087	-.006
Indonesia	.087	.091	.084	.007
New Zealand	.088	.093	.087	.006
Argentina	.095	.110	.081	.029*
Colombia	.097	.102	.093	.009
Uruguay	.103	.096	.106	-.010
Lebanon	.107	.106	.109	-.003
Iran	.108	.118	.097	.021
Kazakhstan	.113	.124	.104	.020
Bolivia	.118	.134	.101	.033*
Guatemala	.119	.138	.102	.036*
Nicaragua	.120	.134	.106	.028
Ukraine	.129	.133	.127	.006
Tajikistan	.135	.121	.149	-.028*
United States	.136	.147	.123	.023*
Slovakia	.137	.146	.129	.017
Thailand	.143	.156	.131	.025*
Chile	.151	.151	.152	-.001

Venezuela	.153	.160	.147	.013
Ecuador	.157	.188	.129	.059*
Russia	.157	.169	.149	.019
South Korea	.160	.160	.161	-.001
Czechia	.164	.167	.162	.006
Hong Kong	.166	.183	.152	.031*
Mexico	.166	.168	.164	.004
Canada	.171	.201	.140	.062*
Morocco	.171	.172	.170	.002
Iraq	.184	.181	.187	-.006
Kenya	.220	.213	.225	-.012
Serbia	.232	.272	.195	.078*
Malaysia	.239	.229	.248	-.019
Mongolia	.255	.253	.258	-.005
Vietnam	.260	.253	.265	-.011
Philippines	.333	.316	.349	-.033

Table A3: Interactive effects of gender and gender inequality on support for political violence. Country-level inequality omitted due to collinearity with fixed effects. Used for Figures 3 and 4.

	Dependent variable:		
	Political Violence Support		
	Base	Demogs	Full
Male	0.111***	0.010***	0.115***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.015)
Age		-0.001***	-0.001***
		(0.000)	(0.0005)
Income		0.003***	0.003***
		(0.000)	(0.004)
Education		-0.005	-0.003
		(0.000)	(0.004)
Christian		-0.013*	-0.013***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Muslim		-0.043***	0.045***
		(0.009)	(0.003)
Sexism			0.045***
			(0.003)
Trusts People			0.009***
			(0.002)
Lacks Confidence in Gov			-0.002
			(0.001)
Pro-Immigrant Beliefs			0.033***
			(0.001)
Anti-Democracy			0.027***
			(0.001)
Male x Inequality	-0.046***	-0.043***	-0.041***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Observations	70,736	70,736	70,736
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R^2	0.091	0.097	0.110
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		

Table A4: Interactive effects of gender, lagged gender inequality, changes in gender inequality, and sexism on support for political violence. Both country-level levels and changes in inequality omitted due to collinearity with fixed effects. Used for Figure 5.

	Dependent variable:		
	Political Violence Support		
	Base	Demogs	Full
Male	0.008***	0.010***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Sexism	0.058***	0.059***	0.053***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age		-0.001***	-0.001***
		(0.000)	(0.0001)
Income		0.003***	0.003***
		(0.000)	(0.0004)
Education		-0.004***	-0.003*
		(0.000)	(0.0005)
Christian		-0.015***	-0.014***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Muslim		-0.001	-0.000
		(0.004)	(0.004)
Trusts People			0.009**
			(0.002)
Lacks Confidence in Government			-0.002
			(0.001)
Pro-Immigrant Beliefs			0.003***
			(0.001)
Anti-Democracy			0.027***
			(0.001)
Male x Inequality	-0.024	-0.019	-0.021
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Male x ΔInequality	0.007	-0.009	-0.007

	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Male x Sexism	-0.008	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Inequality x Sexism	-0.030	-0.060	-0.061
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)
ΔInequality x Sexism	0.086	0.044	0.019
	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.146)
Male x Inequality x ΔInequality	0.158	0.089	0.119
	(0.567)	(0.565)	(0.562)
Male x Inequality x Sexism	-0.022	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Male x ΔInequality x Sexism	0.010	0.083	0.103
	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.216)
Inequality x ΔInequality x Sexism	2.863	2.973*	2.865*
	(1.475)	(1.472)	(1.463)
Male x Inequality x ΔInequality x Sexism	3.084	2.375	1.876
	(1.885)	(1.880)	(1.872)
Observations	70,736	70,736	70,736
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R^2	0.095	0.101	0.111
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		